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In THE YOGAVASISTHA, a syncretic Hindu text of the tenth or twelfth century, an attempt is made to harmonize the absolute truth as articulated in a number of competing systems, including various forms of Buddhism, Vedanta, and Samkhya. This approach, which I call monistic accommodationism, stems from a Buddhist-influenced, highly idealized form of Advaita Vedanta.

From its beginnings, Jainism has been concerned with understanding, respecting, and countering competing religious views. Although acknowledging various forms of Hinduism and Buddhism as offering partial truths, Jainism exhibits what I call flexible fundamentalism, holding firm to its central teachings of jiva, karma, and kevala while exploring other systems. In this paper, these two approaches will be compared and contrasted with select modern, Western approaches to interreligious dialogue.

India has given rise to multiple unique theological and philosophical perspectives. In the Vedic hymns and in later popular Hinduism, we find a number of distinct gods and goddesses being worshipped, in a process dubbed “henotheism” by Max Mueller. In the Upanishads we find an interiorization of ritual, resulting in an identification between the macrocosm (brahman) and the microcosm (atman), the foundation for later Vedantic monism. However, this emphasis on the “not-twoness” of things finds counterbalance in the Samkhya and Yoga schools, which posit a twofold reality, with one aspect in perpetual change (prakrti) and the other merely looking on (purusa). Later sects elevated one or another deity to nearly monotheistic status, as in Vaisnava devotions to Krishna or Rama and Saivite allegiance to Siva. All these traditions—henotheistic, monistic, psychological/meditative, and devotional—claim a common heritage in the Vedic texts, though their interpretations
differ widely. Each of these perspectives can be loosely styled as “Brahmanical.”

In contrast to the Brahmanical models, two renouncer or Sramanic traditions arose in India offering yet two more philosophical positions. The Buddhists denied the abiding nature of anything, either internal or external, and urged people to exert themselves at quelling desire, establishing an anti-deity, anti-metaphysical system. The Jainas posited a universe of countless, interchanging life forms trapped by the effects of past actions, and proclaimed that the release of the human soul is possible through the assiduous observance of an ethic rooted in non-injury to life.

Unlike the prophetic monotheism that arose from the Mediterranean world, where one can speak of a single deity, and a similar, if not common, covenant amongst Jews, Christians, and Muslims, very little united these conflicting world views. Yet, each of these systems, from the henotheistic Hindus to the atheistic Jainas, has managed to flourish in India, along with Islam and more recent traditions such as Sikhism. What has enabled this coexistence of seemingly contradictory systems? What lessons does India offer for the process of interreligious dialogue? How might contemporary India, currently wracked with divisiveness caused by religious allegiances, benefit from an historical reflection on its earlier grappling with the issue of plurality?

To answer some of these questions, I have chosen two texts, one from Hinduism and the other from Jainism, that provide models for respecting other traditions through reflective understanding.

**The Yogavasistha**

In the period during and immediately following Gupta rule (ca. 320-500 C.E.), India experienced an explosion of creativity in the arts, literature, and poetry. The epic tradition had expanded beyond the Ramayana and the Mahabharata into the Purans, and the various forms of speculative Hinduism mentioned above found new articulation and new audiences in the process. The sacred and secret Upanishads and Vedas were retold by the sages of these texts, and even the arguments raised by the Sramanas entered into the discussion. It was within this context that the seeds of the *Yogavasistha* were sown, a text that reached immense proportions (nearly 30,000 stanzas) and sought to address nearly all the systems mentioned above.

B.L. Atreya argues that the *Yogavasistha* was written before Sankara because it contains “too much Buddhism,” and places it in
the sixth or early seventh century C.E. Dasgupta thinks the author was contemporaneous with Sankara and dates it in the seventh or eighth centuries. T.G. Mainkar, the most authoritative scholar on this topic, claims that the work went through three major phases, beginning with a work that was attributed to the sage Vasistha that has since been lost, this text was then expanded into a text known as the *Laghuyogavasistha* and finally into the *Yogavasistha*. The first phase of the text addresses issues of karma and self-effort previously found in the Mahabharata. The second phase relies heavily upon the Vijnanavada School of Mahayana Buddhism, particularly as found in the *Lankavatara Sutra*. The third phase reflects great influence from the Saivite Trika school, particularly in its reference to the "issuing-forth" (*spanda*) process of world creation. The poet­ic style and luxuriant descriptions of the *Yogavasistha* draw from a wealth of Buddhist and Hindu images and metaphors. Atreya has written that:

[The author] has imbibed all that was best in Indian thought that existed before him—Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina—and speaks from his own standpoint....

