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Invisible Hurdles: Gender and Institutional Differences in the Evaluation of Economics Papers

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Abstract

How might the visibility of an author's name and/or institutional affiliation allow bias to enter the evaluation of economics papers? We ask highly qualified journal editors to review abstracts of solo-authored papers which differ along the dimensions of gender and institution of the author. We exogenously vary whether editors observe the name and/or institution of the author. We identify positive name visibility effects for female economists and positive institution visibility effects for economists at the top institutions. Our results suggest that male economists at top institutions benefit the most from non-blind evaluations, followed by female economists (regardless of their institution).

JEL Codes: A14, I23, J16

Keywords: blind review, bias, institution, gender, publication, experiment

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I. Introduction

Tenure decisions in economics are almost exclusively tied to the quality and number of publications in peer-reviewed journals. Research has shown that gender and the institution of economists correlate with the publication output. Compared to male economists, female economists publish fewer articles overall (Ginther and Kahn 2004), publish less frequently in top journals (Hamermesh 2013), and are cited less by articles in the top journals (Koffi 2021). Compared to economists at lower-ranked institutions, economists at top institutions publish more articles (Oyer 2006), give more invited talks, especially at top institutions (Doleac, Hengel, and Pancotti 2021)[1], and are more likely to become members of selective networks, such as NBER (Kleemans and Thornton 2021).[2] Furthermore, compared to publications in other social science disciplines, publications in economics are more concentrated among authors from top departments (Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan 2015).

There could be many reasons for differences in research productivity, including differences in time use (Xie and Shauman 2003; Taylor, Fender, and Burke 2006; Harter, Becker, and Watts 2011; Manchester and Barbezat 2013), differences in access to resources and networks (McDowell, Singell, and Stater 2006; Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham 2017; Carrell, Figlio, and Lusher 2022), and differences in fields of specialization (Sierminska and Oaxaca 2021; Fortin, Lemieux, and Rehavi 2021). Another possible explanation is discrimination against female researchers or researchers at lower-ranked institutions, which can be explicit (overt bias) or implicit (unintentional bias). Any such discrimination will have long-lasting effects on the careers of these researchers. Bias that generates favoritism for male economists or economists at top institutions leads to a less diverse set of economists overall. Having a more diverse set of faculty members in economics is important to ensure proper representation and a broader diversity of views to influence economic policy recommendations, group dynamics, and undergraduate selection into the major, in addition to numerous other benefits to departments and the discipline itself.

The study presented herein utilizes an experiment with a novel set of subjects – journal editors – to examine whether the visibility of the author's name or institution affects editors' evaluations of economics papers. First, we find that editors evaluate female-authored papers more positively when the name of the author is visible to them compared to when it is not. Second, editors evaluate papers of authors from top-institutions more positively when they see the institution of

[1] For example, Doleac, Hengel, and Pancotti (2021) find that 59 percent of the seminars given in top-25 departments were by economists with a top-25 affiliation.

[2] Kleemans and Thornton (2021) document that NBER membership is very concentrated. 50% of NBER members work in one of the 12 universities and 50% of NBER members have their PhDs from one of the 5 universities.

the author compared to when they do not. Comparing evaluations of editors who see the institution and the name of the author to editors who do not see this information, we find that the institution visibility differentially affects male authors at top and non-top institutions but follows a similar pattern for female authors at top and non-top institutions. This last result is partially driven by the pre-existing gender inequalities in the top economics departments.

To properly test for the potential biases resulting from name or institution visibility during the publication process, we employ a unique population of experts: journal editors. We recruit editors from the top 100 journals in economics as the subject pool. Editors receive 8 abstracts that belong to solo-authored economics papers across various fields in economics. Each editor/subject sees a randomized set of abstracts from two male authors at top institutions, two male authors at non-top institutions, two female authors at top institutions and two female authors at non-top institutions. Editors are randomly assigned into one of the four treatments (across subject design): blind, visible name, visible institution, visible name & institution. Editors evaluate the same abstracts across treatments and the treatments differ only in terms of whether the name and/or institutional affiliation of the author are displayed to the editors.[3] In each treatment, editors are asked about their guesses on each paper's publication status, their estimate for the paper's number of citations, and their evaluation of the overall quality of the paper. At the end of the experiment, we collect demographic information from the editors.

Although solo-authored papers are no longer common in economics, we choose to focus on solo-authored papers because they provide the cleanest comparison across treatments.[4] The literature shows the presence of biases in both co-authorship formation and co-authorship credit. Hussey, Murray, and Stock (2022) document significant gender differences in the formation of co-authorship and Jones, Wuchty, and Uzzi (2008) find that authors from elite institutions collaborate amongst themselves and do not collaborate with authors at lower-ranked institutions. Sarsons et al. (2021) find that female economists are penalized for co-authored work when it comes to tenure and promotion decisions while male economists are not. Given these biases in the co-authorship process, our focus on solo-authored papers allows us to cleanly isolate the effects of name (revealing gender) and institution visibility.

Overall, we find a positive name visibility effect for female authors and a positive institution visibility effect for authors at top institutions. In particular, editors in the Visible Name treatment

[3] Throughout the experiment, real names and real institutional affiliations of the authors are used. We only include the abstracts that are associated with authors whose names are clearly recognizable as male or female.
[4] Jones (2021) documents that 80 percent of economics papers were solo authored in 1960s whereas solo-authored papers only represent 26 percent of all economics papers and 22 percent of economics papers at top 5 journals as of 2018.

evaluate the abstracts of female authors 0.26 standard deviation (sd) more positively compared to editors in the Blind treatment (p-value=0.035), whereas we are unable to detect such an effect for male-authored abstracts. Similarly, editors in the Visible Institution treatment evaluate the abstracts of authors from top institutions 0.25 sd more positively compared to editors in the Blind treatment (p-value=0.017), whereas we are unable to detect such an effect for the abstracts of authors from non-top institutions. Finally, editors in the Visible Name and Institution treatment evaluate abstracts of male authors at top institutions 0.38 sd more positively compared to the editors in the Blind treatment (p-value=0.004) whereas we observe negative (but not statistically significant) name and institution visibility effects for abstracts of male authors at non-top institutions. Our results suggest that male economists at top institutions benefit the most from non-blind evaluations (i.e., having their name and institution revealed to reviewers), followed by female economists regardless of the level of their institution. Male economists at non-top institutions benefit the least from having this information revealed, as their papers are likely to be evaluated lower as a result.[5] The statistically significant differences in the evaluation of a paper depending on whether the name and/or institution is visible provide evidence of bias in the publication process.

This paper contributes to a growing literature on gender bias and institutional bias in academia. There is already a sizable literature on gender disparities across different ladders of academia. Women in STEM, including economics, have fewer publications than men at equivalent stages of their career (Ceci et al. 2014). Furthermore, the literature shows that women economists are held to a higher standard in the publication process (Hengel 2022; Card et al. 2019). A commonly proposed solution to this problem is blind reviews. However, there is mixed evidence on whether blind reviews will reduce the gender gap in the publication process.[6] Blank (1991) conducted a randomized control trial with one of the top journals in economics and found no statistically significant gender differences in the acceptance rates whether the referees knew the identity of the author or not. This lack of significance may have been due to the sample size being too small to detect the 2.8% effect size produced in the study. In a laboratory experiment, Krawczyk and Smyk (2016) found that student subjects assessed the same paper as having lower quality when the female co-author of the paper was disclosed compared to when the male co-author of the paper was disclosed, revealing biases generated by a non-blind review which disclosed gender of the other author. Our paper contributes to this literature by testing for potential gender bias using a carefully controlled experiment with a unique subject pool of highly qualified evaluators.

[5] These findings are in line with Kleemans and Thornton (2021), who show that males have a lower chance of becoming an NBER member than females after controlling for institutional rank and research productivity.

[6] Nakamura et al. (2021) show that there is also mixed evidence on this issue in disciplines other than economics. Although some papers found that blinding reduces gender disparities, others find that it does not help. An explanation for these mixed results is given by Uchida (2021). Uchida (2021) shows that whether blinding will work or not in reducing gender disparities depends on the overall acceptance rates of the publication venues.

Compared to the literature on gender bias, there is scant literature that explores institutional bias in academia. In an audit-style study with psychology journals, Peters and Ceci (1982) show that most of the previously published papers in top journals get rejected when they are submitted under a fake name and institution. Blank (1991) found that economists from departments ranked between 5 and 50 are evaluated more positively under non-blind review when compared to blind review. Murray et al. (2016) show that fewer research grants are awarded to authors from smaller, lower-ranked universities. Conducting a randomized experiment in the context of a selective computer science conference, Tomkins, Zhang, and Heavlin (2017) show that non-blind reviews compared to blind reviews result in higher acceptance rates for papers with authors from top universities. We contribute to this literature by documenting that the institutional bias in economics publishing is likely to be an important issue. This finding is in line with the Matthew effect in science (Merton 1968), which shows that disproportionate praise is given to already prominent scientists and argues that this will further increase the prominence of scientists at top institutions (and to reduce the prominence of scientists at non-top institutions). We further contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence that the effect of the institution visibility differs by the gender of the author.[7]

II. Experimental Design

a. Recruitment Pool

We recruit editors of economic journals as our subjects, since journal editors are the ones who decide whether a paper will be sent for a review (or desk rejected) and whether a paper will be accepted at the end of the review process. To create our recruitment pool, we start with a ranked list of top 100 journals by simple impact factors downloaded from RePEc. Then, we choose 42 journals from this list (see Appendix Table 1 Columns 1 and 2 for a list of these journals and their corresponding ranks). From each journal's website, we collect names and email addresses of the editors, co-editors, associate editors, board of editors, and board of reviewers.[8] If the email addresses are not reported on the journal's websites, we find the email addresses either on the personal websites or on department websites of the editors.

This exercise gives us a list of 1029 editors. Some editors appear more than once in our list since they serve on the editorial board of more than one journal. Dropping these duplicates and dropping the editors whose abstracts are used in the experiment, we have a list of 981 unique

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[7] Only a limited number of papers in the literature explore the effects of the interaction between gender and institutional affiliation. Recently, Ginther and Kahn (2021) document that female economists are less likely to get tenure compared to male economists in less research-intensive institutions, whereas there is no gender difference in tenure rates in high research-intensive institutions.

[8] We exclude editors whose affiliations are outside of the U.S. since our payments are through Amazon gift cards which can only be used in Amazon's U.S. store.

editors in our recruitment pool (see Appendix Table 1 Column 4 for the number of editors in our recruitment pool from each journal).

b. Abstract Selection

To select the abstracts for the experiment, we scrape all abstracts that were posted on SSRN Economics Research Network in 2013.[9] We restrict our sample to sole-authored papers. This exercise gives us 2552 papers. We delete the repeat appearances of a paper as well as papers with a title or abstract in a foreign language. Then, we use a website (https://genderize.io), which calculates the probability that a name is male or female based on the data on the internet and provides the number of occurrences of the name. For example, Michael is a male name with probability 0.99 with 245,870 occurrences, whereas Georgy is a male name with probability 0.57 with 1117 occurrences. For the names that do not appear on this website, we do a Google search of the author and categorize the author's sex based on photo or bio of the author (if available). We drop the names for which we cannot determine the sex of the author, the names which have a probability less than 0.95 according to genderize.io website, and the names which have 30 or fewer occurrences according to genderize.io website. This process gives us 1806 papers with 1380 unique author names, of which 212 are female names.

To use the author names that are easily recognizable as female or male, we conduct an association survey with Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (Mturkers). We make 12 lists with 115 unique names in each list. For each list, we recruit 20 Mturkers and we ask each Mturker to guess whether a name is female or male (incentivized). They are paid $2.00 for completing the survey and $0.05 for each accurate guess. We drop the papers associated with the names that have less than 80% accuracy. We end up 1576 papers, 216 of which belong to female authors.

To choose the final list of abstracts, we select 4 female-authored and 4 male-authored papers from each JEL category.[10] Then, for each of these 112 abstracts, we classify them according to author's institutional affiliation (top US academic, non-top US academic, international academic, or non-academic) and we collect data on whether and in which journal the associated papers were published and the number of citations the associated papers had by the end of 2019. At this point, 15 of the papers were published in journals that do not appear in the rankings we used

[9] We thank Graham Beattie for scraping these abstracts. Initially, we tried to use the NBER working paper directory. When we scraped the NBER working papers posted in 2010, we found that out of 200 authors who posted a sole authored paper, only 20 were females. Furthermore, these females were almost all from top universities whereas male authors were from a larger range of selective universities. Since we needed variation both in the gender and the institution of the authors, we decided to use a less selective working paper directory.

[10] There were not enough papers to choose in each JEL category, so we combined some JEL categories together. In particular, we had 14 JEL categories: A, B, C, D, E&P, F, G&M, H, I, J, K, L, O, Q&R&Z. Even with these combined categories, it was difficult to find papers with a female author from a top institution.

(RePEc simple impact factors); hence, we exclude those papers. Among the remaining papers, 19 of the female-authored papers (3 from top US institutions, 6 from non-top US institutions, and 10 from international or non-academic institutions) and 21 of the male-authored papers (6 from top US institutions, 11 from non-top US institutions, and 4 from international or non-academic institutions) were published, whereas the remaining 57 papers were not published. From this pool, we select *two* sets of eight abstracts so that: (1) in each set, we have 2 abstracts with a male author from a top institution (a top 20 academic institution in the US or a top international academic institution), 2 abstracts with a female author from a top institution, 2 abstracts with a male author from a non-top US academic institution, and 2 abstracts with a female author from a non-top US academic institution, (2) we have balance in terms of the JEL codes, actual citation metrics, and actual publication rankings as much as possible, and (3) we include published papers whenever possible (See Appendix Table 2).[11] For example, we only had three published papers by female authors at US top academic institutions and we used all three of them in our final list.

c. Treatments

Figure 1 depicts the treatments. Editors are randomly assigned into one of the four treatments: *blind (T1)*, *visible name (T2)*, *visible institution (T3)*, *visible name & institution (T4).* Editors' treatment assignment stays fixed during the experiment (across subject design). Editors in all treatments receive two abstracts that belong to male authors at non-top institutions, two abstracts that belong to male authors at top institutions, two abstracts that belong to female authors at non-top institutions, two abstracts that belong to female authors at top institutions. Editors in all treatments evaluate the same abstracts and treatments only differ in terms of whether the editors see the author's name and/or institutional affiliation. Author's real names and real institutional affiliations are used. In the *Blind* treatment, editors do not receive any information about the author of the paper. In the *Visible Name* treatment, editors see the name of the author. In the *Visible Institution* treatment, editors see the institutional affiliation of the author. In the *Visible Name & Institution* treatment, editors see both the name and the institutional affiliation of the author. Editors do not receive information about in which capacity the authors are affiliated with the institutions.[12]

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[11] Thirteen out of the sixteen working papers we used in the experiment got published by the end of 2019. The title of the working paper and the published paper were the same for eleven manuscripts and only slightly different for the remaining two. The abstract of the working paper and the abstract of the published paper were identical in ten of the thirteen papers. There does not seem to be a correlation between the author's gender and/or affiliation and how close the published title and abstract are to the ones in the working paper version or how long it took to publish the paper.

