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Talking Back to Rome?
J. R. Dionne on Papal Magisterium and the Church

In the last few years the controversy over authority and what in the United States is called – perhaps unfortunately – ‘dissent’ has had wide reaching implications. It has focused attention, not just on the role of theologians vis-a-vis the magisterium, but on the nature of ecclesial authority, and thus, on the nature of the Church itself. Is teaching authority fundamentally a hierarchical charism, that is, a charism which is possessed solely by those who have been sacramentally incorporated into what the Second Vatican Council described as that divine mission entrusted to the apostles and their successors ‘in this hierarchically structured society?’ Or is it a function of office holders and others, through which the faith entrusted to the whole Church comes to expression? In terms of the contemporary debate, is the Church fundamentally a hierarchical institution, or is it fundamentally a charismatic ‘discipleship of equals,’ some of whom have a teaching authority based either on their office or on their professional competence and training?

There is general agreement that theologians have an important role to play in formulating the faith experience of the Christian community, probing its tradition in light of contemporary issues, and re-expressing its faith in a more contemporary idiom. But what happens when a theological consensus begins to emerge against a consistent teaching of the magisterium? This is where the difficulties begin.

In justifying his own dissent from the magisterium on certain questions concerning sexual ethics, Charles Curran has emphasised the distinction between infallible and non-infallible teaching, and the different assents which are owed to each; ‘the faithful owe the assent of faith to infallible teaching and the obsequium religiosum of intellect and will to authoritative or authentic, non-infallible teaching’. Obsequium religiosum is

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1. Ladislas Orsy has pointed out that the term ‘dissent’ is both too vague and too broad in connotation to be useful in theological debates; see ‘Magisterium: Assent and Dissent’, Theological Studies 48 (1987), pp. 490-91.
4. This term is used by Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza to describe ‘the Jesus movement’. In Memory of Her (New York: Crossroad, 1983), p. 107. A similar
generally translated as ‘religious submission’, but Curran notes that the expression is also translated as ‘due respect’ or simply as ‘respect’.

Curran’s point is that non-infallible teachings of the magisterium do not exclude the possibility of error: ‘According to generally accepted theological interpretations, there is a presumption of truth in favour of such teaching and the Catholic must make a sincere effort to give it intellectual assent; but such teaching can be erroneous.’ It is in this possibility of error that he grounds the theologian’s right to dissent.

Francis Sullivan also has argued that a critical approach by theologians to teachings of the ordinary magisterium – specifically in the case of papal encyclicals – is justified in cases where such teaching ‘goes beyond the pastoral exposition and defence of the doctrine of the faith, and takes on the character of strictly theological discourse.’ When this teaching, whether in encyclicals or in declarations of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, seems to reflect a particular theological opinion not representative of the most widely respected theological opinion available, the theologian has the right to express criticism of what he or she ‘perceives to be a strictly theological option, even when it is incorporated into a document of the ordinary magisterium’.

One of the basic issues that emerges in the present controversy over authority and dissent is the question of how authority functions in the development of doctrine and dogma. Involved here is the question of the relation between theologians and the magisterium as well as the whole issue of collegiality. Now a major work by J. Robert Dionne, The Papacy

approach, emphasising the egalitarian and charismatic nature of the early Church is taken by Leonardo Boff. Church: Charism and Power (New York: Crossroad, 1985), pp. 112-113.

5. Charles E. Curran, Faithful Dissent (Kansas City, Mo.: Sheed & Ward, 1986), p. 25; cf. Lumen gentium no. 35 (Documents 48). Since infallibility belongs properly to the Church itself and only by extension to teachings, it is more correct to speak of the magisterium proclaiming a doctrine infallibly or of an exercise of the extraordinary magisterium.


7. As in James A. Corden, Thomas J. Green, and Donald E. Heintschel, eds., The Code of Canon Law: A Text and Commentary (New York: Paulist, 1985), canon 752, p. 548; also Ladislas Orsy, ‘Reflections on the Text of a Canon’, Amicitia 154 (17 May 1986), p. 397. More recently Orsy has said that absence of refers to an attitude toward the Church rooted in love; it could be “respect” or it could be “submission”, depending on the progress the Church has made in clarifying its own belief; ‘Magisterium: Assent and Dissent’, p. 490.


10. Ibid., p. 211.

and the Church, argues that the official Roman Catholic theory on the way authority functions is not fully in harmony with its praxis.