The great Marathi poet Jnanesvara (1275-1296 C.E.) was influenced by the *Yogavasistha*, making references to the text in both his *Amrtanubhava* and his *Jnanesvari*. It also proved to be popular in Muslim circles as a good text for explaining the essentials of Hindu thought; it was abridged and translated into Persian at least nine times.

Despite his reliance on and inclusion of diverse voices within his text, the unknown author of the *Yogavasistha* established a unique hermeneutical position when dealing with the issue of plurality. Earlier encounters between divergent schools of thought sought to dispute and disprove the assumptions and conclusions of rival schools. Sankara sharply criticized Samkhya for positing a multiplicity of consciousness (*purusas*), holding instead that pure consciousness is by nature single (*advaita*). Patanjali, in his *Yoga Sutra*, seems to attack the Mahayana Buddhist notion that all things are merely inventions of the mind. The Buddha and later Buddhists rejected the notion that any aspect of self is immortal, opting for a *via negativa* rather than assenting to personalist or essentialist language. The Jainas dismiss the Hindus and Buddhists alike as extremists, as we will see below. In the seminal texts of each of these traditions, no allowance is made for the possibility that truth can reside in any system other than the one that it puts forth.
In the *Yogavasistha*, however, we see an exuberant affirmation of diversity. Rather than rejecting the Buddha as a nihilist or simply ignoring him, as is often the case in Hindu texts, the author of the *Yogavasistha* is quite familiar with the Buddhist emphasis on renunciation and praises Buddha's accomplishment of this state:

In that total renunciation does the highest wisdom or self-knowledge exist: the utter emptiness of a pot is where precious jewels are stored. It is by such total renunciation that the Sakya Muni (Buddha) reached that state beyond doubt in which he was firmly established. Hence, O King, having abandoned everything, remain in that form and in that state in which you find yourself. Abandon even the notion 'I have renounced all' and remain in a state of supreme peace.¹⁰

Siding with what in modern times are referred to as perennialists, the author states that all accomplished mystics share the transcendent state of consciousness without an object:

It is a state of bliss that is not its description, which is both the 'is' and the 'is not,' both something and non-something, light and darkness. It is full of non-consciousness and (objectless) consciousness. It can only be indicated by negation (not this, not this). He became that which is beyond description.

That state is the void, Brahman, consciousness, the Purusa of the Sankhya, Isvara of the yogi, Siva, time, Atman or self, non-self and the middle, etc., of the mystics holding different views. It is that state which is established as the truth by all these scriptural viewpoints, that which is all—in that the sage remained firmly established.¹¹

This nondual experience is said to include within it all other possible forms of expression. In the following passage, the author clearly locates the *Yogavasistha* within the Upanisadic tradition, quoting the adage "I am the self of all," but then uses language that is distinctly Buddhist in tone:

Once the realization that ‘I am the self of all’ has arisen, one does not again fall into error or sorrow. It is this self alone which is variously described as the void, nature, Maya, Brahman, consciousness, Siva, Purusa, etc. That alone is ever real; there is nothing else. Resort to the understanding of non-duality, for the truth is non-dual; however, action involves duality and hence functions in apparent duality. The reality is neither duality nor unity. When these concepts cease, the infinite consciousness alone is realized to be the sole reality.¹²

Though the opening lines of this passage express Advaita Vedantin sentiments, the statement that "reality is neither duality nor unity" is
thoroughly Buddhist in character, demonstrating the author’s skill at synthesizing multiple traditions. Like such Christian thinkers as John Hick, the author of the *Yogavasistha* seeks to establish a single transcendent absolute upon which all expressions of truth depend. In some instances he refers to this absolute in essentialist terms:

This is seen as the Purusa of Samkhya philosophers, the Brahman of Vedantins, the Vijnaptimatra of the Yogacara Buddhists, and the Sunya of the Sunyavadins. 

