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One aim of virtue theory in ethics and epistemology is to deepen our understanding of what virtues are—of what makes them virtues, of their internal structure, of how their various constitutive elements are related to each other, and so on. The present chapter is aimed at addressing one question in this vicinity: namely, what are the primary dimensions of an intellectual virtue? As such it is intended as a contribution to what I have elsewhere called “autonomous virtue epistemology,” which involves philosophical reflection on intellectual virtues and their role in the cognitive life considered apart from more traditional questions in epistemology (e.g. questions about the nature and limits of knowledge). I argue that intellectual virtues have four main dimensions: a motivational dimension, an affective dimension, a competence dimension, and a judgment dimension. At the end of the chapter, I deploy this four-dimensional model to address a problem that has recently arisen within virtue epistemology concerning intellectual virtue, reliability, and luck. Given the broad scope of the chapter, the discussion will proceed at a fairly general level. However, my hope is that, partly on account of this generality, it will provide a kind of framework for identifying and organizing further issues and questions that might be pursued by philosophers with an interest in intellectual virtues.

1. Preliminaries

I begin with a few preliminary points. First, I am thinking of intellectual virtues along “responsibilist” lines, that is, as good intellectual character traits like curiosity, attentiveness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual humility, intellectual
carefulness, and so on. As such they are distinct from but involve the use of “faculty virtues” like memory, vision, and introspection. While structurally similar to moral virtues, they are also distinct from what we ordinarily think of as moral virtues on account of aiming at distinctively *epistemic* goods like truth, knowledge, and understanding.

Second, while I take the account sketched here to cover the central dimensions of an intellectual virtue, I do not claim to be specifying sufficient conditions for an intellectual virtue. Nor am I committed to claiming that the dimensions in question are strictly necessary. There may, for instance, be a subset of intellectual virtues the members of which lack one or more of the dimensions identified here. Rather, I am thinking of the account as a theoretical model that covers enough of the relevant cases to be explanatorily illuminating and useful.

Third, I am conceiving of intellectual virtues as “personal excellences,” that is, as qualities that make their possessor good or admirable qua person. As I have argued elsewhere (Baehr 2011: Chs. 6-7), we often admire persons who are inquisitive, thoughtful, intellectually careful, thorough, honest, and open-minded. These virtues bear, not just on their likely success at reaching the truth or achieving knowledge, but also on who they are as persons. They say something important and favorable about some of their fundamental cares and concerns. My focus, then, is the structure of intellectual virtues understood as traits that contribute to personal worth or excellence.

2. Motivational Dimension

The first dimension of an intellectual virtue is a motivational one. It is featured prominently in many extant accounts of intellectual virtue. Indeed, a cursory look at some of the literature in virtue epistemology might lead one to think that there is little more to being an intellectually virtuous person than “loving” or desiring truth and related epistemic goods. Linda Zagzebski, for instance, claims that intellectual virtues “are all forms of the motivation to have cognitive contact with reality” (1996: 167). Similarly, James Montmarquet describes intellectual virtues as the “qualities that a truth-desiring person ... would want to have” (1993: 30). And Bob Roberts and Jay Wood argue that a “love of
knowledge” is a “presupposition or necessary background of all the other intellectual virtues” (2007: 305).

These claims are plausible. I propose the following related principle:

Motivational Principle (MP): A subject S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S's possession of V is rooted in a “love” of epistemic goods.7

Accordingly, if a person is motivated to think or inquire in ways that are careful, thorough, and rigorous, but does so only to impress her peers or to avoid losing her job, then her carefulness, thoroughness, and rigor will not be fully virtuous in the relevant sense. I hasten to add that I intend a broad construal of both “love” and “epistemic goods.” The former can but need not include a desire for epistemic goods. It might also include a firm rational or volitional commitment to truth—a commitment that kicks in when the desire for truth wanes. By “epistemic goods” I mean ends like knowledge, truth, and understanding. However, to the extent that there exist other worthy epistemic ends, they are relevant here as well. Also, the goods in question can be understood in general or specific terms: e.g. as knowledge or understanding in a fairly broad or generic sense or as knowledge or understanding of some very specific matter.