[12] See the surveys for each treatment: http://mylmu.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_8kTn9FxDMniMXZk (Blind), http://mylmu.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_4TJFM0wUgBpYhrE (Visible Name), http://mylmu.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_7V8GSOuCTL4QOjA (Visible Institution), http://mylmu.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_exke5SPFb2o0P30 (Visible Name & Institution).

Figure 1: Treatments

		Institutional Affiliation of the Author	
		Not Visible	**Visible**
Name of the Author	**Not Visible**	**Blind (Treatment 1)** Abstract 1 Year Posted: 2013	**Visible Institution (Treatment 3)** Abstract 1 Affiliation of the Author: [redacted] Year Posted: 2013
	Visible	**Visible Name (Treatment 2)** Abstract 1 Author: [redacted] Year Posted: 2013	**Visible Name & Institution (Treatment 4)** Abstract 1 Author: [redacted] Affiliation of the Author: [redacted] Year Posted: 2013

Notes: This figure depicts the treatment assignments. Each editor is randomly assigned to one of the four treatments (across subject design). Editors in all treatments evaluate the same abstracts but treatments differ in terms of whether the editors see the author's name and/or institutional affiliation before evaluating the abstracts. Editors in all treatments receive information about when the abstract was posted on SSRN (which was the same for all abstracts). In Treatment 1, editors do not receive any other information. In Treatment 2, editors see the name of the author. In Treatment 3, editors see the institution of the author. In Treatment 4, editors see both the name and the institution of the author. Titles of the abstracts are not shown to the editors in any of the treatments.

d. Randomization

We conducted a stratified randomization based on the rankings of the journals with which the editors in our recruitment pool are associated. To do so, we first categorize the journals into four strata based on their rankings so that we have an approximately equal number of editors in the recruitment pool in each category (see Appendix Table 1 Column 3 for the stratum of each journal). Within each stratum, we randomly assign the editors in the recruitment pool to one of the waves of the experiment.[13] Then, within each wave and strata, we randomly assign the editors in our recruitment pool into one of the four treatments such that we have an equal number of editors from the recruitment pool in our treatments. Editors who participate the experiment were then randomly assigned to evaluate either Set 1 or Set 2 of the abstracts and the abstracts were shown in a random order.

[13] The experiment was conducted in four waves. Wave 1: May 4, 2020-May 18, 2020, Wave 2: May 25, 2020-June 8, 2020, Wave 3: June 15, 2020-June 29, 2020, and Wave 4: July 6, 2020-July 20, 2020.

e. Evaluation Questions

We ask editors to evaluate the paper associated with each abstract by answering the four questions listed below (See Appendix III.d for screenshots of these questions).

1. [Actual Publication Question] "Do you think that this paper **was published** and **if yes, where was it published** as of December 2019?" (answer choices: Top 5, 6-25, 26-50, 51-75, 76-100, 101-150, 150+, Not Published)

2. [Optimal Publication Question] "Do you think that this paper **should have been published** and **if yes, where should it have been published** as of December 2019?" (answer choices: Top 5, 6-25, 26-50, 51-75, 76-100, 101-150, 150+, Not Published)

3. [Actual Citation Question] "How many citations do you think this paper **had** as of December 2019?" (answer choices: 0-10, 11-20, 21-35, 36-50, 51-75, 76-100, More than 100)

4. [Subjective Quality Question] "In your opinion, what is the overall quality of this paper?" (answer choices: 7-item Likert Scale)

For the actual publication and optimal publication questions, we provide the editors with a link to the ranking of the journals we use so that all editors evaluate the abstracts according to the same ranking.[14] We include the actual citation question since citations are widely used as a proxy for the quality of publications and are potentially important for access to new opportunities and for career progression (Hamermesh 2018). The actual publication and actual citation questions are more likely to tap into the editors' perceptions on what biases exist in the profession. For example, an unbiased editor who believes that there is discrimination against females in the profession might state a paper's publication and citation metrics will be worse for a female-authored abstract under T2 compared to what they would state under T1. Hence, we include the optimal publication and subjective quality questions which are more likely to pick up editors' own biases.

f. Implementation

The survey was conducted on Qualtrics. Each editor received an invitation email which included short description of the survey and a link to the survey of their assigned treatment (see Appendix III.a for a sample email). All editors received the exact same recruitment email at the same time of the day on the same day of the week (Monday) regardless of their treatment status. Editors were given 15 days to fill out the survey and sent two reminder emails (on days 8 and 15).

[14] It is possible that editors did not use this ranking while answering the questions. This would increase the noise in our results but should not introduce any bias unless there is differential use of the ranking across treatments.

In the instructions, we told editors that we are interested in *their own* answers to the evaluation questions, and we asked editors not to look the answers up online (See Appendix III.c for a screenshot of the instructions). To make searching online for the abstracts difficult, the titles of the abstracts were never displayed and copying text from the survey was disabled. Furthermore, we did not pay for the accuracy of the answers, so the editors did not have any external incentives to look up these papers.[15] Editors were asked to answer the evaluation questions based on the abstract they received and nothing else. At the end of the experiment, we ask editors their gender, ethnicity, age, title, journal affiliation, institution type, and main field of specialization (See Appendix III.e for screenshots of these questions). Editors were paid a fixed amount in the form of an Amazon e-gift card for their participation in the study.

III. Summary Statistics and Balance

Out of 981 editors in our recruitment sample, 165 editors completed our survey experiment.

[15] Grewenig et. al (2020) find suggestive evidence that providing incentives for accuracy increases the use of online search engines. We also check the time stamps for completed surveys to assess whether a subject took longer than the average (possibly indicative of cheating) or was far below the average (potentially indicating random guessing). The median time spent on questions was 9.75 minutes, the 25th percentile was 7.23 minutes, the 75th percentile was 13.44 minutes. Less than 5 percent of our subjects spent 5 minutes or less on the questions and less than 5 percent of them spent 20 minutes or more. Our results are robust to dropping subjects who spent less than 5 minutes or more than 20 minutes on the questions.

Table 1 Panel A presents the summary statistics and balance for the characteristics of the editors who completed the survey.[16] 79% of these editors are male and 71% of them are White, reflecting the nature of the economics profession. 67% of these editors are full professors and the average age of our editors is 47 years old. 16% of our editors are employed at Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, University of Chicago, or UC Berkeley whereas 75% of them are employed in other R1 universities. Our editor sample covers a wide variety of JEL codes (See Appendix Table 3 for details). The demographic characteristics of the editors are balanced across treatment groups. Nevertheless, we present our results both with and without these controls to demonstrate robustness.

[16] Since answers to our demographic questions are quite lopsided, we create dummies for the modal category of gender, ethnicity, title, and institution type. We also create dummies for editors' field of specialization. For the age variable, we created a continuous variable by coding midrange as the answer for each interval and we assigned the median category to the five editors for whom the age data was not reported. Using the answers of the editors to the journal affiliation question, we create an associated journal ranking variable which is based on the ranking of journals we used (See Appendix Table 1). The answer was missing for four editors, and we assigned them the average journal ranking.

Table 1: Summary Statistics and Balance

	(1) All	(2) Treatment 1	(3) Treatment 2	(4) Treatment 3	(5) Treatment 4	(6) Joint F-test	(7) N
Panel A: Demographics of the Editors							
Male	0.79	0.79	0.71	0.88	0.74	0.197	165
White	0.71	0.69	0.74	0.73	0.67	0.881	165
Age	47.02	45.44	46.54	48.89	46.74	0.193	165
Other R1 university	0.75	0.82	0.68	0.69	0.79	0.368	165
Professor	0.67	0.77	0.63	0.69	0.56	0.246	165
Associated journal ranking	30.15	33.75	30.24	32.31	23.75	0.156	165
Panel B: Experimental Variables							
Minutes spent on questions	10.88	9.56	12.91	10.51	10.69	0.063	165
Correct number of answers for publication questions (out of 8)	1	1.05	1.18	0.82	1	0.418	165
Correct number of answers for citation questions (out of 8)	1.78	2.03	1.76	1.65	1.72	0.545	165
Percentage of correct answers for actual publication question	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.1	0.13	0.41	1320
Percentage of correct answers for actual citation question	0.22	0.25	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.538	1320
Index (standardized)	0.16	0	0.2	0.21	0.2	0.155	1320
Answer for actual publication question (categorical)	5.61	5.39	5.57	5.78	5.64	0.325	1320
Answer for optimal publication question (categorical)	5.42	5.01	5.48	5.58	5.57	0.049	1320
Answer for actual citation question (categorical)	3.01	2.8	3.15	3.05	3.04	0.549	1320
Answer for subjective quality question (7-item Likert scale)	4.03	3.79	4.11	4.06	4.14	0.233	1320
JEL match	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.21	0.19	0.922	1320
Number of Subjects	165	39	38	49	38		165
Response Rate (%)	16.8	15.9	15.5	20	15.5		

Notes: Treatment 1 is the Blind Treatment, Treatment 2 is the Visible Name treatment, Treatment 3 is the Visible Institution treatment, and Treatment 4 is the Visible Name and Institution treatment. Joint F-test reports the joint test of equality of means across all treatments. Male is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the editor is a male and 0 otherwise, White is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the editor is white and 0 otherwise, Age is editor's age, Other R1 university is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor is affiliated with an R1 university other than Harvard University, MIT, Princeton University, Stanford University, University of Chicago, or UC Berkeley and 0 otherwise. Professor is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor is a full professor and 0 otherwise. Associated journal ranking is the ranking of the journal with which the editor is associated (Appendix Table 1 reports the journal rankings). Minutes spent on questions is the average time editors spent on 8 abstracts. Correct number of answers and the percentage of correct answers are calculated based on the publication and citation metrics of these abstracts as of December 2019. Index is created using the standardized versions of Actual Publication, Optimal Publication, Actual Citation, and Subjective Quality questions and following the procedures described in Anderson (2008). It is then standardized by subtracting the mean of the Blind treatment (T1) and dividing by the standard deviation of T1. A higher number on the index indicates a more positive evaluation. Answer categories for the Actual Publication and Optimal Publication questions are Top 5, 6-25, 26-50, 51-75, 76-100, 101-150, 150+, Not Published. We recoded these answer categories such that a higher number signifies a higher ranked publication. Answer categories for the Actual Citation question is 0-10, 11-20, 21-35, 36-50, 51-75, 76-100, More than 100. JEL match is equal to 1 if the editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Response rate shows the percentage of editors in the recruitment pool who completed the experiment.

Editors in the recruitment sample and editors who participated in the experiment are similar in terms of gender and race. 80% of the editors in the recruitment sample are male and 75% of them are White, which are similar to the percentages in the recruitment sample. The editors who participated in the experiment are somewhat less likely to be full professors and less likely to work at top universities compared to editors in our recruitment sample. 82% of the editors in the recruitment sample are full professors (compared to 67% of editors in our experiment) and 24 % of them are employed at one of the top 6 universities (compared to 16 % of editors in our experiment).

Table 1 Panel B presents the summary statistics and balance for the experimental variables. Editors spent 11 minutes on average (median is 9 minutes and 45 seconds) answering the questions associated with 8 abstracts. Editors in the Blind treatment (T1) spend slightly less time (mean is 9 minutes and 30 seconds, median is 8 minutes) and editors in the Visible Name treatment (T2) spend slightly more time (mean is 13 minutes, median is 11 minutes and 30 seconds). Appendix Figure 1 depicts the distribution of minutes spent on questions by the treatment status of the editors. The distributions in T2, T3, and T4 are similar but they are different from the distribution in T1 (p-values are below 0.10 for each comparison according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). The distribution in T1 is more concentrated and skewed leftward.

Editors, on average, correctly answer 1 out of 8 actual publication questions and 1.78 out of 8 citation questions. Overall, 13% of the publication questions and 22% of the citation questions are answered correctly. This (in)accuracy of editors is balanced across treatments. The accuracy of editors may be low because the editors are less able to assess papers that are not in their own fields. To investigate this, we regress the accuracy of the editor for a given abstract on a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. We do not find any evidence that suggests the editors are better at predicting the publication (p-value is 0.663) or citation (p-value is 0.451) outcomes of the abstracts that are in their fields (Appendix Table 4 Panel A). Another explanation is that the editors do not take these questions seriously. If that is the case, one would expect that editors who spend more time on the abstracts will be more accurate. When we regress the accuracy of the editors on time spent on the questions, we do not find any evidence supporting this explanation (Appendix Table 4 Panel B). For the publication metric, there is no detectable correlation (p-value is 0.706). For the citation metric, if anything, we find a negative correlation (p-value is 0.037). Another potential explanation (which is only relevant for the publication metrics) is that the editors used their own conceived ranking system and not the journal rankings we provided. This could explain some of the inaccuracy, since the there is sufficient uncertainty in the ranking of economics journals, especially the mid-ranked ones (Lyhagen and Ahlgren 2020; Mogstad et. al. 2022).

To make the discussion of the results easier to follow, we create a standardized index using our four questions and following the procedures described in Anderson (2008).[17] A higher number on the index indicates a more positive evaluation. Using this index, we see that editors in the non-blind treatments (T2, T3, and T4) evaluate the abstracts more positively compared to editors

[17] To create the index, we first normalize the four dependent variables by subtracting the overall mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the Blind treatment (T1). Then, we use ICW_INDEX package in Stata (https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458814.html). Finally, we rescaled the index such that the mean of T1 is 0 and the standard deviation of T1 is 1.

in the Blind treatment (T1) (pairwise tests of the difference across T1 vs T2, T1 vs T3, and T1 vs T4 are all statistically significant at least at the 10% level).[18]

IV. Results

Our analysis proceeds in three parts. First, we study whether the same abstracts are evaluated differently depending on whether author's name is visible or not to the editors, separately for male-authored abstracts and female-authored abstracts. Then, we study whether editors assess the same abstracts differently when the institution of the author is visible or not, separately for authors from non-top institutions and authors from top institutions. Finally, we investigate if editors rate the same abstracts differently when the name and the institution of the author of the abstract are both visible, separately by the gender and institutional ranking of the author.

In the analysis that follows, we use five different dependent variables: *Actual Publication, Optimal Publication*, *Actual Citation, Subjective Quality,* and the index created using these four variables (Anderson (2008)). To make the effect sizes interpretable and comparable, we standardize all our dependent variables by subtracting the mean of the Blind treatment (T1) and dividing it by the standard deviation of T1. We run ordinary least squares regressions and cluster standard errors at the editor level in all these regressions.

In the appendix, we reproduce all of our results by using five alternative dependent variables: whether the editor believes the paper got published in a top-25 journal or not, whether the editor believes the paper should have been published in a top-25 journal or not, whether the editor thinks the paper had more than 20 citations or not, whether the editor evaluates the paper as 5 or above on 7-item Likert scale, and an index created using these four dummy variables based on the procedures described in Anderson (2008).

Figure 2: Evaluations of abstracts under different treatments, separately by gender and/or institution of the authors

Panel (A) Panel (B)

[18] This is not true for the abstracts that are in the editors' own fields. We find that editors' evaluations do not differ across treatments for the abstracts that are in their own fields.



