The Impact of Culture on Member State Migration Policy in the European Union

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The Impact of Culture on Member State Migration Policy in the European Union

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the University Honors Program
of Loyola Marymount University

by

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May 3, 2021
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

EU Migration Policy

Determinants of Migration Policy
INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) was formed with the belief that further integration among European states would bring sustainable peace. This began with economic integration but continued to include political and social integration as well. This ad hoc method of creating cohesion among sovereign Member States was generally accepted among Member State governments and citizens. However, in 2014, when a flood of refugees began arriving in Europe, fleeing from violence and instability in the Middle East and North Africa, the EU as an institution, and what exactly it means to be European, was challenged. Instead of pulling together and promoting the EU’s fundamental values of integration and a commitment to human rights, states took vastly different responses, prioritizing their own sovereignty over EU law. On the one hand, while countries on the border of the EU such as Italy, Hungary, and Greece faced a huge influx of refugees, more Northern states blocked them from entering their borders at all, oftentimes actually sending refugees back to the overburdened border states. On the other hand, some EU countries such as Germany went around EU regulations in order to welcome even more refugees into their borders. These different policies are a consequence of the weak monitoring, low solidarity, and lack of strong institutions within EU migration policy, resulting in an unsustainable system during the refugee crisis (Scipioni 2018: 1358). National governments are ultimately in control of EU policy implementation, and oftentimes they do not promote the same kind of policies as the EU, prominently seen in the implementation of the Dublin Regulation (Scipioni 2018: 1361).

The Dublin Regulation stipulates which state is responsible for reading and processing a migrant’s asylum application (Brouwer 2013: 135). In most cases, this responsibility falls on the state of first entry, which is why border states have been so overburdened with applications and
why other states are permitted to send refugees and asylum seekers back to these over-burdened countries (Brouwer 2013: 135). This policy was created with the understanding that all Member States are not only safe for asylum seekers, but also have the same conditions, access to resources, and policies in place for these migrants (Brouwer 2013: 138). However, as I stated earlier, this is not necessarily true, because not only are some states disproportionately responsible for the majority of asylum applications, but they also have very different migration policies in place. This regulation negatively impacts not only refugees and the conditions they face, but also the relationship among Member States. While the border states feel like the EU is not doing enough to manage the large influx of refugees, the Northern states do not want to take on any more refugees than they already have. Even when a plan was put in place to redistribute among Member States through a quota system, most states have yet to reach their agreed upon quota. In addition, there has generally been a climate of mistrust and resentment between Member States who have brought their migration policies into compliance with EU standards and those who have not. This is further complicated by the fact that a member state can be held accountable for the human rights violations of another (Langford 2013: 218). For example, if France has adequate migration policies under EU law, but sends a refugee back to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation, France could be held liable for any human rights violations that Hungary may commit under its own policies. Yet at the same time, there is an expectation that France will respect Hungary’s sovereign law-making institutions. The Dublin Regulation exemplifies that the few efforts at policy harmonization that were implemented have not dealt with the lack of solidarity among Member States when it comes to migration policies or the lack of centralized institutions, which is at the heart of the migration issue in the EU (Scipioni 2018: 1361).
Ultimately, I believe that EU migration law as it stands now is not sustainable. It not only endangers the refugees and asylum seekers who are fleeing violence and rely on the EU’s commitment to human rights and humanitarian values, but it also weakens the relationship between Member States that could ultimately lead to the dissolution of the EU entirely. The EU is an institution based on international cooperation and a commitment to human rights that is imperative in an interconnected, globalized world. However, in order to promote both economic and political integration, it must be able to deal with issues such as migration, which will affect the EU and its Member States on both a national and international level. When migrants enter into a Member State, they are also entering the EU, and therefore have an impact not only on the country they have entered, but also on the bloc as a whole. To strengthen EU migration policy and address these weaknesses, there needs to be greater coordination and agreement among Member States. In order to do so, there needs to be a better understanding of why two different Member States, who are a part of the same institution and therefore are held to the same standards, have such divergent responses to the migration crisis. This is ultimately the purpose of my study, because by better understanding how national factors impact Member States’ migration policies, there can be more effective policy integration in the EU in the future.

To investigate this, I chose two Member States on either extreme of migration policy in the EU, one with a completely closed policy and other with an open-door policy. If the ultimate goal is further integration in the EU, two extremes are the most beneficial to analyze, as I can determine what influences policies to be so different in states that are a part of the same institution, which will provide the most helpful information in how to better integrate Member States as a whole. The extremes pose the greatest challenge to the EU, as those in between will be easier to integrate. I chose Germany and Hungary in particular because they have both broken
EU policy in response to the migration crisis, but in vastly different ways. Hungary completely closed its borders to all migrants while German disregarded the Dublin Regulation in order to rescue migrants stranded in Hungary. This itself can be detrimental to the legitimacy of the EU because it not only shows that EU regulations can be disregarded, but it can also cause resentment among citizens of different Member States. German citizens will see their country as picking up the slack of other states, while Hungarian citizens will see other states infringing on their national sovereignty. Indeed, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is seen as the most prominent opponent of German refugee policies (Postelnicescu 2016: 205). This represents a widening gap growing between core EU countries such as Germany and the more peripheral countries, a gap that can ultimately lead to the disintegration of the EU if not addressed (Postelnicescu 2016: 205).

**EU MIGRATION POLICY**

The EU accepts the definition of refugees established by international law, that refugees are individuals who

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationalism, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his national and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Bujalska 2019: 3)

The EU Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is a set of laws adopted in 2005 which attempted to create uniform standards and requirements for asylum procedures within EU Member States (Bujalska 2019: 6). They ensure that all refugees have the opportunity to apply
for asylum within the EU, however, the actual asylum procedures are ultimately up to the Member State governments (Bujalska 2019: 6). It also establishes which institutions are permitted to receive asylum applications, such as law enforcement agencies, including border guards and police, as well as that the application should be submitted to a designated place, such as a reception center or headquarters (Bujalska 2019: 8). In addition, all asylum seekers have the right to be questioned on their application, and these hearings must allow the applicant the opportunity to provide the full reasoning of their application (Bujalska 2019: 8). The final decision must be given within six months of submission, and asylum seekers must be permitted to appeal the decision and remain in the country until the appeal process has concluded (Bujalska 2019: 9). In addition, asylum seekers must be given the right to consult with a legal advisor free of charge, especially during the appeals process (Bujalska 2019: 10).

Regulation of borders is one of the most significant areas of EU coordination. Controlling the EU’s external borders through the Schengen system requires cooperation among states through the use of data exchanges and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), which is in charge of coordination among Member States as well as sea rescues and the return of irregular migrants (Owen 2019: 353). This cooperation reveals that when refugees show up at the EU border, they are not only impacted by an individual Member State’s policy, but also the policies of the EU and all of its other Member States (Owen 2019: 353). These states have an obligation to cooperate when it comes to refugees and refugee policy, and the refugee crisis revealed significant weaknesses within this system (Owen 2019: 353). The failure of the EU to address these challenges will affect not only the refugees seeking protection but also the integrity of the EU as a whole (Owen 2019: 347). Addressing these weaknesses will
require increased integration and coming to terms with what an increased number of refugees means for national and European identities (Owen 2019: 347).

The refugee crisis not only challenges EU refugee policy but also what it means to be an EU citizen, as the rules which establish the rights of refugees will have significant implications on the future citizenry of Member States (Owen 2019: 347-8). Although all refugees are a part of the CEAS, there is no widespread regulation on acquiring EU citizenship, as that is a responsibility of Member States (Owen 2019: 348). This means that refugees will encounter unequal treatment when it comes to gaining citizenship (Owen 2019: 348). Yet EU solidarity, which is established in multiple founding and re-founding documents such as the Preamble to the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (1951) all the way to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2006), is grounded in a special obligation of joint action among Member States, which is violated in unequal refugee and citizenship policies (Owen 2019: 352). Refugees pose an even more unique issue EU integration, as when refugees enter a Member State, they are not only entering that state, but also the EU as a whole, and the EU therefore has a responsibility to these refugees as an institution, particularly to ensure that they are subject common standards of protection, integration, and recognition among EU Member States (Owen 2019: 355). In sum, the refugee crisis within the European Union did not only reveal inherent weaknesses in EU migration policy and how that is incorporated into Member States, but also about EU integration and membership as a whole. In order to strengthen integration within the EU, however, there must be greater coordination among Member State migration policies. In the following section, I conduct a literature review on what other scholars believe has the most significant impact on the content of national migration policies, including both economic and non-economic factors.
DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION POLICY

Migration policy can be impacted by many different circumstances and preferences within a country. The different arguments for what factors influence migration policy are generally divided into two camps: economic explanations and political explanations. Economic influences can vary from economic necessities, such as the need for labor in a country during a time of industrialization, or from individual preferences, such as what kind of job an individual has and whether or not it will be threatened by increased immigration, whether or not immigrants will increase taxes, or an individual’s belief on how the economy is faring as a whole. However, although economic preferences are important, they are often overpowered by political preferences. Political influences can range from how the liberal state and international human rights norms impact our understanding of migrant rights, how a country defines their citizenship, as well as the type of political process a country has and how it impacts political party and politician preferences. However, I argue that these influences, while important, are not the most impactful factor on migration policy because they do not incorporate the power citizens and society have on these policies. With immigration in particular, citizens will have an opinion on the issue and have a preference for migration policy regardless of their political participation or economic status. I argue that national culture is the most important influence of migration policy because it determines who the ‘outsiders’ of society are and how a community responds to them.

