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Living a Holistic and Integrated Life: Ignatian Spirituality and Conscience in the Public Sphere

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Living a Holistic and Integrated Life:
Ignatian Spirituality and Conscience in the Public Sphere

by

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ABSTRACT

At the core of the human being is a longing to live a meaningful and integrated life. In an effort to understand what the integrated life entails, this thesis compares theological, legal, and spiritual sources in order to understand the practical human faculty known as the conscience. The interdisciplinary dialogue is significant because it takes into account the multiple facets of conscience and how it relates to decision-making. The comparison between these different sources reveals the necessary balancing between an individual's internal and external worlds. This thesis also demonstrates the inherent relationality of the human being and the importance of an individual's membership in his or her communities. Although the journey towards a holistic and integrated life is complex, this thesis frames the important questions relating to the conscience so that an individual can seriously work towards living a holistic and integrated life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER ONE: Anthropological Methodology of Conscience.....	8
The Transcendental Method of Karl Rahner.....	8
Conditions of Possibility.....	9
Supernatural Existential.....	11
<i>Gaudium et Spes</i>	12
Personalism and Conscience.....	13
Paradigm Shifts in Moral Theology.....	14
Comparing <i>Synderesis</i> and <i>Conscientia</i>	15
Decision Making in Light of a Personalist Paradigm.....	16
Conclusion.....	17
CHAPTER TWO: Analysis of the Relational Conscience within Institutions.....	19
Liberalism.....	19
Communitarianism.....	22
The Catholic Church and Relational Conscience: <i>Dignitatis Humanae</i> ...	24
Conscience and Religious Liberty.....	25
Robert Vischer’s Model of the Mediating Function of Institutions.....	26
Distinguishing Conscience and Religion.....	27
Individual-versus-state paradigm.....	28
Institutions as mediating the exercise of individual conscience....	29
Conclusion.....	32

CHAPTER THREE: Applying the Principles of Ignatian Spirituality to Conscience	34
Suitability of Ignatian Spirituality.....	34
Ignatian Contemplation and Discernment.....	35
Ignatian Contemplation.....	35
Ignatian Discernment.....	37
The Contemplative in Action.....	41
CONCLUSION.....	46

INTRODUCTION

Living a life of integrity is the deep-rooted hope of all human beings. The means to learning about how to live a life of integrity is through the conscience. In order to maintain a life of integrity, one must exercise the dictates that one hears from his or her conscience and maintain them within the public sphere. This life of integrity requires that one's thoughts and beliefs are integrated with one's actions. Prior to answering the question of how to exercise conscience in the public sphere, it is first necessary to define the meaning of conscience. The difficulty in defining conscience stems from the multidimensional nature of conscience. Within the study of theology, the concept of conscience is understood and interpreted through not only moral theology, but also spirituality and ecclesiology. Conscience also touches disciplines outside the study of theology, as it is integral to the discussion of political freedom, psychological analysis, and general ethics. While conscience can be seen from many disciplinary lenses, this interdisciplinary research thesis will examine the theological, legal, and spiritual dimensions of conscience to understand how a person can exercise his or her conscience within the public sphere.

An inquiry into the definition of conscience is significant because conscience is intrinsic to all human beings, and not limited to Catholic Christians. I explore the definition of conscience from a Catholic viewpoint because of the ontological priority the Catholic Church gives to this intrinsic faculty. The Second Vatican Council's pastoral constitution *Gaudium et Spes* defines the private and sacred nature of conscience:

For they have in their hearts a law inscribed by God. Their dignity rests in observing this law, and by it they will be judged. Their conscience is people's most secret core, and their sanctuary. There they are alone with God whose voice echoes in their depths."¹

Every person has a conscience by virtue of his or her humanity. In this most secret core and sanctuary of the human person, God directs a human being towards one action over another. Although everyone possesses this faculty, each conscience is unique; this uniqueness is what has created a lack of consensus over the definition of conscience.

However, despite the great significance of conscience for all human beings, conscience, for various reasons, is oversimplified and misunderstood. The conscience is often referenced in the media as an extrinsic, practical voice that prevents an individual person from living a carefree, enjoyable life. In addition to the extrinsic nature attributed to conscience, the definition of conscience often conflates religion and belief; as a result, it is viewed as a private, individual function. The view of conscience as part of a common, public life is a radical departure from the privatization conscience receives today. This compartmentalization remains problematic because in order to live life with integrity and wholeness, the mandates of one's conscience must be integrated into every facet of a human person's life, including the human's life in the public sphere.

In order to represent fully the holistic nature of the human person, I employ a method involving sources from moral theology, jurisprudence, and spirituality. Consistent with my view that living a life of integrity is the hope of all human beings, I approach this topic from a holistic perspective so that I do not undermine my efforts at integration. While this research aims to deconstruct the different realms in which a human being operates, the ultimate goal is toward integration.

My starting point will be anthropological, consistent with Karl Rahner's transcendental theology. Using the human subject as the starting point, I then look at the extrinsic sources that influence a human being's conscience. From a Catholic moral theological view, the human

subject is influenced by the subject's relationship privately with God and publicly with his or her membership in various communities. While I make these distinctions between private and public, I offer these distinctions as an effort to organize a richer understanding of conscience. In examining the public dimensions of conscience, I explore the American political landscape and the prevailing theory of liberalism. As a possible solution to the problems created by the liberal political climate, I offer Robert Vischer's solution of using the mediating function of institutions to help illuminate the meaning of conscience. Finally, after exploring the dimensions of a human subject's private and public relationships, I offer Ignatian spirituality and discernment as a practical system to navigate between the conscience's private and public relationships.

In the first chapter, I employ Karl Rahner's anthropological starting point in order to utilize his transcendental method.ⁱⁱ By starting anthropologically, I am able to focus on the human person, which is the primary reason for this inquiry on conscience. Because Karl Rahner's theology placed its main focus on the individual subject rather than focusing on the object, his systematic theology remains relevant for my inquiries. Rahner overcomes the extrincism of Neo-Scholastic theology by introducing an anthropological starting point. A transcendental method of inquiry would be the most effective way to enter into a dialogue with the current issues of integrity because it situates the human person holistically and existentially equipped with this communication with God through the conscience.

Rahner approaches the human subject as having an a priori openness to the transcendent, which he coins as preapprehension or *Vorgriff*.ⁱⁱⁱ He also introduces the concept of the supernatural existential, a view that all human beings are ontologically gifted with God's grace.^{iv} Because all human beings are existentially composed with this supernatural grace, in Rahner's theology it follows that the world itself is also graced.^v Rahner's view of the world as graced has

great implications in the concrete world. His systematic theology has the serious Christian asking: what is the function of the human person within this pluralistic reality?

After employing Rahner's systematic methods are employed, I explore the current scholarship on the theological inquiry into formation of conscience. *Gaudium et Spes* resonates with Rahner's theology in that conscience is situated within an anthropological starting point. Linda Hogan, in her book *Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition*, offers the historical progression of conscience and the theological problems conscience poses today.^{vi} Hogan argues for a shift to a personalist view of conscience, consistent with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council.^{vii} Rahner, *Gaudium et Spes*, and Hogan are important for the question of integrity and conscience because they equip us with a method to approach the question of conscience within the American public sphere.

In the second chapter, I address the forum in which the human person can exercise the intrinsic faculty of the conscience, given the attributes of the human person. Living a life of integrity requires not only that one be in touch with his or her conscience, but also that one expresses the dictates of his or her conscience within the public sphere. The United States government recognizes this intrinsic voice known as the conscience and protects its liberty through the Constitution, statutes, and court decisions. Despite its respect for conscience, even the American legal system does not truly understand the full power and meaning of conscience because of its liberal approach to rights divorced from duties. Part of my inquiry aims to understand what this current climate of privatization of conscience means for the moral subject and how one can promote the freedom of conscience through deliberate practice of the dictates of his or her conscience. I engage the recent work of Robert Vischer on the intersection of

conscience and the common good in order to find a possible solution to the problems that the discussion of conscience encounters in the American public sphere.

Vischer's work deals with the treatment of conscience in the American public sphere.^{viii} To Vischer, voluntary associations mediate the tension between the individual and the state.^{ix} His work is helpful because it brings to light the importance of mediating bodies, such as voluntary associations, in the exercise of conscience. While my starting point is with the individual moral subject, Vischer's tendency is to move away from the subject in order to understand the subject in relation to its necessary relationships. While my individualist approach seems contrary to Vischer's argument, in my perspective, my analysis complements Vischer's legal thought into a more integrated whole. I would highlight the importance of the moral subject as a participant in the public sphere because of the necessity of connecting conscience to action. In light of Vischer's view of voluntary associations functioning to mediate tensions between the state and individual, my proposal focuses on how the individual should approach the exercise of conscience in light of these associations. In this chapter, my argument focuses on the necessity of associating with a larger group in order to not only exercise one's conscience but also to form and understand what one believes.

To Vischer, conscience has a relational dimension; that is, conscience is formed within the communities of which the individual is a member.^x Vischer favors a "bottom-up" approach, in which the individual is the driver of the associations or institutions that mediate his or her conscience to the state. Consistent with Vischer's assertion that conscience is dependent upon action, I argue that to be truly in touch with one's conscience and to maintain integrity within one's life, one must be able to discern clearly choices within their own moral framework.

Vischer's model is the most effective solution to the current conscience problems, in light of the liberalism that dictates American political thought.

Finally, in the third chapter, I propose an integrated way of decision-making in light of the intrinsic and extrinsic forces that lead to conscience formation. First, I establish why Ignatian spirituality is instructive in our analysis of conscience. I set out to argue that Ignatian Spirituality has fruits of wisdom rooted in a deep understanding of the human being that can be beneficial for all people. It takes into account the holistic nature of the human being: the physical, mental, socio-emotional, and spiritual aspects are all utilized in the decision-making process. Next, in order to understand the personal dimension involved in Ignatian Spirituality, I describe the Ignatian concepts of contemplation and discernment. In addition to using the Spiritual Exercises, I employ the work of Ignatian spirituality experts such as Adolfo Nicolas, SJ, Monika Hellwig, David Lonsdale, and Walter Burghardt, SJ in order to gain an understanding of Ignatian concepts suitable for the contemporary period.