Dionne, who has a doctorate in philosophy from the Sorbonne and another in theology from the University of Chicago, threads his way carefully between the positions of those he calls ‘minimalists’ and ‘maximalists’ on the issue of papal infallibility. The minimalists maintain that modification, change and/or subsequent rejection of papal teaching is an argument against papal infallibility (29). The maximalists argue that the ordinary papal magisterium . . . may, under certain circumstances, enjoy the charism of infallibility’ (29). While the position of the minimalists is compromised by their failure to distinguish between the ordinary and the extraordinary papal magisterium, that of the maximalists is called into question by Dionne’s careful analysis of cases which show how the consistent teachings of the ordinary papal magisterium have been modified or reversed as a result of theologians ‘talking back’ to the bishop of Rome. Dionne’s study is important, both for the carefully documented examples he presents and for the ecclesiological implications which he draws or which are implicit in his argument.

Modalities of Reception
In his analysis Dionne confines himself for the most part to doctrinal stances taken by the Bishop of Rome in exercising his Petrine ministry; he does not examine decisions of the Roman congregations. He focuses on four issues of doctrine taught by Pius IX and his successors, which, because of their ‘modalities’ of reception (i.e., both positive and critical reception) by the rest of the Catholic Church, were ultimately modified or reversed by the Second Vatican Council. Dionne provides careful analysis of the precise teaching and state of the question in regard to each issue, in terms of both explicit statement and internal logic. Here we can only briefly summarise.

1. Catholicism and Non-Christian Religions: Is there any truth or good to be found in non-Christian religions? According to Dionne, the teachings of Pope Pius IX necessitate a negative answer to this question. To establish his point, he goes beyond the condemnation in number 16 of the Syllabus of Errors (1864), which could be interpreted as being merely


13. He cites the position of Joaquín Salvárez de la Torre, De Ecclesia Christi in Caritatis Nucleo (1903); see also Lumen gentium no. 35 (Documents 48).

14. The one exception is his brief discussion of the Monita ad Missionarios (1840), a document of the former Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, Papacy and Church, pp. 101-103.
a condemnation of religious indifferentism. He explicates the position of Pius IX through a careful analysis of three papal documents, the encyclical *Qui pluribus* of 9 November 1864, the allocution *Ubi primum* of 17 December 1847, and the encyclical *Singulare quidem* of 17 March 1856.

In reviewing the modalities of reception Dionne points to several examples of positive reception on the part of theologians and in the documents of Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XV, and Pius XI. The successors to Pius IX seemed no more able to allow for the possibility of truth or goodness in non-Christian religions than he had been.

However in the early part of the present century a more positive attitude becomes evident with certain missiologists who began to develop the foundations for *Akkommodation* or inculturation, and in the process recovered a forgotten part of the earlier Catholic tradition. With Pius XII a new openness to non-Christian cultures and perhaps to the religious values of those cultures appears. Finally the Second Vatican Council reversed the doctrinal stance of Pius IX. *Nostra aetate* (Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to non-Christian Religions) specifically acknowledged that non-Christian religions reflect a ray of divine truth and therefore contain some truth or good. *Ad Gentes* (Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church) was more cautious, pointing out that whatever truth and grace is present among the nations may be tainted with evil. Nevertheless, as Dionne states, 'the tack the Council was taking relative to possible truth or good in non-Christian religions was contrary to the earlier teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium' (124).

2. Relationship Between Church and State. While the Council Fathers at Vatican II may have been less familiar with the position of the papal magisterium on the previous question, Dionne argues that they knew well its position on the relationship between Church and state and the correlative question of religious freedom. On these issues the papal magisterium had been consistent for the preceding seven generations. Pius XI had condemned the proposition that 'The Church is to be separated from the state and the state from the Church' in number 55 of the Syllabus. Dionne reconstructs his position on the basis of his remarks in the allocution *Acerbissimum* given to the Cardinals on 27 September 1852 and in the encyclical *Quanta cura*, promulgated along with the Syllabus on 8 December 1864: 'For Pius IX, (1) the ideal relation between Church and state seems to have entailed a union in which (a) Catholicism was the officially recognised religion (b) protected by the state; (2) such a union seems to have been perceived by him as necessitated on the basis of doctrine, and did not seem envisaged merely as a matter of policy.'