Economic Factors

Economic factors have shown to be important in determining a country’s migration policies. The economic argument for migration policy is centered around the levels of economic competitiveness, labor costs, and the need for labor in certain sectors (Gumus 2016: 62). States will restrict or allow migration in order to either prevent immigrants from dominating a labor
sector or to fill a need for labor in specific sectors (Gumus 2016: 62). The functionalist theory, for example, argues that whether or not a country looks positively on migration policies has to do with whether migration is necessary to boost the workforce, such as during times of industrialization, when there is a shortage of manpower, or a specific skill is needed (Gumus 2016: 58). With this theory, migration is seen as a temporary solution to an economic problem, and therefore policies tend to restrict access to citizenship, family reunification, and even voting rights (Gumus 2016: 58). The neoclassical theory argues a similar explanation centered around labor and the workforce, except that it specifically argues that migration is a result of geographical differences in the supply and demand for labor, which pushes workers to move from labor-scarce areas to labor-surplus regions (Gumus 2016: 58). However, as I will argue later, many authors have found that economic conditions may be a factor in migration policies, but it is usually not the most prominent factor (Hix and Noury 2007: 185; Piguet 2006: 82). In fact, many argue that other political or individual factors actually overpower a country’s economic preferences when it comes to migration policies (Hix and Noury 2007: 202; Piguet 2006: 83). I argue that a much more nuanced approach of how individual factors impact migration policies is necessary in order to account for the differences between countries within the EU.

On the individual level, some scholars argue that those who are unskilled or unemployed workers will be more likely to oppose immigration than those that are highly skilled or owners of capital, as immigrants are more likely to accept lower-skilled or lower-paid jobs and be in competition with the citizens already in those sectors (Hix and Noury 2007: 184). This is known as the “job threat” hypothesis, which focuses on the vulnerability of the labor market, and argues that factors such as occupation, unemployment, or anxiety about one’s job security is the most
influential determinant of whether or not an individual opposes immigration (Citrin et al. 1997: 861). Others believe that these preferences are only relevant in the creation of migration policy during times of economic crisis, which can exacerbate these issues by resulting in a tightening of migration controls as worsening market conditions will lead to growing unemployment and increased protectionism (Gsir, Lafleur, and Stanek 2016: 1652). However, studies have shown that these crises ultimately do not change the overall policy objectives of a country, they mostly just change the way in which migration policy is framed (Gsir, Lafleur, and Stanek 2016: 1664).

Economic determinants on immigration policy preferences tend to be understood as the aggregate costs and benefits of immigration, the fiscal impact on the public sector, and the impact of immigrants on native labor market returns (Scheve and Slaughter 2001: 133). There are various hypotheses on how exactly individual or collective economic interests impact preferences of migration policies. The “resources” hypothesis argues that it is individual self-interest that impacts how individuals view migration, as those who are experiencing financial stress are more likely than those who are financially secure to fear the impacts of increased immigration on both the labor market as well as on social welfare (Citrin et al. 1997: 860). The “pessimism” hypothesis, on the other hand, argues that regardless of the level of financial resources an individual has, their perception of economic change and whether or not they are on a downward economic trajectory will cause them to support restrictive immigration policies (Citrin et al. 1997: 860). However, the leading argument against current liberal migration policies is the “tax burden” hypothesis, arguing that immigration imposes a heavy fiscal burden on governments, and the impact on the cost or availability of government benefits will determine calls for a reduction in immigration (Citrin et al. 1997: 861).
One of the key areas of debate among these hypotheses is how immigration affects the wages of individuals, as that is argued to play a key role in determining individual economic welfare (Scheve and Slaughter 2001: 133). The Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade argues that immigrants only sometimes impact native wages. The factor-proportions analysis predicts that immigrants will place pressure on the wages of similarly skilled natives throughout the destination country (Scheve and Slaughter 2001: 133). However, the area analysis predicts that immigrants will only pressure the wages of similarly skilled natives who reside in communities where immigrants settle in large numbers (Scheve and Slaughter 2001: 133). Scheve and Slaughter (2001) test these hypotheses and find that less-skilled individuals do in fact prefer more-restrictive policies, in contrast to more-skilled workers who prefer less-restrictive immigration policy, which follows the factor-proportion analysis that immigrants’ pressure on native wages is what leads to tighter immigration restrictions, as migrants often work in less-skilled labor sectors (Scheve and Slaughter 2001: 133, 140). However, their findings contradict the area analysis argument, as they find that people living in high-immigration areas do not necessarily have a stronger correlation between skills and immigration policy preferences than people who are living in other areas (Scheve and Slaughter 2001: 142).

However, this Heckscher-Ohlin factor-proportions analysis contradicts the standard fiscal-burden model, which argues that rich natives will oppose low-skilled immigration more than poor natives, with this difference being larger in states which grant immigrants greater access to public services, due to the belief that an increase in migrants will result in more people using welfare services and therefore higher taxes for wealthier natives (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010: 79). However, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) find that rich natives are less opposed to low-skilled immigration in states which grant immigrants greater access to services than states
which restrict access, which is inconsistent with the argument that a heavier tax burden that results from increased provision of public services drives rich natives to oppose low skilled immigration (79). In addition, they find that poor natives are more opposed to low-skilled immigration in states that offer increased services to both natives and immigrants, which is evidence to the argument that concerns about access to, and the overcrowding of, public services influences more restrictive immigration policy preferences among poorer citizens (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010: 79). These concerns among poor natives about restraints on welfare benefits are much more impactful on policy preferences than concerns among rich natives over increased taxes (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010: 79). This study is important because it reveals that economic self-interest does not necessarily have a strong impact on immigration policy preferences, but instead attitudes towards these policy issues are largely due to perceptions of the collective impact on the nation as a whole (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010: 79).

Many scholars now argue that it is not personal economic circumstances which play the most influential role in policy preferences, but instead it is an individual’s belief about the state of the national economy as well as feelings about minority or immigrant groups (Citrin et al. 1997: 858). Specifically, there is a significant relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and a negative view of the current state of the national economy combined with beliefs that immigration will ultimately have harmful effects on employment opportunities as well as taxes (Citrin et al. 1997: 875). These economic beliefs can have significant consequences on policies, as they can be used as justification for restrictive policies rather than outwardly admitting nativism or xenophobia or they can trigger political protests by those directly affected by immigration (Citrin et al. 1997: 877). This collectivist view, however, is not restricted to economic determinants but also non-economic influences on policy preferences. Non-economic
factors include “individual beliefs about civil rights and expectations regarding the cultural impact of immigration,” which generally depend on the extent to which natives believe that immigrants will change the native culture (Scheve and Slaughter 2001: 134). This is because individuals are surrounded and immersed in their national culture all the time, and not only use it to fall back on when they do not fully understand their policy options, but also because they see it as being the most significant change in their life if there was an increase in immigration.

A perceived threat to culture has been found to be the most significant indicator of hostility towards immigrants (Sniderman et al. 2004: 40). These threats to cultural identity have been found to cut deeper than economic self and collective interest considerations and are also closely related to perceptions of a threat to the national economy, as threats to a country’s way of life and a country’s economy both focus on the vulnerability of society as a whole (Sniderman et al. 2004: 41, 42). Sniderman et al. (2004) also find that whether or not immigrants are perceived to fit into the destination country culturally, such as by knowing the language or sharing key cultural values, is more important than whether or not they are perceived to fit in economically (43). This cultural impact on policy preferences is important as it can be used as a trigger to activate those who are already concerned about the issue as well as those who are not concerned but share the same cultural identity (Sniderman et al. 2004: 43).

Overall, the economy is not the most impactful factor on the differences between migration policies among countries. Instead, it often works with other factors to influence migration policies, on both the national and individual level (Piguet 2006: 82). On the national level, governments must manage the economic interest of the country that may need an increase in migration, however, political preferences of the population may promote more restrictive policies, revealing how political preferences interact with economic interests when deciding
migration policies (Piguet 2006: 82). A compromise many states have made is to promote “highly qualified” immigration from specific countries, limiting either low skilled workers or those from countries that citizens may have a cultural bias against from entering the country (Piguet 2006: 83). This shows that economic factors are not the dominant factor in deciding migration policies, and often, political preferences overpower economic interests.

