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Steven J. Mailloux

*Loyola Marymount University*, [steven.mailloux@lmu.edu](mailto:steven.mailloux@lmu.edu)

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# Jesuit *Eloquentia Perfecta* and Theotropic Logology

Steven Mailloux

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**Abstract** This essay takes a rhetorical pragmatist perspective on current questions concerning educational goals and pedagogical practices. It begins by considering some challenges to rhetorical approaches to education, placing those challenges in the theoretical context of their posing. The essay then describes one current rhetorical approach—based on Kenneth Burke’s dramatism and logology—and uses it to understand and redescribe another rhetorical approach—Jesuit teaching of *eloquentia perfecta*. Proceeding in this way, the essay presents both a general theoretical framework for discussing educational aims and a specific practical example of how such aims might be achieved.

**Keywords** Rhetoric · Pragmatism · Kenneth Burke · Jesuit education

## Introduction

Rhetorical theory has long played a prominent role in establishing the purposes of education. From the classical Greek *paideia* through the medieval trivium of the first European universities to the neo-classical curriculum of American colleges in the Golden Age of Oratory, rhetorical thinking contributed to debates over educational policy and pedagogical practice. Only in the twentieth century did rhetorical studies fade from the academic scene of responding to questions like those appearing in the inaugural issue of *Educational Theory*: “How shall we conceive our educational endeavor? At what shall it aim, both generally and specifically? And what kind of educative process promises best to attain these aims?” (Kilpatrick 1951: 2). Today these same questions are being asked with

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S. Mailloux (✉)  
Department of English, Loyola Marymount University, University Hall, 1 LMU Drive, Los Angeles,  
CA 90045, USA  
e-mail: smaillou@lmu.edu

increasing urgency, and new rhetorical approaches are being proposed to address them (Rutten and Soetaert 2012).

In this essay I take a rhetorical pragmatist perspective on current questions about educational purpose (see Mailloux 2011). I begin by considering some challenges to rhetorical approaches to education, placing those challenges in the theoretical context of their posing. I then describe one current rhetorical approach—based on Kenneth Burke’s dramatism and logology—and use it to understand and redescribe another rhetorical approach—Jesuit *eloquentia perfecta*. Proceeding in this way, I hope to present both a theoretical framework for discussing educational aims and a practical example of how such aims might be achieved.

## Rhetorical Education

Gert Biesta’s recent work illustrates how altered disciplinary conditions affect the way basic questions about educational policy are now being asked. In criticizing the dominance of scientific evidence-based approaches, Biesta challenges educators “to reconnect with the question of purpose in education” (Biesta 2009). They should not be valuing just what can be measured, he argues; they should be measuring what they truly value. Biesta himself develops a general framework for discussing the purpose of education, specifying three functions that educational systems perform: qualification, socialization, and subjectification (Biesta 2009). The educational function of *qualification* consists of providing students “with the knowledge, skills and understanding and often also with the dispositions and forms of judgement” that enables them to “do something” within their current society, e.g., train for a job or become an informed citizen. Related to this first function, a second is *socialization*, which “has to do with the many ways in which, through education, we become members of and part of particular social, cultural and political ‘orders.’” The third function that Biesta emphasizes is individualization or what he prefers to call *subjectification*, “becoming a subject.” Biesta characterizes this function as the opposite of socialization. Subjectification “is precisely *not* about the insertion of ‘newcomers’ into existing orders, but about ways of being that hint at independence from such orders; ways of being in which the individual is not simply a ‘specimen’ of a more encompassing order.” Biesta is most concerned about the “quality” of subjectification, that is, “the kind of subjectivity—or kinds of subjectivities—that are made possible as a result of particular educational arrangements and configurations.” He clearly agrees with those who believe that “any education worthy of its name should always contribute to processes of subjectification that allow those being educated to become more autonomous and independent in their thinking and acting” (Biesta 2009: 39–41).

Turning to rhetorical perspectives on education, Biesta challenges educators to go beyond explaining *how* curricula and pedagogies persuade students and instead ask about *why* they should do so (Biesta 2012). He acknowledges the value of rhetorical approaches, including Burke’s dramatism, but questions whether such approaches move effectively from socialization and empowerment to subjectification and emancipation. According to Biesta, both the old and new rhetorics when applied to education emphasize “processes that provide individuals with power to operate within a particular (linguistic, social, cultural, or political) ‘order’” rather than “a process that challenges the particular orders that grant individuals the power to speak and act, so that new ways of speaking and acting, and ultimately new ways of being become possible” (Biesta 2012: 823). That is, rhetorical

education of empowerment ultimately reinforces the established order (and its injustices) instead of changing that order.