Ignatian spirituality is also useful for understanding the relational dimension of the conscience. Finally, I will explore the concept of the "contemplative in action" as a vehicle for understanding the relational conscience. My primary interlocutors for Ignatian spirituality and the relational dimension of conscience include Wilkie Au and Michael Cooper, SJ. Although it seems counterintuitive, I demonstrate that the focus on the personal dimension conscience is important in moving towards the relational dimension.

The synthesis of these theological, legal, and spiritual voices is significant because it enables one to understand and integrate the multiple dimensions of conscience. As an attorney, instructor, and theologian, I encounter my clients' and students' daily struggle to do just that. The prevailing question is often, "what should I do?" While that question is very simple, the

answer is very complex. The answer is not the same for everyone; the answer depends on multiple factors, including who the individual is, the individual's context, the communities and institutions the individual is a part of, and universal and communal norms of society.

The significance underlying this synthetic work is its systematic approach, rooted in wisdom from theological, legal, and spiritual sources, which one can use to answer "what should I do?" The primary concern in any decision-making question is whether the decision maintains integrated with an individual's conscience. In addition, by virtue of asking the question "what should I do?" to another person, it showcases the relational dimension of the conscience and decision-making.

Given the purpose, method and approach, and significance of this research thesis, it is integral to keep in mind the centrality of the human person in this analysis not as an end in his or herself, but as a vehicle to God. It is my hope that in learning more about the human person, one realizes that the ultimate trajectory of the human mind, body, and soul is towards God.

CHAPTER ONE

Anthropological Methodology of Conscience

In this chapter, I examine the progression of Catholic moral theological thought on conscience. The Catholic view of the human being was traditionally compartmentalized, accounting for certain aspects of human behavior rather than holistically viewing the human being. A survey of the theology of Karl Rahner, the Second Vatican Council's pastoral constitution, *Gaudium et Spes*, and Linda Hogan reveals a more holistic view of moral theology necessary to understand an anthropologically-centered definition of conscience. The aim of this chapter is to establish a definition of conscience that seriously considers the multiple factors surrounding an individual and the decisions the individual makes.

I. The Transcendental Method of Karl Rahner

Karl Rahner, in *Foundations of Christian Faith: an Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*, introduces a method of inquiry starting from the human person. Rahner's anthropological starting point stands in sharp contrast to Neo-Scholastic theology, which focuses on the extrinsic reality of God as the starting point. He builds on the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger and shifts the locus of theology from an extrinsic starting point to one centered on the human being.^{xi} In his first chapter, he highlights the importance of understanding philosophy and theology together, because philosophy is the way towards gaining insight about the human person. In contrast to the extrincism of Neo-Scholasticism, Rahner's speculative theology centers on anthropological return to the subject: he understands the subject of the message prior to discussing the message itself.^{xii} Rahner starts with the intended hearer of the message in order to better understand where the message is coming from.^{xiii} To comprehend fully the impact of Rahner's theology on moral theology generally and conscience in particular, it is necessary to examine the following: first, what Rahner believes are the conditions that make

it possible to allow the human being to hear the message of God; second, Rahner's concept of the supernatural existential; and finally, how Rahner's thought influenced the Second Vatican Council's pastoral constitution, *Gaudium et Spes*.

Conditions of Possibility

After starting with the question of who the human being is, Rahner transitions to determining what human conditions make it possible for the human being to hear God's message; in other words, what is intrinsic to the human being that allows the human being to hear the call of God? Rahner answers that question by establishing that the human being is person and subject, transcendent, responsible and free, historically conditioned, and dependent.

In explaining these conditions of possibility, Rahner introduces his idea of *Vorgriff*, an a priori openness to the transcendent.^{xiv} In introducing this concept, he carefully balances the understanding that the human is a being in between: the human being is both categorical and transcendent. Although the human being is between these two places, the human is not static. This self-transcendence is characterized by a movement toward the infinite horizon of being. "Being situated in this way between the finite and infinite is what constitutes man, and is shown by the fact that it is in his infinite transcendence and in his freedom that man experiences himself as dependent and historically conditioned."^{xv} In other words, *Vorgriff* is a condition of possibility that allows the human being to transcend the categorical and move towards God. To Rahner, the ultimate meaning of subjectivity is that one is open to transcendence because of the pre-apprehension or *Vorgriff*^{xvi}. With *Vorgriff*, Rahner establishes the dependence of human beings upon God; it also situates the human being's historical situation within the categorical realm.

The role of grace through the movement of transcendentalism is “a relationship which does not establish itself by its own power, but is experienced as something which was established and is at the disposal of another, and which is grounded in the abyss of ineffable mystery.”^{xvii} The human subject is dependent upon God for the a priori grace of transcendence, as well as any a posteriori grace. A priori and a posteriori are epistemological ways of looking at a subject. An a priori view will look at conditions prior to any human experience; in contrast, a posteriori looks at conditions after an experience has occurred.

In discussing conditions of possibility, Rahner offers a method for understanding the relationship between true freedom and responsibility: as dependence upon God increases, freedom proportionately increases.^{xviii} “He comes to the real truth about himself precisely by the fact that he patiently endures and accepts this knowledge that his own reality is not in his own hands.”^{xix} Only through recognition of the human being’s dependence upon God is a human being truly free. A transcendental trajectory towards God is the only way that a human being can be free because it is the way a human being can understand his or her limited nature and assume responsibility based on that limitedness.^{xx} Thus, a proper understanding of the human being leads the limited human being to a proper understanding of the human in relation to an unlimited God.

Rahner’s survey of the conditions that make it possible to recognize God’s communication remain important for the discussion on conscience because these conditions make it possible for human beings, regardless of experience, location, or other limiting factors to hear the dictates of his or her conscience. In turn, the discussion of conscience remains important because conscience is where the movement of action in the world begins.

Supernatural Existential

In Rahner's theology, the innermost understanding of Christian existence can be expressed in the following statement: the human is the event of a free, unmerited and forgiving, and absolute self-communication of God.^{xxi} Rahner's concept of the supernatural existential situates human beings as ontologically equipped with the gift to hear God's communication. In other words, human nature is already filled at the level of grace, or the supernatural, at the level of creation. The human being is existentially constituted to prepare for this event of God's self-communication. In contrast to the Neo-scholastic theology that separated the natural and supernatural in order to protect the gratuitous nature of grace, the theology of the supernatural existential eliminates need for that separation. Rahner accounts for the unmerited dimension of grace by making it a condition of the human being; the free self-communication of God remains a gift to the subject who is constituted by God to recognize and respond to this gift.

While Rahner's theology of the supernatural existential seems to assert that all human beings are graced without taking into consideration the problem of evil, Rahner accounts for human freedom by leaving the human subject the freedom to accept or reject God's offer of grace. God's offer requires a response from the human person's free will; the human person is then free to accept or reject God's offer of grace as a fundamental option. With the supernatural existential, Rahner establishes creation's intrinsic goodness. Humans remain dependent upon God for God's self-communication but are free to either reject or accept their dependence upon God.

Although Rahner's theology is systematic in nature, his anthropological starting point contributes to the importance of experience in moral theology. As we will later see when we discuss the different parts of conscience, human disposition and human freedom are crucial in

understanding the distinction between *synderesis* and *conscientia*. Rahner's theology also accounts for the existential dimensions of all human beings, creating a highly humanistic theology that later influences the reforms of the Second Vatican Council. William Dych explains that "[t]here is no doubt that by the time the Council ended in December 1965 Rahner had exercised enormous influence on the final shape of many of the conciliar documents."^{xxii} One of those documents that Rahner particularly influences is the Second Vatican Council's document dealing with conscience, *Gaudium et Spes*.

Gaudium et Spes

In light of Rahner's transcendental theology and modern view of the human being, the Catholic Church experienced a renewal through the Second Vatican Council. Written in 1965, *Gaudium et Spes*, the Second Vatican Council's pastoral constitution, "is a landmark document for the shift from 'nature' to 'person' in an official [Catholic] Church document."^{xxiii} Richard Gula views *Gaudium et Spes* as a historically conscious, empirically oriented, personally focused document that focuses not on human nature, but on the human person.^{xxiv} An examination of Linda Hogan's thought in the next section will reveal the impact of the *Gaudium et Spes* on the meaning and dignity of conscience.

Gaudium et Spes defines the nature of conscience:

Deep within their consciences men and women discover a law which they have not laid upon themselves and which they must obey. Its voice, ever calling them to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, tells them inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that. For they have in their hearts a law inscribed by God. Their dignity rests in observing this law, and by it they will be judged. Their conscience is people's most secret core, and their sanctuary. There they are alone with God whose voice echoes in their depths. Through loyalty to conscience, Christians are joined to others in the search for truth and for the right solution to so many moral problems which arise both in the life of individuals and from social relationships. Hence, the more a correct conscience prevails, the more do persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and endeavor to conform to the objective standards of moral conduct....^{xxv}

Gaudium et Spes presents an existential and intrinsic understanding of conscience, consistent with Rahner's anthropological starting point and the concepts of *Vorgriff* and the supernatural existential. While *Gaudium et Spes* gave in 1965 an anthropological and subjective definition of conscience in light of Rahner's transcendental theology, this definition continues to require further interpretation.

II. Personalism and Conscience

While Rahner's *Foundations of Christian Faith* laid the framework for a modern theology based on the human person and Rahner's transcendental theology greatly influenced the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church is still adjusting to the new and broad understanding of conscience. In an attempt to deal with the problems in contemporary moral theology in light of Rahner's transcendental method, Linda Hogan, in her book *Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition*, documents the historical progression of conscience and reinterprets the spirit of the Second Vatican Council in order to reconcile the ambiguities that give rise to current problems.