Political Factors

It has been argued that politics, rather than economics, is more significant in determining attitudes towards migration policies on a national and individual level (Hix and Noury 2007: 182). In fact, when it comes to migration, political and economic interests are often in conflict with each other, with political preferences ultimately prevailing (Hix and Noury 2007). For example, Europe has an ageing population which is putting a strain on public finances due to public pensions (Hix and Noury 2007: 182). In addition, its service sector continues to produce jobs that its citizens are reluctant to take (Hix and Noury 2007: 182). Both of these economic factors should signal that Europe requires an increase in migration rather than more restrictive policies (Hix and Noury 2007: 182). However, there has been an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment and parties as well as an increase in violence targeted at ethnic minorities (Hix and Noury 2007: 182). This reveals that political preferences will often overpower economic interests when it comes to determining migration policies (Hix and Noury 2007: 182).

One theory of how non-economic factors impact migration policies is the historical-structural explanation, which argues that the differences in migration policies are due to different historical backgrounds (Gumus 2016: 59). It argues that countries with colonial pasts tend to have more liberal policies towards immigration due to the fact that they have larger minority populations (Hix and Noury 2007: 186). Yet this cannot explain the increasingly restrictive anti-immigrant
rhetoric and policies that are spreading across European countries, for example in the UK, a significant colonial power. This theory also does not adequately address the differences in migration policies both within the EU and around the world, as it focuses on broad, structural reasons for differing migration policies. I propose that it is just as important to look at how citizen-level political preferences influence migration policies in order to accurately account for these differences.

In order to determine just how political preferences influence migration policies, explanations have focused on how the state is defined as a whole as well as what kinds of institutions and processes make up the state. The liberal state itself has been argued to have influenced the development of migration policies in the post-World War II system because of the broadening rights within liberal democratic systems that extend to migrants (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 160). This has also been used to argue why these liberal states still allow migration despite a growing sentiment against it, as governments understand the economic need for it and the political and legal institutions of these states continue to allow for at least some migration (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 161). The liberal state argument believes that this liberalism continues to drive migration policies in a more open direction (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 161). However, the weakness in this argument is that even in liberal states, such as in the EU, policies have become more restrictive and have violated the liberal understanding of human rights.

Others argue that it is not the liberal state itself that influences migration policies in the post-World War II era, but it is instead the international human rights norms that have restricted a state’s ability to manage migration (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 159). This is exacerbated by the increased globalization of labor, markets, and human rights instruments that
influence the meaning of citizenship (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 159). Because of this, national membership has transferred into an international community in which even those who are not citizens have rights to protection and privilege in other countries (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 160).

However, others counter this and argue traditions of nationhood are still significant and remain the most influential factors in determining migration policies. They argue that migration policy is connected to a deep-rooted understanding of what constitutes the nation, which is built on the historical background of what membership in the political community entails (Gumus 2016: 53; Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 159). Countries which define their citizenship in civic terms are more likely to be open to immigrants, while those which define their citizenship in ethnic terms will be closed off to immigrants, as they view them as “strangers” invading the “hosts” (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 159). This argument, however, is unable to account for changes in migration policies, as it rests on the fact that nationhood is defined as static and unchanging over time. For example, Germany has been known as a state that defines its citizenship and culture in ethnic terms, and therefore attempts to keep its migrant population on the periphery as an economic force rather than including them into the nation (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 159). Yet in 1998, the SPD-Green coalition government revised a citizenship law that included provisions for children of foreign residents to acquire citizenship, bringing immigrants into society (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 159).

All three of these explanations focus on the state in broad, structural terms rather than on an individual basis in which citizens and their beliefs and preferences influence the outcome of migration policies. While these factors may provide the structures in which citizens are able to interact and form their beliefs, they do not account for the freedom or influence citizens have on
an individual basis. These factors focus on the overarching structures and influences on a state rather than the specific government or citizens which make up that state. Even within the EU, a supranational institution, national governments still have control and influence over their policies. In addition, these arguments do not take into account the fact that liberal states continue to have very different migration policies, even when they are held to the same international standard regarding human rights.

Others take a narrower approach when analyzing the state, arguing that it is the political systems themselves and how political parties and preferences interact within these systems that affect migration policy. It is believed that the design of electoral and political institutions influences migration policy by affecting how individual preferences or economic factors become policies (Hix and Noury 2007: 186). Countries with a first-past-the-post electoral system as well as a separation of powers between the legislature and the executive will be constrained by the individual preferences of their constituents, rather than their own ideological preferences or the instructions of their party (Hix and Noury 2007: 186). Direct democracy in particular allows for a significant influence from populist parties, grassroots movements, and xenophobia on political discourse and policy-making, restricting the kinds of policies politicians can pass (Piguet 2006: 82). On the other hand, in parliamentary systems, in which politicians are more likely to follow their own ideological preferences as long as it is in line with their party (Hix and Noury 2007: 186). However, it has been determined that one of the most influential factors on migration policy creation is on the individual level, and whether or not individuals feel that increased immigration will change society, and whether or not they want to see those changes (Hix and Noury 2007: 185). Even in parliamentary systems, which favor party preferences over constituents, politicians continue to be influenced by the individual preferences which voted
them into power. They must respect the promises they made during an election, allowing constituents to indirectly influence migration policies. Therefore, these individuals cannot be taken out of consideration regardless of the political system in place.

Others argue that the influence of political institutions is even more narrow, and the primary influence comes from the political parties themselves rather than the political system. They argue that because political parties represent competing political preferences, they are able to translate these into policy through participation in government (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 157). In the Germany example mentioned earlier, the stark change in citizenship laws came at the same time as a change of government with the SPD-Green coalition, which was not surprising given the ideological orientation and policy positions of both parties (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 159). Partisanship and party preferences play an important role in determining migration policy, particularly around the scope of rights given to migrants or specific policy areas such as family reunification (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 173). Party politics also interact with the contested nature of nationhood, international human rights, and liberal norms that are crucial when considering migration issues (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 172). However, party politics is not the most important factor on its own, because it is often connecting these different concepts and influences on migration policy, rather than influencing policy directly (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 172).

For some, the focus on party politics also remains too broad, as they believe it is the political preferences of the individual politicians that ultimately influence policy the most, rather than constituent or party preferences. They believe that it is the left-right ideological preferences of the politicians that push them to create policies rather than the economic or political preferences of their constituents (Hix and Noury 2007: 185). Left-libertarian politicians, for
example, tend to have more liberal attitudes towards migrants and the rights they have, and will ultimately favor equal opportunities and treatment (Hix and Noury 2007: 185). However, their voters tend to compete with immigrants for unskilled jobs, and therefore these politicians are going against their constituent interests when they pass policies that are more open to migrants (Hix and Noury 2007: 186). Right authoritarian politicians, on the other hand, favor traditional social and cultural values, and therefore will have more restrictive and exclusive policies when it comes to migrants (Hix and Noury 2007: 186). This goes against their constituents' economic interests because they tend to be individuals who would benefit from increasing returns on capital investment as a result from greater migration (Hix and Noury 2007: 186). However, these studies focus on the political preferences and ideologies of politicians rather than constituents. There must be further investigation into how constituent political preferences influence migration policies in order to make a fuller argument, as even low-skilled workers will vote for right wing parties if they align with their social and cultural values. This argument does not take into account that political preferences go beyond just economic influences, and these politicians may be representing their voters' social preferences rather than their economic ones.

Culture

All of these arguments of what impacts the creation of migration policy focus on how the political institutions, processes, parties, or politicians affect migration policies by translating their constituents' political preferences into policy. However, I argue that this confines migration as a political issue, not taking into account the fact that it impacts all areas of society. Immigration is an increasingly salient issue, one that any given citizen may have an opinion on due to personal, social, political, or economic experiences unique to them. Oftentimes, they will have an opinion regardless of their level of education or political engagement. In order to truly
understand what causes the differences between any two given countries when it comes to migration policies, we must analyze the culture of these countries.

Cultural identities have been used to analyze migration policies as it connects the political system with the feelings and beliefs of individual citizens. Political culture has been defined as “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation” (Denk, Christensen, and Bergh 2015: 360). This connects political culture with “the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population and thereby provides political culture with a micro level basis” (Denk, Christensen, and Bergh 2015: 360). By examining political culture, we will be able to better understand the differences in migration policies between countries. Cultural beliefs significantly impact migration policies as they can divide the population and portray migrants as cultural ‘outsiders’ who have different views on traditional values and other cultural beliefs (Burganova 2018: 65). This is particularly important when it comes to migration because the way a group is culturally defined determines how they will interact with those deemed as outsiders (Reijerse et al. 2013: 626). These cultural norms need to be better understood within immigration in order to create policies which foster favorable intergroup relations and social cohesion, particularly because cultural identities have been believed to always be more fair, liberal, and open towards migrants, which we now know is not always the case (Reijerse et al. 2013: 626).

It is more beneficial to look at culture rather than other determining factors because it is able to account for many different kinds of political and historical identities as well as give a more individual perspective of policy preferences that go beyond just the realm of politics. For example, the nationhood argument states that whether or not a state defines itself with an ethnic citizenship or a civic citizenship influences the openness of its migration policies
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(Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006: 159). However, more recent studies argue that a cultural citizenship is in fact much more common within the EU when it comes to impacting migration policies (Reijerse et al. 2013: 625). This may be because an ethnic citizenship is associated with older, more blatant forms of racism and exclusion which are no longer acceptable in the mainstream political realm, and therefore is no longer as relevant when explaining attitudes towards migration or influences on migration policy (Reijerse et al. 2013: 625). Instead, a cultural citizenship has been associated with a more covert, symbolic form of racism and exclusion that is now much more influential within politics, making it more relevant to study as an influence on migration policies (Reijerse et al. 2013: 625).