The position of Pius IX was systematised by Leo XIII and essentially followed by his successors up to and probably including John XXIII. In reporting the debate by the members of the Preparatory Commission on 19 and 20 June 1962, Dionne makes clear that speakers on both sides realised that what was at stake was a change in the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium. And that teaching was changed by the Council, though its position on the question of Church-state relations was expressed only indirectly in a later document which focused on what emerged as a far more significant issue, that of religious freedom.  

3. Religious Freedom. In his introduction to Vatican II's *Declaration on Religious Freedom* John Courtney Murray points out that the document was the most controversial of the whole Council precisely because of the issue of the development of doctrine that it raised. This, he says, and not the issue of religious freedom itself, 'was the real sticking point for many of those who opposed the Declaration even to the end.' Murray left it to later theologians to explain the development from the *Syllabus of Errors* to the Declaration.

According to Dionne, Murray's assessment may turn out to be an understatement. Dionne argues that even though the Declaration claims that it 'leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ', in fact 'there is a sense in which the Council Fathers reversed the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium' (193). The teaching of Pius IX on religious freedom did not depart essentially from that of his predecessors. In number 15 of the *Syllabus* Pius IX condemned the error of saying that a human being may '... embrace and practice that religion which by the light of reason he [or she] thinks true'.

Reconstructing the position of Pius IX, Dionne identifies two basic arguments. Negatively, the Pope was against what he considered to be a false idea of religious freedom as an objective right, understood in the context of the Enlightenment which presupposed the separation of Church and state and exalted reason independently of faith. Positively, he assumed that since the Catholic religion was the only true one, there could be no objective right for a person to take a contrary position. However non-Catholic religious practice could be tolerated, for the sake of the


17. *Ad gentes* no. 9, Abbott, pp. 595-96.

18. *Papacy and Church*, 126, italics in original. Italics in quotations will be used only when they appear in the original.

19. See the paragraph in the *Declaration on Religious Freedom* (*Dignitatis humanae personae*), no. 6 which ends with footnote 17, Abbott, p. 685.


common good.23 Once again, the teaching of Pius was systematised by his successor Leo XIII, and did not change substantially until the Second Vatican Council, with possibly the exception of John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem in terris.

But the Council did change the traditional teaching. In spite of the efforts of the Council Fathers to affirm continuity with the ordinary papal magisterium, in Dignitatis humanae they went beyond the previous position of the magisterium which held that error could be tolerated for the sake of the common good. The Declaration, in grounding religious freedom in the human person, implicitly affirms what the sense of the papal magisterium had previously denied, specifically, that in the present economy of salvation, a human being has an objective right to worship God in accordance with a responsible use of intellect. Even though the Council did not specifically use the term objective right, according to Dionne it affirmed ‘that the right to religious freedom is based on the dignity of the human person and is grounded in revelation itself. In that sense, there can be no doubt whatever that the Council reversed the position of Pius IX and his successors, with the possible exception of John XXIII’ (193).24

4. Church and Church Membership. More widely known is the fact that the Second Vatican Council reversed the exclusive identification of the Roman Catholic Church with the Mystical Body of Christ, made by Pope Pius XII in his encyclical Mystici corporis (1943).25 The identification of the Church – understood as the Roman Catholic Church – with the Mystical Body of Christ had already been made in the encyclical Mortalium animos (1928) by Pius XI, who went on to the harsh conclusion that ‘Whoever is not united with it is not a member of it nor does he communicate with its Head Who is Christ’.26 In Mystici corporis, which Dionne says must be interpreted with reference to Humanae generis, the position of Pius XII was more nuanced. Though he identified the Mystical Body of Christ with the Roman Catholic Church and concluded that non-Catholic Christians are not really members of the Church, Dionne argues that the internal logic of his statements suggests that he, like the older Catholic tradition, considered non-Catholic Christians as belonging to the soul of the Church (196).

Both the Decree on Eastern Catholic Churches (Orientalium Ecclesi- arum) and the earlier drafts of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen gentium) followed the orientation of Mystici corporis on the question of identity and the correlative question of membership. However, after considerable debate, the Council Fathers in the famous substitution of ‘subsists in’ for ‘is’ in what became no. 8 of Lumen gentium effectively changed the position of Pius XII by moving away from the relation of identity he had asserted between the Mystical Body of Christ and the Roman Catholic Church. Because the text of Orientalium Ecclesi arum was not brought into harmony with Lumen gentium, the two documents remain inconsistent with each other.