Hogan discusses the modern debates surrounding conscience in the Catholic Church by distinguishing two schools of thought: "[o]ne is clustered around John Finnis and Germain Grisez," and "the other around McCormick, Charles Curran and Josef Fuchs."^{xxvi} She recognizes the common question that unites both schools of thought, the question of where ultimate moral responsibility and authority resides.^{xxvii} She suggests that the reason for these two schools of thought is due to the Catholic Church's "failure to confront its own ambiguities in its own understanding of conscience."^{xxviii} Hogan argues for a return to the personalist theology of the Second Vatican Council to provide a starting point for the interpretation of conscience.^{xxix}

Hogan's thought is important for understanding the individual conscience in light of the theology of *Gaudium et Spes* because it prepares for the upcoming discussion on the relational conscience. In order to understand Hogan's thought on conscience, this section 1) examines the paradigm shifts in moral theology, 2) distinguishes between two types of conscience: *synderesis* and *conscientia*, and 3) highlights decision-making in light of a personalist theology.

Paradigm Shifts in Moral Theology

Hogan examines the extent of the paradigm shift from the manualist tradition to the humanistic paradigm of the Second Vatican Council.^{xxx} She identifies the new paradigm as “a personalist paradigm.”^{xxxix} Hogan explores conscience today within the context of this personalist paradigm and notes that the current conflicts of paradigms coincide with the old issues of institutional versus personal moral authority.^{xxxii} Hogan attributes this paradigm shift to three developments: 1) the introduction of historical consciousness into theological reflection; 2) the resistance to neo-Thomism; and 3) the controversy surrounding situation ethics debates.^{xxxiii} Hogan believes that Karl Rahner was one of the major thinkers who influenced the three developments.

To Hogan, *Gaudium et Spes* is an example of the personalist paradigm that “describes the Christian moral demand as a personal response to the divine initiative in salvation. The free response to this invitation is the basis of the new morality and requires a reorientation of heart and mind.”^{xxxiv} Consistent with the anthropological starting point and conditions of possibility set forth by Rahner, Hogan highlights that “[t]he consequence of framing morality... was that the person moved center stage.... *Gaudium et Spes* puts forward a model of morality in which the person is the source of ethical discernment and action.”^{xxxv} Hogan concludes that “[i]t involves a radical departure from the previous theology because it commits us to an entirely different way

of assessing the morality of human actions. In practical terms it means that each action must be evaluated in the context of the person considered holistically, that is, in light of the person's circumstances and relationships.^{xxxvi} Her holistic and integrative method of looking at the individual conscience is helpful at understanding the definition of conscience set forth in *Gaudium et Spes*. While Hogan briefly alludes to the relational conscience, the theories of relational conscience set forth by Pope Benedict XI and Robert Vischer will be discussed in greater depth in chapter two.

Comparing *Synderesis* and *Conscientia*

After reframing the conscience in light of the personalism of the Second Vatican Council, Hogan proposes reexamining the relationship between *synderesis* and *conscientia*.^{xxxvii} In referring to *synderesis*, Hogan views it as a habitual conscience which is the innate sense of good and evil.^{xxxviii} This fundamental orientation to the good is held in contrast to *conscientia*, or the actual conscience which is the judgment of conscience in which the orientation is manifested.^{xxxix} Hogan notes that these two parts of conscience were originally integrated within Thomistic thought, only to be compartmentalized through the advent of casuistry.^{xl} She frames the function of *synderesis* and *conscientia* within the new personalist framework, citing this as the most significant change in the understanding of the role of conscience.^{xli} Within a personalist theology,

[C]onscience denotes both the fundamental orientation of the person to seek and do the good, and the actualization of this desire in decisions of conscience. Conscience is thus understood to be more than the sum of particular decisions, although each choice is important. Conscience also refers to the integrated and consistent thrust of the person toward goodness. It is the dimension of one's character that determines the direction of one's moral life, one's self-conscious option for good.^{xlii}

With Hogan's reconceptualization of *synderesis* and *conscientia* as habitual and actual conscience, the link between character or disposition and act lost through casuistry is restored and reintegrated when viewed in light of the personalist theology of the Second Vatican Council. This understanding of conscience shows the intimate relationship between the kind of person one is with the kind of actions that one performs.^{xliii} Thus, in Hogan's view, the good conscience is one that has the "disposition or orientation to desire the good and is the culmination of a life lived consistently in the pursuit of virtue"^{xliv} as opposed to seeing a human being's act as solely indicative of one's conscience.

Decision Making in Light of a Personalist Paradigm

Consistent with the holistic view of the human person, Hogan seeks to present an integrated way of decision-making by understanding reason, intuition, emotion, and imagination as fundamentally related to each other. She examines these four elements because "[a] personalist model of conscience should highlight the multidimensional aspects of its decision making."^{xlv} With reason, she highlights the importance of viewing reason within a contextual framework.^{xlvi} Hogan explains that "[o]ne of the most important roles that reason has in moral decision making relates to defining the problem or the issue at stake."^{xlvii} She further elaborates that "[t]he work of reason, therefore, involves the person in a constant appraisal of every aspect of the problem and not just a once-for-all judgment. Although such rational decisions are ultimately personal, they must be made with reference to the wider community."^{xlviii} Rationality allows one to test or compare one's reasoning capacity with the reasoning of others in the community to be able to honestly assess it.^{xlix} Intuition, in contrast to reason, is an instinctive knowledge that comes from a nonconscious place.¹ The reliability of intuition is contingent upon the ability of the person to articulate the reasons for trusting the intuitive knowledge; this

exercise remains consistent with the integrated activity of conscience.^{li} Emotion is also important in decision-making, although, similar to intuition, it must be critically examined to ensure its reliability.^{lii} Because of the spontaneous nature of emotions, one has to incorporate it into the decision making process and decide how much weight it will be given in the integrative process. Finally, Hogan highlights the importance of taking imagination and creativity into the decisions of conscience and the formation of character.^{liii} Imagination is important because “[t]he process of reevaluating one’s commitments and redescribing one’s reality is part of the process of being human.”^{liv} An integration of the intellectual, intuitive, emotional, and imaginative levels sets the stage for holistic decision making in line with the anthropological dimensions of the human being. “Conscience needs an interplay of each of these elements to operate sensitively and successfully.”^{lv} In light of this understanding of the inward dynamics of conscience, how does the individual conscience work in relation with other individuals and institutions?

Hogan’s work is important for three main reasons. First, she highlights the personalist paradigm, in which the person is placed at the center in the discussion of conscience. Second, Hogan reintegrates the concepts of *synderesis* and *conscientia* so that a human being’s journey, rather than isolated choices, determine the integrity of the human’s life. Finally, Hogan offers a practical way of making decisions in light of the whole person. Her paradigm remains consistent with Rahner’s transcendental theology while addressing contemporary problems in moral theology.

III. Conclusion

In conclusion, the development of Catholic moral theology since the modern age and the Second Vatican Council has been one marked by a transcendental method in which it returned to

the subject. In light of this return to the subject, what does it mean for the individual subject to exercise his or her conscience in relation to other individual consciences? The next chapter explores the American political environment in order to understand how to exercise this anthropologically-based understanding of the conscience in the public sphere.

CHAPTER TWO

Analysis of the Relational Conscience within Institutions

In the first chapter, I established the inherent dignity of the individual conscience by appealing to the anthropologically centered theology of Karl Rahner and the personalist paradigm of the Second Vatican Council's *Gaudium et Spes*. In this chapter, I seek to understand the relational dimension of conscience. Guided by a personalist understanding of conscience, my analysis centers upon determining how an individual conscience operates in relation to other individual consciences and to institutions. Liberalism, as the operative political theory in American public law, raises potential conflicts with a personalist understanding of conscience. Despite the current climate of liberalism, a bottom-up approach to conscience could effectively overcome those conflicts so as to maintain a personalist understanding of conscience.

First, I proceed by examining two operative models of social theory: liberalism and communitarianism. Next, I review the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom (*Dignitatis Humanae*) to understand the Catholic Church's view of conscience in light of the public sphere to determine if it provides any contributions in the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. Finally, I offer Robert Vischer's model of relational conscience as a way of mediating between liberalism and communitarianism in light of *Dignitatis Humanae*. Vischer's model offers the bottom-up approach to conscience that could possibly solve this *Kobayashi Maru* scenario^{lvi}, or no-win situation, that the discussion of conscience in the public sphere often encounters.

I. Liberalism

Liberalism has functioned as the prevailing modern political theory in the United States. As a result, liberalism has warranted a particular interpretation of the conscience within U.S. political discourse. Philip Selznick defines liberalism as:

...an ideology of constrained liberation, or as we sometimes say, of ordered liberty. A social, political, or economic doctrine is liberal if (1) it seeks to free individuals, institutions, and practices from the restraints of custom, dogma, vested interest, and centralized authority; and (2) it holds that liberation must take place within a framework of orderly process, constitutional principle, and respect for social continuity. Taken together, these criteria distinguish what it means to be a liberal from what it means to be a conservative, a radical libertarian, a revolutionary, or a collectivist.^{lvii}

Liberalism has taken on a rights-centered focus, brought about first by the social contract theory of Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes and adapted later by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Instead of seeing rights in relation to obligations, rights are seen as ends in themselves.^{lviii} Using a rank-ordering system, Rawls prioritizes individual liberty over the pursuit of social justice; liberty cannot be sacrificed even for the pursuit of social justice.

According to Rawls, justice is viewed in terms of fairness.^{lix} Rather than discussing matters of rights and justice through comprehensive doctrines such as religious ones, individuals must engage the public sphere with impartiality and appeal to publicly reasonable arguments. Rawls' idea of fairness as impartiality is based on his concept of the original position. Rawls' student, Amartya Sen, describes the original position as "an imagined situation of primordial equality, when the parties involved have no knowledge of their personal identities, or their respective vested interests, within the group as a whole."^{lx} The parties would establish the policies for a society from behind a veil of ignorance, a state in which the parties would not know what particular characteristics they possess. These characteristics include but are not limited to characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, and income level. Under the Rawlsian concepts of the original position and the veil of ignorance, the principles of justice are determined by the basic social institutions that should govern the society the parties, through their imagination, create.^{lxi}

This rights-centered understanding is problematic because "rights are divorced from discipline and duty.... [t]he *ethos* of liberalism... gives rights a life of their own, detached from

the assessment of conditions and consequences.”^{lxii} This detachment is illustrated through the aforementioned concepts of the original position and the veil of ignorance. Because society is seen from a state of perfection, it fails to take into account the realities surrounding the plurality of American society. The human person disintegrates into the ideal society when society is viewed from a veil of ignorance. As a result, the intrinsic worth of the human person is overlooked and undervalued.