It is intuitively plausible to think of intellectual virtues as character traits that are rooted in or flow from a “love” of epistemic goods. But there are other reasons to accept MP as well. First, as suggested above, MP provides a way of distinguishing between intellectual virtues and what we ordinarily think of as moral virtues. It allows us to say, plausibly, that what unifies the class of intellectual virtues and distinguishes them from other virtue-types is that they aim at distinctively epistemic ends. Moral virtues, by contrast, tend to be oriented toward distinctively moral ends like justice, pleasure, and the alleviation of suffering.8

Second, thinking of intellectual virtues as involving a “love” of epistemic goods also provides an explanation of why we often think of intellectual virtues as admirable personal qualities or “personal excellences.” To see why, it will be helpful to briefly consider two recent accounts of moral virtue. In Virtue, Vice, and Value (2001), Tom Hurka defends the view that virtues are instances of “loving” (desiring, pursuing, taking pleasure in) one or
more “baseline” goods like pleasure, achievement, and knowledge. In *A Theory of Virtue* (2006), Robert Adams argues that virtue is a matter of persisting excellence in “being for” (loving, liking, wanting, respecting, appreciating) the good. Moreover, both Hurka and Adams characterize the sort of orientation in question as having a kind of intrinsic value akin to the notion of personal worth or excellence described above—a value over and above the value of any moral effects or consequences that are likely to follow from this orientation. In explaining the evaluative basis of virtue, Hurka invokes the following principle: “If $x$ is intrinsically good, then loving $x$ (desiring, pursuing, or taking pleasure in $x$) for itself is also intrinsically good” (Hurka 2001: 13). The first-order intrinsic goods Hurka has in mind are the baseline goods like pleasure and achievement; and the second-order intrinsic value is the type of value instantiated by virtues on his view. According to Adams, “[to] say that virtue must be excellent is not just to say that it must be good … Excellence is the objective and non-instrumental goodness of that which is worthy to be honored, loved, admired, and (in the extreme case) worshipped, for its own sake” (Adams 2006: 24). The overall picture here is one according to virtues involve being properly oriented toward certain good or worthy ends—an orientation that is intrinsically valuable or admirable. If this is right, then a motivational dimension of intellectual virtues of the sort described by MP is capable of explaining the sense in which intellectual virtues are personally admirable, for this dimension involves “loving” or “being for” epistemic goods.

### 3. Affective Dimension

Consider a person with a wide range of intellectual interests who regularly follows up on these interests by reading about and reflecting on the various topics in question. While she perseveres in her attempts to acquire knowledge and understanding in the relevant areas, her enjoyment of the learning process doesn’t match her initial intellectual enthusiasm. In fact she often finds rather dull or even resents the kind of intellectual effort and activity required by this process. Compare this person with an exact counterpart minus the lack of enjoyment just noted. The counterpart has the same intellectual interests and engages in the same intellectual activity in the pursuit of these interests, but instead is
often invigorated by and takes delight in the learning process: she enjoys asking questions, attending to important details, solving puzzles, and probing for deeper understanding. Plausibly, the second person is more intellectually virtuous than the first. This points in the direction of a second, affective dimension of intellectual virtue.

Aristotle gets at this dimension at various points in the *Nicomachean Ethics* when discussing the relationship between pleasure and virtue. One of his key points is that a person can do the right or virtuous thing—even do so because it is right—while still falling short of virtue, even in that performance. The problem is that the person might do the right thing without the proper feelings or affections, in particular, without taking any pleasure in the action. He remarks:

\[ T \]he person who does not enjoy noble actions is not good. For no one would call a person just if he did not enjoy acting justly, or generous if he did not enjoy generous actions; and the same goes for the other virtues. If this is so, it follows that actions in accordance with virtue are pleasant in themselves. (1099a)

While Aristotle’s primary concern in this passage is moral activity and virtue, he makes a similar point in connection with contemplative activity in Book X:

Pleasure completes the activity not as the inherent state does, but as a sort of supervenient end, like the bloom on the faces of young men. So long, then, as the objects of intellect or perception, and the faculties of judgement or contemplation, are as they should be, there will be pleasure in the activity. (*NE*, 1175a)