On the related question of membership, the Council Fathers, ‘in refusing to say that non-Catholic Christians are members of the Church and in refusing to say they differ from Catholics only in degree or level of membership’, seemed not to have wanted to depart totally from the position of Pius XII (233). But they did modify his position slightly. Dionne explains the shift in terms of the theories or ontologies underlying the different points of view. The position of Pius XII can be described as presupposing a theory which explains various kinds of membership on the basis of different levels of being (Schichten-theorie). The Council Fathers moved to a position which recognised various modes or ‘modalities’ of membership (Modalitats-theorie). What they did not go so far as to embrace was a theory of different degrees of membership (Stufen-theorie).27

In a chapter entitled ‘Prior Modalities of Reception’, Dionne shows how a minority of theologians played the role of a ‘loyal opposition’ in the years prior to Vatican II. He does not use the word dissent; instead he stresses the ‘appropriate criticism’, the careful scholarship, and the ‘talking back’ to the papal magisterium by scholars such as Bishop Duanloup, John Courtney Murray, Valetin Morel, P. Michalon, and Karl Rahner, among others, which prepared the way for the developments, modifications or reversals of the ordinary papal magisterium at Vatican II which we have just surveyed. This needs to be acknowledged, as Dionne emphasises in his conclusion: ‘What official Catholicism has never admitted is that the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium has sometimes had to be modified and/or reversed because of the modalities of its reception’ (362).

Ecclesiological Implications

Dionne suggests at the outset that the Roman Catholic Church will advance considerably in its ecumenical relations when it allows its praxis to transform its theory (27). Towards that end, it might be helpful to single out some of the ecclesiological implications he draws in the final sections of his book.

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27. Papacy and Church, pp. 230-35; on p. 232 Dionne notes that a paragraph which appeared for the first time in the draft of Lumen gentium submitted to the Council Fathers in July 1964 speaks of Catholics, others who believe in Christ, and all of humanity as belonging ‘in various ways’ [varis modo] to the oneness of the Church: LG no. 13; Abbott, p. 32.
1. In defining its faith, the Church has functioned as a community of believers. Dionne describes the Church as a ‘koinonia on the level of word’. His concern is to argue that the Church cannot be understood simply as institution, for it also involves ‘associative elements’ even on the level of doctrine and dogma (297). He derives the term ‘associative’ Ernst Troeltsch, who divided Christianity into two basic forms, the church-type or institution and the sect type.28 characterises the church-type as tending to exercise authority from the top down, while the sect-type tends to do so from the bottom up; he refers to the former as the institutional model and the latter as the associative (28). Later he points to mutual dependence and koinonia as associative elements (297).

That associative elements enter into the articulation of doctrine is clear from his study of the cases previously considered where critical modes of reception on the part of theologians led ultimately to changes in the ordinary papal magisterium. But does this same blending of institutional and associative elements occur on the level of dogma?

Dionne carefully reviews the two cases where the extraordinary papal magisterium has been exercised, the proclamations of the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception (1854) and Assumption (1950) of Mary. In both cases the dogmas were defined only after a process of consulting the Church through a polling of the bishops. The review shows that associative elements based on the sensus fidelium were present in the process that led to both ex cathedra definitions. Thus he concludes that ‘even on the level of the extraordinary papal magisterium, Church as association was intimately involved with Church as institution’ (336).

As a consequence of this, Dionne suggests that the distinction between ecclesia docens [teaching Church] and ecclesia discens [learning Church] may not be as clear-cut as previously supposed (348). His position here, though arrived at independently,29 is similar to that of Leonardo Boff who argues that docens and discens are two functions of one community; they cannot be understood as two parts or divisions within the Church.30 Dionne does not go quite so far in what he says explicitly, but the implications of his argument suggest that a new master image of Church, better able to incorporate the associative elements he has illustrated, may be necessary. As he stresses throughout the book, ‘praxis not only illumines theory but transforms it’ (344).