Although liberalism’s current approach disregards human dignity, the roots of liberalism are attributed to the modern understanding of the human person from Christianity. Kenneth Grasso highlights liberalism’s deviation from the original Christian understanding: “[w]hat modern liberalism did was to lay claim to one of the consequences of the revolution in human self-understanding brought about by Christianity – the recognition of the irreplaceable worth and unique value of each and every human being – while rejecting its source.”^{lxiii} Grasso asserts that liberalism is incompatible with Catholic social teaching due to its deviation from the Christian conception of the soul and its destiny on earth.^{lxiv} Liberalism is disguised as a vehicle to promote the individual; however, in virtue of the Christian understanding that the communal dimension of human existence is ultimately grounded in the relational aspects of the *imago dei*. In practice, liberalism remains insensitive to the human person.

Although it purports to protect individual rights, liberalism does so at the expense of failing to respect the dignity of the human person and selfhood. Under the model of liberalism, conscience is viewed as a right detached from any obligation or context. Liberty of conscience, as many other rights, is viewed as an absolute; when conscience is viewed as connected with religion, it brings about a partiality that liberalism cannot tolerate. Given this socio-political landscape, the anthropologically-centered view of conscience presented in the first chapter is

unable to flourish. As a result, political theorists have searched for an alternative to the absolutism of liberalism through an alternative theory known as communitarianism.

II. Communitarianism

Philip Selznick proposes a different model for society, based on the common good. In contrast to the ideals of liberalism, the idea of the common good runs against the pervasive idea that moral judgment is inescapably subjective and relative.^{lxv} Selznick seeks to return to a values-centered constitutional theory.^{lxvi} “The well-being of individuals depends on the health of the collectivity; therefore, society must be the unit of analysis, and the common good must be the focus of our striving. The common good in turn requires ‘an area of individual liberty.’”^{lxvii} In other words, focusing on the common good is a vehicle to promoting the individual liberty that liberalism fails to promote in practice.

Selznick sees community not as a unity of any sort but a specific type of unity that “preserves the integrity of persons, groups, and institutions.”^{lxviii} By creating bonds and proving pathways for participation, the community experience becomes richer.^{lxix} Rather than appealing to a liberal structure, the communitarian perspective is “profoundly federalist in spirit and structure.”^{lxx} Selznick views a true communitarian model as moderating between the two extremes of a model of total integration and a model that barely sustains a minimal moral order.^{lxxi}

Selznick outlines the diversity of communitarian views, contrasting the difference between the conservative and the anarchist. In contrasting the differing poles, Selznick reminds the reader that “[t]he multi-valued perspective of [communitarianism] demands a high tolerance for ambiguity.”^{lxxii} While both views prefer decentralization and self-regulation, they differ in their reliance on the historical community. While the conservative view finds moral worth in the

historical community, the anarchist views an ideal community as one detached from the historical community.^{lxxiii} However, Selznick finds neither view to sufficiently provide a reliable guide to the moral community.

Consistent with Selznick's observations, Grasso also notes the disintegrated nature of communitarianism. Rather than being a proactive movement seen independently of liberalism, it is a theory reacting to the inadequacies of liberalism.^{lxxiv} The key components of communitarianism include "a common desire to forge a new public philosophy taking its bearings from man's nature as a social being and emphasizing the importance of public spiritedness, participation, and the common good."^{lxxv} Communitarianism takes into account the fact that human beings are not separate and independent individuals; the communities that one is a part of and roles that an individual plays within them are constitutive of a human being's identity.^{lxxvi} The selfhood of a human person is inseparable from one's membership in the communities and the roles that one plays.^{lxxvii}

In contrast with Selznick, Grasso, hesitant to accept communitarianism as the antidote to liberalism, determines that communitarianism is not a satisfactory alternative to liberal individualism.^{lxxviii} He doubts that communitarianism has adequately supplied a coherent, intellectually sophisticated model of humanity and society.^{lxxix} He questions whether a theory of politics centered upon the good of the community rather than the rights of an individual can serve as the moral foundation of a free society.^{lxxx} Finally, Grasso sees as problematic the claim of communitarians that the liberal tradition possesses the intellectual resources necessary to address the current crisis of the liberal theory.^{lxxxi} Grasso, in comparing the attributes of liberalism and communitarianism, finds that communitarianism is not a viable alternative to liberalism because the problems of liberalism remain unresolved.

To solve this seemingly no-win situation, Grasso turns to Richard John Neuhaus, who says “this can and should be the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the United States assumes its rightful role in the culture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed public philosophy for the American experience in ordered liberty.”^{lxxxii} This view is problematic for liberalism, as it seeks to free individuals and institutions from the restraints of dogma and centralized authority.

Although it is not necessarily a solution to the problems posed by liberalism because of its shared history rooted in the Enlightenment, the Catholic Church’s understanding of conscience and the common good possibly contains some answers to the current dilemmas brought about by liberalism and communitarianism.

III. The Catholic Church and Relational Conscience: *Dignitatis Humanae*

In light of the liberal environment of the American public sphere, we now turn to the Catholic Church’s stance on conscience in relation to the public sphere. In addition to *Gaudium et Spes*, the Second Vatican Council also issued *Dignitatis Humanae* (hereinafter *Dignitatis*), a declaration on religious liberty. The declaration states:

This [right to religious freedom] becomes even clearer if one considers that the highest norm of human life is the divine law itself...God has enabled the human person to share in this law so that, under the gentle disposition of divine providence, many may be able to arrive at an even deeper knowledge of unchangeable truth. For this reason everybody has the duty and consequently the right to seek the truth in religious matters so that, through the use of appropriate means, they may form prudent judgments of conscience which are sincere and true. The search for truth, however, must be carried out in a manner that is appropriate to the dignity and the social nature of the human person...The human person sees and recognizes the demands of the divine law through conscience. All are bound to follow their conscience faithfully in every sphere of activity so that they may come to God, who is their last end. Therefore, the individual must not be forced to act against conscience nor be prevented from acting according to conscience, especially in religious matters.^{lxxxiii}

Consistent with the themes of *Gaudium et Spes*, *Dignitatis* approaches the human being from the personalist paradigm discussed in the first chapter. The declaration situates the dictates of the conscience as a sharing with divine law. As a gift from God, God existentially created humans to have the truth written in their hearts. Because of this existential condition, *Dignitatis* sets forth a duty to listen to this divine law. Unlike the liberalist perspective, the right of liberty comes from the duty that arises from the conscience.

In discussing religious freedom, the declaration situates the liberty of conscience as a human right. The distinguishing characteristic of *Dignitatis* vis-à-vis *Gaudium et Spes* is the relational nature of conscience; the declaration mandates that an individual must not be prevented from acting according to his or her conscience within all spheres of life, including the public sphere. Thus, in order to maintain true integrity, a human person must be able to act with the dictates of his or her conscience within the public sphere.

Conscience and Religious Liberty

Dignitatis, in acknowledging this modern shift to historical consciousness, legitimizes the human conscience as a source of information for Church teaching.^{lxxxiv} The newly discovered truth lies in the dignity of the human person.^{lxxxv} While the Church recognizes the intrinsic dignity of the human person and the conscience, the Church carefully rejects a relativist view of human knowledge and truth.^{lxxxvi} “Unlike liberal political theory, *Dignitatis* situates religious freedom not in the right of a free conscience, but in the duty of a conscience objectively bound by the obligation to seek and embrace truth.”^{lxxxvii} *Dignitatis* views the conscience as bound by a larger truth, as opposed to the liberal stance of impartiality with regards to truth: “...[J]ust as liberalism recognizes its role in caring for the well-being of its establishment of irreligion, the Church makes a counterclaim that a property ordered state must care for the well-being of its

claim of religious truth.^{1xxxviii} Through *Dignitatis* and Selznick's definition of liberalism as seeking to free individuals and institutions from the restraints of dogma and centralized authority, we can clearly see the tension with the role of truth in an understanding of conscience.

While both the Catholic Church and liberalism find their roots in the Enlightenment through a return to the human person, the Catholic Church is careful not to make the same mistakes as liberalism. *Dignitatis* takes into account the mutual relationship between rights and duty: rights cannot stand alone without duties.

Dignitatis Humanae situates the mandate for all to follow their conscience within every sphere of activity, including the public sphere. The major issue surrounding the exercise of conscience in the public sphere centers upon potential conflicts over multiple consciences. In light of the liberal state of the American public sphere, the question remains as to whether it is possible for a person of faith to exercise his or her conscience. Robert Vischer offers a possible solution through the mediating function of institutions.

IV. Robert Vischer's Model of the Mediating Function of Institutions

In *Conscience and the Common Good*, Robert Vischer examines conscience in relation to the state. Vischer highlights the state's legal deference to the individual conscience, even in the situation where one conscience loses out to another conscience. Because the United States has adapted a liberalist approach to the conscience, the state is hesitant to have any involvement in anything that deals with the conscience.

In order to understand the current American environment and how it treats conscience, I examine the confusion over conscience and religion. I then analyze the current legal paradigm that has been heavily influenced by liberalism. Finally, I offer Vischer's proposal to use

institutions as a mediating function for the relational conscience in order to promote the common good within the landscape of liberalism.