In other instances he uses the evasive style of the Madhyamika Buddhists to avoid substantialistic truth claims:

It is neither sentient nor insentient, neither being nor non-being, neither ego nor non-ego, neither one nor many.

In this formula, similar to those employed by Nagarjuna, no positive statement is allowed in regard to the ultimate entity. I refer to this particular attempt to deal with multiplicity as monistic accommodationism. On the one hand, the *Yogavasistha* is committed to the notion that a single truth undergirds reality, as experienced by all mystics. On the other hand, it is sensitive to the unwillingness of the Buddhist tradition, which it holds in great esteem, to characterize this reality. Consequently, it both “co-opts” Buddhism by including it in sweeping declarations of parallelism, and upholds Buddhism by employing its unique style of evasive language. In a sense, the *Yogavasistha* does not want its cake, but it does eat it anyway. In order to reconcile the differences in various systems, it blankets them with incipient monism, while adopting non-monistic rhetorical devices to explain both mystical experience and the “non-nature” of the absolute.

**Flexible Fundamentalism in Jainism’s Syadvadamanjari**

The Jain tradition holds the practice of non-violence to be the key to all spiritual advancement. For Jainas, the personal application of non-violence extends to how one forms and holds opinions about others who do not share one’s own religious convictions. Two devices assist in this process: the seven-fold aspect of Jaina logic, and Jaina teachings about what are called “partial truths.” This latter approach will be compared and contrasted with the *Yogavasistha*’s monistic accommodationism and modern models for interreligious dialogue.

The fundamental teachings of Jainism state that the world is divided into non-living and living components, that life forms have
existed since the beginning of time in myriad forms, and that life can be liberated through a fourteen-fold process. These teachings have remained unchanged since their inception. In this regard, the Jaina tradition may be considered “fundamentalist” in the sense that its cosmology and ethics have not been subject to revision. However, this fundamentalism is tempered by a fervent concern that the points of view held by others not be dismissed but rather that they be explored, understood, and then contextualized in the light of Jaina doctrine.

The Jaina concern for understanding the traditions of others relative to their own is quite ancient. Record of it is found in the earliest texts of the Jaina Canon. The Sutrakrta, included in the second section of Jaina canonical literature, critiques other systems of Indian thought in light of Jainism, specifically those that seem to advocate fatalism, eternalism, or vacuity. In the fifth century (C.E.), Siddhasena Divakaras’ Sanmatisutra investigates various viewpoints as being non-valid when asserted in an absolutist manner. In the thirteenth century, Mallisena’s Syadvadamanjari offers a comprehensive critique of non-Jaina philosophical schools and religious practices.

Jain logic regards all statements to be provisional. Any statement could possibly be truth (syadvada). In the words of H.R. Kapadia, this signifies that “every judgment that we pass in daily life is true only in reference to the standpoint occupied and the aspect of the object considered.” In the Jaina system, each truth is a partial one (naya) and no one statement can ever account for the totality of reality (anekantavada). Kapadia relates this stance to the practice of non-violence:

When this ahimsa is allowed to play its role on an intellectual plane, it teaches us to examine and respect the opinions of others as they, too, are some of the angles of vision or pathways to reality which is many-sided and enable us to realize and practice truth in its entirety. This implies that ahimsa—and the Jaina attitude of intellectual ahimsa—is the origin of anekantavada. In other words, the Jaina principle of ‘respect for life’ (ahimsa) is the origin of ‘respect for the opinions of others’ (amelamtavada).

For purposes of illustrating how Jainas have applied this method to their approach to other traditions, we will now examine a few key passages from the Syadvadamanjari of Mallisena. This text analyzes the views of the Vaisesika “atomists,” the Nyaya logicians, the Purvamimamsa ritualists, the Vedantins, the adherents to the
Samkhya system, various schools of Buddhism, and the Lokayata materialists. Mallisena’s text is ostensibly written as a commentary on verses written by his teacher Hemacandra.

