Document Type

Article - pre-print

Publication Date

2016

Abstract

In Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa takes “reliabilist” virtue epistemology deep into “responsibilist” territory, arguing that “a true epistemology” will assign “responsibilist-cum-reliabilist intellectual virtue the main role in addressing concerns at the center of the tradition.” However, Sosa stops short of granting this status to familiar responsibilist virtues like open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual humility. He cites three reasons for doing so: responsibilist virtues involve excessive motivational demands; they are quasi-ethical; and they are best understood, not as constituting knowledge, but rather as putting one “in a position” to know. I elaborate on and respond to each of these concerns. I argue that none of them provides Sosa with a good reason for excluding responsibilist virtues from occupying a central role in his reliabilist virtue epistemology. I conclude that Sosa owes virtue responsibilism an even wider embrace.

Comments

The final version is located here.

Recommended Citation

Baehr, Jason. “Responsibilist Virtues and the ‘Charmed Inner Circle’ of Traditional Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies (2016), doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0734-z.

Available for download on Saturday, October 21, 2017

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