The “order” Biesta assumes here is that of a *world*, a context for ways of being, doing, and speaking. But Biesta should be careful in criticizing rhetoric as simply maintaining a past world-order and perhaps be more skeptical about the possibility of transcending such world-orders. Most rhetorical perspectives explicitly recognize that all criticism takes place in a world using the tools of that world’s order. There is no neutral, free-space above and beyond all worlds from which to criticize a particular world-order but rather only various options more or less available within that world for self-criticism (Mailloux 1989). This being the case, the rhetorical choice is never between empowerment and emancipation, but between an empowerment that promotes the possibility of emancipation and one that does not. From a rhetorical pragmatist perspective, empowerment is a condition of possibility for emancipation, and socialization is a prerequisite for subjectification. (Despite emphasizing the contrast between socialization and subjectification, Biesta is not unaware of their overlap or the difficulties I am raising here—see especially Biesta 2006, 2007, 2009: 41.) Another, more paradoxical, way to put the claim is to say that rhetorical conformity is the only way beyond socio-political conformism (cf. Dreyfus 1991: 154–158). Students must know how to use rhetoric effectively in their world, must initially conform to its conventions, in order to transform that world.

Rhetorical approaches also recognize another troublesome aspect of education: the unpredictability of usage and consequences. Like rhetoric in general, rhetorical education can be seen as risky business precisely because it refuses to guarantee its results. From the time of its legendary origins in ancient Syracuse, rhetorical education has been portrayed in contradictory ways, sometimes as conservative defender of tradition and at other times as progressive advocate of change. After the fall of the Syracusan tyrant in 467 BCE, the stories go, Corax invented rhetorical theory to educate the newly-free citizens on how to act in their changing circumstances. In one version Corax was a democrat who rhetorically educated his fellow citizens to enable them to deliberate effectively in the assemblies and argue in the law courts to regain their state-confiscated property; but in another version Corax was an autocratic member of the old tyrant’s retinue and invented rhetoric only to maintain his power and as much of the status quo as possible (Mailloux 1998: xii). Today rhetorical education still offers no guarantees concerning its uses and results, symbol-wise and world-wise—or, better, symbol-wise as world-wise (see Enoch 2004; Biesta 2012). But it also champions phronetic consideration of probabilities. Rhetoric is concerned with interpreting contexts, choosing strategies most likely to work, and acting accordingly.

For a rhetorical pragmatist in education, “what works” must be defined to encompass not simply what is procedurally effective in a specific rhetorical context but also what is consistent with greater educational purposes across multiple contexts. That is, the rhetorical issue is not just what works efficiently in one time and place, but what works long term, in the largest sense, including that of educational purpose. The means and ends of educational persuasion must work together. What counts as “effective” teaching or “achieved” learning outcomes is only so when the chosen educational methods are considered the most probable means for achieving results consistent with carefully-discerned educational purposes. In other words, the truth about education resides in the contextual imbrication of methods and purposes. If this just sounds like educational common sense, it is a common sense that needs emphasis in any historical period that either overstresses measurable efficiency without purpose or advocates purposeful indoctrination without choice. Here it is useful to recall William James’s definition of truth: “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite,

assignable reasons” (James 1978: 42). The truth of educational practice and policy is dependent on what we believe to be the purpose of education, what we are trying to achieve and how we are trying to achieve it. A rhetorical approach to education embraces this challenge and provides tools for accomplishing it in practice and thinking about it in theory.

### Burkean Symbolic Action

One such rhetorical approach develops out of Kenneth Burke’s dramatism and logology. His famous definition of humans as “bodies that learn language” is based on an ontological distinction between symbolic action and non-symbolic motion, which then grounds his linguistic approach to education (Burke 1978, 1984). Symbolic action is the domain of the humanities and social sciences or what Burke calls the “verbal” and “socio-political” fields of inquiry; and non-symbolic motion is the domain of physical and biological sciences or the “natural” fields. But on the meta-level the verbal or linguistic perspective can be applied to all these disciplinary fields insofar as their practices, theories, and traditions involve symbolic action. More specifically, Burke’s rhetorical emphasis on *terminologies* through which the world is interpreted suggests both a general curricular structure for organizing academic disciplines and a specific pedagogical method for engaging students and treating subject matter (Burke 1966: 44–62).