Panel (C)



Notes: The dependent variable in all panels is a standardized index created using the standardized versions of Actual Publication, Optimal Publication, Actual Citation, and Subjective Quality questions and following the procedures described in Anderson (2008). A higher number on the index indicates a more positive evaluation. Panel (A) depicts evaluations across the Blind treatment (T1) and Visible Name treatment (T2) separately for male-authored abstracts and female-authored abstracts. Panel (B) depicts evaluations across T1 and Visible Institution treatment (T3), separately for abstracts of authors at non-top institutions and top institutions. Panel (C) depicts evaluations across T1 and Visible Name & Institution treatment (T4), separately by gender and institution type of the author of the abstract.

a. Effect of the visibility of the name of the author in editors' evaluation of the abstracts

We begin by analyzing whether the name of the author being visible makes a difference in editors' evaluations of the abstracts. The cleanest way to answer this question is to compare the evaluations of the editors under the *Blind* treatment (T1) versus the *Visible Name* treatment (T2), where the only variable that differs is the visibility of the name of the author of the paper (and hence, the gender of the author).

Figure 2 Panel A displays the evaluations of editors (the *index*) under T1 versus T2, separately for male- and female- authored abstracts.[19] Editors' evaluations of male-authored and female-

[19] Appendix Figure 2 Panel A displays the evaluations of editors under all treatments, separately for male- and female-authored abstracts.

authored abstracts are similar under T1.[20] However, editors' evaluations of the same female-authored abstracts under T2 is 0.27 standard deviation higher compared to their evaluation under T1 (statistically significant at the 5% level) whereas we are unable to detect an effect for male-authored abstracts. The difference-in-differences coefficient (comparing evaluations of male- and female- authored papers under different treatments) is not statistically significant.

To formalize this result, we run the following regression:

$$\boldsymbol{y_{ij} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 T2_i + \alpha_3 T3_{i+} \alpha_4 T4_i + \gamma_1 Female_j + \gamma_2 T2_i * Female_j} \qquad (1)$$
$$\boldsymbol{+ \gamma_3 T3_i * Female_j + \gamma_4 T4_i * Female_j + \varepsilon_{ij}}$$

$\boldsymbol{y_{ij}}$ is the relevant dependent variable pertaining abstract *j* editor i. $\boldsymbol{T2_i}$ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor is assigned to the *Visible Name* treatment and 0 otherwise, $\boldsymbol{T3_i}$ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor is assigned to the *Visible Institution* treatment and 0 otherwise, and $\boldsymbol{T4_i}$ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor is assigned to the *Visible Name and Institution* treatment and 0 otherwise. $\boldsymbol{Female_j}$ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is female and 0 otherwise. Although we include all treatments in this regression for completeness, our focus is comparing T2 to T1. Hence, we only report coefficients $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2$, and p-value $(\alpha_2 + \gamma_2 = 0)$ in Table 2. Appendix Table 5 reports all coefficients from this regression. α_1 measures how male-authored papers are evaluated under the blind review and $\alpha_1 + \gamma_1$ measures how female-authored papers are evaluated under the blind review. α_2 measures the name visibility effect for male-authored papers and $\alpha_2 + \gamma_2$ measures the name visibility effect for female-authored papers.

Table 2 presents the results. Different panels correspond to different dependent variables. Column 1 does not include any controls, Column 2 includes controls for the editors, and Column 3 adds the abstract fixed effects. Controls are editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's title, editor's affiliation, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. The discussion of the effects sizes in the text are based on the specification without any controls.

Table 2: Name Visibility Effect

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Index (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.106 (0.116)	0.110 (0.124)	0.110 (0.126)
Female	-0.0419 (0.0961)	-0.0332 (0.0950)	

[20] In our sample, the average (median) journal ranking was 94 (102) for published papers of female authors and 125 (98) for published papers of male authors. The average (median) number of citations was 140.5 (15) for female-authored papers and 30 (25.5) for male-authored papers. The average (median) Flesch readability score was 29 (29) for papers of female authors and 27 (26) for papers of male authors. A higher score indicates that the abstract is easier to read. See Appendix Table 2 for details.

T2*Female	0.184 (0.129)	0.175 (0.130)	0.168 (0.122)
Constant	0.0210 (0.0830)	1.060*** (0.349)	1.201*** (0.368)
p (Female T1=Female T2)	0.0357	0.0446	0.0396
Panel B: Actual Publication (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0271 (0.118)	-0.0122 (0.127)	-0.0142 (0.130)
Female	-0.0744 (0.0907)	-0.0665 (0.0898)	
T2*Female	0.117 (0.123)	0.109 (0.124)	0.105 (0.118)
Constant	0.0372 (0.0841)	0.894*** (0.254)	1.093*** (0.272)
p (Female T1=Female T2)	0.274	0.461	0.454
Panel C: Optimal Publication (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.139 (0.119)	0.117 (0.124)	0.115 (0.127)
Female	-0.0851 (0.0901)	-0.0778 (0.0897)	
T2*Female	0.163 (0.119)	0.156 (0.119)	0.152 (0.113)
Constant	0.0426 (0.0866)	1.223*** (0.253)	1.478*** (0.273)
p (Female T1=Female T2)	0.0243	0.0526	0.0415
Panel D: Actual Citation (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.146 (0.147)	0.178 (0.150)	0.180 (0.150)
Female	0.111 (0.0929)	0.116 (0.0933)	
T2*Female	0.0984 (0.123)	0.0929 (0.124)	0.0877 (0.120)
Constant	-0.0554 (0.100)	0.626 (0.583)	0.569 (0.599)
p (Female T1=Female T2)	0.141	0.110	0.116
Panel E: Subjective Quality (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0863 (0.121)	0.112 (0.121)	0.113 (0.122)
Female	-0.119 (0.102)	-0.111 (0.101)	
T2*Female	0.237* (0.130)	0.228* (0.130)	0.221* (0.125)
Constant	0.0594 (0.0912)	1.026*** (0.240)	1.189*** (0.253)
p (Female T1=Female T2)	0.0657	0.0682	0.0707
Controls	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165
Observations	1320	1320	1320

Notes: Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper was published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel C is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper should have been published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel D is the editor's perception of how many citations the paper had by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel E is the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper on a 1 to 7 scale (7 being the highest quality). All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the mean of the Blind treatment (T1) and dividing by the standard deviation of T1. T2 is the Visible Name treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate male-authored abstracts under T1. Female is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is a female and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with female-authored abstracts under T2. p(Female T1=Female T2) shows the result of the test of equality across T1 and T2 for female authors. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Female dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Female dummy in Column 3. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

According to Table 2 Panel A, editors in T2 evaluate female-authored papers 0.29 sd more positively than editors in T1 (p-value is 0.036) whereas evaluations of male-authored papers by the editors in T2 versus T1 do not statistically differ. Exploring the other panels, we see that the name visibility effect for female authors is primarily driven by the optimal publication question

(0.30 sd, p-value is 0.024) and the subjective quality question (0.32 sd, p-value is 0.066). The name visibility effect for male authors is almost always positive but never statistically significant. The name visibility effect for female authors is always larger than the name visibility effect for male authors, but the differences is only statistically significant for the subjective quality question. Appendix Table 6 investigates the name visibility effect using the alternative dependent variables. The findings are qualitatively similar.[21]

One potential reason for this result is the experimenter demand effects. If editors in the Visible Name treatment suspect that the study investigates gender effects, then they might more positively evaluate abstracts by female authors. Indeed, our finding that the name visibility effect for female-authored papers is driven by the optimal publication and subjective quality questions suggests that this explanation plays a role in our result. Another potential reason for this result could be the dynamic nature of discrimination (Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg 2019). That is, positive evaluations of female economists in our sample when their names are visible could be a function of selection earlier in their careers. For example, 5 of the female authors in our sample were full professors by the end of 2019 and 2 of them were associate professors. Hence, our sample of female authors almost exclusively consist of women who are tenured. Finally, Hadavand, Hamermesh, and Wilson (2021) find that papers with female authors have a longer review time in the revise & resubmit stage and Hengel (2022) finds that female-authored papers are between 1 and 6 percent better written than equivalent papers by men, so perhaps the editors presupposed that the female-authored papers would be better written (extrapolating from the abstract to the manuscript) and more likely to publish higher as a result. These explanations may account for why we do not find evidence of bias against female-authored abstracts in this study, if it is systematic in the profession.

Result 1: Editors in *Visible Name* treatment (T2) evaluate female-authored abstracts 0.29 sd more positively than editors in *Blind* treatment (T1).

b. Effect of the visibility of the institution of the author in editors' evaluation of the abstracts

Next, we look at whether the institution of the author being visible makes a difference in editors' evaluations of the abstracts. The cleanest way of answering this question is to compare the

[21] Editors in T2 evaluate the female-authored papers 0.27 sd higher than editors in T1 based on the index of the alternative dependent variables (p-value is 0.038). Editors in T2 think these papers 12 percentage points (pp) more likely should have been published in a top 25 journal (p-value is 0.0530) and 16 pp more likely to have more than 20 citations (p-value is 0.039) compared to editors in T1.

evaluations of the editors under the *Blind* treatment (T1) versus the *Visible Institution* treatment (T3) where the only thing that differs is the visibility of the institution of the author of the paper.

Panel B of Figure 2 displays the evaluations of editors (the *index*) under T1 versus T3, separately for abstracts of authors affiliated with non-top institutions and abstracts of authors affiliated with top institutions.[22] Under T1, abstracts of authors from non-top institutions are evaluated 0.42 standard deviation (sd) more positively than abstracts of authors from top institutions (statistically significant at the 1% level). This is probably because papers in our sample by authors from non-top institutions are slightly better in terms of publication statistics, citation statistics, and readability scores than papers by authors from top institutions.[23] Editors' evaluation of the abstracts whose authors are affiliated with a top institution is 0.29 sd higher under T3 compared to under T1 (p-value is 0.018) whereas we are unable to detect an effect for abstracts whose authors are affiliated with a non-top institution. The difference-in-differences coefficient (comparing evaluations of abstracts by non-top-institution- and top-institution- affiliated authors under different treatments) is not statistically significant.

To formalize this result, we run the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \boldsymbol{y_{ij}} = \boldsymbol{\delta_1} + \boldsymbol{\delta_2 T2_i} + \boldsymbol{\delta_3 T3_{i+}\delta_4 T4_i} + \boldsymbol{\theta_1 Top\ Institution_j} \\ + \boldsymbol{\theta_2 T2_i * Top\ Institution_j} + \boldsymbol{\theta_3 T3_i * Top\ Institution_j} \\ + \boldsymbol{\theta_4 T4_i * Top\ Institution_j} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon_{ij}} \end{aligned} \qquad (2)$$

$\boldsymbol{Top\ Institution_j}$ is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is affiliated with a top 20 institution in the US or a top international institution and 0 otherwise. Although we include all treatments in this regression for completeness, our focus is comparing T3 to T1. Hence, we only report coefficients $\delta_1, \delta_3, \theta_1, \theta_3$, and p-value ($\delta_3 + \theta_3 = 0$) in Table 3. Appendix Table 7 reports all coefficients from this regression. δ_1 measures how editors evaluate papers by authors affiliated with non-top institutions under the blind review and $\delta_1 + \theta_1$ measures how editors evaluate papers by authors affiliated with top institutions under the blind review. δ_3 measures the institution visibility effect for papers by authors affiliated with non-top institutions and $\delta_3 + \theta_3$ measures the institution visibility effect for papers by authors affiliated with top institutions.

[22] Appendix Figure 2 Panel B displays the evaluations of editors under all treatments, separately for abstracts of authors at non-top institutions and abstracts of authors at top institutions.

[23] In our sample, the average journal ranking was 95 for published papers of authors from non-top institutions and 119 for published papers of authors from top institutions. The median rankings are similar to the averages. Similarly, the average (median) number of citations was 99.5 (27.5) for papers by authors from non-top institutions and 71 (15) for papers by authors from top institutions. The Flesch average (median) readability score was 31 (29) for papers of authors from non-top institutions and 25 (26) for papers of authors from top institutions. A higher score indicates that the abstract is easier to read. See Appendix Table 2 for details.

Table 3 presents the results. According to Panel A, editors in T3 evaluate the abstracts of authors from top institutions 0.29 sd more positively than editors in T1 (p-value is 0.018) whereas evaluations of abstracts of authors from non-top institutions are not statistically significantly different based on editors' treatment assignment (T1 vs T3). This positive institution visibility effect for top-institution authors is particularly driven by the optimal publication question (0.37 sd, p-value is 0.007), but also present for the actual publication question (0.25 sd, p-value is 0.051) and the actual citation question (0.24 sd, p-value is 0.058). The institution visibility effect for top-institution authors is always larger than the institution visibility effect for non-top-institution authors, but the difference is only statistically significant for the optimal publication and actual citation questions. Appendix Table 8 investigates the institution visibility effect using the alternative dependent variables. The findings are qualitatively similar and more statistically significant.[24]

Result 2: Editors in *Visible Institution* treatment (T3) evaluate abstracts of authors from top institutions 0.29 sd more positively than editors in *Blind* treatment (T1).

c. Effect of the visibility of the name and institution of the author in editors' evaluation of the abstracts

Lastly, we look at the joint effect of the visibility of the author's name and institution on editors' evaluation of the abstracts. To do so, we compare the evaluations of the editors under the *Blind* treatment (T1) versus the *Visible Name & Institution* treatment (T4), under which both the name and the institution of the author of the paper are visible to the editors.

Table 3: Institution Visibility Effect

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Index (std)			
Visible Institution (T3)	0.132 (0.112)	0.155 (0.104)	0.149 (0.103)
Top Institution	-0.425*** (0.0893)	-0.423*** (0.0891)	
T3*Top Institution	0.156 (0.108)	0.161 (0.109)	0.157 (0.106)

[24] Editors in T3 evaluate the top-institution-authored papers 0.24 sd higher than editors in T1 based on the index of the alternative dependent variables (p-value is 0.032). Editors in T3 think these papers 12.2 percentage points (pp) more likely to be published in a top 25 journal (p-value is 0.039), 10.3 pp more likely should have been published in a top 25 journal (p-value is 0.072), and 12.3 pp more likely to have more than 20 citations (p-value is 0.0373) compared to editors in T1. The institution visibility effect for top-institution authors is always larger than the institution visibility effect for non-top-institution authors (statistically significantly for the index, actual publication at a top 25 journal, and having more than 20 citations).