There is considerable plausibility in Aristotle’s views here. They support the following principle:

Affective Principle (AP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S takes pleasure in (or experiences other appropriate affections in relation to) the activity characteristic of V.
Two points of clarification are in order. First, while the primary focus of AP is pleasure, pleasure is not the only affective state that might be required by intellectual virtue. Indeed, as suggested by virtue ethical discussions of regret (e.g. Hursthouse 1999), there may be times when an intellectually virtuous inquirer will feel regret or be pained by an action that nevertheless is consistent with or even required by intellectual virtue. For instance, a person might, out of intellectual humility, feel compelled to recognize and acknowledge a particular intellectual mistake he has made. If the mistake is egregious enough or if the stakes surrounding the mistake are sufficiently high, we might expect the person, if he is truly intellectually humble, to be pained by or to feel regret about his error. Hence the parenthetical clause in MP about “other appropriate affections.” A second and related point is that AP should not be read as saying that every instance of intellectually virtuous activity must be accompanied by a particular affective state (whether pleasure, pain, or otherwise). As Aristotle observes in connection with courage, virtuous activity sometimes requires, not pleasure, but rather a mere absence of pain or other unvirtuous affective state (NE 1104b). Similarly, in certain contexts, the demands of a virtue like intellectual tenacity may be exceedingly tedious. While we would not expect an intellectually virtuous agent to take delight in such activity, we might expect her not to be pained by it. These exceptions notwithstanding, it remains plausible that on the whole, a fully intellectually virtuous person will as such derive pleasure from virtuous intellectual activity.

It is worth considering in a little more detail the relationship between the motivational and affective dimensions of an intellectual virtue. It might be thought that if a person really has a robust “love” of epistemic goods, then he will necessarily already have the sorts of affections required by AP, thereby rendering AP redundant. But this is mistaken on two counts. First, as noted above, MP can be satisfied by a purely volitional commitment to epistemic goods. While such a commitment would still reflect favorably on its possessor qua person, it would not guarantee a proper affective response. A person might, for instance, be firmly committed to acting in accordance with her epistemic duty or to pursuing knowledge of a particular subject matter while nevertheless doing so begrudgingly, thereby indicating a deficiency of intellectual virtue. Second, as I am thinking of it, the love of epistemic goods described in MP pertains more to the onset or inception of inquiry than it does to the entire process of seeking after the truth. As the example above is
intended to illustrate, even a sincere and robust desire for epistemic goods does not guarantee proper enjoyment of the intellectual activity that must be undertaken to fulfill this desire. For these reasons, we should view the motivational and affective components of an intellectual virtue as closely related but distinct.

We have examined the motivational and affective dimensions of an intellectual virtue. However, the account as developed thus far is incomplete in two important respects. To get at why, it will be useful to return to Adams’s (2006) account of virtue, according to which virtue is “excellence in being for the good.” The notion of excellence plays a critical role in Adams’s account. It is intended to account for the fact that one can be for the good in ways that are entirely serious and robust but that nevertheless are inconsistent with virtue. Specifically, one can be for the good either incompetently or foolishly. If I desire to get to the truth but am incompetent at asking good questions, assessing evidence, taking up alternative points of view, and so on, then, all my good epistemic will notwithstanding, my claim to intellectual virtue will be weak indeed. Similarly, if I am both motivated and competent at taking up alternative points of view, but consistently do so at the wrong time, toward the wrong views, in the wrong situations, and so on, then here as well I will fall short of genuine virtue. This points in the direction of two additional dimensions of an intellectual virtue.

4. Competence Dimension

Elsewhere I have argued (2011: Ch. 6) that for each intellectual virtue, we can identify a form of cognitive activity that is specific to or characteristic of that virtue (see also Zagzebski 1996). So, for instance, open-mindedness involves setting aside a default cognitive standpoint in order to take up an alternative one, attentiveness involves noticing and attending to important details, curiosity involves asking thoughtful and insightful questions, and so on. This point, together with the observation that a person can be “for” epistemic goods while nevertheless being incompetent at pursuing or handling them, suggests the following further principle:
Competence Principle (CP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S is competent at the activity characteristic of V.