In addition, there have been times when a country’s main form of identity has shifted from an ethnic citizenship to a cultural citizenship, which goes against the current historical-structural, liberal state, and nationhood arguments which tend to view these identities as static and unchanging over time. In Germany, for example, studies argue that there has recently been a transformation of the legal, institutional, and rhetorical landscape of migration policies and citizenship laws in Germany in the past couple of decades (Fogelman 2020: 66). With an increased focus on integrating immigrant communities into national identities throughout Europe, Germany began to redefine its citizenship from one that used to emphasize Germanness through ethnicity to one which focused on a socio-political belonging for those that were physically in Germany and contributing to its economy (Fogelman 2020: 67). This reveals that cultural influences and identities can change over time and influence migration policies differently at different points in time. In addition, governments and citizens can change their preferences for migration over time, which also goes against the static view of identity. For example, Germany was much more open to migrants in the beginning and peak of the crisis in
2014 and 2015. However, although they remain relatively open compared to other EU countries, they did change their policies to be slightly more restrictive after terrorist attacks at the end of 2015 and into 2016. While history and liberal values are very important, it must be combined with culture in order to show that while they do influence society, they do so in a much more fluid way.

When analyzing culture as an influence on political preferences, many authors focus on political culture. However, migration is an issue which extends beyond politics, one that most people have an opinion on regardless of how involved they are in political processes. They see migration not just as an economic or political issue, but as an identity issue. Therefore, when creating policies around migration, there cannot be a singular focus on political or economic factors, there must be a cultural identity factor as well. For my project, I will not just focus on culture as it relates to politics, but also how it relates to citizenship, identity, and history. It is important to incorporate history’s influence on culture as well as how representations of history help define the social identity of a group, how they relate to others, and how they respond to issues such as international politics and internal diversity (Liu and Hilton 2005: 537). For example, the positive and negative aspects of a group’s history impact their willingness to help others, depending on whether they have a collective sense of shame or guilt (Liu and Hilton 2005: 537). However, a collective sense of victimization can actually prevent a group from helping others, as they feel a moral entitlement to behave selfishly (Warner, Wohl, and Branscombe 2014: 231). As I have argued, culture is a significant impact on migration policy because it helps shape national identity and belonging within the nation-state. However, being a member of the EU further complicates this, as identities and migration policies are impacted by both national and EU actors and influences.
This paper will investigate the impact of national culture on migration policies in different Member States within the EU. I argue that culture is the most beneficial factor to analyze because it captures individual preferences both politically and socially, providing a framework for individuals to fall back on in determining their own policy preferences. In addition, national culture impacts the formation of national identity. This is particularly important within the context of the EU, which has also attempted to create its own culture and identity, coming into conflict with traditional notions of nation states.

While culture and migration have been analyzed in the past, I will be focusing my study specifically within the context of the EU, conducting a comparative case study. Most culture studies analyze single cases, how a single culture is related to a single kind of policy. However, the EU challenges this method, as it brings together multiple countries and cultures with a coordinated policy connecting them. With an increasingly globalized and interconnected world resulting in more and more international organizations and treaties, policies cannot be looked at individually, especially migration policies. Immigration itself is an interconnected issue, and just because a country’s culture is specific to them does not mean it will not affect others through the policies they choose to adopt. The EU has attempted bring together common migration policies across different nations, which inherently raises questions as to the nature of legal status, political participation, and national and transnational belonging within a European culture (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdukal 2008: 164-5). In addition, the creation of a European identity through economic and political institutions created a citizenship which resembles national one, as it cannot be given directly to those not a part of an EU Member State. However, this has resulted in debates on multiculturalism, integration, and assimilation in a transnational
culture that both embodies and threatens national culture (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakal 2008: 165).

I hypothesize that the more inclusive a national culture, the more open migration policies that country will have, while more exclusive cultures will result in more restrictive migration policies. To test this hypothesis, I will conduct a study using Germany and Hungary. In my case study analysis, I analyze Germany and Hungary’s histories, how that has influenced their national culture, and how it is evident in their current migration policies. I then measure levels of cosmopolitanism using the Eurobarometer Survey to operationalize their cultural openness. I then conduct a systematic content analysis on asylum policies from each country. I find that while Germany and Hungary’s cultures and refugee policies seem very similar, they are ultimately aimed at different goals. Germany pursues a civic integration with its refugee policies, providing refugees with the resources necessary for them to be a part of German society without forcing them to give up their previous identity. On the other hand, Hungary pushes assimilation with the goal of forcing refugees to adopt the dominant culture and disappear within it, erasing any differences that may exist between refugees and Hungarians.
CHAPTER II

Cultural Impact on National and International Identity

Methodology: Cosmopolitanism and Refugee Policies
CULTURAL IMPACT ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY

In this section, I argue that culture encompasses both political and social identities which create connections between people that inherently exclude others. This determines the openness of society through the creation of a national identity. Culture has the most significant impact on EU Member State migration policy because it determines notions of belonging, national identity, and EU identity. Because Member States have different national cultures, and EU migration policy threatens national culture while pushing an EU culture, Member State policies will ultimately be in conflict with each other and the EU. This creates a conflict between national and EU culture and identity. The refugee crisis revealed these weaknesses in EU policy coordination, as Member States continue to create policies on a national level, yet they continue to be impacted by international cooperation.

Culture

Culture is a broad phenomenon used by many different disciplines to explain behavior, preferences, societal structures, and government policy. However, many continue to disagree on the definition of culture and how it should be interpreted. In the field of comparative politics, the idea of culture revolves around political culture, a specific field of research on the influence of beliefs, behaviors, and institutions of a country, such as its elites, citizens, and structure of government (Theil and Freidman 2011: 8). One of the most influential definitions of political culture is “the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectation of nations and groups,” (Nyyssonen 2006: 155). This definition centers itself around how people define their own surroundings and interpret their attitudes towards politics (Nyyssonen 2006: 155). It also includes the notion that the ways in which nations acknowledge and incorporate their past into
the present is a significant aspect of their political culture (Nyyssonen 2006: 155). However, others within international relations extend the definition beyond political culture to include the influence of identity, interests, and ideas, highlighting the importance of cultural attributes of civilizations and the creation of political relationships in both domestic and international contexts (Theil and Freidman 2011: 8). To these scholars, culture is a social phenomenon involving both individuals and groups that can change over time as societies and institutions also change (Theil and Freidman 2011: 3). For my study, I interpret a broad definition of culture used within international relations, one which is influenced by political and societal attitudes and values as well as historical experience and domestic and international relations. Culture is capable of shifting and changing as the community begins to interpret their culture differently, however, this is a difficult task to achieve due to the fact that these communities are often bound by symbols and values that have been integral to the continuity of their identity over time.

Because culture is influenced by a variety of societal practices, attitudes, discourses, and traditions, it can significantly impact how states and nations conduct domestic and international politics (Theil and Freidman 2011: 9). Culture can explain certain political behaviors, such as how active individuals are compared to others or the expectations and identifications of citizens within a polity (Theil and Freidman 2011: 8). Overall, scholars have found that a stable, pluralistic, and participatory political culture will best support a political system, yet identity politics and cultural exclusivity continue to influence national, state, and regional cultures (Theil and Freidman 2011: 9). Within the EU, culture is a particularly important phenomenon as the EU must incorporate sub-national, national, and transnational cultures into a single political system (Theil and Freidman 2011: 4). A collective cultural identity requires a sense of belonging, uniqueness, and demarcation from the surrounding world which allows for feelings of a shared
continuity, memories, and destiny (Pedersen 2008: 125). This kind of cultural community rests in common experiences and aspirations but is inherently challenged by the nature of the EU and the bringing together of sovereign states (Pedersen 2008: 125). A shared EU culture inherently threatens national identity as it seeks to create a new, transnational identity out of many different national cultures. Migration in particular impedes on national and international culture and identity, as those who are outside of the community are now coming into it. How a nation defines its identity and how exclusive or inclusive it becomes will significantly impact how they respond to migrants.

**Culture and National Identity**

Many view nationalities as being based in more than just territorial division, but also include shared beliefs, a historical community, joint activities, and separation from others by a cultural community (Pedersen 2008: 75). While all nations include some kind of political community, they differ in the kinds of emphasis they place on other aspects of national identity such as culture, ideology, or common myths (Shevel 2011: 48). All of these aspects come together to make up a national culture, which influences how those in the community not only view each other but also those who are considered outsiders. National culture is used to create connections among people who will never meet each other and can exist within but also beyond national borders.