Distinguishing Conscience and Religion

The difficulties associated in the discussion of relational conscience stem partly from the synonymous association of liberty of conscience with freedom of religion. While religion can often factor into conscience formation, *Dignitatis* situates conscience as an intrinsic feature of human dignity. Religion, in contrast, is an extrinsic reality that differs with each human person depending on his or her place in time or location. Because of the constitutional protection of religion, courts have been hesitant to rule on conscience-related issues. Vischer highlights this through his treatment of formation of conscience. He explains how the legal system's epistemological agnosticism has gotten in the way of truly respecting liberty of conscience. "The Establishment Clause [of the Constitution] should not be read to foreclose the law's treatment of religion as a distinct category of conscience-driven claims."^{lxxxix} He continues by explaining that "[t]he most obvious reason why the law tends to treat conscience within the individual-versus-state paradigm is the close historical association between conscience and religious liberty."^{xc} Conscience is seen in an individualist light as its conception has been adopted from a Protestant idea of conscience. The Protestant idea of conscience viewed a direct connection between the individual and God in matters of salvation and spirituality. In contrast, *Dignitatis* promotes an idea of conscience based in community, that is, connection with the public sphere. The individually-centered view of conscience coupled with the legal system's epistemological agnosticism has resulted in the separation of religious from non-religious conscience, with non-religious conscience winning over religious conscience.

Vischer argues against this trend, citing individualism as the reason for the current laissez-faire stance on conscience. He purports that “[w]e need to expand our understanding of conscience, not only to support and secure the common good, but also to facilitate the continuing vitality of conscience itself.”^{xc1} Vischer emphasizes the relational conscience and the mediating institutions’ necessary function in allowing citizens to exercise this relational dimension of conscience. His fear is that conscience will lose its intrinsic dignity if the social system continues on its current individualist trajectory.

Individual-versus-state paradigm

Vischer introduces the current legal paradigm, one consistent with liberalism. He asserts that “[f]ocusing on the point of individual-versus-state conflict has been essential to the American legal system’s success in maintaining conscience as a bulwark, shielding the individual from the state’s coercive power.”^{xc2} This paradigm has led to a model that ceases any dialogue as to what the common good entails. Instead, this model promotes battles between consciences and places the state in the position to choose which conscience must be followed and which conscience must be violated. The state, consistent with the mistaken view that conscience shaped by religion or faith compromises religious liberty, then proceeds to choose whose conscience wins. In effect, the state’s position of supposed impartiality guarantees that the non-religious conscience wins. Often, the state will side with the non-religious conscience in order to avoid any Establishment Clause violations. Vischer is looking to propose a solution in which the state is not the decider of whose conscience wins. Rather, Vischer wants the state to act as a mediator, allowing for the forum to exercise one’s conscience.

Because of this current paradigm, the state has failed to focus on the substance of any conscience claims. Rather, by sorting out the subject matter of the claims, the state automatically

rules on the side of the non-religious conscience. Vischer notes that “the law must pay attention to the substance of conscience’s claims and to their impact on the state’s legitimate pursuit of the common good.”^{xciii} Rather than just looking at one small part of the conscience claim, the state should look at its full impact on the political order. Given this problematic paradigm, Vischer questions the state’s role in adjudicating conscience claims.

Paradoxically, the state’s stance of neutrality violates the very problem it seeks to avoid: it establishes its own form of secular conscience. Vischer highlights this problem by explaining that “[w]hen the state encroaches on the venues in which people live out their core beliefs, the cause of conscience suffers. It is no answer to point out the state’s self-restraint in intruding on the inner sanctum of the mind; conscience cannot easily or prudently be separated from action.”^{xciv} In the earlier discussion of liberalism, the main difficulty arising from liberal politics theory is the divorce of rights from duties. The problem with liberalism that shapes the current problem with conscience in the public sphere emanates from an apparent impartiality, which in reality becomes an endorsement for secular beliefs. Communitarianism might offer some relief, as it departs from the individual-centered paradigm of liberalism. However, given the reactive foundation of the communitarian movement, other solutions to this problem may be more viable. Synthesizing ideas from Catholic, Calvinist, and sociological models, Vischer offers a proposal for the state’s proper role in the discussion of liberty of conscience.

Institutions as mediating the exercise of individual conscience

Vischer proposes a solution in which the state is not the decider of whose conscience wins. “When the state encroaches on the venues in which people live out their core beliefs, the cause of conscience suffers. It is no answer to point out the state’s self-restraint in intruding on the inner sanctum of the mind; conscience cannot easily or prudently be separated from

action.”^{xcv} The state’s involvement with conscience claims has implicitly created a divide between belief and action; consequently, it has undermined the very definition of conscience.

In contrast to the state’s current role, Vischer wants the state to act as a mediator. The state’s primary role is to provide the forum for citizens to exercise their conscience. “Even within the positive law, the state cannot presume to enforce any particular vision of the moral good or to shape the substance of its citizens’ visions of the good; rather, it is to mediate among the citizens’ competing visions of the good.”^{xcvi} By taking sides on a conscience claim, the state enforces its own theory of the moral good upon society.

Rather than leaving the task to the state, Vischer seeks to have the individual citizens decide what the common good is for society.

If our focus is only on belief, conscience has very little to do with personal integrity, which requires a unity of action and belief. Protecting conscience-as-action is an essential component of ensuring that individuals’ lives can unfold in narrative form. The moral coherence on which a personal narrative is built requires an ability to integrate the various strands of life into a relatively seamless story...^{xcvii}

In light of the interconnectedness of action and belief in the exercise of personal integrity, Vischer proposes that the true place to exercise one’s conscience is through a venue or a space of an individual’s choosing rather than through the state. These venues or spaces include institutions or voluntary associations which align with an individual’s belief. In allowing individuals to associate with certain institutions or associations, the association would be the vehicle for promoting certain conscience claims. In Vischer’s theory of the moral marketplace, the institution or association’s viability would be dependent upon the individuals who choose to associate with the institution or association. This bottom-up approach allows the state to avoid adjudicating conscience claims but also allows the individual to maintain integrity of conscience by allowing the individual a forum to exercise the conscience.

Although Vischer's model is relational, it leaves responsibility with the individual, who is the ultimate moral actor is pursuing his or her own personal integrity. While Vischer's relational model could create new problems, he explains that "...an externally oriented conscience is preferable to the privatized, personalized conscience that amounts to meaninglessness."^{xcviii} In the past, the state has deferred to a stance of neutrality and avoided any major conflict. Vischer believes that the potential conflict may be necessary to protect the viability of conscience. He warns that "[d]efining conscience [solely] as freedom of belief avoids the tough questions..., but it eviscerates the power of conscience, which is more properly understood as moral belief applied to conduct."^{xcix} True liberty of conscience means requires the need to understand the relatedness of belief and action despite the problems that arise from connecting duties to rights.

To promote the relational conscience, Vischer appeals to the common good. "Maintaining space for conscience-driven action furthers the common good to the extent that individuals' moral beliefs motivate their participation in the myriad associations that stand between the individual and the state."^c Not only do individuals have a true liberty of conscience; in exercising that liberty, individuals further the common good.

Although it seems that a relational dimension to conscience eliminates the individual, Vischer highlights how the relational dimension can actually promote the individual much more effectively than the liberal model. "Conscience's relational dimension can be understood as a lens through which to bring our citizens' expansive self-understandings into clearer focus."^{ci} Vischer distinguishes the common good from the collective good in order to effectively situate the role of the state. "The state, as society's only legitimate purveyor of coercive force, must act with deference toward the dimension of the common good that is not defined by the collective will..."^{cii} In the realm of conscience, Vischer proposes that the state, in light of its conceptual

and practical separation from society, should perform the following actions: first, appreciate the social nature of the human being; second, permit individuals and the groups to which they belong broad discretion to pursue moral identities that are not favored by the majority or contemplated by the premises of liberalism; third, the state should focus its equality initiatives on ensuring goods and services, not on enshrining equality as a nonnegotiable requirement for marketplace participation; and fourth, embracing moral pluralism does not preclude the building of social consensus on issues of common importance.^{ciii} In other words, Vischer argues that in order to truly give liberty of conscience, the presuppositions of liberalism need to be reconsidered and challenged because those presuppositions undermine the exercise of conscience in the public sphere.

Vischer sees a flourishing of conscience and participation by individuals as essential to social stability.^{civ} When individuals truly feel like they have the power to act on their beliefs and participate in the public sphere, it is the hallmark of true freedom. Vischer's bottom-up approach accomplishes a number of conscience-related dilemmas: first, it extinguishes the need to separate religious from non-religious conscience; second, it truly maintains the state's role of neutrality in the realm of conscience claims; and finally, and most importantly, it allows for the citizen to freely exercise his or her conscience within the public sphere through the use of the institution.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, I introduced the theories of liberalism and communitarianism to set the landscape of American society. In surveying the political landscape, I demonstrated that liberalism creates many problems for the practice of conscience because it focuses upon rights without regard for duties. Communitarianism, although attempting to address the problems of liberalism, creates its own set of new problems. I offered *Dignitatis Humanae* as possible

dialogue partner with liberalism because it focuses on the personhood of the human person as well as accounts for rights with duties. Finally, I introduced Vischer and his idea of the mediating function of the state as a way to balance the communitarian perspectives and the perspective brought about by *Dignitatis Humanae*.

The discussion about the conscience in relation to the public sphere reveals the current disharmony present in the American political landscape. Vischer's proposal offers a possible solution to mediating competing conscience claims while dealing with the current political environment of liberalism. In light of the discussion in chapter one on the internal condition of the human person and the discussion in this chapter about the external condition within the American public sphere, I continue and conclude my analysis by looking at the practical dimension of liberty of conscience. In the final chapter, I examine what I believe to be a way to exercise the liberty of conscience consistent with Vischer's bottom-up approach. Drawing upon the wisdom of Ignatian spirituality, I explore the practical ways in which a person of faith can exercise his or her conscience within the public sphere.

CHAPTER THREE

Applying the Principles of Ignatian Spirituality to Conscience

In the first chapter, I described the individual conscience as intrinsically and anthropologically based. In the second chapter, I demonstrated the importance of a public forum in which conscience can properly be exercised within a pluralistic society. Given the understanding of individual conscience and the difficulties associated with exercising the conscience within a pluralistic society, it is imperative to find a resource to help one maintain integrity of conscience in light of these internal and external contexts. In light of the concerns over maintaining the freedom of an anthropologically-based notion of conscience within the public sphere, Ignatian spirituality is full of wisdom to aid the ordinary person in making decisions within his or her life. First, I demonstrate that while other types of spiritual disciplines are available, Ignatian discernment is best suited in decision-making because it respects the understanding of conscience discussed in chapter one. Next, I highlight the two important concepts of contemplation and discernment within Ignatian Spirituality as a way to understand reality. Finally, I introduce a central idea of Ignatian Spirituality called the “contemplative in action” as a way to understand the concept of the relational conscience discussed in chapter two.