One mark in favor of CP is that it provides a plausible basis for individuating one intellectual virtue from another. On the present model, an open-minded person is importantly similar to an attentive person, a curious person, and anyone else in the possession of an intellectual virtue. For, again, all such persons are motivated by a positive orientation toward epistemic goods. How, then, are we to differentiate the virtues in question? One plausible response is to say that an open-minded person is competent or skilled at one type of virtue-relevant activity, while an intellectually attentive person is skilled at a different type of activity, and the curious person at yet a different type. This is precisely what is required by CP.

CP also explains why habituation has typically been thought to play an important role in the acquisition of virtues. It is widely believed that moral virtues are developed at least partly via the practice or repetition of certain virtue-relevant actions—practice that eventually leads to the formation of settled dispositions or habits. This is no less plausible in the case of intellectual character virtues. If CP is true, this is precisely what we should expect, for the activities picked out by this principle are ones that can be deliberately practiced and improved upon with time. One can practice taking up alternative standpoints or noticing and focusing on important details. One can even practice curiosity by deliberately attempting to identify and formulate thoughtful and insightful questions. Thus CP fits well with a habituation model of virtue formation.

As these remarks suggest, CP is also capable of making sense of the putative connection between virtue, on the one hand, and competences and skills, on the other. Several authors in virtue epistemology and virtue ethics have defended the existence of such a connection. Ernest Sosa, for instance, has long argued for a competence model of intellectual virtues (1991: 138; 1997). And Julia Annas has argued that the possession of moral and intellectual virtues centrally involves the possession of certain skills (2013; 2003: 16-23). These are plausible views. CP fits well with them by making the possession of a certain sort of cognitive competence or skill central to the possession of an intellectual virtue.
5. Judgment Dimension

A fourth and final dimension of intellectual virtue is made evident by some empirical research conducted at Project Zero, an education research institute at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. This research focuses on “thinking dispositions,” which are nearly identical to what we are calling intellectual virtues. One notable finding of Project Zero researchers David Perkins and Shari Tishman (2001) concerns what they refer to as “sensitivity,” which, roughly, is an awareness of which virtues should be deployed or exercised in a given situation. Specifically, they found that a surprising number of students have both the will and the ability to, for example, engaging in open-minded and creative ways of thinking but fail to do so because they lack good judgment about when such thinking is appropriate. Tishman summarizes their findings thus:

Motivation is important, of course, and so are intellectual skills. But research reveals that sensitivity plays a much larger role in effective thinking than one might expect. Students often have quite a bit of difficulty perceiving opportunities to think critically and creatively when these opportunities are embedded in the everyday stream of life, even when they possess the skills and the will to do so. (Tishman 2000: 46)

This points to a further dimension of an intellectual virtue:

Judgment Principle (JP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S is disposed to recognize when (and to what extent, etc.) the activity characteristic of V would be epistemically appropriate.

The students above fail to possess intellectual virtues because they fail to satisfy JP. Again, they fail to reliably identify the occasions on which they should deploy their cognitive abilities.
In addition to the empirical research just noted, there are at least two further reasons in support of RP. The first is that RP provides an explanation of the putative connection between intellectual virtue and *phronesis*. According to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, virtue-possession involves acting or feeling in certain virtue-relevant ways at the right time, in the right amount, toward then right person, in the right way, and so on. This requires a certain kind of practical judgment supplied by *phronesis*. Specifically, for any form of virtue-relevant activity, the *phronimos* knows when, how much, toward whom, in what way, and so on, to engage in that activity. While Aristotle’s point here concerns moral virtues, it applies equally well to intellectual character virtues. To possess open-mindedness, intellectual courage, or intellectual carefulness, one must be able to judge when, for how long, toward whom, and in what manner to engage in the activity characteristic of these virtues. This is precisely the sort of recognitional ability required by JP. This close connection between intellectual virtue and phronesis is gestured at by Roberts and Wood when they say, of intellectual virtues, that *phronesis* or practical wisdom “is involved in every virtue, as constituting the good judgment without which no human virtue could be exemplified … Insofar as virtues are human, they are infused with and qualified by reason, as the ancients would say; they are dispositions of intelligence” (2007: 305).