Constant	0.212** (0.0856)	1.255*** (0.346)	1.734*** (0.362)
p (Top T1=Top T3)	0.0176	0.00825	0.00660
Panel B: Actual Publication (std)			
Visible Institution (T3)	0.121 (0.101)	0.131 (0.100)	0.125 (0.0964)
Top Institution	-0.402*** (0.0881)	-0.400*** (0.0869)	
T3*Top Institution	0.125 (0.109)	0.129 (0.109)	0.125 (0.105)
Constant	0.201** (0.0803)	1.061*** (0.242)	1.526*** (0.258)
p (Top T1=Top T3)	0.0511	0.0327	0.0211
Panel C: Optimal Publication (std)			
Visible Institution (T3)	0.165 (0.110)	0.186* (0.110)	0.181* (0.109)
Top Institution	-0.505*** (0.0934)	-0.503*** (0.0932)	
T3*Top Institution	0.205* (0.121)	0.209* (0.121)	0.204* (0.114)
Constant	0.252*** (0.0806)	1.435*** (0.245)	1.859*** (0.270)
p (Top T1=Top T3)	0.00716	0.00424	0.00197
Panel D: Actual Citation (std)			
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0369 (0.150)	0.0316 (0.143)	0.0293 (0.144)
Top Institution	-0.275*** (0.0826)	-0.274*** (0.0838)	
T3*Top Institution	0.201* (0.111)	0.205* (0.113)	0.203* (0.113)
Constant	0.138 (0.116)	0.822 (0.590)	1.107* (0.603)
p (Top T1=Top T3)	0.0584	0.0723	0.0804
Panel E: Subjective Quality (std)			
Visible Institution (T3)	0.153 (0.119)	0.203* (0.118)	0.198* (0.118)
Top Institution	-0.340*** (0.105)	-0.339*** (0.106)	
T3*Top Institution	0.0499 (0.124)	0.0547 (0.124)	0.0506 (0.121)
Constant	0.170* (0.1000)	1.140*** (0.235)	1.565*** (0.246)
p (Top T1=Top T3)	0.122	0.0441	0.0405
Controls	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165
Observations	1320	1320	1320

Notes: Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper was published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel C is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper should have been published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel D is the editor's perception of how many citations the paper had by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel E is the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper on a 1 to 7 scale (7 being the highest quality). All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the mean of the Blind treatment (T1) and dividing by the standard deviation of T1. T3 is the Visible Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of authors from non-top institutions under T1. Top Institution is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is from a top 20 institution in the US or from a top international institution and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with abstracts of top-institution authors under T3. p (Top T1=Top T3) shows the result of the test of equality across T1 and T3 for authors at top institutions. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Top Institution dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Top Institution dummy in Column 3. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 2 Panel C depicts how evaluations of editors (the *index*) differ under the *Blind* Treatment (T1) versus the *Visible Name & Institution* treatment (T4), separately by the gender and institution type of the author of the abstract.[25] The results show that abstracts of male authors

[25] Appendix Figure 2 Panel C displays the evaluations of editors under all treatments, separately by the gender and institution type of the author of the abstract.

at non-top institutions are evaluated more negatively under T4 compared to T1 (not statistically significant), whereas abstracts of male authors at top institutions are evaluated more positively under T4 compared to T1 (p-value is 0.003). The difference-in-differences coefficient for male authors is also statistically significant. We see suggestive evidence that abstracts of female authors are evaluated more positively under T4 compared to T1, regardless of their institutional affiliation (this effect is marginally significant for female authors at non-top institutions and close to being significant for female authors at top institutions). The difference-in-differences coefficient for female authors is not significant.

depicts editors' evaluations (index) for each *abstract* separately, across the *Blind* Treatment (T1) and the *Visible Name & Institution* treatment (T4). All abstracts that belong to male authors at top institutions get a higher evaluation when the name and institutional affiliation of the authors are visible to the editors (compared to when they are not visible). However, the abstracts that belong to male authors at non-top institutions are evaluated either similarly or more negatively when the name and institutional affiliation of the authors are visible to the editors (compared to when they are not visible). We also note that some abstracts that belong to female authors are evaluated more positively under T4 compared to T1, but this positive visibility effect is not linked to the institutional affiliation of the authors.[26]

To formalize these findings, we run Equation (2) separately for male-authored abstracts and female-authored abstracts. Since our focus is comparing T1 to T4, we only report coefficients $\delta_1, \delta_4, \theta_1, \theta_4$ and p-value ($\delta_4 + \theta_4 = 0$) in Table 4. Appendix Table 9 reports all coefficients from this regression. δ_1 measures how editors evaluate papers by authors affiliated with non-top institutions under the blind review and $\delta_1 + \theta_1$ measures how editors evaluate papers by authors affiliated with top institutions under the blind review, separately for male and female authored papers. δ_4 measures the name and institution visibility effect for papers by authors affiliated with non-top institutions and $\delta_4 + \theta_4$ measures the name and institution visibility effect for papers by authors affiliated with top institutions, separately for male and female authored papers.

[26] Appendix Figure 3 depicts editors' evaluations (index) for *each* abstract separately, across all treatments.

Figure 3: Evaluations of each abstract under T1 versus T4, separately by gender and institution of the authors



Notes: The dependent variable in all panels is a standardized index created using the standardized versions of Actual publication, Optimal publication, Actual citation, and Subjective Quality questions and following the procedures described in Anderson (2008). A higher number on the index indicates a more positive evaluation. Top left (right) panel of this figure shows the editors' evaluation of abstracts of male authors from non-top (top) institutions. Bottom left (right) panel shows the editors' evaluation of abstracts of female authors from non-top (top) institutions. Blue dots depict the mean evaluations in the Blind treatment (T1) and red squares depict the mean evaluations in the Visible Name & Institution treatment (T4) for each abstract.

Table 4 Columns 1-3 present the results for male-authored abstracts. Panel A shows that editors in T4 evaluate the abstracts of male authors from top institutions 0.44 sd more positively than editors in T1 (p-value is 0.003) whereas evaluations of abstracts of authors from non-top institutions are not statistically significantly different based on editors' treatment assignment (T1 vs T4). This positive institution visibility effect for top-institution male authors is statistically significant for all four questions. The institution visibility effect for non-top-institution male authors is negative and statistically significantly different from the institution visibility effect for top-institution male authors. P-values for the difference-in-differences coefficients are less than 0.05 in all panels. Appendix Table 10 investigates the visibility effect for male authors using the alternative dependent variables. The findings are qualitatively similar.[27]

[27] Editors in T4 evaluate the top-institution male-authored papers 0.34 sd more positively than editors in T1 based on the index of the alternative dependent variables (p-value is 0.028). Editors in T4 think these papers are 18 percentage points (pp) more likely to be published in a top 25 journal (p-value is 0.016) and 14 pp more likely to have more than 20 citations (p-value is 0.068) compared to editors in T1. The institution visibility effect for top-institution male authors is always larger than the institution visibility effect for non-top-institution male authors (statistically significantly for all variables, except the ``high quality" dummy variable).

Table 4: Name and Institution Visibility Effect

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Index (std)						
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.164 (0.159)	-0.161 (0.165)	-0.152 (0.166)	0.279* (0.157)	0.219 (0.155)	0.187 (0.141)
Top Institution	-0.304** (0.130)	-0.310** (0.130)		-0.546*** (0.114)	-0.537*** (0.112)	
T4*Top Institution	0.607*** (0.190)	0.595*** (0.194)	0.563*** (0.191)	-0.0376 (0.167)	-0.0465 (0.167)	-0.0354 (0.170)
Constant	0.173 (0.106)	1.352*** (0.426)	1.415*** (0.446)	0.252** (0.111)	1.157*** (0.334)	1.570*** (0.333)
p (Top T1=Top T4)	0.00284	0.00343	0.00467	0.123	0.238	0.254
Panel B: Actual Publication (std)						
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.286* (0.159)	-0.317* (0.173)	-0.319* (0.171)	0.167 (0.130)	0.118 (0.135)	0.0938 (0.123)
Top Institution	-0.316** (0.131)	-0.320** (0.131)		-0.488*** (0.110)	-0.479*** (0.108)	
T4*Top Institution	0.649*** (0.191)	0.640*** (0.195)	0.614*** (0.195)	0.0536 (0.170)	0.0444 (0.172)	0.0351 (0.168)
Constant	0.195* (0.0989)	0.986*** (0.344)	1.120*** (0.374)	0.207** (0.0988)	1.134*** (0.235)	1.551*** (0.226)
p (Top T1=Top T4)	0.0126	0.0265	0.0383	0.152	0.265	0.297
Panel C: Optimal Publication (std)						
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0182 (0.148)	-0.0567 (0.153)	-0.0549 (0.153)	0.249* (0.127)	0.178 (0.133)	0.154 (0.126)
Top Institution	-0.316** (0.122)	-0.321*** (0.123)		-0.693*** (0.118)	-0.685*** (0.118)	
T4*Top Institution	0.474*** (0.171)	0.465*** (0.173)	0.435** (0.171)	0.122 (0.170)	0.113 (0.172)	0.104 (0.168)
Constant	0.201* (0.104)	1.493*** (0.309)	1.635*** (0.336)	0.304*** (0.0986)	1.376*** (0.251)	1.760*** (0.257)
p (Top T1=Top T4)	0.00157	0.00474	0.00631	0.0306	0.0736	0.0672
Panel D: Actual Citation (std)						
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.107 (0.177)	-0.0734 (0.184)	-0.0543 (0.185)	0.179 (0.210)	0.122 (0.206)	0.0929 (0.200)
Top Institution	-0.200* (0.119)	-0.204* (0.121)		-0.350*** (0.133)	-0.345** (0.134)	
T4*Top Institution	0.422** (0.172)	0.415** (0.177)	0.387** (0.174)	-0.0358 (0.183)	-0.0408 (0.184)	0.00269 (0.185)
Constant	0.0447 (0.129)	1.017 (0.646)	0.939 (0.658)	0.231 (0.145)	0.625 (0.588)	0.793 (0.598)
p (Top T1=Top T4)	0.0545	0.0370	0.0433	0.344	0.608	0.560
Panel E: Subjective Quality (std)						
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0328 (0.158)	-0.0170 (0.154)	-0.00904 (0.156)	0.344** (0.167)	0.304* (0.166)	0.278* (0.158)
Top Institution	-0.221* (0.133)	-0.227* (0.134)		-0.459*** (0.124)	-0.451*** (0.123)	
T4*Top Institution	0.434** (0.187)	0.423** (0.189)	0.397** (0.188)	-0.148 (0.163)	-0.155 (0.163)	-0.155 (0.165)
Constant	0.170 (0.116)	1.278*** (0.264)	1.348*** (0.281)	0.170 (0.125)	1.001*** (0.279)	1.421*** (0.270)
p (Top T1=Top T4)	0.00824	0.00704	0.00850	0.243	0.342	0.379
Controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165	165	165	165
Observations	660	660	660	660	660	660
Author of the Abstract	Male	Male	Male	Female	Female	Female

Notes: Sample is male-authored abstracts for Columns (1)-(3) and female-authored abstracts for Columns (4)-(6). Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper was published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel C is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper should have been published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel D is the editor's perception of how many citations the paper had by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel E is the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper on a 1 to 7 scale (7 being the highest quality). All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the mean of the Blind treatment (T1) and dividing by the standard deviation of T1. T4 is the Visible Name & Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of male authors from non-top institutions under T1 and constant in Column 4 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of female authors from non-top institutions under T1. Top Institution is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is from a top 20 institution in the US or from a top international institution and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with abstracts of top-institution authors under T4. p (Top T1=Top T4) shows the result of the test of equality across T1 and T4 for authors at top institutions. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Top Institution dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Top Institution dummy in Columns 3 and 6. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4 Columns 4-6 present the results for female-authored abstracts. Panel A shows that editors in T4 evaluate the abstracts of female authors from non-top institutions 0.29 sd more positively (marginally significant) and the abstracts of female authors from top institutions 0.24 sd more positively (close to being marginally significant) than editors in T1. Other panels show that this positive visibility effect is only significant for some variables (the optimal publication and subjective quality questions for female authors from non-top institutions and the optimal publication question for female authors from top institutions). Furthermore, the difference-in-differences coefficient is never statistically significant. Appendix Table 10 investigates the visibility effect for female authors using the alternative dependent variables. The findings are qualitatively similar but not statistically significant for any of the variables. Overall, both for females at non-top institutions and females at top institutions, we find suggestive evidence that editors produce more positive evaluations when they observe the name and institution of the author of the abstract as compared to when this information is not available to them. Most notably, the visibility effect for female-authored abstracts do not vary by the ranking of the institution of the author (top vs non-top).

Result 3: Editors in *Visible Name & Institution* treatment (T4) evaluate abstracts of male authors from top institutions 0.44 sd more positively than editors in *Blind* treatment (T1).

Our results suggest that there are institutional biases in the evaluation of abstracts of male authors, but not for female authors. However, these results should be interpreted with caution. Comparing Blind treatment (T1) to Visible Institution treatment (T3) in Appendix Table 9, we see patterns like the ones discussed above for male-authored papers and female-authored abstracts. That is, we find positive institutional bias for abstracts by male authors, but not for abstracts by female authors. However, since editors do not observe the names of the authors in T3, this placebo test suggests that another feature of these abstracts, other than the revelation of the author's names, might be causing the differences in evaluations across male- and female-authored abstracts.

Various mechanisms might be at play here. First, the result might be due to the differences in the prestige of the institutions of the authors in our sample among male and female authors. We have some evidence to support this hypothesis. At the end of the experiment, we ask editors in all treatments to rank the institutions with which the authors of abstracts were affiliated (see Appendix III.f for a screenshot of this question). Editors rank the institutions from 1 to 8, 1 being the highest quality and 8 being the lowest quality. We find that the institutions of male authors at top institutions were ranked the highest (mean is 1.92, sd is 0.415), followed by the institutions of female authors at top institutions (mean is 3.61, sd is 0.772), the institutions of female authors at non-top institutions (mean is 5.67 and sd is 0.679), and then institutions of male authors at

non-top institutions (mean is 6.47 and sd is 1.32). Hence, the gap in editors' perceptions of the quality of institutions of male authors was larger than the gap associated with the institutions of female authors. However, it is important to note that our choice of institutions for the abstracts was quite limited because it was difficult to find female authors associated with top institutions in our database. In our reduced list of 112 papers, we had only three published papers by female authors at a top 20 institution in the US and we used all of them.

Another potential explanation is that we inadvertently included heavily male-dominated top institutions for male authors but not for female authors. Economics departments are male dominated in general, and top institutions have even higher shares of male faculty on average. According to CSWEP 2020 annual report[28], 15.5% of tenure-track faculty in top 10 doctorate granting economics departments are female, 17.3% of tenure-track faculty in the next 10 departments (top 11 to top 20) are female, and 24% of tenure-track faculty in other doctorate granting economics departments are female.[29] Hence, when an editor in T3 learns that the author of an abstract is from a top 6 department, they might intrinsically assume that the author is a male given the prevalence of males in top departments. In our sample, we have two male authors but no female authors with top 6 department affiliations.[30] To test whether this discrepancy could be driving the patterns we observe, we repeat the analysis shown in Table 4 but drop the abstracts affiliated with top 6 authors. Appendix Table 11 presents the results. This table shows that the result of Table 4 remains intact (i.e. abstracts of male authors from top institutions are evaluated more positively under T4 compared to T1) but the result of placebo test is no longer true (abstracts of male authors from top institutions are not evaluated more positively under T3 compared to T1).

Our result shows the importance of having the *Visible Institution* treatment (T3). In real world settings, we would either have papers evaluated blind (no information about name or institution of the authors) or non-blind (name and institution of the authors are visible). Without the inclusion of a treatment like T3, we would have concluded that the institutional visibility effect applies to males but not to females. This conclusion would be incomplete since a portion of the

[28] https://www.aeaweb.org/content/file?id=13749.