I. Suitability of Ignatian Spirituality

While moral theology is often regarded as a distinct area from spirituality,^{cv} the discussion on conscience stands to greatly benefit from spirituality. Anthony Egan, SJ suggests the importance of incorporating moral theology and spirituality into ethics in order to avoid a compartmentalization of Catholic life.^{cv1} Moral theology is often seen as a list of what one can and cannot do; in contrast, spirituality is often seen as a way to connect with an ultimate reality on an intimate basis. The two are not often seen in an integrated light. In the traditional manualist school of moral theology, rules are seen as black and white, often not requiring the

individual person to examine seriously his or her disposition; the focus was on the act. This heightened focus on act rather than the integration of intent and act results in a compartmentalization of Catholic life.

Ignatian Spirituality is as an alternative to that compartmentalization because Patrick A. Heelan, SJ writes that “[t]he Spiritual Exercises [a primary source for Ignatian Spirituality] do not teach doctrine or morals. When used by an experienced master, they prepare a person to experience and to discern the affects that accompany the practice of living the ‘memory’ of Chris’s life, death, and resurrection.”^{cvii} Rather than prescribing hard rules, Ignatian Spirituality invites the human being to understand his or her life experience in light of a relationship with God. Ignatian Spirituality avoids dichotomies in favor of a more integrated understanding of the human person and respects and understanding of conscience set forth in the first chapter.

II. Ignatian Contemplation and Discernment

While Ignatian Spirituality is characterized by a holistic nature, for purposes of consistency with the prior chapters, I begin with an individual focus through the concepts of contemplation and discernment, with a goal to synthesize it with the relational dimension of Ignatian Spirituality.

Ignatian Contemplation

The first major concept that is useful for our analysis on conscience is the idea of contemplation. Walter Burghardt, SJ, defines contemplation as “a long, loving look at the real.”^{cviii} One component of contemplation is the use of the imagination. Adolfo Nicolas, SJ, Superior General of the Society of Jesus, explains that “[o]ne might call this ‘pedagogy’ of Ignatian contemplation the exercise of the creative imagination. The imagination works in

cooperation with Memory, as we know from the Exercises.^{cxix} In using the imagination, one looks at reality through recalling experiences.

Nicolas notes the importance of imagination to Ignatian Spirituality because it

...is a creative process that goes to the depth of reality and begins recreating it. Ignatian contemplation is a very powerful tool, and it is a shifting from the left side of the brain to the right. But it is essential to understand that imagination is not the same as fantasy. Fantasy is flight from reality, to a world where we create images for the sake of a diversity of images. Imagination grasps reality. In other words, depth of thought and imagination in the Ignatian tradition involves a profound engagement with the real, a refusal to let go until one goes beneath the surface. It is a careful analysis (dismembering) for the sake of an integration (remembering) around what is deepest: God, Christ, the Gospel. The starting point, then, will always be what is real.^{cx}

Thus, Ignatian imagination and contemplation are vehicles for understanding and living within a concrete reality. As discussed in chapter two, liberalism's idealistic view of public life creates a lack of resonance with reality. Ignatian imagination is a way of getting in touch with the concrete world in order to transcend it and think of other alternatives. It calls a person to be aware of his or her thoughts and actions in light of reality.

Since Ignatian imagination requires a heightened awareness of reality, it is important to look back at one's day to see what has occurred. Ignatian spirituality's famous prayer has a person looking back at his or her day through an Examination of Consciousness or the Examen. Dennis Hamm, SJ describes the Examen as a prayer that deals with the full contents of one's consciousness.^{cxii} He expands the English definition of conscience by appealing to the broader scope of the word for conscience in French and Spanish, Romance languages which view the word as moral awareness, judgment, and consciousness.^{cxiii} Hamm offers five steps to doing the daily Examen: 1) pray for light, 2) review the day in thanksgiving, 3) review the feelings that surface in the replay of the day, 4) choose one of those feelings (positive or negative) and pray from it, and 5) look toward tomorrow.^{cxiiii} He names this process "rummaging for God"^{cxiv}

because it is akin to looking through a drawer for something that you cannot find but you know is there. Given our understanding of conscience as being intrinsic to all human beings, the Examen provides a helpful method for understanding an individual's deepest longings. Once a person understands his or her longings, he or she can act in accordance with those inner dictates.

Monika Hellwig, in describing the Spiritual Exercises, explains that "most characteristic of all, the whole process is geared to consciousness raising of the individual...to be alert to one's own motivations and inclinations, and to learn to discern what is the voice of the Holy Spirit of God and what is the voice of a spirit that is counter to God's Spirit, a spirit of destruction and disorientation."^{cxv} This practice of being aware of one's dispositions gives a person the freedom and control to choose a course of action that is aligned with his or her disposition. When a human person rushes to action without first consulting his or her inner conscience, the choice that results may be incongruent with a person's disposition. The goal of awareness is to align a person's actions with his or her disposition to promote self-integrity. While the use of imagination in gaining awareness of reality focuses on motivations, inclinations and inner dispositions, the Ignatian concept known as discernment facilitates the course of action a human person would take in light of that inner awareness.

Ignatian Discernment

The second Ignatian concept, discernment, examines the freedom of a human person and the choices made as a result of that freedom. David Lonsdale describes discernment as a tool for decision-making:

In scripture, in tradition, the Church, our own consciences and powers of judgment, and in many other gifts, God has given us aids to the responsible exercise in our freedom. God's will is that we should exercise our freedom responsibly and well by choosing what honestly seems the best course of action in a given set of circumstances...^{cxvi}

He defines discernment as an art of appreciating those gifts and responding to that love.^{cxvii} As an art form, it is a way of making a choice as response to God on the basis of different affective movements. Thus, the first task is to determine what movements are stirring within the person.

Prior to determining the movements that occur, discernment requires a predisposition of interior freedom. This predisposition, which is often called Ignatian indifference, questions what effect exterior stimuli have on a person's freedom. Interior freedom deals with what Ignatian spirituality terms as "inordinate attachments." Ignatian spirituality recognizes the importance of human desires. Instead of rejecting human desires altogether, Ignatius integrates human desires by distinguishing between ordered and disordered attachments. In contrast to relying on inordinate attachments to guide our decisions, Ignatian spirituality proposes a stance of indifference, where the human being is open to whatever choice would lead to the end for which he or she is created.

In order to understand affective stirrings, Ignatius describes the difference between good and evil spirits by the effect the spirit has on the person. "[I]n those who go on from good to better, the good angel touches such soul sweetly, lightly, and gently, like a drop of water which enters into a sponge, and the evil touches it sharply and with noise and disquiet, as when the drop of water falls on the stone."^{cxviii} Ignatius labels these effects as consolation and desolation. Although consolation is often understood as joy and desolation is often understood as despair, these two concepts must be seen in relation to God. In other words, consolation is viewed as an orientation towards God; in contrast, desolation is an orientation away from God. This understanding accounts for the times when one suffers as a result of one's orientation towards God or the times when one is content but feeling empty inside.

Orientation towards God is important because it highlights the importance of disposition. Rather than focusing solely on a person's actions, Ignatius' focus on consolation and desolation aids us in understanding why we are doing something. For example, a person who donates money to church each week on the surface seems like a good person. With the Ignatian method, one would have to ask himself or herself, 'why am I donating to the church?' If it is out of a sense of looking good in front of other people, one could argue that the donation is made by turning towards something other than God, thus producing desolation. In contrast, if one donates out of a way to gift God what God has originally given, then one could argue that the donation is made in light of turning towards God, thus producing consolation. This orientation, or *synderesis*, helps us situate why we do things. Through his practical guidelines for discernment, Ignatius highlights the inherent importance of the habitual conscience. However, in addition to paying attention to disposition, it is also important to understand action in conjunction with disposition.

The Three Times for Making an Election (hereinafter Election) examines how to make a decision consistent with the inner stirrings that a person discovers. The Election takes into account a person's intellect, feelings, and intuition. Halfway through the thirty-day retreat at the end of the second week, Ignatius offers the Election. He characterizes the first time as one where the election or choice is undeniable. "The first time is, when God our Lord so moves and attracts the will, that without doubting, or being able to doubt, such devout soul follows what is shown it..."^{cxi} Ignatius' illumination at the river Cordoner was arguably the first time of making an election; it sustained him throughout his whole life.^{cxv} Ignatius explains that he "experienced a great clarity in his understanding. This was such that in the whole course of his life, after completing sixty-two years...he does not think he had got as much as at that one time."^{cxvi}

While the first time is powerful and life altering, it is very rare to have such a strong conviction about a choice.

Ignatius describes the second time of election as one “when enough light and knowledge is received by experience of consolations and desolations, and by the experience of discernment of various spirits.”^{cxixii} Because discernment of spirits involves listening to the affective movements of the heart, the second election is characterized by prioritizing the emotional stirrings of a person.

In contrast to the emotional focus of the second time, the third time is characterized by a lack of affective movements. “The third time is quiet...when the soul is not acted upon by various spirits, and used its natural powers freely and tranquilly.”^{cxixiii} Because the heart is not giving any signals regarding a decision, a process based on logic would be most appropriate in decision-making under the third election. For example, one could list the positives and negatives of a decision to determine which one is most logical. Thus, instead of relying on emotional stirrings, one would primarily rely on reasoning in the third election.

Because the first time of making an election is so rare, a person will often encounter the choices summarized in either the second or third time. When making an election within the second and third time, the goal is to have an election that is integrated with the whole person. Thus, the second and third times cannot be seen alone. Wilkie Au coins the accountability of the second and third elections as “integrity of effect.”^{cxixiv} Because the second and third times do not have the same undeniable characteristic of the first election, it is necessary to use the reasoning process to test the second time and to understand the affective movements to test the third time.

This Ignatian concept of decision-making is important for the discussion on conscience because it offers a practical method for making judgments of actual conscience or *conscientia*.