A second advantage of JP is its ability to explain the sense in which intellectual virtues “flow” from or are “rooted” in a love of epistemic goods. As indicated above, this is a familiar and plausible way of thinking about intellectual virtues. But what exactly does it amount to? In what way or sense do intellectual virtues “flow” from a love of epistemic goods? To see how JP contains an answer to this question, consider an example of intellectual carefulness. Imagine a student working on a lengthy and challenging logical proof. Having arrived at an apparent solution, she decides to double-check her work because she knows that with a proof of this sort, mistakes can easily be made. Thus she manifests the recognitional ability described in JP. Now, suppose the student were asked why she has decided to double-check her work. Her initial reply might be: “Because I want to make sure I get the proof right.” But suppose she were pressed further about why this aim has led her to engage in this specific form of intellectual activity rather than some other form. She might respond, somewhat incredulously: “This is a lengthy and difficult proof. It’s
easy to make mistakes on a problem like this. I am double-checking my work to ensure that it doesn’t contain any errors.”

This example illustrates the point that certain sorts of beliefs are built into the structure of the recognitional ability described in JP, namely, beliefs to the effect that certain kinds of virtue-relevant activity (e.g. double-checking one’s work) are an effective way of pursuing or achieving one’s epistemic aims (e.g. correctly completing the proof). Again, when an intellectually virtuous agent makes a judgment about how to proceed in a given situation, he draws upon his beliefs about which sorts of activities will be most useful or relevant given both the particularities of the situation he is in together with his interest in getting to the truth, acquiring knowledge, or the like. Accordingly, such beliefs—and the judgmental capacity they partly constitute—play an important role in explaining why intellectually virtuous agents think and inquire in the ways they do.

Elsewhere I have referred to the beliefs in question as “connecting beliefs” because of how, from the agent’s point of view, they connect the agent’s immediate focus or actions with her broader epistemic aims or goals. Of course, these beliefs need not be conscious or explicit. The agent may not even be aware of or have reflected on the fact that she has them. In fact, in the kind of case described above, it is important that the belief or beliefs in question not be occurrent, at least while the relevant activity is taking place. As she double-checks her proof, the logic student will be focused exclusively on the steps of the proof itself—not on the fact that reviewing these steps will help secure a correct answer to the problem she is working on. Nevertheless, again, if we reflect on why she engages in this virtue-relevant activity rather some other form of activity (e.g. turning in the proof without further review), a plausible answer is that she believes at some level that this activity is importantly related to her broader epistemic goal.

Suppose, then, that connecting beliefs are partly constitutive of the judgmental or recognitional ability required by JP. How does this shed light on the point that intellectual virtues are grounded in a love of epistemic goods? My suggestion is that intellectual virtues “flow” from or are “rooted” in a love of epistemic goods in the sense that an intellectually virtuous agent is disposed to engage in virtue-relevant activity because she believes that doing so will be helpful in her pursuit or handling of epistemic goods. Her intellectually
I have sketched a theoretical model or framework according to which intellectual virtues have four main dimensions: a motivational dimension, an affective dimension, a competence dimension, and a judgment dimension. As general as it is, the model sheds light on the broad structure of an intellectual virtue. In addition to furthering our understanding in this way, the model can prove useful in other ways. It can, for instance, give us a better sense of what additional questions and issues need to be addressed in order to arrive at an even deeper and more precise understanding of intellectual virtues.10

It can also be useful in the context of “intellectual character education,” that is, in the process of trying to foster growth or progress in intellectual virtues in ourselves or in others (e.g. in an educational setting). By identifying the central dimensions of an intellectual virtue, it provides a clearer account of just where an educator’s focus and efforts need to be directed. It can also be useful in the attempt to understand how successful these educative efforts have been, that is, in trying to measure growth in intellectual virtues. Specifically, it suggests that instead of trying to do so in a holistic or singular manner (an intimidating and perplexing endeavor, to say the least), it might be more effective to measure intellectual character growth along the four specified dimensions, perhaps employing a different measure in connection with each dimension.