[29] We collect data on the percentage of female faculty in the institutions with which the authors of the abstracts in our sets are affiliated. We find that the percentage of female faculty is 19.3% in top institutions with which female authors in our sample are affiliated whereas it is 16.2% in top institutions with which male authors are affiliated. As a comparison, the percentage of female faculty is 27.1% in non-top institutions with which female authors in our sample are affiliated whereas it is 24.7% in non-top institutions with which male authors are affiliated.

[30] Considering the original list of 1806 papers, we had only 6 female authors who are affiliated with top 6 departments (Harvard University, MIT, Princeton University, Stanford University, University of Chicago, and UC Berkeley), whereas we had 43 male authors. Excluding law school affiliations, we were left with 36 males, but only two females. The abstracts of both of these females were excluded from our final list since the names of the authors were not easily recognizable as female.

visibility effect for male authors results from the high correlation between top institutions and male-dominated (or almost exclusively male) Economics departments. Hence, the preexisting gender inequalities in the top economics departments may be driving this result. To the extent that top institutions are heavily male dominated, we will continue to observe this effect.

V. Conclusion

It is known that the quantity and quality of publications play a key role for hiring and promotion of economists in academia. The literature shows that female economists and economists from lower ranked institutions publish relatively fewer articles, in general. One potential explanation for this productivity difference is explicit or implicit bias against female authors or authors from lower ranked institutions in the review process. To investigate this explanation, we conducted an experiment with a unique subject pool of journal editors. More specifically, each editor evaluated abstracts from two female authors from top institutions, two female authors from non-top institutions, two male authors from top institutions, and two male authors from non-top institutions. Importantly, editors evaluated the exact same abstracts across the treatments in which we vary whether the name and/or institutional affiliation of the author is visible to the editors.

We find a positive name visibility effect for female authors and a positive institution visibility effect for authors from top institutions. When editors observe both the name and institution of the author, we find that this positive institution visibility effect only applies to male authors at top institutions, whereas the abstracts of women from top institutions and non-top institutions are not evaluated differently. The differences in the evaluation of the same abstract when the name and institutional affiliation are or are not visible to the reviewer provides empirical evidence of bias in the evaluation of economics papers. Although the bias we document is favoritism in some cases, the resulting impact on those who do not benefit from such favoritism is significant and likely one reason behind the lower publication rates of many authors from non-top institutions. Although we can only speculate given these data, it seems that reviewers are more inclined to believe that a male author's quality of work is more highly correlated with the rank/quality of their institution, whereas this is not the case for women. The more interesting question is, why? More research is necessary to study these perceptions of quality and interrelated questions regarding institutional bias.

There are some limitations of this study. First, the editors in the experiment evaluate abstracts from a variety of fields in a short period of time. Normally, editors carefully evaluate full articles in their own fields. Hence, the experimental setting might have led them to resort to external signals of quality, like one's institution, to make judgments about the quality of the papers.

Another limitation is the response rate, with only seventeen percent of the editors in the recruitment sample participating in the study. This low response rate led to a smaller than optimal sample size and raises the concern of selection into the sample. Hence, more studies are needed to understand the full extent of non-blind reviews in publishing.

Given the existence of differences in evaluations across blind and non-blind reviews, which reveals potential biases in favor of or against certain types of authors, we have policy recommendations for authors, journals, and departments. In the current system, some journals offer blind reviews whereas some others offer non-blind reviews. Male authors from top institutions would benefit from sending their papers to non-blind journals whereas male authors from non-top institutions would have better odds with journals that utilize a blind review process. For journals which utilize non-blind reviews, editors can provide reviewers with objective evaluation criteria or a rubric to reduce the amount of bias. Departments can allow broader criteria in hiring, tenure, and promotion decisions to provide a fairer playing field.

Lastly, the economics profession might consider moving to double-blind reviews. This practice would avoid unintended biases of reviewers and editors if applied strictly. However, since it is generally possible to look up the authors of the economics papers through an internet search, double-blind reviews could also introduce unsystematic biases (i.e., papers that reviewers look up would likely receive higher reviews). Hence, double-blind reviews would need to be reinforced through a generally agreed-upon honor-system in the economics discipline, which would be no small feat.

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APPENDIX

I. Figures

Appendix Figure 1: Distribution of Minutes Spent on Questions Across Treatments



Notes: The figure depicts the kernel density of how many minutes editors spent on evaluating the abstracts, separately for the editors in the blind treatment (T1), in the Visible Name treatment (T2), in the Visible Institution treatment (T3), and in the Visible Name & Institution treatment (T4).

Appendix Figure 2: Evaluations of abstracts under all treatments, separately by gender and/or institution of the authors



Notes: The dependent variable in all panels is a standardized index created using the standardized versions of Actual publication, Optimal publication, Actual citation, and Subjective Quality questions and following the procedures described in Anderson (2008). A higher number on the index indicates a more positive evaluation. Panel (A) depicts evaluations across the blind treatment (T1), Visible Name treatment (T2), Visible Institution treatment (T3), and Visible Name & Institution treatment (T4), separately for male-authored abstracts and female-authored abstracts. Panel (B) depicts evaluations across all treatments, separately for abstracts of authors at non-top institutions and top institutions. Panel (C) depicts evaluations across all treatments, separately by gender and institution type of the author of the abstract.

Appendix Figure 3: Evaluations of each abstract under different treatments, separately by gender and institution of the authors



Notes: The dependent variable in all panels is a standardized index created using the standardized versions of Actual publication, Optimal publication, Actual citation, and Subjective Quality questions and following the procedures described in Anderson (2008). A higher number on the index indicates a more positive evaluation. Top left (right) panel of this figure shows the editors' evaluation of abstracts of male authors from non-top (top) institutions. Bottom left (right) panel shows the editors' evaluation of abstracts of female authors from non-top (top) institutions. Blue dots depict the mean evaluations in the Blind treatment (T1), orange diamonds depict the mean evaluations in the Visible Name treatment (T2), green triangles depict the mean evaluations in the Visible Institution treatment (T3), and red squares depict the mean evaluations in the Visible Name & Institution treatment (T4) for each abstract.

II. Tables

Appendix Table 1: Recruitment Pool

Ranking	Journals	Category	# of Editors in the Recruitment Sample	# of Editors in the Experiment
1	The Quarterly Journal of Economics	1	30	1
2	Journal of Political Economy	1	18	2
3	American Economic Review	1	59	11
4	Econometrica	1	43	5
5	Journal of Economic Literature	1	26	5
6	Journal of Financial Economics	1	37	4
7	Review of Economic Studies	1	5	1
8	Journal of Finance	1	28	6
9	Journal of Economic Growth	2	17	4
10	Journal of Monetary Economics	2	37	2
11	Journal of Economic Perspectives	2	11	0
12	Review of Financial Studies	2	24	6
13	Journal of Econometrics	2	29	2
14	The Review of Economics and Statistics	2	33	3
15	American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics	2	11	2
16	Journal of Labor Economics	2	14	3
17	Journal of International Economics	2	40	8
19	Journal of Public Economics	2	13	7
21	Journal of Development Economics	3	45	10
22	American Economic Journal: Applied Economics	3	15	4
29	European Economic Review	3	15	1
30	Journal of Economic Theory	3	23	5
33	Journal of Human Resources	3	27	16
34	Energy Policy	3	12	0
36	Economic Journal	3	5	3
38	Experimental Economics	3	25	4
39	Journal of Accounting and Economics	3	43	1
45	Management Science	3	3	5
46	Economics Letters	3	22	2
51	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization	3	27	8
56	Journal of Urban Economics	4	33	5
57	Journal of Health Economics	4	23	7
61	Labour Economics	4	15	3
64	Journal of Risk and Uncertainty	4	24	0
70	Games and Economic Behavior	4	22	3
74	Journal of Industrial Economics	4	17	1
76	Econometric Theory	4	15	1
82	Scandinavian Journal of Economics	4	1	0
83	Journal of Empirical Finance	4	33	3
91	Economics Bulletin	4	22	5
95	Journal of Financial Econometrics	4	17	0
97	Journal of Economics & Management Strategy	4	22	2

Notes: Column (2) lists the journals we used to compile our editor recruitment pool and Column (1) shows the rankings of these journals according to simple impact factors downloaded from RePEc. Column (3) shows to which strata each journal belongs. We classify the journals into 4 strata based on journal rankings. For each journal, Column (4) shows the number of editors in the recruitment sample and Column (5) shows the number of editors who participated in our experiment.

Appendix Table 2: Abstract Selection

Set	Abstract Number	Author Name	Author Gender	Mturk Gender Accuracy	Author Affiliation	Top Institution	Paper JEL	Paper Title	Paper Published?	Journal Name	Journal Ranking	Publication Year	Google Scholar Citations	Flesh Reading Ease Score
1	1	[redacted]	Female	0.86	[redacted]	No	J, O, C	[redacted]	Yes	World Bank Economic Review	53	2017	40	25.62
1	2	[redacted]	Female	0.90	[redacted]	No	M, D	[redacted]	Yes	Management Science	45	2015	625	33.25
1	3	[redacted]	Female	0.90	[redacted]	Yes	D	[redacted]	Yes	AEJ: Microeconomics	129	2016	15	17.34
1	4	[redacted]	Female	0.90	[redacted]	Yes	G, D	[redacted]	Yes	Applied Economics	126	2013	15	12.13
1	5	[redacted]	Male	0.95	[redacted]	No	D, G	[redacted]	Yes	The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics	173	2013	28	41.3
1	6	[redacted]	Male	1.00	[redacted]	No	C	[redacted]	Yes	Journal of Financial Econometrics	95	2015	22	12.97
1	7	[redacted]	Male	1.00	[redacted]	Yes	D, L	[redacted]	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	34.65
1	8	[redacted]	Male	0.90	[redacted]	Yes	J, O	[redacted]	Yes	The Review of Economics and Statistics	14	2014	24	30.9
2	1	[redacted]	Female	0.90	[redacted]	No	D, G, Z	[redacted]	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	64.71
2	2	[redacted]	Female	0.90	[redacted]	No	D, J	[redacted]	Yes	Economic Inquiry	102	2013	15	12.05
2	3	[redacted]	Female	0.90	[redacted]	Yes	B, P	[redacted]	Yes	Economics of Transition	196	2013	15	32.38
2	4	[redacted]	Female	1	[redacted]	Yes	F, C	[redacted]	Yes	Journal of Economic Literature	5	2013	398	33.49
2	5	[redacted]	Male	0.95	[redacted]	No	O, C	[redacted]	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	38	41.53
2	6	[redacted]	Male	0.95	[redacted]	No	G	[redacted]	Yes	Journal of Corporate Finance	101	2014	27	16.08
2	7	[redacted]	Male	0.91	[redacted]	Yes	I, O, Z	[redacted]	Yes	American Economic Review	3	2016	94	20.28
2	8	[redacted]	Male	1	[redacted]	Yes	F, D, L	[redacted]	Yes	International Productivity Monitor	361	2013	6	20.73

Notes: Set denotes which set the abstract belong to. Editors were randomly assigned to receive either Set 1 or Set 2. Mturk gender accuracy is the percentage of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who have correctly guessed the sex of the authors based on first name. Author name, author affiliation, and paper title are blackened out for privacy reasons. Top Institution takes the value "Yes" if the author of the paper is from a top 20 institution in the US or from a top international institution and takes the value "No" otherwise. Paper JEL is the JEL categories of the abstract reported on the SSRN website. Paper Published takes the value "Yes" if the paper was published by December 2019 and takes the value "No" otherwise. Journal ranking is the RePEc ranking of the journal (https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.simple.html) at which the paper was published. Google Scholar citations are the citations the paper had as of December 2019. Flesh Reading Ease score (between 0 and 100) measures the readability of a text. A higher score indicates that the abstract is easier to read.

Appendix Table 3: Editor's Characteristics

Gender:	**Count**
Male	130
Female	28
Decline to Answer	6
Other	1
Ethnicity:	**Count**
Asian	16
Black/African American	1
Caucasian/White	117
Hispanic/Latino	12
Decline to Answer	15
Other	4
Age:	**Count**
30-39	27
40-49	77
50-59	33
60 or above	23
Decline to Answer	5
Institution Type:	**Count**
Other R1	123
R2	6
Master's College	1
Baccalaureate Colleges	1
Other	7
Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, UChicago, UC Berkeley	27
Title:	**Count**
Assistant Professor	3
Associate Professor	44
Professor	110
Other	8
Field of Specialization	**Count**
C Mathematical and Quantitative Methods	17
D Microeconomics	22
E Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics	14
F International Economics	11
G Financial Economics	18
H Public Economics	7
I Health, Education, and Welfare	19
J Labor and Demographic Economics	15
K Law and Economics	2
L Industrial Organization	7
M Business Administration and Business Economics	3
N Economic History	2
O Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth	19
Q Agricultural and Natural Resource/Environmental and Ecological Economics	3
R Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics	5
Z Other Special Topics	1
Total	**165**

Notes: The table denotes the distribution of editors in our experiment in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, institution type, title, and main field of specialization.