The Election provides the moral agent with an approach to the decision-making process that utilizes a person's intellect, emotions, and intuition rather than privileging one part over another. Additionally, the Election allows for a holistic method consistent with the theological anthropology and the anthropologically-centered notion of conscience presented in the first chapter.

Ignatian contemplation and imagination are important corollaries to discernment because the powers of imagining are “a manner of experiencing and then discerning...first in the course of such imaginative exercises, and finally at the heart of daily human living. By the correct use of such discernment, one was enabled automatically to come to those decisions that were (to use the motto of the Jesuit order) ‘for the greater glory of God.’”^{cxxv} The point of the Ignatian practices of contemplation and discernment is to center life around God. In chapter one, I established the centrality of God in an anthropologically-based understanding of conscience. Thus, Ignatian spirituality uniquely complements the aforementioned definition of conscience.

III. The Contemplative in Action

A hallmark of Ignatian spirituality (and why it is the most appropriate form of spirituality in light of the discussion of individual and relational conscience) is the Ignatian concept of the “contemplative in action.” While the calling to be “contemplatives in action” (*simul in actione contemplativus*) was coined by Jerome Nadal, SJ, the spirit of being in prayer while in action is located throughout the Spiritual Exercises.

Wilkie Au elaborates further on the concept of being a contemplative in action. Au writes that “[i]n Ignatian spirituality, service takes on great significance because it is seen as a way of collaborating with God.”^{cxxvi} In reviewing the first Spiritual Exercise, *First Principle and Foundation*, with the last Exercise, *The Contemplation to Attain Love*, Au posits the two

exercises as an *inclusio*, a literary device that creates a frame by placing familiar matter at the beginning and end of a text.^{cxxvii} Both exercises invite the retreatant to stand in grateful awe before God and to contextualize service to God within a relationship of love and as a grateful response to God's gift.^{cxxviii} While contemplation, as stated earlier, is a long loving look at the real, action is the corollary which responds to the real. Nadal, a close companion of Ignatius, describes that "Ignatius' special grace was the ability to see and contemplate in all things, actions, and conversations the presence of God and the love of spiritual things, to remain a contemplative even in the midst of action."^{cxxix} While contemplation is often an individual directive, in Ignatian spirituality it is seen in conjunction with action; that is, one's actions are dictated by what occurs within that communication with God. As such, Ignatian spirituality remains the most appropriate way of practicing conscience in light of the earlier chapters' discussion on the intrinsic relationship between individual consciences and the groups those consciences belong to.

Michael W. Cooper, SJ also notes the context of the Spiritual Exercises. In light of Ignatius' understanding of the Church of his time as corrupt and abusive, "[h]e grasped the need for a strategy that would free individuals and groups from personal and societal constraints so that they could challenge the manipulative and self-serving status quo of ecclesial and societal structures."^{cxxx} The Spiritual Exercises and Ignatian Spirituality are rooted in providing freedom through awareness of the inner dictates of one's conscience and action in light of that awareness. Despite a political context that might not particularly be amenable to a God-centered spirituality, Ignatian spirituality responds to the existential needs of the human person^{cxxxi} making it difficult to be simply labeled as a religious movement. Because of its ability to transcend religious differences, Ignatian spirituality has the potential to address the pluralism of our modern world.

Cooper writes that “Ignatian spirituality has an apostolic thrust; its goal is unitative action, that is, a felt sense of bondedness with Christ in the midst of active life and ministry.”^{cxxxii}

In the second chapter, I advocated for engagement with the world through a relational understanding of conscience. The purpose of the inner work of contemplation and discernment is to prepare for action within the public sphere. Unlike liberalism’s disunity with the individual, Ignatian spirituality grounds the personhood of the individual through these life-affirming practices. Rather than functioning as a reaction to liberalism, Ignatian spirituality gives the human person the opportunity to transcend the real by looking at the real.

Ignatian spirituality often receives the critique that it is too individualistic.^{cxxxiii} Cooper argues that Ignatius was a pioneer in ushering in the Modern Age because his spirituality freed people from a static and passive destiny that came from antiquated social structures.^{cxxxiv} “Ignatius challenged people to wake up and actively claim their proper destiny and individual gifts in the context of their personal relationship to God and express them in service in the community....he made the connection between the personal and the communal dimensions of the human person integral to each other.”^{cxxxv} In Hellwig’s description of prime characteristics of Ignatian spirituality, she explains the impact of this type of spirituality on one’s public life: the gradual elimination of the profane margins of one’s life. Hellwig writes that,

[I]n Ignatian spirituality this does not mean that one no longer engages in worldly responsibilities or in social, economic, and political affairs. What it does mean is that engagement in such affairs ceases to be profane, which means outside of the range of the religious commitment. All secular activities of life are brought into the faith commitment....This commitment to the integration of all aspects of life, therefore, does not allow a separation of politics and economics from religious values and judgments.^{cxxxvi}

Ignatian spirituality is truly integrative when the differences between the individual and the community that the individual relates to become one whole.

An integrated life requires the individual to take into account both the external and internal dimensions of life. Au writes that “[h]olistic discernment requires paying close attention to what goes on both in the external world and in our inner world of feelings and desires, through thoughts and bodily sensations, dreams and fantasies, aspirations and fears.”^{xxxvii} Ignatian spirituality is suited at balancing both the external and internal worlds of an individual without prioritizing one to the detriment of the other. It seriously takes into consideration the necessity of integrating a person’s public and private life. Through Vischer’s bottom-up approach in which the individual exercises his or her conscience through the mediating function of institutions coupled with the understanding of conscience set forth in the first chapter, an individual can make decisions in a holistic and integrated manner.

While integrating both the external, public life with the internal, personal world is a challenging task, it is a worthy goal that leads to the freedom that God intended for human beings to have. It is a challenge to integrate one’s life when one grows accustomed to compartmentalizing his or her life. It is important to educate people in the integrative life; the place for that education is through the communities in which a person participates.

While faith communities are often the first community that comes to mind when dealing with formation, other communities need to be aware of this need for integration. The formation of conscience, as stated earlier, occurs within the community. Work communities are a potential area for promoting the integrated life, as it is a place that most people voluntarily associate with. These work communities would also see a benefit from promoting an integrated life as an integrated formation program could possibly replace expensive, non-effective ethics manuals by getting to the root of the problem. By promoting an integrated life in the workplace, employers

could spend less time micromanaging and more time giving employees the freedom they need to participate in the work community.

Another potential area is though primary and secondary education. By teaching and forming children about the integrated life, the educational community would promote integrated, future citizens. While the formation would have to be tailored to the needs of growing children, it would be best to engrain these integrative habits early. This integrative method is applicable to numerous communities; due to the limits of this thesis, the application of this method will have to be explored in the future.

CONCLUSION

The journey towards an integrated life requires an awareness of our external environment and our inner sanctuary known as the conscience. I began the analysis with a look at the human person. In the first chapter, I presented an anthropologically-centered understanding of conscience, through the lens of Rahner's thought. Rahner guided the analysis by situating the starting point anthropologically and offered the view that human beings are all existentially graced. Following from Rahner's thought, I presented the definition of conscience through the Second Vatican Council's *Gaudium et Spes*. I expanded upon that definition by introducing a personalist view consistent with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council.

After beginning with the human person, I explored the environment in which the human person participates. In the second chapter, I focused on the public environment in the United States. The American political climate is characterized by liberalism, which has practically reduced the true freedom and dignity of the human person. Under the liberal model, the supposedly neutral government has effectively become a moral arbiter. To deal with this dilemma, I introduced alternatives such as communitarianism and the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom *Dignitatis Humanae*. Robert Vischer's proposal to use institutions as mediators of individual conscience promotes a bottom-up approach consistent with the definition of conscience set forth in chapter one and avoids the American government's involvement in determining which conscience prevails.

In light of the analysis of the theological basis of conscience and the legal and sociological environment in which relational conscience, Ignatian Spirituality provides a methodological and practical vehicle for exercising the conscience within the public sphere, even if the public sphere is not wholly welcoming to a faith-based conscience.

In the third chapter, I explained the suitability of Ignatian spirituality for the discussion on conscience. While many methods of spirituality exist to help a person live an integrated life, Ignatian spirituality is most suitable in light of our analysis on conscience because it focuses on both the individual and the relational dimensions of conscience. Using the concepts of Ignatian contemplation and discernment, the individual can listen to the stirrings of one's heart through experience and other sources to determine the proper course of action. The Ignatian concept of the "contemplative in action" connects the faculty of moral reasoning and judgment to action within the world, remaining consistent with the model that Vischer proposed.

Remaining aware of one's inner stirrings and how to make choices based on those inner stirrings are important because it is a means to living an integrated and free life. While it may take an extra effort to be aware and to look back on the day to see where one could improve upon his or her actions, it is a worthy goal to be able to exercise our intrinsic faculty known as the conscience.

The implications of the conversation between conscience, the public sphere, and Ignatian spirituality are numerous. Although Ignatian spirituality originates from the Catholic tradition, its anthropological focus makes it accessible to the human person and overcomes the extrincism attributed to conscience. Consistent with Vischer's bottom up approach, the concepts of Ignatian spirituality allow the individual the freedom to choose the type of life he or she was created to live.

Earlier I posed the question that I encountered daily in my work, which is "what should I do?" In light of the analysis, the question should be answered with a recommendation first to be self-aware. Because the answer depends on an individual's context, self-awareness would be a way to grow an understanding of one's context, including personal and religious beliefs, values,

and experiences. Once a person understands himself or herself, he or she can make a decision on the basis of self-knowledge, which is at the core of truly listening to one's conscience.

This multidisciplinary synthesis does not propose to answer life's most difficult questions in a few pages; however, it does propose the revolutionary nature of pausing to think about decisions before making those decisions. A future application of the principles set forth to persons in a specific context would be a worthwhile project. While I may not have answered the question, "what should I do?," framing what is important to consider in responding to that question reveals a wealth of wisdom to the person who is seeking to live a life of integrity. I have highlighted not only the areas in which a person may not have control of a situation, but also the areas where a person has the freedom to live a life integrated with his or her conscience. It is through this lens that one truly changes the world by responding to and integrating his or her public life with the inner voice of his or her conscience.