Sections IV through IX of the text critique the Vaisesika system. The Vaisesikas are criticized for being inconsistent, on the one hand asserting that a lamp is non-eternal while on the other, that space is eternal. Within the Jaina system, as we have seen, no such inconsistency is allowed due to the teachings that atoms and space are both eternal. Mallisena then explains the Vaisesika doctrine of a world-creating god, justified by his omnipresence, self-dependence, and eternity. The Jainas do not assent to the argument that a thing’s presence proves that it has been created; the maker of a pot can be seen, so why is this creator-god invisible? If he is truly the author of scripture, then why would he praise himself therein? Why would he compose scriptures that contradict one another on the utility of animal sacrifice and the necessity of a Brahman to have a son? The Jaina position considers the postulate of a creator god to be untenable logically and also states that such a notion weakens the perceived efficacy of karma.

The Nyaya logicians are criticized for their vagueness; the Purvami mamsa is criticized for its support of sacrificial animal slaughter. Vedanta’s position on the non-duality of Brahman and the non-reality of the world is examined and then attacked on the grounds that if the world is not real then how is it that the world is seen? “One is not both a mother and barren.” Samkhya is criticized on four counts: its notion that consciousness can be devoid of object; that the buddhi (intellect) could be “non-intelligent,” proclaiming that ‘I am not’; that sky is born from the subtle elements of sound; and that the purusa is neither bound nor liberated. From the Jaina perspective, each of these is contradictory.

Three distinct schools of Buddhism are presented. The Madhyamika is dismissed as not adequately disproving the existence of either cogniser or cognition. The Sarvastivadin doctrine of momentariness, wherein things come into existence, remain for a moment, go into decay, and then cease, is countered by the perdurance of memory. The Yogacara approach to vasana (residues of karma) is deemed inadequate due to its being based on the doctrines of impermanence and no-self. The final system critiqued by Mallisena is the Nastikas or Nihilists who proclaim nothing has meaning or purposes. As a retort, the author notes that there is “purity of intelligence even on the part of one who has a body infected by leprosy,” thus advancing an alternate, optimistic view of human potential.
In each of the instances mentioned above, Mallisena has clearly summarized the various schools examined. The critique he presents, while certainly not palatable from the perspective of those holding the respective views being discussed, holds true to Jainism’s seven-fold analysis of reality and rejection of extreme views. Each system is acknowledged as a partial truth and hence validated, though not applauded.

The Jaina technique of rehearsing and then abrogating the “extreme” views of others, illustrated above in our cursory assessment of non-Jaina systems, provides an interesting contrast with the Yogavasistha. The inclusivistic syncretism of Yogavasistha explicitly integrates teachings of Buddhist momentariness with Vedantin absolutism. It attempts to combine the two extremes condemned by Mallisena into a single vision, although it lacks the systematic framework such as the Jaina system of logic to accomplish this in a philosophically coherent manner. Although the Hindu approach that advocates unifying multiplicity under the monistic umbrella has been referred to by Western scholars as inclusivism, no such equivalent term occurs within the Yogavasistha tradition. The term inclusivist might seem to indicate that the variant positions included are part of an overarching schematic, or answerable to some sort of central deity or monistic absolute. I would argue that syncretic Hinduism seeks not so much to include divergent views but to force divergent views to accommodate themselves to the core Upanisadic monistic teachings on the identity of atman and brahman.

Both monistic accommodationism and flexible fundamentalism illustrate that India has long grappled with an issue that has come to the forefront in the West during the last thirty years: given the plurality of world religions that now come regularly into contact with one another, what hermeneutic approach is the most valid? Will the traditions more clearly define and maintain their integrity in light of their contact with other traditions? Will traditions begin to meld together, in the manner of late Hinduism absorbing aspects of Buddhism, to the point where a discrete Buddhism disappeared?