Appendix Table 4: Correlates of Accuracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Publication Accuracy			Citation Accuracy		
Panel A:						
JEL Match	0.0110	0.0329	0.0403*	-0.0223	-0.0213	-0.0234
	(0.0251)	(0.0267)	(0.0235)	(0.0295)	(0.0339)	(0.0350)
Constant	0.123***	0.102	0.0286	0.227***	0.206	0.197
	(0.0111)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.0131)	(0.141)	(0.149)
Panel A:						
Minutes Spent	0.00357	0.00368	0.00255	-0.0127**	-0.0123**	-0.0130**
	(0.0095)	(0.0093)	(0.0100)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)	(0.0061)
Constant	0.120***	0.101	0.0273	0.240***	0.209	0.204
	(0.0161)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.0145)	(0.142)	(0.150)
Controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165	165	165	165
Observations	1320	1320	1320	1320	1320	1320

Notes: Dependent variable in Columns (1)-(3) is a dummy variable that is equal 1 if the editor guessed the publication status of an abstract correctly and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Columns (4)-(6) is a dummy variable that is equal 1 if the editor guessed the citation metrics of an abstract correctly and 0 otherwise. JEL Match is equal to 1 editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract and 0 otherwise. Minutes Spent is the time spent on an abstract. Panel A tests whether the accuracy of editors differ based on JEL Match and Panel B tests whether the accuracy of editors correlate with time spent on evaluating the abstracts. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Appendix Table 5: Name Visibility Effect (Full Version of Table 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Index (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.106 (0.116)	0.110 (0.124)	0.110 (0.126)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.211* (0.109)	0.241** (0.107)	0.232** (0.108)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.140 (0.119)	0.109 (0.124)	0.102 (0.124)
Female	-0.0419 (0.0961)	-0.0332 (0.0950)	
T2*Female	0.184 (0.129)	0.175 (0.130)	0.168 (0.122)
T3*Female	-0.00169 (0.120)	-0.0118 (0.118)	-0.00883 (0.113)
T4*Female	0.121 (0.127)	0.116 (0.126)	0.0955 (0.119)
Constant	0.0210 (0.0830)	1.060*** (0.349)	1.201*** (0.368)
Panel B: Actual Publication (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0271 (0.118)	-0.0122 (0.127)	-0.0142 (0.130)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.195* (0.109)	0.212* (0.109)	0.202* (0.105)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0387 (0.118)	-0.00294 (0.126)	-0.0180 (0.123)
Female	-0.0744 (0.0907)	-0.0665 (0.0898)	
T2*Female	0.117 (0.123)	0.109 (0.124)	0.105 (0.118)
T3*Female	-0.0227 (0.114)	-0.0319 (0.113)	-0.0290 (0.111)
T4*Female	0.155 (0.126)	0.150 (0.126)	0.136 (0.122)
Constant	0.0372 (0.0841)	0.894*** (0.254)	1.093*** (0.272)
Panel C: Optimal Publication (std)			

Visible Name (T2)	0.139 (0.119)	0.117 (0.124)	0.115 (0.127)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.256** (0.117)	0.284** (0.117)	0.274** (0.115)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.219* (0.117)	0.162 (0.119)	0.148 (0.117)
Female	-0.0851 (0.0901)	-0.0778 (0.0897)	
T2*Female	0.163 (0.119)	0.156 (0.119)	0.152 (0.113)
T3*Female	0.0222 (0.113)	0.0137 (0.113)	0.0166 (0.109)
T4*Female	0.0912 (0.117)	0.0868 (0.117)	0.0731 (0.113)
Constant	0.0426 (0.0866)	1.223*** (0.253)	1.478*** (0.273)
Panel D: Actual Citation (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.146 (0.147)	0.178 (0.150)	0.180 (0.150)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0905 (0.130)	0.0900 (0.131)	0.0858 (0.132)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.104 (0.146)	0.0909 (0.152)	0.0973 (0.154)
Female	0.111 (0.0929)	0.116 (0.0933)	
T2*Female	0.0984 (0.123)	0.0929 (0.124)	0.0877 (0.120)
T3*Female	0.0941 (0.124)	0.0878 (0.124)	0.0899 (0.123)
T4*Female	0.0572 (0.118)	0.0540 (0.119)	0.0389 (0.114)
Constant	-0.0554 (0.100)	0.626 (0.583)	0.569 (0.599)
Panel E: Subjective Quality (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0863 (0.121)	0.112 (0.121)	0.113 (0.122)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.215* (0.113)	0.272** (0.112)	0.264** (0.113)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.184 (0.123)	0.170 (0.121)	0.165 (0.120)
Female	-0.119 (0.102)	-0.111 (0.101)	
T2*Female	0.237* (0.130)	0.228* (0.130)	0.221* (0.125)
T3*Female	-0.0736 (0.124)	-0.0831 (0.122)	-0.0809 (0.117)
T4*Female	0.0861 (0.127)	0.0812 (0.127)	0.0598 (0.121)
Constant	0.0594 (0.0912)	1.026*** (0.240)	1.189*** (0.253)
Controls	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165
Observations	1320	1320	1320

Notes: Shaded rows are the rows that are presented in Table 2 of the paper. Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper was published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel C is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper should have been published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel D is the editor's perception of how many citations the paper had by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel E is the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper on a 1 to 7 scale (7 being the highest quality). All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the mean of the Blind treatment (T1) and dividing by the standard deviation of T1. T2 is the Visible Name treatment, T3 is the Visible Institution treatment, and T4 is the Visible Name and Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate male-authored abstracts under T1. Female is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is a female and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with female-authored abstracts under different treatments. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Female dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Female dummy in Column 3. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix Table 6: Name Visibility Effect (Full Version of Table 2 with alternative dependent variables)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Index			
Visible Name (T2)	-0.00542 (0.121)	0.0304 (0.126)	0.0301 (0.128)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0929 (0.117)	0.132 (0.115)	0.125 (0.117)

Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0602 (0.123)	0.0566 (0.124)	0.0536 (0.124)
Female	-0.0220 (0.111)	-0.0146 (0.111)	
T2*Female	0.280* (0.148)	0.273* (0.148)	0.268* (0.144)
T3*Female	0.0372 (0.131)	0.0286 (0.131)	0.0315 (0.129)
T4*Female	0.158 (0.136)	0.153 (0.137)	0.139 (0.135)
Constant	0.0110 (0.0877)	0.807** (0.389)	0.797* (0.415)
Panel B: Published at Top 25			
Visible Name (T2)	-0.0479 (0.0595)	-0.0454 (0.0652)	-0.0461 (0.0659)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0195 (0.0596)	0.0388 (0.0593)	0.0351 (0.0587)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-4.11e-15 (0.0604)	-0.0211 (0.0593)	-0.0267 (0.0587)
Female	-0.0192 (0.0477)	-0.0159 (0.0473)	
T2*Female	0.0719 (0.0707)	0.0685 (0.0710)	0.0668 (0.0695)
T3*Female	0.0498 (0.0602)	0.0459 (0.0602)	0.0470 (0.0602)
T4*Female	0.0385 (0.0669)	0.0364 (0.0668)	0.0312 (0.0662)
Constant	0.429*** (0.0455)	0.772*** (0.140)	0.767*** (0.156)
Panel C: Optimal Published at Top 25			
Visible Name (T2)	0.00253 (0.0562)	-0.0177 (0.0625)	-0.0186 (0.0636)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0161 (0.0584)	0.0229 (0.0570)	0.0196 (0.0573)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0256 (0.0580)	-0.0201 (0.0556)	-0.0248 (0.0555)
Female	-0.0641 (0.0453)	-0.0602 (0.0454)	
T2*Female	0.117* (0.0646)	0.113* (0.0651)	0.112* (0.0641)
T3*Female	0.0896 (0.0568)	0.0851 (0.0571)	0.0862 (0.0570)
T4*Female	0.128** (0.0647)	0.126* (0.0650)	0.122* (0.0646)
Constant	0.346*** (0.0434)	0.761*** (0.120)	0.750*** (0.127)
Panel D: More than 20 Citations			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0452 (0.0697)	0.0793 (0.0714)	0.0799 (0.0705)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0372 (0.0642)	0.0534 (0.0653)	0.0515 (0.0648)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0256 (0.0716)	0.0515 (0.0719)	0.0555 (0.0729)
Female	0.00641 (0.0580)	0.00812 (0.0583)	
T2*Female	0.112 (0.0755)	0.110 (0.0760)	0.108 (0.0742)
T3*Female	0.0446 (0.0696)	0.0426 (0.0698)	0.0438 (0.0693)
T4*Female	0.0833 (0.0688)	0.0823 (0.0694)	0.0762 (0.0681)
Constant	0.468*** (0.0517)	0.786*** (0.292)	0.757** (0.301)
Panel E: High Quality			
Visible Name (T2)	-0.0231 (0.0580)	-0.0173 (0.0578)	-0.0178 (0.0593)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0517 (0.0543)	0.0639 (0.0537)	0.0608 (0.0541)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0385 (0.0586)	0.0293 (0.0594)	0.0263 (0.0593)
Female	-0.00641 (0.0520)	-0.00275 (0.0523)	
T2*Female	0.131* (0.0704)	0.128* (0.0710)	0.126* (0.0704)
T3*Female	-0.0650 (0.0634)	-0.0693 (0.0637)	-0.0682 (0.0632)
T4*Female	0.0385 (0.0674)	0.0363 (0.0680)	0.0311 (0.0685)
Constant	0.372*** (0.0396)	0.619*** (0.109)	0.648*** (0.120)
Controls	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165
Observations	1320	1320	1320

Notes: Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the standardized versions of all four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper was published in a top 25 journal by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel C is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper should have been published in a top 25 journal by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper had 20

or more citations by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel E is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper is 5 or above (on a 1 to 7 scale, 7 being the highest quality) and 0 otherwise. T2 is the Visible Name treatment, T3 is the Visible Institution treatment, and T4 is the Visible Name and Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate male-authored abstracts under the Blind treatment (T1). Female is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is a female and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with female-authored abstracts under different treatments. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Female dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Female dummy in Column 3. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Appendix Table 7: Institution Visibility Effect (Full Version of Table 3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Index (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.114 (0.118)	0.112 (0.122)	0.113 (0.122)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.132 (0.112)	0.155 (0.104)	0.149 (0.103)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0578 (0.129)	0.0302 (0.130)	0.0180 (0.127)
Top Institution	-0.425*** (0.0893)	-0.423*** (0.0891)	
T2* Top Institution	0.169 (0.114)	0.171 (0.115)	0.162 (0.114)
T3* Top Institution	0.156 (0.108)	0.161 (0.109)	0.157 (0.106)
T4* Top Institution	0.285** (0.135)	0.273** (0.134)	0.264** (0.133)
Constant	0.212** (0.0856)	1.255*** (0.346)	1.734*** (0.362)
Panel B: Actual Publication (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0253 (0.113)	-0.0188 (0.118)	-0.0172 (0.116)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.121 (0.101)	0.131 (0.100)	0.125 (0.0964)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0595 (0.115)	-0.0982 (0.123)	-0.112 (0.117)
Top Institution	-0.402*** (0.0881)	-0.400*** (0.0869)	
T2* Top Institution	0.121 (0.114)	0.122 (0.114)	0.111 (0.114)
T3* Top Institution	0.125 (0.109)	0.129 (0.109)	0.125 (0.105)
T4* Top Institution	0.351*** (0.135)	0.340** (0.134)	0.324** (0.132)
Constant	0.201** (0.0803)	1.061*** (0.242)	1.526*** (0.258)
Panel C: Optimal Publication (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.119 (0.115)	0.0927 (0.120)	0.0951 (0.120)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.165 (0.110)	0.186* (0.110)	0.181* (0.109)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.116 (0.111)	0.0614 (0.117)	0.0496 (0.113)
Top Institution	-0.505*** (0.0934)	-0.503*** (0.0932)	
T2* Top Institution	0.202* (0.119)	0.204* (0.119)	0.191 (0.117)
T3* Top Institution	0.205* (0.121)	0.209* (0.121)	0.204* (0.114)
T4* Top Institution	0.298** (0.134)	0.288** (0.133)	0.269** (0.128)
Constant	0.252*** (0.0806)	1.435*** (0.245)	1.859*** (0.270)
Panel D: Actual Citation (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0888 (0.162)	0.118 (0.162)	0.116 (0.163)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0369 (0.150)	0.0316 (0.143)	0.0293 (0.144)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0358 (0.168)	0.0250 (0.169)	0.0196 (0.170)
Top Institution	-0.275*** (0.0826)	-0.274*** (0.0838)	
T2* Top Institution	0.213** (0.101)	0.214** (0.102)	0.216** (0.103)
T3* Top Institution	0.201* (0.111)	0.205* (0.113)	0.203* (0.113)
T4* Top Institution	0.193 (0.119)	0.186 (0.120)	0.194 (0.121)
Constant	0.138 (0.116)	0.822 (0.590)	1.107* (0.603)
Panel E: Subjective Quality (std)			

Visible Name (T2)	0.165 (0.132)	0.186 (0.127)	0.187 (0.128)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.153 (0.119)	0.203* (0.118)	0.198* (0.118)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.156 (0.140)	0.145 (0.136)	0.135 (0.135)
Top Institution	-0.340*** (0.105)	-0.339*** (0.106)	
T2* Top Institution	0.0794 (0.135)	0.0811 (0.136)	0.0719 (0.135)
T3* Top Institution	0.0499 (0.124)	0.0547 (0.124)	0.0506 (0.121)
T4* Top Institution	0.143 (0.143)	0.132 (0.142)	0.121 (0.142)
Constant	0.170* (0.1000)	1.140*** (0.235)	1.565*** (0.246)
Demographic Controls	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165
Observations	1320	1320	1320

Notes: Shaded rows are the rows that are presented in Table 3 of the paper. Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper was published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel C is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper should have been published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel D is the editor's perception of how many citations the paper had by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel E is the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper on a 1 to 7 scale (7 being the highest quality). All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the mean of the blind treatment (T1) and dividing by the standard deviation of T1. T2 is the Visible Name treatment, T3 is the Visible Institution treatment, and T4 is the Visible Name and Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of authors from non-top institutions under T1. Top Institution is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is from a top 20 institution in the US or from a top international institution and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with abstracts of top-institution authors under different treatments. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Top Institution dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Top Institution dummy in Column 3. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Appendix Table 8: Institution Visibility Effect (Full Version of Table 3 with alternative dependent variables)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Index			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0910 (0.122)	0.122 (0.129)	0.126 (0.130)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.0157 (0.123)	0.0167 (0.119)	0.0134 (0.120)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0119 (0.143)	0.0113 (0.143)	0.00970 (0.144)
Top Institution	-0.394*** (0.0896)	-0.393*** (0.0906)	
T2* Top Institution	0.0871 (0.116)	0.0886 (0.117)	0.0767 (0.111)
T3* Top Institution	0.254** (0.119)	0.259** (0.120)	0.254** (0.115)
T4* Top Institution	0.254* (0.152)	0.244 (0.153)	0.227 (0.148)
Constant	0.197** (0.0894)	0.996** (0.393)	1.429*** (0.413)
Panel B: Published at Top 25			
Visible Name (T2)	-0.0391 (0.0651)	-0.0386 (0.0691)	-0.0377 (0.0690)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.0332 (0.0630)	-0.0169 (0.0620)	-0.0191 (0.0621)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0705 (0.0685)	-0.0903 (0.0677)	-0.0949 (0.0669)
Top Institution	-0.186*** (0.0505)	-0.185*** (0.0506)	
T2* Top Institution	0.0543 (0.0648)	0.0550 (0.0652)	0.0501 (0.0655)
T3* Top Institution	0.155** (0.0641)	0.157** (0.0645)	0.155** (0.0635)
T4* Top Institution	0.179** (0.0791)	0.175** (0.0795)	0.168** (0.0787)
Constant	0.513*** (0.0473)	0.856*** (0.141)	1.092*** (0.157)
Panel C: Optimal Published at Top 25			