ⁱ Charles E. Curran, ed., *Readings in Moral Theology, No. 14, Conscience* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004): 65.

ⁱⁱ Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith* (Crossroad Publishing: New York, 1978): 81.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Ibid.*, 33.

^{iv} *Ibid.*, 127.

^v *Ibid.*

^{vi} Linda Hogan, *Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition* (New York: Paulist Press, 2000).

^{vii} *Ibid.*, 118.

^{viii} Robert Vischer, *Conscience and the Common Good* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 97.

^{ix} *Ibid.*, 153.

^x *Ibid.*, 97.

^{xi} Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, ed., *Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, Volume 1* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1991): 37.

^{xii} Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith*, 24.

^{xiii} *Ibid.*, 19.

^{xiv} *Ibid.*, 33.

^{xv} Note: while contemporary theology notes the use of inclusive language, Rahner's language uses non-inclusive language to refer to the human person. In order to preserve Rahner's actual language, direct quotes will include non-inclusive language; Rahner, *Foundations*, 42.

^{xvi} *Ibid.*, 33.

^{xvii} *Ibid.*

^{xviii} *Ibid.*, 43

^{xix} *Ibid.*, 43.

^{xx} *Ibid.*, 34.

^{xxi} *Ibid.*, 116.

^{xxii} William Dych, SJ, *Karl Rahner* (London: Continuum, 2000): 13.

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- xxiii Richard Gula, *Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality* (New York: Paulist Press, 1989): 245.
- xxiv Ibid.
- xxv Curran, *Conscience*, 65.
- xxvi Hogan, *Confronting the Truth*, 1.
- xxvii Ibid.
- xxviii Ibid., 2.
- xxix Ibid., 5.
- xxx Ibid., 101.
- xxxi Ibid.
- xxxii Ibid., 102.
- xxxiii Ibid., 102-103.
- xxxiv Ibid., 107-108.
- xxxv Ibid., 108.
- xxxvi Ibid., 109.
- xxxvii Ibid., 128.
- xxxviii Ibid.
- xxxix Ibid.
- xl Ibid.
- xli Ibid., 128-29.
- xlii Ibid., 129.
- xliii Ibid., 133.
- xliv Ibid., 134.
- xlv Ibid., 136.
- xlvi Ibid., 137.
- xlvii Ibid., 137.
- xlviii Ibid., 139.
- xlix Ibid., 140.
- ¹ Ibid., 141.
- ^{li} Ibid., 143.
- ^{lii} Ibid., 144.
- ^{liii} Ibid., 148.
- ^{liv} Ibid.
- ^{lv} Ibid., 135.
- ^{lvi} The Kobayashi Maru Scenario is a fictional scenario featured in the movie, *Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan*. It references an unwinnable scenario which then cadet, James Kirk, overcomes by changing the conditions of the test. http://www.startrek.com/database_article/kobayashi-maru.
- ^{lvii} Philip Selznick, *The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992): 273.
- ^{lviii} Ibid., 376-77.
- ^{lix} Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009): 53.
- ^{lx} Ibid., 54.
- ^{lxi} Ibid.
- ^{lxii} Selznick, *Moral Commonwealth*, 379.
- ^{lxiii} Kenneth L. Grasso, "Introduction: Catholic Social Thought and the Quest for an American Public Philosophy," in *Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism*, Kenneth L. Grasso, ed. et al (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995): 10.
- ^{lxiv} Ibid.
- ^{lxv} Selznick, *Moral Commonwealth*, xi.
- ^{lxvi} Ibid., xiii.
- ^{lxvii} Ibid., 376.
- ^{lxviii} Ibid., 369.
- ^{lxix} Ibid., 359.
- ^{lxx} Ibid., 369.
- ^{lxxi} Ibid., 371.

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- lxxii Ibid.
- lxxiii Ibid., 372.
- lxxiv Grasso, "Introduction," in Grasso, ed., *Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism*, 4.
- lxxv Ibid., 4.
- lxxvi Ibid.
- lxxvii Ibid.
- lxxviii Ibid., 5.
- lxxix Ibid
- lxxx Ibid
- lxxxi Ibid.
- lxxxii Ibid., 7.
- lxxxiii Curran, *Conscience*, 67.
- lxxxiv Kenneth R. Craycraft, Jr., "Religion as Moral Duty and Civic Right: *Dignitatis Humanae* on Religious Liberty," in *Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism*, Kenneth L. Grasso, ed. et al (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995): 61.
- lxxxv Ibid.
- lxxxvi Ibid.
- lxxxvii Ibid., 63-64.
- lxxxviii Ibid., 69.
- lxxxix Vischer, *Conscience and the Common Good*, 25.
- xc Ibid., 34.
- xcI Ibid., 3.
- xcii Ibid., 30.
- xciii Ibid.
- xciv Ibid., 101.
- xcv Ibid.
- xcvi Ibid., 31.
- xcvii Ibid., 100.
- xcviii Ibid., 101.
- xcix Ibid., 98.
- c Ibid., 101.
- ci Ibid., 102.
- cii Ibid., 103.
- ciii Ibid., 119-120.
- civ Ibid., 101.
- cv For a perspective that affirms the connection between moral theology and spirituality, see William C. Spohn, "Spirituality and Ethics: Exploring the Connections," *Theological Studies* 58, Volume 1 (March 1997).
- cvi Anthony Egan, "Conscience, Spirit, Discernment: the Holy Spirit, the Spiritual Exercises and the Formation of Moral Conscience," *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa* 138 (November 2010): 58.
- cvi Patrick A. Heelan, SJ, "Foreword to *Powers of Imagining: Ignatius de Loyola*," in *An Ignatian Spirituality Reader*, ed. George W. Traub (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2008), 140.
- cvi Walter J. Burghardt, SJ, "Contemplation: a Long Loving Look at the Real," in *An Ignatian Spirituality Reader*, ed. George W. Traub (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2008), 91.
- cix Adolfo Nicolas, "Depth, Universality, and Learned Ministry: Challenges to Jesuit Higher Education Today," (April 2010)
http://www.sjweb.info/documents/ansj/100423_Mexico%20City_Higher%20Education%20Today_ENG.pdf: 4
- cx Ibid.
- cxI Dennis Hamm, SJ, "Rummaging for God: Praying Backwards through Your Day," in *An Ignatian Spirituality Reader*, ed. George W. Traub (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2008), 106.
- cxii Ibid., 106.
- cxiii Ibid., 107-108.
- cxiv Ibid., 105.
- cxv Monika K. Hellwig, "Finding God in All Things: A Spirituality for Today," in *An Ignatian Spirituality Reader*, ed. George W. Traub (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2008), 51.

^{cxvi} David Lonsdale, “Discernment of Spirits,” in *An Ignatian Spirituality Reader*, ed. George W. Traub (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2008), 175.

^{cxvii} *Ibid.*, 173.

^{cxviii} Fleming, *Draw Me Into Your Friendship*, (Saint Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1996): 264.

^{cxix} *Ibid.*, 138.

^{cxx} Ignatius’ life experience was influential in creating his Spiritual Exercises. Ignatius, or Inigo as he was called before his studies in Paris, was a soldier from the sixteenth century who lived in the Basque region of Spain. In 1521, while fighting a battle in Pamplona, a cannonball struck him in the leg, shattering his leg completely. The doctors reset the bones of his leg; he almost died from this surgery. When he emerged from the surgery only to find out that his new leg was shorter than his uninjured leg, he could not bear such a deformity because he was focused on his worldly career. He was a man of the world, prioritizing his outward appearance over his inward spiritual stirrings.

As a result of his vanity, he decided to undergo more surgeries so that the injured leg would be even with the uninjured leg. During the recovery time from that second surgery, he was forced to stay in bed and recover at his brother’s home. He wanted to read books about knights and chivalry while he was resting but those types of books were unavailable. His sister-in-law provided him with books about Jesus Christ and the saints instead. As he was reading the stories of Jesus Christ and the saints, Ignatius became inspired and believed that he could do what they did. In reading these books, Ignatius discovered his true feelings about worldly ambitions and how they do not compare to thinking about God. This experience was the seed for Ignatius’ understanding of discernment of spirits. Because of his spiritual reading, Ignatius travelled to Manresa, where he experienced the difficulties of being too scrupulous. On the verge of suicide because he was not perfect in his spiritual practices, Ignatius discovered that evil could be disguised as an apparent good.

While at Manresa, near the river Cordoner, Ignatius experienced a mystical illumination. Through this illumination, Ignatius understood the humanity of Jesus, the interrelation of the Trinity, and the importance of the Scriptures. In light of his mystical illumination, he changed his actions to be less extreme and grew more focused on Christ-like service to others.

^{cxxi} George E. Ganss, S.J., ed., *Ignatius of Loyola: The Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works*, (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 81.

^{cxxii} Fleming, *Friendship*, 138.

^{cxxiii} *Ibid.*, 138.

^{cxxiv} Wilkie Au and Noreen Cannon Au, *The Discerning Heart*, (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2006): 54.

^{cxxv} Heelan, “Foreword to *Powers of Imagining*,” in Traub, ed., *Ignatian Spirituality Reader*, 140.

^{cxxvi} Au, *Discerning Heart*, 3.

^{cxxvii} *Ibid.*, 13.

^{cxxviii} *Ibid.*, 14.

^{cxxix} *Ibid.*, 20.

^{cxx} Michael W. Cooper, “Ignatian Spirituality: Unitative Action with Christ on Mission,” *Presence: an International Journal of Spiritual Direction*, Volume 2, Number 3 (September 1996): 29.

^{cxxxi} Earlier in the thesis, I situated the existential conditions of the human person; cf. Karl Rahner, *Thesis Chapter One*, 9-13.

^{xxxii} Cooper, “Ignatian Spirituality”, 29.

^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, 30.

^{xxxiv} *Ibid.*, 31.

^{xxxv} *Ibid.*

^{xxxvi} Hellwig, “Finding God in All Things,” in Traub, ed., *Ignatian Spirituality Reader*, 56.

^{xxxvii} Au, *Discerning Heart*, 5.