Finally, the model may be useful for addressing certain issues or questions within virtue epistemology. To illustrate, in the remainder of this section I explain how the model provides at least a partial resolution to a problem concerning intellectual virtues, epistemic reliability, and epistemic luck.

Within the virtue epistemology literature, two competing claims or intuitions about the reliability of intellectual virtues are regularly countenanced. According to the first, epistemic reliability is an essential—indeed even an uncontroversial—feature of intellectual virtues. The idea, roughly, is that a mere desire for truth or understanding, or

virtuous activity is a way of working out or expressing her love of epistemic goods—a way that is guided and explained the beliefs in question.
even the (mere) attempt to lay hold of such goods, is not sufficient for the possession of an intellectual virtue. Rather, to possess an intellectual virtue, one must, on account of the activity characteristic of the virtue, reliably form true beliefs. Call this the reliability intuition.

There is, of course, something quite compelling about the reliability intuition. However, it must be balanced against a second, also very plausible intuition. Consider an unwitting victim of a Cartesian demon who routinely engages in the sort of intellectual activity we take to be expressive of intellectual virtues. She cares deeply about acquiring knowledge and understanding about a wide range of topics. She asks thoughtful and insightful questions. She notices and attends to important details. She embraces intellectual challenge and struggle. She gives an honest and fair hearing to opposing views. And so on. Such a person has all the internal markers of intellectual virtue. However, these markers are wholly unreliable. Because of the systematic discrepancy between appearance and reality in the demon world, they fail to supply the person with a preponderance of true beliefs. As other authors have noted (e.g. Montmarquet 1993), it remains highly plausible to think of such a person as intellectually virtuous. Her failure to reach the truth is due entirely to bad epistemic luck. From her own point of view, and from that of everyone else in her world, her intellectual activity is reliable. While in reality it is not, this fact is entirely beyond her ken. Particularly if we are committed to thinking of intellectual virtues as personal excellences, the bad luck of the demon victim should not prevent her from possessing any intellectual virtues. Bad luck of the sort in question does not plausibly bear upon one’s goodness or badness qua person. Call this the luck intuition.

Elsewhere (2011: Chs. 6 and 7; 2007) I have defended an internalist account of intellectual virtue according to which reliability is not a requirement for the possession of an intellectual virtue. I will not rehearse the relevant dialectic here. Rather, my aim at present is to show how the four-dimensional model of an intellectual virtue sketched above makes possible at least a partial reconciliation of the reliability and luck intuitions.

Note, first, that CP goes at least some way toward making sense of the reliability intuition. According to this principle, a person possesses an intellectual virtue only if he is competent at the activity characteristic of the virtue in question. This rules out the possibility that a person might be intellectually virtuous while possessing a mere love of
epistemic goods or on account of mere attempts to get at the truth. It requires that intellectually virtuous agents be *competent* at the activities characteristic of the virtues they possess. Put another way, it requires that they reliably engage in certain virtue-relevant activities—even if these activities don’t reliably result in the formation of true beliefs. Moreover, it seems entirely plausible to think that if a person is competent in the manner required by CP (and satisfies MP and JP), then provided that she is operating under reasonably favorable epistemic conditions (e.g. that she is not the victim of a Cartesian demon), she will be epistemically reliable. Thus the four-dimensional model can be viewed as entailing a kind of *conditional* reliability requirement—one that holds only in reasonably epistemically favorable circumstances.

The four-dimensional model also allows us to make sense of the luck intuition. For, it does not entail a strict or unconditional reliability requirement. A demon victim might possess a love of epistemic goods, be competent at asking good questions, probing for understanding, listening openly to competing views, and so on, and be a good judge of when (and to what extent, etc.) to engage in activities. As such, she might be intellectually virtuous according to the model. In this way, the model is also capable of making sense of some familiar and forceful intuitions about epistemic luck.