Cultural nations use symbols and rituals, such as customs, history, or language, dating back to pre-modern times in order to connect the community (Pedersen 2008: 68). This emphasizes a certain way of life that is of great importance to the community, and can either be based in ethnic ties, which is inherently closed off to others, or through broader cultural ties in which foreigners are able to assimilate into (Pedersen 2008: 69). However, while these
foreigners may be able to integrate into the cultural characteristics of the community, these nations can also include citizenship rules that are restrictive, as cultural openness does not inherently allow for legal openness (Pedersen 2008: 75). Cultural and ethnic nations tend to be rooted in Central and Eastern European history and often use language as one of the most important defining features of the community (Pedersen 2008: 74). Within these communities, other private cultures can exist among the dominant, public culture, however, the public culture is ultimately the most important in defining the national identity (Pedersen 2008: 76).

In contrast to cultural nations, constitutional, political, or civic nations center around a state or societal view that emphasizes participation in the public sphere (Pedersen 2008: 69). Rights, values, and national myths rather than language, customs, and history, are used to hold together a community, with constitutions being one of the main forms of nation-building (Pedersen 2008: 70-1). This document is not only responsible for establishing agreed upon societal and political structures, but also for laying the “foundational myth” of society and for defining the rights and obligations the community has towards others (Liu and Hilton 2005: 538). The nation is often seen as a voluntary association in this sense, yet that does not mean that it is inherently more inclusive, as citizenship can be used to promote exclusion as well as inclusion (Pedersen 2008: 75). These different types of national identities will have significant implications for how a community responds to increased migration. Because cultural communities see belonging as a matter of culture, rather than simply one of political participation, their response to outsiders entering the community will be one of assimilation, in order to force the outsiders to adopt the ways of the common culture. Civic nations, however, will promote more integrative policies to assist foreigners in participation within the political, economic, and public sphere.
The idea of cultural roots can help explain how nationalism forms within national identity (Theil and Feidman 2011: 5). National images and symbols are crucial for the creation of a national identity and defining where one belongs and also where others do not belong (Saunders 2009: 10). Cultural connections allow for an imagined community that shares a common sense of self and identity, even though it is likely that they will never meet (Theil and Feidman 2011: 5). This can rest in the idea of shared daily routines, predispositions, and practices of particular groups that connects to a shared national identification and allows an individual to express their identification with this group (Theil and Feidman 2011: 6). For example, the German housewife was used as a symbol of German national feeling during reunification, showing that a national identity can extend beyond public rituals and displays into the domestic sphere, revealing that the “culture of the everyday” is defined by national narratives (Theil and Freidman 2011: 6). This daily routine influence on culture can be particularly threatened with increased migration, as many feel that migrants threaten the routine and predictability of their lives within their community by bringing unfamiliar characteristics into a culture in which they feel comfortable.

History is a crucial aspect of cultural identity, as it defines both the language and uniqueness of a nation (Pedersen 2008: 83). Historical experience is of great importance for defining individual political identity but also an understanding of the impact of cultural factors on national and supranational communities (Pedersen 2008: 85). Representations of history within communities can impact how they define their identities and therefore how they relate to internal and external diversity and events (Liu and Hilton 2005: 537). Historical trauma can continue to impact policies and political culture due to the significant emotional impact common trauma and sacrifices can have on a community (Pedersen 2008: 88). This impacts cultural cohesion as nations are a product of history, memory, and socialization by historical
interpretations (Pedersen 2008: 88). Collectively significant events will be incorporated into the ethnic, national, and supranational identities and will impact how these communities deal with similar current events, as well as the stability and legitimacy of their community (Liu and Hilton 2005: 537). The historical impact on culture is particularly relevant for migration policy, as not only can past trauma impact how communities view other victimized groups, but it also makes it difficult for a national culture to be more open or for a supranational culture to be created. When migrants enter a new community, they have not experienced this shared history and are seen as outsiders because of it. In addition, countries across Europe have had different histories that they have interpreted in different ways, which can impede the creation of a European culture.

Most of history is defined by conflicts between collective groups, and the positive or negative outcome of a group’s collective history can affect feelings of shame or guilt, which can impact how they choose to treat other groups in the future (Liu and Hilton 2005: 538). A communal defeat may result in a nation having lower degrees of cultural cohesion and are subsequently more open to cultural heterogeneity and multiculturalism (Pedersen 2008: 91-2). This has a particular impact on how different cultural communities will address refugees, as whether or not they feel a moral obligation to help other victimized groups can be determined by feelings of past collective suffering (Warner, Wohl, and Branscombe 2014: 231). Historic victimization of some groups has been found to make them less likely to help other victimized groups, as they feel a moral entitlement that allows them to do harm or behave selfishly because of the trauma they experienced in the past (Warner, Wohl, and Branscombe 2014: 231). In addition, if they feel threatened by other victimized groups, they will further defend this moral entitlement and behave more selfishly (Warner, Wohl, and Branscombe 2014: 232). The impact of historical experience on refugee policy is particularly prevalent in each of my case studies, as
it has been argued that Germany’s guilt over its National Socialist past and Hungarians’ experiences as refugees during their communist past have impacted how they treat refugees today.

The impact of culture on national identity provides unique challenges for the EU. A collective cultural identity requires a sense of belonging, uniqueness, and demarcation from the surrounding world (Pedersen 2008: 125). This kind of cultural community rests in common experiences and aspirations but is inherently challenged by the nature of the EU and the bringing together of sovereign states (Pedersen 2008: 125). There are different ways a nation can define itself, either through a cultural sense of belonging that brings together a community based on shared loyalties, norms, values, or ethnic ties, or by bringing together people through a social contract based on convenience, usefulness, and effectiveness (Pedersen 2008: 67). The EU has often been known for the usefulness of economic cooperation, however, a cultural sense of belonging will be necessary for increased integration among Member States (Pedersen 2008: 67).

**EU Culture and Identity**

The impact of culture on Member State migration policies is particularly pertinent within the EU yet has rarely been systematically considered in a comparative case study. Although there have been efforts at establishing cultural policy within the EU, Member State autonomy and resistance to further integration has added to the complexity of this initiative (Schlesinger 1997: 370). In particular, xenophobic reactions have grown as a reaction against multiculturalism within the union and national culture has now begun to be used as the grounds to refuse increased pluralism within Member State societies (Schlesinger 1997: 370). While political culture within the Member State exists in order to conceptualize a national identity and is often considered to be “thick,” “dense,” and exists throughout everyday life, EU political culture
remains to be categorized as “thin” due to the fact that there is a lack of popular consent and support for the EU because of the democratic deficit which impedes on the creation of a European citizenry (Schlesinger 1997: 386). National culture policies have been tied to forms of identity in which natives are a part of a solidified community that defines their citizenship, while European citizenship is a much more abstract, inclusive concept of identity (Barnett 2001: 405).

Although national sovereignty remains a fundamental pillar of the EU, there are policies in place to encourage the formation of a cultural union in addition to an economic and political one. For example, the European Cultural Convention was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1954, establishing the basis of cultural cooperation among Member States (Constantin 2012: 10). The respect and promotion of cultural diversity is a crucial European value in order to uphold a union that is based on solidarity, and so the EU must both support diversity while also ensuring cohesion among various societies and nations (Constantin 2012: 11). This has so far been promoted by intercultural and interfaith dialogue within the context of the international universal human rights regime as a means to promote greater understanding and tolerance among communities and prevent conflict (Constantin 2012: 11). Freedom, democracy, tolerance, and solidarity have been the key values that a common EU culture and identity have been built off of by continuously attempting to strike a balance between respecting national and regional diversity while also promoting a common cultural heritage and European integration (Constantin 2012: 11). The cultural objectives established by the EU commission include

- to promote cultural dialogue,
- to highlight the cultural diversity,
- to share the cultural heritage at a European level,
- to take into account the role of culture in socioeconomic development,
- to foster intercultural dialogue,
- to recognize culture as an economic and social factor

and to involve as many EU citizens as possible. (Constantin 2012: 12)
Studies have found that many in Europe agree that culture is a value that is essential for further integration from the economic sphere into the social sphere (Constantin 2012: 15). These policies reveal that there has been a move to create a common European culture among its Member States in order to promote greater cohesion within the union. Yet this culture must be achieved while continuing to respect national sovereignty and national culture. Because there has not been a stronger push to create a European identity among EU citizens, Member States have begun to interpret their European identity in very different ways, which can impact not only EU solidarity but also responses to migration from outside the EU.

Further integrating its members into a cohesive culture is a difficult task, as the EU cannot suppress diversity both among and within Member States in order to promote this unity (Constantin 2012: 13). The EU is founded on the importance of cooperation among people, groups, and states, and this cooperation extends beyond the political and economic levels into the cultural sphere, however, the current form of cultural pluralism allows for acceptance of others and peaceful coexistence without integration (Constantin 2012: 13). Many EU citizens see their membership in the EU as separate for their own traditions, history, and culture (Constantin 2012: 13). However, cultural integration is crucial to the future of the EU, as perceived cultural differences among Member States can impact levels of mutual trust and solidarity (Pedersen 2008: 13). Levels of trust depend on which cultures are being included in the EU, and the perceived levels of modernization, similarity of cultural characteristics, and perceived threats of the nations that are being incorporated into the union (Pedersen 2008: 133).