In his “Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education,” Burke made his most concentrated application of the dramatisitic perspective to educational theory and practice. Here I emphasize just one aspect of that application, what might be called his *rhetorical hermeneutics of terms*. Most generally, a rhetorical hermeneutics deals with the intersection of language use and making sense, rhetoric and interpretation (Mailloux 2006). Burke’s terminological version consists of an interpretive theory for making sense of rhetorical practice (a dramatisitic pentad) and a rhetorical account for interpretations of reality (a theory of terministic screens through which humans make sense of the world). Burke’s dramatisitic theory uses the terminology of drama (act, agent, agency, scene, purpose and their various ratios) to interpret symbolic action, and in his logology (words about words) he rhetorically analyzes the terminological ensembles of various domains of human activity (Burke 1969, 2003). In his “Linguistic Approach” essay, Burke explores the educational implications of four terminological orders or pyramids. In addition to the verbal, the social, and the natural, Burke also includes the supernatural and notes that each terminological realm has its own distinctive words and phrases and also borrows from the other realms (Burke 2010: 27–28; see Burke 1966: 359–379). What he says about a social philosophy he recommends more generally: “we should set out dramatisitically to analyze the structure of its statements, considered as symbolic acts.” We should “ask what terministic devices are used here, how they combine, etc.” Thus, “a linguistic point of view...confronts a *practical* use of language for rhetorical effect by a *theoretical* study of such usage” (Burke 2010: 24). Logology is a theoretical study of the practical usage of terms in and across different terminological realms. Viewed logologically, dramatism is a perspective on human behavior that privileges the terms of drama (an agent acts in a scene through an agency for a purpose); viewed dramatisitically, logology is the study of the use and abuse of terms in symbolic action.

One part of Burke’s “Linguistic Approach” essay provides an especially useful orientation for applying his dramatisitic logology to other traditions of rhetorical education. In the “School and Religion” section, Burke argues that “the study of religion fits perfectly

with the approach to education in terms of symbolic action” (Burke 2010: 33). Religious discourse, in particular theology, presents multiple examples of terminological ingenuity, its depth and scope. Indeed, for Burke “the language of religion is the most central subject matter for the study of human relations in terms of symbolic action,” and “the long tradition of religion provides us with a field of study as vital and as sweeping as the over-all history of human culture itself” (34). But in a world of conflicting religious and secular faiths, how can the linguistic study of religion proceed in our educational institutions? Burke proposes that such study should not be substantively doctrinal but rather terminologically formal. “That is, it does not ask: ‘Is such a doctrine literally *true* or *false*?’ Rather, it asks, ‘what are the relationships prevailing among the key terms of this doctrine?’ And: ‘Can we adapt the terminology to other terminologies, at least somewhat?’” (35). Burke promotes his own dramatic perspective as a formal meta-terminology to analyze the symbolic activities of the many religious persuasions on the global scene by comparing, contrasting, and mutually translating their terminological configurations. These different religious terminologies, for example, “have charted with especial urgency and thoroughness the problems of ‘sin’ and ‘redemption’ as these take form against a background of hierarchal order” (35). How do such terminological charts interrelate? What are their similarities and differences, their terminological borrowings and rejections, their past rhetorical histories, present overlaps and tensions, their future possibilities of common linguistic sharing or even conversion?

Burke makes additional claims about “secular religions” such as the political ideologies of capitalism and communism. “These, too, are terminologies of action, hence essentially ‘dramatic’ in structure—and whatever their vast disagreements, they can at least meet in terms of their nature as terminologies of action.” Burke admits that his approach won’t resolve specific issues that lead to direct collisions between political enemies. This is an impossible request to make of any educational method. “But one can ask that it provide a positive equivalent for the area of commonality which even opponents must share, if they are to join the same battle.” Regarding both religious and secular faiths, Burke concludes: “Where the various ‘persuasions’ are brought together, what topic surely transcends them all but the question of persuasion itself?” (Burke 2010: 36).