References


For representative samples from virtue ethics, see Adams (2006) and Hurka (2001). For representative samples from virtue epistemology, see Roberts and Wood (2007) and Baehr (2011).

See Baehr (2011: Ch. 1). The questions and problems central to traditional epistemology generally pertain to the nature, limits, and sources of knowledge. For an approach to virtue epistemology that is “conservative” rather than autonomous, see Zagzebski (1996).

This model bears resemblances to a four-part model of “thinking dispositions” developed by educational psychologist Ron Ritchhart in (2002). Three parts of my model correspond fairly closely to three part’s of Ritchhart’s model; in fact, as I get to below, one part of my model was directly influenced by empirical work conducted by Ritchhart and some of his colleagues at Harvard’s Project Zero. The fourth part of my model is substantially different from the fourth part of Ritchhart’s model.

“Virtue reliabilists” focus primarily on the latter sorts of virtues. For reliabilist approaches to virtue epistemology, see Sosa (2007) and Greco (2010). It is worth noting that the divide between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism appears to be closing, particularly as virtue reliabilists like Sosa (ibid.) are giving greater attention to the role of agency and the
will in the cognitive life. See my (2011: Ch. 4) for more on the relationship between virtue responsibilist and virtue reliabilism.

5 For more on the distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues, see my (2011: Appendix). See also Zagzebski (1996: 137-65).
6 For instance, what I have elsewhere (2013: 114-115) referred to as “negative” virtues (virtues that are manifested in a lack or absence of certain sorts of concerns or actions) may lack what I describe below as the judgment and competence dimensions of an intellectual virtue.
7 Later I will address the sense in which intellectual virtues must be “rooted” in a love of epistemic goods. For more on the precise nature of the orientation in question, see my (Baehr 2011: Ch. 6).
8 This is not to suggest than an especially deep or sharp distinction can be drawn between the two sets of traits. See note 3 above for references on this topic.
9 Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure and intemperance in Book VII brings to mind the possibility of epistemic intemperance or self-indulgence. A person who, say, takes too much pleasure in marking extremely fine but inconsequential distinctions or who delights in the accumulation of trivial knowledge or celebrity gossip may be guilty of this vice. This is a reminder of the fact pleasure in certain epistemic goods or apparent goods can be indicative of intellectual vice. See Battaly (2010) for more on this and related topics.
10 Some such questions, underscored by the foregoing discussion, include: How exactly should a “love” of epistemic goods be understood? Must it be an intrinsic love of such goods or love of them for their own sake? How, more precisely, is the motivational component of an intellectual virtue related to the affective component? Is it really plausible to think that all (or at least most) intellectual virtues involve a unique cognitive competence? How reliable are these competences likely to be in ordinary (non-demon) worlds? How should we understand the epistemic status of the beliefs and related elements of the judgment dimension of intellectual virtues? Must these justified? Must they amount to knowledge?
11 See e.g. Zagzebski (1996: 177-84).
12 Defenders of a reliability requirement sometimes seem to equivocate between the two sorts of requirements just noted. Zagzebski, for instance, says: “[W]e do not call a person virtuous who is not reliably successful herself … So if she is truly open-minded, she must actually be receptive to new ideas, examining them in an evenhanded way and not ruling them out because they are not her own; merely being motivated to act in these ways is not sufficient” (1996: 177). Elsewhere (e.g. 184-94), her focus is clearly on reliability understood as truth-conduciveness.
13 Some might argue that unqualified competence-possession requires a stronger kind of reliability, namely, that the person reliably achieve the final end or goal of the competence in the world she inhabits. On this view, the demon, owing to bad environmental luck, fails to possess the relevant competences. On the view assumed here, by contrast, competence-possession can, to an extent, be separated from considerations of environmental luck. Again, while I am content with saying that the demon victim possesses a competence only if, under favorable environmental conditions, he would reliably form true beliefs, I deny that he must be in such conditions in order to possess the competence. In the end I do not think much hangs on the difference between these two conceptions of a competence. If the more restrictive conception were correct, my claim would simply be that one central
dimension of an intellectual virtue is the possession of something like a *conditional* or *qualified* competence.

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