This emphasis on the levels of modernization in new Member States has created an East-West divide within the European Union that moves beyond ideas of cultural sameness (Pedersen 2008: 133). One such divide existed before the creation of the EU, with Western-European
cultures being significantly shaped by a Catholic influence while Eastern-European culture had a stronger influence from the Orthodox Church (Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 73). Because the EU was originally created by Western European countries, it shared not only their political identity but also this cultural identity (Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 73). This created a cultural divide between East and West Europe due to historical, religious, and political differences that have shaped the culture of those living there (Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 78). This difference was even seen during the Soviet occupation of many European countries during the Cold War, as only those of Western Europe revolted against Soviet rule, such as in Eastern Germany and Hungary, as it was not only a political occupation but a cultural one as well (Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 79). However, when Eastern European countries began to join the union, this culture was undermined, posing serious questions as to what exactly it means to be European (Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 75). Any attempts at a further cultural integration among Member States will be impacted by this cultural divide, as a cultural identity is necessary in order to have a closer political union in which Member States feel comfortable enough to make tradeoffs between international cooperation and solidarity and their own national sovereignty (Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 82). By not acknowledging the differences between Member State cultures and what this means for a European culture, there has been no clear identification as to what exactly it means to be European, and who is excluded from that identity.

Other divisions within the EU exist due to the recent political histories, or lack thereof, of certain Member States compared to others (Pedersen 2008: 134). For example, many central European countries in addition to Eastern European countries lived under foreign authoritarian rulers until relatively recently, which has significant implications for the strength of civil society as well as their current democratic institutions (Pedersen 2008: 134). In addition, as will be
discussed in the context of Hungary, Soviet rule impacts the feeling of cultural and national identity that can determine current attitudes towards further European integration among Member States (Pedersen 2008: 135). Central and Eastern EU countries also tend to have stronger ethnic, religious, symbolic, cultural, national, and European identities, and therefore may feel stronger about the current European culture and how it will be impacted by increased migration (Scott 2020: 663).

In addition to addressing these various East/West divisions among Member States, the EU’s greatest challenge in encouraging further integration will be national culture. With increased policy coordination, many EU citizens have felt threatened by Brussels-initiated policies which they perceived as infringing on their own national culture, particularly with the candidacy of multiple South-Eastern European countries as well as Turkey (Theil and Freidman 2011: 10). In the past, feelings of a European identity have been linked to civic concepts, rather than cultural ones, due to a lack of a common European heritage (Theil and Freidman 2011: 11).

However, the increasing Europeanization of culture has challenged traditional understandings of national identity (Theil and Freidman 2011: 11). The migration crisis in particular has exacerbated this, as it has forced EU and Member States to acknowledge what it has meant in the past to be European, and how the EU may impact that identity in the future.

Many believe that even though EU citizens remain nationals first and foremost, they have still come to identify in some regard with the EU, even though that support may not be very clearly demonstrated (Duchesne 2011: 53). Because EU integration was originally centered around political processes, European citizens rarely interact directly with the EU, and so any connection they may have with the EU is either through national institutions or feelings of attachment to a European culture (Duchesne 2011: 53). This means that any connection to a
European identity will be largely psychological, and therefore will depend on the individual and collective benefits of EU membership as well as the characteristics of national identity and how it frames further integration (Duchesne 2011: 67). However, the European cultural imaginary has so far failed in creating a strong sense of European identity that goes beyond political integration (Saunders 2009: 11). Some argue this is because Europe does not have a common past or collective memory in which culture can be used to create an identity that has some sense of stability through time (Saunders 2009: 11). The cultural aspects of the EU, such as an attempt to create a socio-historical collective identity or a mass political orientation, have not been particularly successful in creating a transnational European identity, as while they are viewed as essential for a common identification among EU citizens, they continue to clash with national cultures when citizens begin to feel threatened (Theil and Freidman 2011: 1). Culture has been crucial in creating a sense of a common belonging among local, regional, and even transnational identities; however, the EU has been unable to create an international identity that transcends national borders (Theil and Freidman 2011: 2).

National identity is one of the strongest contributors to anti-integration attitudes and in many Member States those in favor of EU integration are seen as in conflict with national feelings and identity (Duchesne 2011: 54). Rather than seeing EU identity as a complement to national identity, many believe that one must oppose EU identification in order to prioritize national identity (Duchesne 2011: 54). However, not all forms of national identity are in direct opposition of an EU identity, as it has been found that support for EU integration can depend on a national identity being cultural or civic, and therefore exclusive or inclusive (Duchesne 2011: 55). Exclusive national identities often result in xenophobic attitudes and feelings of superiority of the national group (Duchesne 2011: 55). These groups often have a national identity based in
culture, as was discussed earlier. Others, who may still feel pride in their country but have a more civic, participatory understanding of their identity, can be more inclusive of other groups within this identity (Duchesne 2011: 55). This reveals how national identity and EU identity are intimately connected, which can be further complicated in times of increased immigration.

In addition, the EU inherently changes national identity through the dissolution of internal borders, which then creates a sharper distinction between those in the EU and those outside of it (King, Le Gales, and Vitale 2017: 428). The refugee crisis called these borders into question even more (King, Le Gales, and Vitale 2017: 428). Increased membership of the EU expanded these borders without adequately accounting for a common migration and integration policy (Lesinska 2014: 46). This has resulted in differing priorities and policies among Member States, as they each have different interests when it comes to integrating refugees and migrants into their societies (Lesinska 2014: 46). While the EU did significantly reduce the ethnic, racial, and religious “othering” within the union, it did not address how a diverse, free-floating supranational European civil sphere was going to address those wanting to come into it from the outside, often with non-Western origins, customs, skin colors, and religions (Alexander 2013: 542).

Culture and Refugee Policy

Debates on refugee policy within nations are becoming increasingly framed around culture and the concept of a cultural citizenship rather than an ethnic or civic one (Reijerse et al. 2013: 611). Ethnic and cultural attitudes have been found to be more closely related to anti-immigrant attitudes due to the idea that multiculturalism is seen as a threat to both national identity and social cohesion (Reijerse et al. 2013: 612). These differing forms of identity can
impact how these groups relate to and interact with members of the ingroup and outgroup (Reijerse et al. 2013: 626).

A sense of belonging to a community is intricately linked to national borders (Scott 2020: 662). The integrity of this national identity is threatened by increased immigration and can often result in an emotional response (Scott 2020: 662). Refugees are seen as threatening not only to the physical safety but also the ontological safety of a nation, or the sense of order, continuity, and predictability citizens feel in everyday life, that impacts how they view the world and the position of their community within it (Scott 2020: 662). Immigration itself is not just an economic or demographic issue, but instead is used as a symbol of difference within communities (Alexander 2013: 535). Immigrants are seen by the dominant culture as they are described and are often framed as a threat to cultural identity, and therefore how the community responds is usually based in collective identity (Alexander 2013: 535).

Those who feel a more ‘primordial’ solidarity often prioritize their ties to specific groups, places, and beliefs, while a more civil solidarity represents universal ties, which are more imagined rather than concrete (Alexander 2013: 536). Primordial solidarity is connected to an ethnic nationalism, when the concept of belonging within a nation is connected to ethnic descent, which inherently excludes migrant populations (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 158). Even if refugees are granted the legal rights of belonging, which will be more difficult because of ethnic nationalism, culturally they will always be excluded (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 158). While primordial connections are much more exclusive, civil solidarity allows for collective moral responsibilities to treat everyone with respect and to recognize basic human rights, regardless of their status within the social community (Alexander 2013: 537). Civic nationalism sees citizenship as voluntary political membership, which makes
inclusion of other groups much easier (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 158). Yet others believe that in order to have a sense of a collective community, there must be fundamental values, norms, religion, or culture that all those in the community share (Alexander 2013: 544). This shows that how a community interprets its cultural and national identity has direct implications for how it views those outside of the community, such as migrants, and what rights those outsiders will have when they enter the nation.

The EU presents a particular challenge when it comes to culture and migration policy, as the underlying principle allows for states to exercise sovereignty over their own cultural identity, which in some cases results in limited policies as these cultures can be unrepresentative of the actual diversity of the EU (Xuereb 2009: 31). Migration is a major challenge to traditional understandings of national culture, and EU Member States have been unable to cope with the influx of people across European borders and how that challenges their framings of national culture (Xuereb 2009: 41). These changes have forced national and European lawmakers to reassess how they understand their national and European culture (Xuereb 2009: 41).

Historically, cultural policy within the EU has been conceptualized around politics and government and is understood as a subject of policy formulation and implementation, rather than cultural unity (Barnett 2001: 405). This is complicated by the fact that cultural politics within Member States remain bounded by territorial borders, rather than supranational ones (Barnett 2001: 420).