Six years after his 1955 “Linguistic Approach” essay appeared, Burke published his most extensive logological study of religion. Burke’s *Rhetoric of Religion* develops what might be called a *theotropic logology*, words about words about God (Mailloux 2012). Burke’s rhetorical hermeneutics here treats God-talk as language-talk. He notes that his book is “concerned not directly with religion, but rather with the *terminology* of religion” and once again affirms his logological thesis “that, since the theological use of language is thorough, the close study of theology and its forms will provide us with good insight into the nature of language itself as a motive” (Burke 1970: vi). Thus, he says, “We are to be concerned with the analogy between ‘words’ (lower case) and The Word (*Logos, Verbum*) as it were in caps” (Burke 1970: 7).

## Jesuit Rhetoric

We can use Burke’s theotropic logology to redescribe a far older rhetorical approach to education. The Society of Jesus, known as the Jesuits, was established in 1540 as a missionary order that soon became involved in rhetorical education. Emerging out of European Renaissance humanism, Jesuit rhetoric aimed to produce a Christian version of the classical ideal orator, a good person writing and speaking well for the common good.

The 1599 *Ratio Studiorum* presented the Jesuit educational framework, including Rules for the Professors of Rhetoric. The rhetoric class had the aim of instructing students to “perfect eloquence.” It combined written and oral rhetoric, focusing on oratory and poetry while promoting both useful skills and cultural enrichment. Students learned the general precepts and stylistic practices of the Greco-Roman classical tradition and joined them with erudition derived from Church doctrine and “study of the history and customs of nations” (“*Ratio*” 1933: 208–209). All of this rhetorical education was adjusted to the abilities of individual students, exemplifying the famous Jesuit accommodationism that adapted rhetoric to the audiences of the Society’s various ministries of the Word (O’Malley 1993: 255–256).

Up until at least the early twentieth century, rhetorical education remained central to the Jesuit *paideia* in schools throughout the world. During the last few years in the United States, several of the twenty-eight Jesuit colleges and universities have attempted to revitalize this rhetorical tradition, especially in relation to core curriculum reform (Clarke 2011; Schroth 2013). These attempts at rhetorical education have incorporated the educational purposes presented in documents such as “The Characteristics of Jesuit Education” and “Ignatian Pedagogy: A Practical Approach” (Duminuco 2000: 161–293). The aim of Jesuit education is “the fullest possible development of every dimension of the person, linked to the development of a sense of values and a commitment to the service of others which gives priority to the needs of the poor and is willing to sacrifice self-interest for the promotion of justice” (Duminuco 2000: 198). This purpose can be redescribed as empowerment within the world-order working toward the emancipation of self and others. As Pedro Arrupe, the Jesuit Superior General, put it: “The excellence which we seek consists in producing men and women of right principles, personally appropriated; men and women open to the signs of the times, in tune with their cultural milieu and its problems; men and women for others” (quoted in Duminuco 2000: 198, n 56). This educational purpose underwrites the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm of context, experience, reflection, action, and evaluation (Duminuco 2000: 251).

The new teaching of Jesuit *eloquentia perfecta* works within these redescribed educational aims and pedagogical strategies, explicitly combining training in the language arts with critical thinking and moral reflection. Jesuit ways of rhetorically proceeding, both old and new, have developed out of terminology used in the central formation text composed by the Society’s founder, the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius Loyola. This guide to vocational choice is a series of meditative and contemplative practices performed by a retreatant working with a director. Burke’s theotropic logology can serve as a framework for understanding the shared rhetoric of the *Spiritual Exercises* and Ignatian pedagogy as well as an instrument to be used within the theory and practice of Jesuit *eloquentia perfecta*.

Advocates of the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm present it “in light of the *Spiritual Exercises*” as a “fitting description of the continual interplay of experience, reflection and action in the teaching–learning process” and also as “an ideal portrayal of the dynamic interrelationship of teacher and learner in the latter’s journey of growth in knowledge and freedom” (Duminuco 2000: 245). Moreover, “the active role of the person making the *Exercises* is the model for the active role of the student” in self-reflection, personal development, imaginative creativity, and public interaction, while “the progression in the *Exercises* is one source of the practical, disciplined, ‘means to end’ approach that is characteristic of Jesuit education” (Duminuco 2000: 213). When we look more closely at the terms of contemporary Jesuit education, we find certain repeated phrases and slogans: *cura personalis* (care of the individual person), *magis* (doing more), “finding God in all

things,” “service of faith that promotes justice,” and “men and women for others” (see Traub 2002). But just as important from a Burkean perspective is the playing out of terminological cycles within the Jesuit way of proceeding. For example, Burke’s terminological Cycle of Order is prominent in the *Spiritual Exercises* and has implications for rhetorical education.