The history of Christianity is replete with instances of both tendencies: inward-looking fundamentalism and outwardly-influenced syncretism. On the one hand, the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon were fundamentalist responses to movements within the Christian community that were considered suspect: Arianism, monophysitism, Nestorianism, etc. The creeds aim to establish a clear, unambiguous definition as the foundation for Christian faith. Yet even the Gospels themselves are clearly the product of two cultural sensibilities joined
together, the Hebrew and the Hellenistic. Likewise, as with Augustine and then with Aquinas, the insights of other cultures have shaped and re-shaped the direction and orientation of Western Christianity. With Augustine we see an ascendance of personalistic, Neoplatonic, Manichaean religious forms; with Aquinas, thanks to the Islamic translations of Aristotle, we see yet another re-writing of the tradition. In each of these examples, the Christian faith seems less interested in maintaining fundamentals than in accommodating itself to new thought forms and issues.

Since the advent of rationalism, European colonialism, the rise of the academic study of the world religions, and Vatican II, whole new revelations have been made accessible to the Christian world. As Thomas Berry has noted, the acknowledgment of and interest in world traditions potentially signals an infused vigor within the realm of theological discourse, unparalleled since the time of Thomas Aquinas. With this new development have arisen great debates over how best to proceed. In his book entitled *No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions*, published in 1985, Paul Knitter offers a comprehensive survey of how various Christian denominations and thinkers have assessed this situation. In some ways, this book, which describes itself as a textbook, is not unlike Mallisena's *Syadvadamanjari* and hence provides a similarly concise summary of a much larger body of literature. It surveys a host of positions, including the positions that all religions are relative (Troeltsch), that all are essentially the same (Toynbee), that all share a common psychic origin (Jung), that Christianity is the only true religion (Barth), that revelation is possible in other religions while salvation is not (Tillich), that all religions are ways of salvation (Rahner). Knitter's own contribution attempts a new synthesis, building on the theocentric model of Hick, Panikkar, and Samartha.

Of the various models offered in Knitter's survey, the combined positions of Jung, Barth, and Tillich are closest to that of the Jainas. Like Jung, the Jainas see a commonality amongst *jivas*: all hold the potential for liberation (though some lack the ability to achieve it). Like Barth, the Jainas are convinced of the sole effectiveness of their own tradition in achieving their goal. Like Tillich, they agree that partial truth is found elsewhere as well.

The solutions posed by Troeltsch, Toynbee, Rahner, and Knitter himself are more problematic from the Jaina perspective. Radical relativity would negate the efficacy of the Jaina system. Commonality of traditions (Toynbee) flies in the face of the perceived content of the respective traditions, as does the idea that all religions are ways
of salvation (Rahner). Ultimately, however, the most troublesome of these viewpoints from a Jaina perspective would be that of theocentrism, which, in the eyes of the Jainas, would remove the religious process from human control; the Jainas refute the notion of any external divine force and assert that all religious experiences rescind due to one's own initiative.

In comparing the world view and method of contemporary ecumenists with that of the Jainas, there are both similarities and differences. Many ecumenists are searching for a unified truth, a basis for one's own belief that shares a ground of commonality with the religious life of others. For the Jainas, this quest for common ground is not the case. The Jainas are firm in their own belief structure: their cosmology, logic, and ethics have remained unaltered for nearly three thousand years and, as we have seen, Jainism clearly distinguishes itself from other traditions. In a sense, Jaina fundamentals are unshakable. However, accompanying this certitude is a driving concern to understand the beliefs of others, not to change themselves or even necessarily to convert others.

The work of contemporary Christian ecumenists, on the other hand, is often exploratory, creative, synthetic, and sometimes syncretic. However, this adventurousness carries with it the possibility of losing or altering one's own truths. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr has pointed out:

Although based often on the positive intention of creating better understanding of other religions, most of the proponents of ecumenism place mutual understanding above the total integrity of a tradition to the extent that there are now those Christian theologians who claim that Christians should stop believing in the incarnation in order to understand Muslims and have Muslims understand them. One could only ask why they should remain Christians and not embrace Islam altogether.