Visible Name (T2)	0.0496 (0.0644)	0.0269 (0.0692)	0.0285 (0.0699)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0184 (0.0624)	0.0218 (0.0616)	0.0201 (0.0620)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0256 (0.0640)	-0.0185 (0.0623)	-0.0206 (0.0622)
Top Institution	-0.141*** (0.0463)	-0.140*** (0.0467)	
T2* Top Institution	0.0226 (0.0683)	0.0234 (0.0690)	0.0177 (0.0683)
T3* Top Institution	0.0849 (0.0633)	0.0872 (0.0638)	0.0853 (0.0620)
T4* Top Institution	0.128 (0.0778)	0.123 (0.0781)	0.114 (0.0759)
Constant	0.385*** (0.0436)	0.801*** (0.120)	0.994*** (0.141)
Panel D: More than 20 Citations			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0801 (0.0742)	0.113 (0.0731)	0.115 (0.0721)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.00406 (0.0668)	0.0106 (0.0667)	0.0103 (0.0662)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.00641 (0.0752)	0.0329 (0.0770)	0.0364 (0.0779)
Top Institution	-0.147*** (0.0497)	-0.147*** (0.0502)	
T2* Top Institution	0.0422 (0.0591)	0.0425 (0.0596)	0.0385 (0.0572)
T3* Top Institution	0.127** (0.0632)	0.128** (0.0637)	0.126** (0.0631)
T4* Top Institution	0.122* (0.0685)	0.119* (0.0692)	0.114* (0.0685)
Constant	0.545*** (0.0531)	0.864*** (0.296)	0.975*** (0.304)
Panel E: High Quality			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0378 (0.0602)	0.0413 (0.0600)	0.0426 (0.0611)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.00798 (0.0614)	0.0170 (0.0608)	0.0153 (0.0613)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	0.0577 (0.0677)	0.0500 (0.0680)	0.0480 (0.0683)
Top Institution	-0.135*** (0.0454)	-0.134*** (0.0462)	
T2* Top Institution	0.00962 (0.0657)	0.0104 (0.0666)	0.00543 (0.0652)
T3* Top Institution	0.0224 (0.0662)	0.0245 (0.0673)	0.0227 (0.0653)
T4* Top Institution	7.50e-15 (0.0750)	-0.00509 (0.0757)	-0.0124 (0.0734)
Constant	0.436*** (0.0425)	0.685*** (0.110)	0.861*** (0.123)
Controls	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165
Observations	1320	1320	1320

Notes: Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the standardized versions of all four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper was published in a top 25 journal by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel C is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper should have been published in a top 25 journal by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper had 20 or more citations by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel E is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper is 5 or above (on a 1 to 7 scale, 7 being the highest quality) and 0 otherwise. T2 is the Visible Name treatment, T3 is the Visible Institution treatment, and T4 is the Visible Name and Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of authors from non-top institutions under the Blind treatment (T1). Top Institution is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is from a top 20 institution in the US or from a top international institution and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with abstracts of top-institution authors under different treatments. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Top Institution dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Top Institution dummy in Column 3. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix Table 9: Name and Institution Visibility Effect (Full Version of Table 4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Index (std)						
Visible Name (T2)	0.00526 (0.141)	0.0592 (0.149)	0.0666 (0.147)	0.222 (0.158)	0.165 (0.161)	0.160 (0.152)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0177 (0.133)	0.102 (0.127)	0.0974 (0.128)	0.246* (0.140)	0.206 (0.134)	0.203 (0.126)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.164 (0.159)	-0.161 (0.165)	-0.152 (0.166)	0.279* (0.157)	0.219 (0.155)	0.187 (0.141)
Top Institution	-0.304** (0.130)	-0.310** (0.130)		-0.546*** (0.114)	-0.537*** (0.112)	
T2* Top Institution	0.202 (0.166)	0.202 (0.166)	0.184 (0.158)	0.136 (0.177)	0.140 (0.180)	0.140 (0.181)
T3* Top Institution	0.386** (0.161)	0.369** (0.164)	0.371** (0.157)	-0.0748 (0.150)	-0.0481 (0.153)	-0.0656 (0.155)
T4* Top Institution	0.607*** (0.190)	0.595*** (0.194)	0.563*** (0.191)	-0.0376 (0.167)	-0.0465 (0.167)	-0.0354 (0.170)
Constant	0.173 (0.106)	1.352*** (0.426)	1.415*** (0.446)	0.252** (0.111)	1.157*** (0.334)	1.570*** (0.333)
Panel B: Actual Publication (std)						
Visible Name (T2)	-0.0573 (0.131)	-0.0709 (0.145)	-0.0664 (0.147)	0.108 (0.147)	0.0327 (0.148)	0.0322 (0.137)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.00875 (0.127)	0.0509 (0.123)	0.0460 (0.124)	0.234* (0.120)	0.208* (0.125)	0.206* (0.116)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.286* (0.159)	-0.317* (0.173)	-0.319* (0.171)	0.167 (0.130)	0.118 (0.135)	0.0938 (0.123)
Top Institution	-0.316** (0.131)	-0.320** (0.131)		-0.488*** (0.110)	-0.479*** (0.108)	
T2* Top Institution	0.169 (0.167)	0.169 (0.168)	0.155 (0.165)	0.0727 (0.158)	0.0761 (0.159)	0.0660 (0.163)
T3* Top Institution	0.372** (0.153)	0.358** (0.155)	0.359** (0.153)	-0.123 (0.152)	-0.0958 (0.152)	-0.116 (0.152)
T4* Top Institution	0.649*** (0.191)	0.640*** (0.195)	0.614*** (0.195)	0.0536 (0.170)	0.0444 (0.172)	0.0351 (0.168)
Constant	0.195* (0.0989)	0.986*** (0.344)	1.120*** (0.374)	0.207** (0.0988)	1.134*** (0.235)	1.551*** (0.226)
Panel C: Optimal Publication (std)						
Visible Name (T2)	0.0491 (0.135)	0.0374 (0.142)	0.0434 (0.143)	0.189 (0.145)	0.148 (0.152)	0.147 (0.144)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.132 (0.135)	0.186 (0.135)	0.181 (0.136)	0.198 (0.126)	0.184 (0.127)	0.181 (0.123)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0182 (0.148)	-0.0567 (0.153)	-0.0549 (0.153)	0.249* (0.127)	0.178 (0.133)	0.154 (0.126)
Top Institution	-0.316** (0.122)	-0.321*** (0.123)		-0.693*** (0.118)	-0.685*** (0.118)	
T2* Top Institution	0.179 (0.158)	0.179 (0.158)	0.162 (0.152)	0.225 (0.166)	0.228 (0.168)	0.219 (0.169)
T3* Top Institution	0.248 (0.156)	0.235 (0.158)	0.236 (0.151)	0.161 (0.159)	0.187 (0.159)	0.169 (0.157)
T4* Top Institution	0.474*** (0.171)	0.465*** (0.173)	0.435** (0.171)	0.122 (0.170)	0.113 (0.172)	0.104 (0.168)
Constant	0.201* (0.104)	1.493*** (0.309)	1.635*** (0.336)	0.304*** (0.0986)	1.376*** (0.251)	1.760*** (0.257)
Panel D: Actual Citation (std)						
Visible Name (T2)	0.0570 (0.183)	0.154 (0.181)	0.162 (0.177)	0.121 (0.194)	0.0810 (0.203)	0.0698 (0.199)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.0950 (0.157)	-0.0359 (0.154)	-0.0371 (0.150)	0.169 (0.191)	0.0984 (0.183)	0.0972 (0.181)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.107 (0.177)	-0.0734 (0.184)	-0.0543 (0.185)	0.179 (0.210)	0.122 (0.206)	0.0929 (0.200)
Top Institution	-0.200* (0.119)	-0.204* (0.121)		-0.350*** (0.133)	-0.345** (0.134)	

T2* Top Institution	0.178 (0.161)	0.178 (0.163)	0.163 (0.156)	0.248 (0.175)	0.250 (0.178)	0.268 (0.172)
T3* Top Institution	0.371** (0.158)	0.360** (0.162)	0.362** (0.155)	0.0317 (0.179)	0.0466 (0.185)	0.0382 (0.181)
T4* Top Institution	0.422** (0.172)	0.415** (0.177)	0.387** (0.174)	-0.0358 (0.183)	-0.0408 (0.184)	0.00269 (0.185)
Constant	0.0447 (0.129)	1.017 (0.646)	0.939 (0.658)	0.231 (0.145)	0.625 (0.588)	0.793 (0.598)
Panel E: Subjective Quality (std)						
Visible Name (T2)	0.00928 (0.146)	0.0773 (0.144)	0.0834 (0.144)	0.321* (0.171)	0.294* (0.166)	0.291* (0.163)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0977 (0.140)	0.209 (0.138)	0.205 (0.139)	0.209 (0.150)	0.196 (0.150)	0.193 (0.147)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0328 (0.158)	-0.0170 (0.154)	-0.00904 (0.156)	0.344** (0.167)	0.304* (0.166)	0.278* (0.158)
Top Institution	-0.221* (0.133)	-0.227* (0.134)		-0.459*** (0.124)	-0.451*** (0.123)	
T2* Top Institution	0.154 (0.165)	0.154 (0.164)	0.139 (0.160)	0.00475 (0.199)	0.00756 (0.203)	0.00392 (0.203)
T3* Top Institution	0.234 (0.162)	0.217 (0.165)	0.220 (0.160)	-0.135 (0.163)	-0.112 (0.164)	-0.126 (0.165)
T4* Top Institution	0.434** (0.187)	0.423** (0.189)	0.397** (0.188)	-0.148 (0.163)	-0.155 (0.163)	-0.155 (0.165)
Constant	0.170 (0.116)	1.278*** (0.264)	1.348*** (0.281)	0.170 (0.125)	1.001*** (0.279)	1.421*** (0.270)
Controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165	165	165	165
Observations	660	660	660	660	660	660
Author of the Abstract	Male	Male	Male	Female	Female	Female

Notes: Shaded rows are the rows that are presented in Table 4 of the paper. Sample is male-authored abstracts for Columns (1)-(3) and female-authored abstracts for Columns (4)-(6). Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper was published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel C is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper should have been published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel D is the editor's perception of how many citations the paper had by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel E is the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper on a 1 to 7 scale (7 being the highest quality). All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the mean of the Blind treatment (T1) and dividing by the standard deviation of T1. T2 is the Visible Name treatment, T3 is the Visible Institution treatment, and T4 is the Visible Name and Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of male authors from non-top institutions under T1 and constant in Column 4 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of female authors from non-top institutions under T1. Top Institution is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is from a top 20 institution in the US or from a top international institution and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with abstracts of top-institution authors under different treatments. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Top Institution dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Top Institution dummy in Columns 3 and 6. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix Table 10: Name and Institution Visibility Effect (Full Version of Table 4 with alternative dependent variables)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Index						
Visible Name (T2)	-0.0737 (0.167)	0.00978 (0.169)	0.0224 (0.161)	0.256 (0.162)	0.235 (0.166)	0.230 (0.165)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.160 (0.152)	-0.0610 (0.151)	-0.0635 (0.148)	0.129 (0.158)	0.0958 (0.154)	0.0941 (0.153)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.225 (0.170)	-0.196 (0.171)	-0.174 (0.171)	0.249 (0.183)	0.217 (0.182)	0.193 (0.178)
Top Institution	-0.289** (0.136)	-0.295** (0.139)		-0.499*** (0.133)	-0.493*** (0.132)	
T2* Top Institution	0.137 (0.190)	0.136 (0.192)	0.109 (0.171)	0.0377 (0.187)	0.0399 (0.189)	0.0430 (0.191)
T3* Top Institution	0.506*** (0.187)	0.489** (0.193)	0.489*** (0.178)	0.00274 (0.171)	0.0210 (0.173)	0.00857 (0.174)
T4* Top Institution	0.570*** (0.213)	0.559** (0.218)	0.508** (0.209)	-0.0622 (0.194)	-0.0683 (0.196)	-0.0544 (0.201)
Constant	0.156 (0.116)	1.268*** (0.387)	1.199*** (0.404)	0.238* (0.124)	0.725 (0.464)	1.054** (0.480)
Panel B: Published at Top 25						
Visible Name (T2)	-0.118 (0.0799)	-0.110 (0.0848)	-0.106 (0.0846)	0.0398 (0.0874)	0.0329 (0.0891)	0.0304 (0.0853)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.125 (0.0768)	-0.0794 (0.0772)	-0.0806 (0.0780)	0.0586 (0.0799)	0.0455 (0.0782)	0.0439 (0.0766)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.179** (0.0814)	-0.200** (0.0796)	-0.195** (0.0800)	0.0385 (0.0882)	0.0190 (0.0884)	0.00520 (0.0855)
Top Institution	-0.167** (0.0692)	-0.169** (0.0692)		-0.205*** (0.0748)	-0.202*** (0.0747)	
T2* Top Institution	0.140 (0.0967)	0.140 (0.0972)	0.129 (0.0932)	-0.0317 (0.0968)	-0.0306 (0.0977)	-0.0294 (0.0981)
T3* Top Institution	0.289*** (0.0922)	0.282*** (0.0939)	0.281*** (0.0905)	0.0215 (0.0933)	0.0307 (0.0945)	0.0258 (0.0953)
T4* Top Institution	0.359*** (0.0967)	0.354*** (0.0982)	0.333*** (0.0964)	-2.24e-15 (0.109)	-0.00312 (0.110)	0.00218 (0.111)
Constant	0.513*** (0.0592)	0.898*** (0.169)	0.882*** (0.183)	0.513*** (0.0620)	0.814*** (0.157)	1.009*** (0.164)
Panel C: Optimal Published at Top 25						
Visible Name (T2)	-0.0165 (0.0756)	-0.0388 (0.0816)	-0.0337 (0.0811)	0.116 (0.0881)	0.0926 (0.0861)	0.0909 (0.0862)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.0351 (0.0721)	-0.0078 (0.0695)	-0.0089 (0.0695)	0.0720 (0.0831)	0.0513 (0.0836)	0.0502 (0.0825)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0769 (0.0741)	-0.119* (0.0691)	-0.112 (0.0694)	0.128 (0.0879)	0.0812 (0.0854)	0.0708 (0.0848)
Top Institution	-0.0513 (0.0628)	-0.0543 (0.0645)		-0.231*** (0.0772)	-0.226*** (0.0766)	
T2* Top Institution	0.0381 (0.0969)	0.0380 (0.0982)	0.0263 (0.0950)	0.00709 (0.100)	0.00868 (0.101)	0.00883 (0.102)
T3* Top Institution	0.102 (0.0930)	0.0934 (0.0964)	0.0927 (0.0920)	0.0675 (0.0960)	0.0804 (0.0968)	0.0757 (0.0976)
T4* Top Institution	0.205** (0.0984)	0.199** (0.101)	0.177* (0.0977)	0.0513 (0.109)	0.0470 (0.110)	0.0501 (0.111)
Constant	0.372*** (0.0508)	0.856*** (0.148)	0.835*** (0.158)	0.397*** (0.0638)	0.746*** (0.135)	0.897*** (0.146)
Panel D: More than 20 Citations						
Visible Name (T2)	0.0401 (0.0963)	0.107 (0.0951)	0.113 (0.0886)	0.120 (0.0880)	0.119 (0.0865)	0.116 (0.0866)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.0665 (0.0841)	-0.0291 (0.0838)	-0.0294 (0.0799)	0.0583 (0.0807)	0.0500 (0.0799)	0.0505 (0.0802)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0897 (0.0952)	-0.0436 (0.0957)	-0.0297 (0.0955)	0.103 (0.0868)	0.109 (0.0890)	0.102 (0.0889)
Top Institution	-0.115* (0.0671)	-0.116* (0.0683)		-0.179** (0.0742)	-0.178** (0.0750)	
T2* Top Institution	0.0101 (0.0937)	0.0101 (0.0953)	-0.0012 (0.0849)	0.0742 (0.0916)	0.0748 (0.0929)	0.0779 (0.0939)