In his logological analysis of Genesis in the Christian Bible, Burke examines the term *order* by asking what other key terms are “tautologically” implied by it. He immediately notes that there is a “strategic ambiguity” in the application of the term *order* whereby it can be employed in both the natural and socio-political realms, the domains of non-symbolic motion and symbolic action (Burke 1970: 183). One can speak of the natural order of things, but also of the human order of socio-political institutions that enable the giving of orders. Burke is especially interested in the way word-orders mutually affect each other through rhetorical borrowings and translations, how, for example, “a vision of the natural order can become infused with the genius of the verbal and socio-political orders” (185). He thus describes “from the purely logological point of view” the Genesis account of creation: a daily “kind of enactment done through the medium of God’s ‘Word’” in which “the sheerly ‘natural’ order contains a verbal element or principle that, from the purely empirical point of view, could belong only in the socio-political order” (185).

Burke elaborates the terminological Cycle of Order in various directions. On the one hand, *order* simply implies its opposite, *disorder*, in both the natural and socio-political domains. But, on the other hand, order as a verbal command within the socio-political implies a response of obedience or disobedience. Then “we have the proportion: Order is to Disorder as Obedience is to Disobedience” (186). Burke looks further into “the *act* of Disobedience” and comes up with “the need for some such term as ‘Pride,’ to name the corresponding *attitude* that precedes the act. And some such term as ‘Humility’ names the idea of the attitude that leads into the act of Obedience” (187). From here Burke proceeds to the implicit idea within the distinction between Obedience and Disobedience, what he calls “the idea of some dividing line, some ‘watershed’ that is itself midway between the two slopes.” The term often “used for naming this ambiguous moment is ‘Will,’ or more fully, ‘Free Will,’ which is thought of as a faculty that makes possible the choice between the yea-saying of Humble Obedience or the nay-saying of Proud Disobedience” (187). Burke goes on to spin out the cycle of terms around *order* and apply it in an interpretation of the Genesis narrative, but I will stop here and turn to the way the cycle relates to the central text of the Jesuit way of rhetorically proceeding.

Ignatius gives the aim of the *Spiritual Exercises*: “to overcome oneself, and to order one’s life, without reaching a decision through some disordered affection” (Ignatius of Loyola 1992: 31). The order/disorder opposition serves to frame both the ends and the means of the exercises, as the retreatant is instructed to pray that all his or her “intentions, actions, and operations may be ordered purely to the service and praise” of God (40). In attempting this ordering of life, the retreatant must examine the interior ordering of his or her mental and spiritual states, developing the right attitude toward the world as a means to an end and being sensitive to one’s inner “motions” in performing the meditations and contemplations. The proper Ignatian attitude toward the world is that of “indifference,” not in the sense of being uncaring about the world (quite the contrary) but rather in the sense of being neutral toward its affordances (e.g., opportunities for wealth and honor) that become obstacles to one’s ultimate goal of salvation or self-flourishing in the divine plan (32). In its directions for self-examination, Ignatian terminology illustrates Burke’s point about how one word-order borrows from another, in this case the use of natural “motion” to describe workings of human interiority: What are the inner motions during meditations and

contemplations? What do they tell the retreatant about what direction to take? How do they result in spiritual “consolation” or “desolation” (122)? In all of these orderings, we see the way the *Spiritual Exercises* function as technologies of the self, rhetorical techniques that work toward a specific subject formation (Foucault 1986, Hadot 1995). Ultimately, the subject formed is one who is empowered to resist certain self-interested affordances in the world and turn instead toward an emancipatory service to God in serving others.

The Ignatian spin on the terminological Cycle of Order carries over into the Jesuit educational project, including its rhetorical teaching and learning. As the authors of “Ignatian Pedagogy” put it, the *Spiritual Exercises* are “rigorous exercises of the spirit wholly engaging the body, mind, heart and soul of the human person. Thus they offer not only matters to be pondered, but also realities to be contemplated, scenes to be imagined, feelings to be evaluated, possibilities to be explored, options to be considered, alternatives to be weighed, judgments to be reached and choices of action to be made—all with the expressed aim of helping individuals to seek and find the will of God at work in the radical *ordering* of their lives” (Duminuco 2000: 245–246, emphasis added). This ordering takes place in various specific practices that have pedagogical applications, such as the composition of place and the discernment of spirits (Ignatius of Loyola 1992: 40, 126–128). Translated into secular terms, these applications include the imaginative placing of oneself into a narrative and taking a lesson from the experience and the phronetic deliberation on the motives of one’s actions as well as their effects.