Increased immigration into the EU due to the refugee crisis not only presents a change to European culture but also national culture by disproportionately changing the demographics of certain Member States and not others (Owen 2019: 353). If these refugees are able to apply for citizenship after a certain amount of time, the Dublin Regulation will cause a significant change
in the citizenry of border states but not others, which can have lasting effects on EU solidarity and integration (Owen 2019: 353). In general, this increase in diversity within the EU has raised questions on the EU’s ability to assimilate and integrate outside populations into the European identity and what it means exactly to be European (Pedersen 2008: 12). Emphasizing cross-cultural differences between Member States as well as between the EU and those outside of it can cause tension and impede both political decision-making and further integration. Because EU identity is entirely symbolic, those within the EU see an increase in migrants as not only a threat to their personal security but also an attack on European values, as what they considered made them culturally “European” is at risk of being destroyed by those from outside the boundaries of the culture (Kende, Hadarics, Szabo 2019: 572). When these citizens from various European nations feel that their cultural connections are disappearing, they resist integration and become more strongly attached to their national identities (Kende, Hadarics, Szabo 2019: 572).

Ultimately, immigration, particularly refugee policy, is intimately connected with national culture and therefore national identity because it challenges current understandings of citizenship and the differences which exist between national boundaries and social boundaries (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 155). This creates tension between citizenship as a legal status, and what rights and obligations should come with it, and citizenship as participation in the political, social, and cultural community (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 155). While citizenship can simply mean the political participation and recognition within a territory in which citizens have certain obligations to the government and vice versa, notions of belonging within a cultural community can be completely different (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 156). In order to have a collective community, there must inherently be groups that do not belong, in other words, there needs to be a “them” in order to be an “us” (Bloemraad, Korteweg,
and Yurdakul 2008: 156). This exclusion is justified in order to have social cohesion within a
group, yet reveals that citizenship is not just a political or legal identity, but a cultural and social
one as well (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 156).

How an individual interprets their various identities can have significant implications for
how they respond to immigration. Immigration attitudes within EU Member States can be
influenced by both national and European identities, as immigration is both a European and
national issue, with political, legal, and economic consequences on the national and
supranational level (Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 571). It can be perceived as a threat to the
European values within the continent while also a threat to the labor market or welfare system
within the state (Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 571). For example, it has been found that
those who feel protective of their national identities have increased prejudices towards those who
they see as outside of the dominant culture, such as Muslim immigrants (Kende, Hadarics, and
Szabo 2019: 572). These individuals often have strong emotional ties to their “ingroup,” or
national identity, that can result in feelings of superiority, and therefore see Muslim immigrants
as an inherent threat to this identity (Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 584). This results in
those with a strong national identity having stronger anti-immigrant attitudes (Kende, Hadarics,
and Szabo 2019: 577).

However, those that feel a stronger European identity associate more positively to
migrants and are therefore more accepting of refugees coming in from outside the EU (Kende,
Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 583). Individuals with a stronger attachment to their European
identity are often more accepting of multiculturalism, as diversity is an integral part of the union
(Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 584). However, there are times when a European identity can
cause anti-immigrant attitudes, such as when individuals perceive increased immigration from
Muslim countries as threat to Europe and European values (Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 572). This happens when identification with Europe is inflated so that European values and European culture are perceived to be superior to other cultures (Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 578). This can be seen in the case of Hungary, as the government has framed Hungarian refugee and immigration policies to be the savior of Europe, protecting European values from outside influences (Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 572).

National culture represents notions of belonging within communities which are not only impacted by political systems, but also historical experience, values, and traditions. The emphasis a nation puts on each of these aspects will significantly influence how attached their society is to their cultural identity, impacting how inclusive or exclusive their national identity is to outsiders. EU membership has challenged these notions of national culture by attempting to create a supranational culture through political and territorial cohesion. Both national and European identities significantly impact how EU Member States respond to the increased migration brought on by the refugee crisis, however, due to a lack of cultural integration within the EU, national culture significantly influenced their policy response. Because of the influence culture has on the creation of refugee policies and the integration of refugees into society, I hypothesize that the exclusivity of the culture of a country will impact the exclusivity of its refugee and asylum policies. The more exclusive the culture, the more likely the country will create more exclusive migration policies. However, the more inclusive the culture, the more inclusive the policies will be.

**METHODOLOGY: COSMOPOLITANISM AND REFUGEE POLICIES**

Having established culture’s influence on migration policy, I will now test as to whether or not a country’s openness due to national culture impacts the openness of their refugee policies.
I will conduct a qualitative study of national culture with a quantitative study of cosmopolitanism, measuring how attached German and Hungarian citizens are to their town, country, and the EU using the Eurobarometer survey from the 2010, 2014, 2016 and 2018 waves. I will then conduct a content analysis of five asylum policies from each of my case studies from the time period of 2004 to 2020 to measure how many barriers each country has to migration as well as what kind of efforts have been made to help refugees and asylum seekers integrate into society.

Case Selection

In order to test my hypotheses, I will be conducting a plausibility probe with two illustrative cases, Germany and Hungary. I chose these cases in order to demonstrate the impact culture can have on immigration policies in both directions, making them both more inclusive and more exclusive. This is crucial for the larger implications of my study, specifically, how the EU must work to incorporate the national culture of each of its Member States if it is going to create a more politically and culturally cohesive union. By working with extremes, these cases will also demonstrate the suitability of culture as an explanatory variable for migration policies within the EU. Ultimately, I hope my study will contribute to more coordinated policies within the EU. These countries will present the most difficult challenge to the EU in creating more integrated migration policies and are therefore the most beneficial to analyze.

Germany was one of the first countries to call for increased solidarity among EU countries during the refugee crisis, as well as for countries to embrace quotas for a fairer redistribution of refugees among Member States (Mushaben 2017: 96). Chancellor Angela Merkel had been developing stronger and more inclusive refugee policies within Germany before the current refugee crisis even began, arguing that a looming “demographic deficit” in Germany
warranted increased immigration reforms (Mushaben 2017: 95). These included language acquisition programs, education, vocational training, labor-market mobility, living conditions, and equal opportunities for women and girls (Mushaben 2017: 95). New policies also granted adults a right to remain in Germany under certain conditions and a right to permanent residency for young people who had either attended school or vocational training in Germany (Mushaben 2017: 96). This was accepted by German lawmakers because there had largely been a decline in asylum applications before the onset of the 2014 crisis (Mushaben 2017: 95). However, even after the German government registered over 1.2 million asylum applications in 2015 and 2016, Merkel continued to cite Germany’s conditions, economic strength, demographic needs, and the flexibility it showed during reunification as reasons for why Germany should continue to accept refugees and asylum seekers (Mushaben 2017: 97). At the peak of the crisis in 2015, Merkel sent trains to accept thousands of people stranded in overwhelmed EU Member States, such as Hungary, essentially suspending the Dublin regulation that requires asylum seekers to file their claim in the first EU member state they enter (Ilgit and Klotz 2018: 614).

Germany’s 20th century history is also believed to play a role in their decision to be an international leader during the refugee crisis, as they are acting out of a sense of moral obligation in response to their Nazi past (Conrad and Adalsteinsdottir 2017: 1). The past crimes committed under National Socialism influence current German public discourse and policies on the refugee crisis, as even though the large influx of refugees is sometimes seen as both a challenge as well as a security risk, Germany’s moral obligation to “provide shelter to those fleeing from war and persecution” continues to be emphasized (Conrad and Adalsteinsdottir 2017: 8). This image of refugees as desperate and in need of help was particularly prevalent in Germany during the first few years of the crisis, when Germany’s migration policies were the most welcoming and there
were images of German citizens greeting the first refugees arriving at Munich Central Station with signs and gifts (Conrad and Adalsteinsdottir 2017: 8). This history and subsequent moral obligation will be particularly helpful in examining how national culture will impact a country’s migration policies, especially when contrasted with Hungary’s history.

Hungary, on the other hand, has pursued policies of border securitization and the renationalization of its migration policies after joining the EU (Korkut et al. 2020: 402). Hungarian political leaders have justified this policy position as defending Europe against threats to both national and European identity (Korkut et. al 2020: 402). These policies have physically and symbolically created widespread fear against migrants, multiculturalism, and European federalism (Korkut et. al 2020: 402). Some key policies include the creation of a border fence along Hungary’s border with Serbia and Croatia that is patrolled by armed member of the police and military, the forcible removal of any undocumented asylum seekers apprehended in Hungary, and the criminalization of any irregular entry into Hungary or any activity that would facilitate the protection or reception of migrants (Korkut et. al 2020: 403). In addition, the Hungarian government implemented increased surveillance mechanisms, inadmissibility criteria, and the blanket rejection of all asylum applications arriving through Serbia (Korkut et. al 2020: 403). In 2016, Hungary also held a referendum on whether or not to accept the proposed EU quota for migration, as the Hungarian government was strongly against the imposition of such a quota (Cvrtila et. al 2019: 21).