This is the inevitable conundrum of holding a logical system that seeks truth in monolithic terms. Nasr himself clearly and self-admittedly operates out of a commitment to esoteric experience that assents to the Vedantic and Islamic Sufi vision of oneness; in his perspective, all religions are seen through this prism. However, like the Jainas (and unlike some ecumenists), Nasr defends holding strongly to one's own perspective while simultaneously advocating the exploration of other expressions of truth:

The criticism that can be made against the religious exclusivists is not that they have strong faith in their religion. They possess faith but
they lack principal knowledge, that kind of knowledge which can penetrate into foreign universes of form and bring out their inner meanings.\textsuperscript{22}

In this instance, a more sympathetic eye is cast on the foundations of other traditions than has been evidenced by the Jainas.

Another approach, similar to the quest for commonality, has been suggested by Leonard Swidler. Unlike Nasr's emphasis on the divine or sacred as fundamental, Swidler offers an architectonic, "universal theology" that, as its ethos, allows "full human life" and "ultimate meaning."\textsuperscript{23} However, just as Nasr's solution may sound odd to the non-theistic ears of a Jaina, so Swidler's appeal to a higher humanism might offend a Muslim because of its avoidance of God-language.

In this brief survey of interreligious encounters, three potential outcomes can be discerned: conversion; accommodationist syncretism, often in the form of a monistic, super-inclusivistic metatheology; and renewed or tolerant or flexible fundamentalism.

Conversion is one very real option: undoubtedly, some ecumenists have been converted unconsciously or in spite of themselves and would protest such a label. As Ewert Cousins has commented, one of the greatest challenges facing Christians who have had a genuine experience of Islam is to be able to return to the Christian Trinitarian tradition: the monotheism of the Islamic faith is very compelling and convincing. The emphasis on inferiority found within south and east Asian traditions also has been very attractive and effective for many.

Accommodationist syncretism has been a long-standing practice throughout Asia, with the interpenetration of Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism in China, Korea, and Japan, and the successive religious adaptations made in India when the Sramanic and Vedic traditions merged, when Sankara infused Hinduism with Buddhism, when Guru Nanak brought Islam and Hindu ideas together, when Akbar formulated and instituted his Divine Wisdom religion, when Ram Mohan Roy began to integrate the Christian gospels with all of the above, and when Swami Vivekananda brought neo-Vedanta to the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. Within the last decade, the New Age movement has introduced shamanic techniques into the melange. One difficulty with a "tradition" of this sort (and this is meant to also include inclusive ideologies such as benevolent humanism), is that the rigorous study and logical consistency that characterizes the "great traditions" becomes tenuous, though,
as Raimundo Panikkar has pointed out, these matters should not be the litmus test for spiritual experience: "a rationality does not exhaustively define the human being."\textsuperscript{24}

Renewed or tolerant or flexible fundamentalism, preferred by the Jainas, allows and, in fact, requires that the religiously informed person be well acquainted with how different traditions have approached the basic issues of human limitation and transcendence. It encourages respect for others' perspectives and yet allows one's primary commitment to remain rooted in that with which one feels most authenticated. It combines both perspectivalism and apologetics, as advocated by Paul Griffiths.\textsuperscript{25}

Fundamentalism is often viewed disparagingly as a blind devotion to a fixed set of beliefs to the point of excluding all other views. However, in order for a religious tradition to perform effectively, certain world views need to be agreed upon by its adherents; understandably these at times come into conflict. The Jaina solution to this dilemma is found in a logical structure that allows for and respects myriad positions yet holds to its own cosmological and ethical view. Jaina beliefs and precepts have not changed in over two and a half millennia, and yet Jainism survives with vigor in modern, industrial India. As various forms of Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam enter into dialogue with their own multiple forms and with one another, new structures are needed to identify what beliefs are essential and central to one's own subtradition and tradition and how these may best be articulated and then related to the traditions of others. The Jaina model of flexible fundamentalism offers one option for validating a fundamentalist devotion to basic teachings while still acknowledging the validity of divergent views within their own context.

\textbf{NOTES}

13. Yogavasistha III:5,6-7 (my own translation).