Within this conception of Jesuit education redescribed in Burkean terms, Jesuit *eloquentia perfecta* achieves three major aims of education—the pragmatic, the admonitory, and the appreciative—through training in rhetorical skills, moral reflection, and aesthetic appreciation (Burke 2010: 14, 28). The rhetorical skills taught continue to build on the Greco-Roman tradition but are now informed by contemporary communication theory and composition research. Moral reflection includes not only using Jesuit discernment strategies for rhetorical invention, but also theoretical discussion that combines traditional Jesuit casuistry with revitalized philosophical analysis in contemporary Virtue Ethics (see Maryks 2008, Harrington and Keenan 2002, 2010). And whereas the *Ratio Studiorum* description of rhetorical study emphasized only oratory and poetry, today’s Jesuit rhetorical classroom deals with the appreciation of multiple genres in different media. With his usual imaginative flare, Burke once described the pragmatic, admonitory, and appreciative aims of education as “secular or technical analogues of the trinitarian three: ‘power,’ ‘wisdom,’ and ‘love’” (Burke 2010: 28). Jesuit rhetorical education encompasses both sides of Burke’s analogy.

In addition, Jesuit rhetoric under a Burkean redescription helps meet certain philosophical challenges to the old and new rhetorics applied in education. Citing Donald Davidson’s “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (Davidson 1984),” Biesta criticizes rhetorical meta-perspectives for emphasizing perspectivity, arguing that it is simply untenable to distinguish between perspectival frames of reference and the empirical content of our experience. Abandoning this scheme-content distinction, he claims,

raises serious questions for the [rhetorical] idea that it is possible to become ‘symbol-wise’ or that inter/multi/transcultural education should focus on gaining knowledge about each other’s frames of reference. While this does not mean that we cannot learn from each other, this can, in my view, no longer be understood as a process in which we become acquainted with each other’s *perspectives* on the world. Instead, it has to be seen as a process through which we become acquainted with each other’s *worlds*.

As educators, we should emphasize becoming “world-wise” rather than rhetorically “symbol-wise” (Biesta 2012: 821).

Jesuit rhetoric can respond to this challenge in two complimentary ways. First, Jesuit rhetorical accommodationism has for centuries promoted educational “dialogue across difference” in its cross-cultural missionary work, not only by learning and describing native languages but by practicing the language arts through immersion more generally in the rich world of others’ cultural practices (rituals, dress, etc.). Indeed, as mentioned above, Jesuit rhetorical education included early on the suggestion to study the “customs of nations” in its rules for teaching *eloquentia perfecta* (“Ratio” 1933: 208–209). To be symbol-wise is to be world-wise. Second, a world-wise Jesuit rhetoric can redescribe Burke’s symbol-wise terminological method and avoid using the scheme-content distinction. Burke’s notion of “terministic screen” is usually taken to refer to a *lens through which* reality is viewed, a linguistic version of a conceptual scheme *between* viewer and world. In contrast, Jesuit rhetorical practice (and rhetorical pragmatist theory) treat terminologies as *tools by way of which* an actor acts in a world in dealing with self and others. Actors, language-use, and worlds are primordially co-constituted. (Cf. Dreyfus 1991: 220–221; Rorty 1989.) So, again, to be symbol-wise is to be world-wise—and vice versa.

## Conclusion

By focusing on Jesuit rhetorical education, its theory and practice, I am suggesting that it is not sufficient to talk in general about educational purpose and its intended accomplishments. Rather, it is necessary to talk about a specific example and then use it as something like an informative or representative anecdote for educational thinking (Burke 1969: 59–61). Understood from a dramatistic–logological perspective, Jesuit educational theory and practice represent one powerful way to answer the questions with which I began: How should we conceive the purpose of education today? What should be its aims and how might they best be attained? With *eloquentia perfecta* at its core, Jesuit rhetorical education not only presents its own concrete answers to these questions; it also offers resources of thought to other educational approaches, especially as those resources get terminologically translated within the Burkean framework of theotropic logology.

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