T3* Top Institution	0.207** (0.0896)	0.204** (0.0917)	0.205** (0.0860)	0.0468 (0.0963)	0.0513 (0.0984)	0.0459 (0.0982)
T4* Top Institution	0.231** (0.0966)	0.229** (0.0987)	0.208** (0.0960)	0.0128 (0.0947)	0.0113 (0.0962)	0.0212 (0.0972)
Constant	0.526*** (0.0707)	1.025*** (0.247)	0.977*** (0.251)	0.564*** (0.0638)	0.702* (0.378)	0.765** (0.387)
Panel E: High Quality						
Visible Name (T2)	-0.0418 (0.0798)	-0.0206 (0.0798)	-0.0166 (0.0793)	0.117 (0.0826)	0.103 (0.0836)	0.102 (0.0844)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.0123 (0.0742)	0.0239 (0.0737)	0.0223 (0.0734)	0.0283 (0.0795)	0.0121 (0.0799)	0.0110 (0.0802)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0128 (0.0798)	-0.0074 (0.0802)	-0.0017 (0.0805)	0.128 (0.0882)	0.107 (0.0889)	0.0980 (0.0886)
Top Institution	-0.0769 (0.0673)	-0.0802 (0.0697)		-0.192*** (0.0623)	-0.190*** (0.0622)	
T2* Top Institution	0.0374 (0.0961)	0.0374 (0.0975)	0.0283 (0.0950)	-0.0182 (0.102)	-0.0173 (0.103)	-0.0182 (0.104)
T3* Top Institution	0.128 (0.0916)	0.118 (0.0957)	0.119 (0.0924)	-0.0832 (0.0902)	-0.0760 (0.0911)	-0.0800 (0.0914)
T4* Top Institution	0.103 (0.107)	0.0959 (0.111)	0.0793 (0.107)	-0.103 (0.0973)	-0.105 (0.0981)	-0.104 (0.0990)
Constant	0.410*** (0.0545)	0.784*** (0.125)	0.773*** (0.139)	0.462*** (0.0589)	0.587*** (0.140)	0.733*** (0.145)
Controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165	165	165	165
Observations	660	660	660	660	660	660
Author of the Abstract	Male	Male	Male	Female	Female	Female

Notes: Sample is male-authored abstracts for Columns (1)-(3) and female-authored abstracts for Columns (4)-(6). Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the standardized versions of all four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper was published in a top 25 journal by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel C is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper should have been published in a top 25 journal by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor thinks that the paper had 20 or more citations by December 2019 and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in Panel E is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper is 5 or above (on a 1 to 7 scale, 7 being the highest quality) and 0 otherwise. T2 is the Visible Name treatment, T3 is the Visible Institution treatment, and T4 is the Visible Name and Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of male authors from non-top institutions under the Blind Treatment (T1) and constant in Column 4 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of female authors from non-top institutions under T1. Top Institution is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is from a top 20 institution in the US or from a top international institution and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with abstracts of top-institution authors under different treatments. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Top Institution dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Top Institution dummy in Column 3. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix Table 11: Name and Institution Visibility Effect (Full Version of Table 4 Columns (1)-(3)) dropping abstracts with authors from top-6 institutions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Index (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.00526 (0.142)	0.0265 (0.158)	0.0397 (0.155)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0177 (0.134)	0.0965 (0.132)	0.0922 (0.133)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.164 (0.159)	-0.157 (0.167)	-0.145 (0.166)
Top Institution	-0.421** (0.174)	-0.422** (0.178)	-0.806*** (0.182)
T2* Top Institution	0.295 (0.247)	0.289 (0.251)	0.242 (0.179)
T3* Top Institution	0.112 (0.227)	0.0957 (0.233)	0.0973 (0.186)
T4* Top Institution	0.529** (0.235)	0.525** (0.239)	0.425** (0.198)
Constant	0.173 (0.106)	0.298 (0.351)	0.321 (0.388)
Panel B: Actual Publication (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	-0.0573 (0.131)	-0.101 (0.150)	-0.0914 (0.153)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.00875 (0.128)	0.0434 (0.129)	0.0380 (0.129)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.286* (0.160)	-0.325* (0.174)	-0.324* (0.170)
Top Institution	-0.494*** (0.176)	-0.496*** (0.179)	-1.065*** (0.179)
T2* Top Institution	0.311 (0.233)	0.304 (0.237)	0.263 (0.187)
T3* Top Institution	0.148 (0.217)	0.131 (0.223)	0.129 (0.190)
T4* Top Institution	0.631** (0.243)	0.626** (0.248)	0.540** (0.218)
Constant	0.195* (0.0991)	0.0344 (0.337)	0.319 (0.389)
Panel C: Optimal Publication (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0491 (0.135)	0.00646 (0.148)	0.0165 (0.149)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.132 (0.135)	0.178 (0.138)	0.173 (0.139)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0182 (0.148)	-0.0760 (0.153)	-0.0726 (0.151)
Top Institution	-0.389** (0.182)	-0.390** (0.186)	-0.842*** (0.204)
T2* Top Institution	0.246 (0.234)	0.241 (0.238)	0.201 (0.187)
T3* Top Institution	0.00199 (0.227)	-0.0113 (0.232)	-0.00981 (0.194)
T4* Top Institution	0.371 (0.226)	0.367 (0.231)	0.283 (0.203)
Constant	0.201* (0.104)	0.264 (0.336)	0.428 (0.370)
Panel D: Actual Citation (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.0570 (0.184)	0.133 (0.186)	0.146 (0.181)
Visible Institution (T3)	-0.0950 (0.157)	-0.0392 (0.157)	-0.0399 (0.155)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.107 (0.177)	-0.0484 (0.187)	-0.0256 (0.188)
Top Institution	-0.236 (0.152)	-0.236 (0.156)	-0.309* (0.176)
T2* Top Institution	0.199 (0.240)	0.200 (0.246)	0.161 (0.194)
T3* Top Institution	0.156 (0.210)	0.159 (0.215)	0.160 (0.182)
T4* Top Institution	0.379* (0.206)	0.380* (0.211)	0.296 (0.180)
Constant	0.0447 (0.129)	-0.116 (0.388)	-0.372 (0.420)
Panel E: Subjective Quality (std)			
Visible Name (T2)	0.00928 (0.147)	0.0491 (0.151)	0.0594 (0.150)
Visible Institution (T3)	0.0977 (0.141)	0.208 (0.142)	0.204 (0.143)
Visible Name & Institution (T4)	-0.0328 (0.159)	-0.0176 (0.154)	-0.00715 (0.155)
Top Institution	-0.295* (0.171)	-0.297* (0.174)	-0.558*** (0.196)
T2* Top Institution	0.219 (0.231)	0.211 (0.233)	0.174 (0.187)
T3* Top Institution	-0.00502 (0.217)	-0.0285 (0.224)	-0.0239 (0.191)
T4* Top Institution	0.312 (0.218)	0.305 (0.221)	0.225 (0.193)
Constant	0.170 (0.116)	0.803** (0.338)	0.773** (0.362)
Controls	NO	YES	YES

Abstract Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES
Subjects	165	165	165
Observations	495	495	495
Author of the Abstract	Male	Male	Male

Notes: Sample only includes abstracts of male authors who are not at top 6 departments. Dependent variable in Panel A is an index created using the four dependent variables in other panels according to Anderson (2008). Dependent variable in Panel B is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper was published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel C is the editor's perception of whether and where the paper should have been published by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel D is the editor's perception of how many citations the paper had by December 2019. Dependent variable in Panel E is the editor's evaluation of the quality of the paper on a 1 to 7 scale (7 being the highest quality). All dependent variables are standardized by subtracting the mean of the Blind treatment (T1) and dividing by the standard deviation of T1. T2 is the Visible Name treatment, T3 is the Visible Institution treatment, and T4 is the Visible Name and Institution treatment. Constant in Column 1 shows how editors evaluate abstracts of male authors from non-top institutions under T1. Top Institution is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the author of the paper is from a top 20 institution in the US or from a top international institution and 0 otherwise. The interaction terms show the additional effects associated with abstracts of top-institution authors under different treatments. Since the abstract fixed effects are collinear with Top Institution dummy, we do not report the coefficients on Top Institution dummy in Column 3. Controls include editor's gender, editor's race, editor's age, editor's rank, editor's affiliation category, editor's journal ranking, editor's field of specialization and whether editor's field of specialization matches with at least one of the JEL categories of the abstract. Standard errors are clustered at the editor level and reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

III. Experimental Materials

a. Sample Email

From: Fulya Ersoy and Jennifer Pate <fulya.ersoy@lmu.edu>
Sent: Monday, July 6, 2020 7:29 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Incentivized Research Study

Dear Dr. [redacted],

You are being invited to participate in a research project that seeks to investigate publication quality in economics. If you choose to participate, you will be asked to evaluate 8 abstracts of economics papers. As an editor, your input is crucial for the validity of this research.

The survey is expected to take **10 to 15 minutes**. We know your time is precious and we would like to compensate you in the form of Amazon gift cards. Your completion payment will be **$50**.

This study has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Loyola Marymount University. Your responses will be confidential. Taking part or not in this research study is your decision. You can decide to participate and then change your mind at any point.

Please complete the survey by clicking this link. You can also copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
http://mylmu.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0linnF9sXk2vHoh?Q_DL=t7WqhrvohDt2rmb_0linnF9sXk2vHoh_MLRP_cFN20M4gp5AVsLb&Q_CHL=email

The survey link will be active until **July 20th, Monday, 11:59 PM (PST)**. We will send you two reminder emails. You can opt-out of future emails by following this link.

Thank you, in advance, for your participation – your answers will be critical in understanding an important question in economics.

Sincerely,
Dr. Fulya Ersoy and Dr. Jennifer Pate
Department of Economics
Loyola Marymount University

b. Consent Form

Loyola Marymount University
Informed Consent Form

TITLE:	Economics Research Study
INVESTIGATORS:	Professor Jennifer Pate and Assistant Professor Fulya Ersoy, Department of Economics, Bellarmine College of Liberal Arts, Loyola Marymount University, jennifer.pate@lmu.edu (310-338-1738) and fulya.ersoy@lmu.edu (310-338-7372).
PURPOSE:	You are being asked to participate in a research project that seeks to investigate publication quality in economics. You will be asked to evaluate 8 abstracts of economics papers. You will not be photographed or videotaped. The survey is expected to take 10 to 15 minutes.
RISKS:	There are no foreseeable risks of this study. There will be no deception at any point.
BENEFITS:	The results of this study will benefit the economics profession by furthering our understanding.
INCENTIVES:	Participation in this study will require no monetary cost to you. You will be paid $50 (in the form of an Amazon Gift Card) for completing the survey.
CONFIDENTIALITY:	Your email addresses will not be associated with any data except payment purposes and your demographic information will be limited to your responses in the survey. Your data will never be publicly disseminated with any identifying characteristics. All research materials will be stored on password-protected computers accessible only to the Principle Investigators **for 10 years.** When the research study ends, any identifying information will be removed from the data, or it will be destroyed. All of the information you provide will be kept confidential.
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW:	Your participation in this study is *voluntary*. You may withdraw your consent to participate at any time without penalty.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS:	A summary of the results of this research will be supplied to you, at no cost, upon request, from Professor Jennifer Pate (jennifer.pate@lmu.edu, 310-338-1738) or Assistant Professor Fulya Ersoy (fulya.ersoy@lmu.edu, 310-338-7372).
VOLUNTARY CONSENT:	I have read the above statements and understand what is being asked of me. I also understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time, for any reason, without penalty. If the study design or use of the information is changed I will be informed and my consent reobtained. On these terms, I certify that I am willing to participate in this research project.

I understand that if I have any further questions, comments or concerns about the study or the informed consent process, I may contact Dr. David Moffet, Chair, Institutional Review Board, Loyola Marymount University, 1 LMU Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90045-2659 or by email at David.Moffet@lmu.edu.

By clicking NEXT, you provide your voluntary consent to participate in this research project.

NEXT

c. Instructions

INSTRUCTIONS

You will be shown 8 abstracts.

The abstracts are all taken from working papers posted in 2013.

For each of these abstracts, we will ask you 4 questions about the quality of the associated paper. We are interested in your answers to these questions. **Please do not look up the answers online since it will invalidate the results of this research**.

At the end of the survey, we will ask you a few demographics questions.

We expect this survey to take 10 to 15 minutes.

You will receive **$50** for completing the survey in the form of an Amazon e-Gift card.

NEXT

d. Main Questions

Based on the abstract above (and nothing else), please answer the following questions to the best of your ability:

1. Do you think that this paper **was published** and **if yes, where was it published** as of December 2019?

Click here for the ranking of journals we are using.

- ○ Top 5
- ○ 6-25
- ○ 26-50
- ○ 51-75
- ○ 76-100
- ○ 101-150
- ○ 151+
- ○ Not Published

2. Do you think that this paper **should have been published** and **if yes, where should it have been published** as of December 2019?

Click here for the ranking of journals we are using. The answer to this question is purely subjective.

- ◯ Top 5
- ◯ 6-25
- ◯ 26-50
- ◯ 51-75
- ◯ 76-100
- ◯ 101-150
- ◯ 151+
- ◯ Not Published

3. How many citations do you think this paper **had** as of December 2019?

- ◯ 0-10
- ◯ 11-20
- ◯ 21-35
- ◯ 36-50
- ◯ 51-75
- ◯ 76-100
- ◯ More than 100

4. In your opinion, what is the overall quality of this paper?

☆☆☆☆☆☆☆

e. Demographic Questions

From the subset of journals below, please identify the journal with which you are most closely affiliated in an editorial role.

Please choose the JEL category that describes your research area the best.
(For more information on JEL categories, please click here.)

What is your title?

- ◯ Assistant Professor
- ◯ Associate Professor
- ◯ Professor
- ◯ Instructor or Lecturer
- ◯ Other (Please Specify):

What type of institution are you currently affiliated with?

- ◯ Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, University of Chicago, UC Berkeley
- ◯ Other R1: Doctoral Universities – Very high research activity
- ◯ R2: Doctoral Universities – High research activity
- ◯ D/PU: Doctoral/Professional Universities
- ◯ Master's Colleges and Universities (M1, M2, M3)
- ◯ Baccalaureate Colleges
- ◯ Other (Please Specify):

What is your gender?

- ◯ Male
- ◯ Female
- ◯ Genderqueer
- ◯ Decline to Answer
- ◯ Other (Please Specify)

What is your ethnicity?

- Asian
- Black/African American
- Caucasian/White
- Hispanic/Latino
- Decline to Answer
- Other (Please Specify)

How old are you?

- Under 30
- 30-39
- 40-49
- 50-59
- 60 or above
- Decline to Answer

f. Perceptions of Editors about the institutions

[Set 1]

Please provide a quality ranking of the following institutions' economics departments by dragging and dropping them into appropriate places.
(Please put 1 for the highest quality department, 2 for the next highest quality department, etc.)

- Tufts University
- Boston University
- California Institute of Technology
- Cornell University
- George Washington University
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- University of California, Los Angeles

[Set 2]

Please provide a quality ranking of the following institutions' economics departments by dragging and dropping them into appropriate places.
(Please put 1 for the highest quality department, 2 for the next highest quality department, etc.)

- Columbia University
- Georgetown University
- University of Toronto
- University of Connecticut
- Clemson University
- Pompeu Fabra University
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- George Washington University