2. Part of LG 25 may have to be revised by a future ecumenical council. Dionne calls attention to what Lumen Gentium no. 25 says about the conditions for judging that the ordinary universal magisterium has infallibly taught a particular doctrine: ‘Although the individual bishops do not enjoy the prerogative of infallibility, they can nevertheless proclaim Christ’s doctrine infallibly. This is so, even when they are dispersed around the world, provided that while maintaining the bond of unity among themselves and with Peter’s successor, and while teaching authentically on a matter of faith or morals, they concur in a single viewpoint as the one which must be held conclusively [tantum definitive tenendum]’ 31

Dionne maintains that the conditions necessary for judging that the ordinary universal magisterium has infallibly taught a particular doctrine are ambiguous as given in LG 25. It is insufficient to suggest that a doctrine is infallibly taught merely because the bishops concur with the Pope in judging that one view is to be held definitively, for their concurrence may be based more on obedience than on judgement that the point in question pertains to the substance of the faith. Dionne’s basic argument is to show that teaching of the papal magisterium upheld by the bishops over several generations as definitive tenendum were actually reversed by the bishops and Pope of a later generation. He suggests that it may be necessary to add a phrase indicating that the bishops together with the Pope teach infallibly when they judge that a single viewpoint is to be held definitively as pertaining to the substance of the faith. Otherwise, the magisterium remains faced with the dilemma posed by Hans Küng: either to acknowledge that the Church’s position on artificial contraception has been taught infallibly by the universal ordinary magisterium or to repudiate infallibility itself (353).

3. A new understanding of the ordinary papal magisterium is necessary. Dionne’s study of the way doctrine has developed since Pius IX indicates the need for a new understanding of how the ordinary papal magisterium functions. Maximalist attempts to maintain that a doctrine taught by a series of Popes over an extended period of time is taught infallibly ‘are utterly shattered . . . against the rock of Catholicism’s praxis’ (357). Dionne’s conclusion on this point is stated cautiously: ‘From a Catholic point of view it may be possible to argue that the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium may be judged to be unerring only when it has been so received by the rest of the Catholic Church’ (357).

4. The extraordinary magisterium: a partial solution on the basis of praxis. Dionne acknowledges that there is a tension between the associative elements and what he calls ‘the determinative factors in the Petrine function insomuch as they have to do with so-called papal infallibility’, specifically, the implications of the ex sese clause of the constitution Pastor aeternus of Vatican I which states that ex cathedra definitions are ‘irreformable of themselves [ex sese], and not from the

29. See Primacy and Church, p. 465, fn. 7.
consent of the Church’.

He argues that the *ex sese* clause means exercising the extraordinary papal magisterium the Roman Bishop not need in any strict or absolute sense the prior or subsequent agreement of the rest of the Catholic Church’ (302).

However, a review of what actually happened in the definition of the two Marian dogmas shows that this determinative factor was not operative. The definitions were made only after consulting the Church, and thus, associative elements were present. Because of this, Dionne concludes that ‘the determinative factors in the Petrine function, inasmuch as they have to do with papal infallibility, are for official Catholicism a value having to do more with principle than with practice’ (359).

Though a doctrine of papal infallibility which holds that the rest of the Church has to agree with the extraordinary papal magisterium remains an ecumenical problem on the level of theory, Dionne suggests that a practical solution can be found on the level of what has in fact been the Church’s praxis. His own study has indicated that whatever papal authoritarianism was exhibited in the period under discussion took place on level of the ordinary papal magisterium, not that of the extraordinary. And it was precisely the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium which was changed in a number of cases through the modalities of its reception. The Church’s actual practice suggests that it functions as a *koinonia* on the level of word (359).

There are obviously important ecumenical implications here, and Dionne notes them at the end of his book: ‘Non-Catholic Christians should perhaps take another look at the way authority functions within [the Roman Catholic Church]; the Roman Bishops and their advisors should perhaps ask themselves whether their theory about the function of the ordinary papal magisterium is fully in harmony with Catholicism’s praxis’ (362). If the Church’s theory on the subject of papal authority were to be transformed on the basis of the Church’s praxis, that could indeed move the ecumenical dialogue significantly forward.

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33. According to Dionne the mind of the Council Fathers was that the Pope should consult the rest of the Church prior to a definition, but they rejected the idea that he must do so; see *Papacy and Church*, pp. 337-343. Others would argue that the *ex sese* clause means only that *ex cathedra* definitions do not need subsequent juridical validation by a higher tribunal; see J. M. R. Tillard, *The Bishop of Rome*, trans. John de Satgé (Wilmington, DE.: Michael Glazier, 1983), pp. 174-76; also Patrick Granfield, *The Limits of the Papacy* (New York: Crossroad, 1987), p. 69, p. 144.