Hungary’s location has left it particularly vulnerable to the migration crisis, as being on the border of the EU has resulted in the country feeling the significant consequences of such a large influx of migrants (Cvrtila et. al 2019: 20). Many of the migrants entering Hungary are coming in through Serbia, which is not an EU state, which results in Hungary being the first
country of entry under the Dublin Regulation, which technically means that these refugees and asylum seekers must file their claim in Hungary (Davis 2020: 273). The Hungarian government argues that the actions taken to restrict immigration were necessary because of the EU’s failure to create a better plan to deal with such a large influx of immigrants, especially considering most migrants were concentrated on border states (Davis 2020: 274). Hungary joined the “Anti-Immigration Axis” along with Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland in opposition to the EU’s pro-immigration laws and policies, with the goal to reverse the open-door policies (Davis 2020: 265). Hungary is an important case to analyze because it not only represents the opposite policies of what the EU promotes, but it is mostly justified in its decision to create those policies in opposition to the EU. It is important to understand what causes these policies to be so different from the EU, as the decision to implement these policies not only affects the Member States through the number of refugees they may receive, but also in how other Member States will respond to Hungary’s decision to implement these policies. If the differences in Member State policies are not addressed, they will create tension among the different sovereign nations that make up the EU, ultimately weakening the union as a whole and damaging the protections it provides to vulnerable populations such as refugees and asylum seekers.

By examining two countries that both have EU membership yet very different migration policies, I will argue that culture must be analyzed in order to address the significant differences among Member States when it comes to migration policy. Migration poses significant threats to national culture which then impacts what kinds of policies a nation will adopt. This cultural identity is complicated even further by EU membership, as it inherently changes not only what it means to be a part of a nation but also an international organization. In addition, the movement of immigrants and refugees across borders within the EU challenges our established
understanding of territories and how they create a national culture. A comparative case study within the EU which analyzes the cultural impact on migration policies at a national level is crucial to understand how the increase of migration and discrepancies of migration policies among Member States will ultimately impact the EU as an institution.

Variables of Interest

For my independent variable, culture is defined to incorporate various representations, such as images, concepts, and language, that create a “frame of interpretation” which influences public perception and policy development (Vertovec 2011: 251). These representations serve as emblems of larger political concepts, national models, and cultural sets of meaning that are used to reflect ideas of “us” and “them,” or the nation and its others, acceptable and unacceptable cultural difference, or good versus bad diversity (Vertovec 2011: 251). Culture can also be defined as “a complex array of overlapping forms, markers, and meanings in a constant state of flux” which can include “lifestyles, social representations, value systems, codes of conduct, social relations...notions of public and private space, forms of learning and expression, and modes of communication” (Vertovec 2011: 251).

I will measure culture through levels of cosmopolitanism present in each country. I will do this by analyzing the percentages of each country’s population who feel close to their village, town or city; their country; and the EU. Cosmopolitanism has been used as an indication for the openness of a culture by differentiating between individuals who have an orientation towards the world rather than their own community and vice versa (Bechtel et. al 2014: 841). An individual who displays strong tendencies towards cosmopolitanism relates more strongly to “issues, events, and social organization outside of his local community” (Dye 1963: 240). Political cosmopolitanism also argues that certain rights exist beyond national boundaries and must be
guaranteed as such (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 164). This needs to involve
global political institutions, rooted in universal values, that will be able to adapt to many
different cultures around the world (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 165). Many
argue that the international human rights regime has decreased the legitimacy of a narrow, state-
defined citizenship, as states are now required to extend certain rights and protections to
individuals based on them being human rather than a member of a certain political community
(Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 165). Although sovereign nation states will not
become obsolete, they must adapt their current political systems to acknowledge that personhood
is at times superior to national citizenship (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 165).
Localism, on the other hand, can be closely related to ethnocentrism, consisting of individuals
who are primarily interested in local rather than international affairs, or see themselves as
members of a local community rather than a larger, international one (Dye 1963: 241).

In order to measure levels of cosmopolitanism in each of my case studies, I will be using
the Eurobarometer Survey 73.3 (2010), 82.3 (2014), 86.2 (2016), and 89.1 (2018) in order to take
into account attitudes both leading up to and during the current refugee crisis. In each wave,
respondents were asked: Please tell me how attached you feel to... [your city/town/village], [our
country], [the European Union] and could then respond very attached, fairly attached, not very
attached, not attached at all. By analyzing individuals’ attachments to their town and nation
compared to the EU, I will be able to analyze how they prioritize their identities, as attitudes
towards immigration and integration policies can be influenced by how citizens combine their
national and European identifications (Duchesne 2011: 55). For example, how exclusive or
inclusive one views their cultural community can be influenced by how closely they associate
this community with the EU, as it has a direct impact on feelings of nationalism, chauvinism, and
patriotism (Duchesne 2011: 55). These surveys are able to help explain how nationality and feelings of social belonging are connected within the context of the EU (Duchesne 2011: 55). Immigration and immigration policies are ultimately subjects based on emotions, as migrants are often framed using national symbols which evoke very emotional responses. National and European identities are often cultivated the same way, people feel that their national identification is important to them because they are often told so (Duchesne 2011: 69). Similarly, the European community is not a physical one, but instead is largely symbolic (Duchesne 2011: 69).


I will systematically analyze these policies to determine whether or not they contain physical or financial barriers to seeking asylum as well as what provisions were included to promote or prevent integration, such as allowing for integration into the labor market, ensuring adequate accommodation, providing social assistance as well as access to the public health system and education system (Dumitrescu 2018: 175). For each policy, I will determine whether or not there was mention of a wall or fence; a checkpoint to check documents; border control
officers to patrol border areas; grounds for unfounded asylum applications such as safe country of origins or residence or entry bans; detention centers; application or entrance fees; any other fees needed to enter the country or apply for asylum. I will then determine whether or not refugees have access to the labor market, accommodations, language services or training, financial services, the healthcare system, and the education system. I will categorize each of these integration measures as whether or not refugees are (1) prevented from integration, (2) they are permitted but only in a restricted form, (3) they are allowed to integrate into these sectors, (4) resources are provided to assist them in integrating into these sectors, or (5) if they are required to integrate or participate in these sectors. I will then determine how many barriers exist overall and what each policy’s overall integration score is. Please see Appendix A for full code and key words used in my analysis.

In the following section, I conduct a comparative case study of the national culture in both Germany and Hungary, how their histories have contributed to different types of national identity, and how that has influenced their refugee policies and relationship with the EU. I then use this analysis to contextualize my results from the Eurobarometer surveys examining cosmopolitanism in each country and my content analysis of five asylum policies.
CHAPTER III

Comparative Case Study: Germany and Hungary

Results: Cosmopolitanism and Refugee Policies
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY: GERMANY AND HUNGARY

In order to investigate how culture impacts migration policy within EU Member States, I begin with an analysis of my two case studies in order to provide further evidence of their cultures that will contextualize the results on levels of cosmopolitanism. Germany’s history, particularly the Weimar Republic and then National Socialism, led to a fractured national identity that was exacerbated by the division of East and West Germany after World War II. This has resulted in low levels of national identification even years after unification, allowing for a more open culture and therefore more open migration policies. Hungary’s loss of territory after World War I and communist regime after World War II, however, created a strong ethno-cultural community that it extends to ethnic Hungarians beyond its borders while excluding minorities within the territory. This has created a much more exclusive culture that has led to exclusive migration policies as Hungary seeks to protect its ‘European’ identity.

German Culture

History

While Europe has some common history within the continent, national histories create much stronger connections among citizens and have a greater impact on the culture of each state. The German history of the Weimar Republic, the National Socialist Regime, and the separation and subsequent reunification of East and West Germany have been particularly impactful on current German culture and politics. In the Weimar Republic, traditional values and ways of life in Germany were agitated by war, with any understanding of national identity becoming controversial (Lehnert and Megerle 1993: 45). This resulted in a splintering of sub-cultures of different values and behavioral norms that were never united (Lehnert and Megerle 1993: 46). The Republic’s inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise between various political parties
ultimately led to its failure as well as contributed to the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda to accumulate mass support (Lehnert and Megerle 1993: 58). The ‘People’s Community’ promoted by the National Socialist Party capitalized on the fragmented political culture of the Weimar Republic in a way that was able to bring together varied interests and mobilize xenophobic ideologies (Lehnert and Megerle 1993: 58).

Nazi Germany was essentially a mass protest against Weimar society that depended on mass integration and cultural connections (Reichel 1993: 60). The National Socialist party was able to target feelings of insecurity among the middle-class population and turn it into hatred targeted towards the cultural modernism of the Weimar Republic (Reichel 1993: 60). National symbolism within Germany began to be interpreted as the representation of power that could be achieved not through economic or political achievements but instead through “great cultural achievement” (Reichel 1993: 74). The national identity at the very center of National Socialist ideology was one of superiority and purity that was able to justify its racial doctrine of separating and even eliminating those who did not belong within the national culture (Reichel 1993: 75). This ideology also promoted social integration among groups that were previously separated in the Weimar Republic by reducing the political structure into a single person and forming political myths that brought together the community by promoting certain modern ideals and ways of living, essentially standardizing the individual (Reichel 1993: 76). This appealed to the desire for common identification and community with mutual interests felt by many after the divisive years of the Weimar Republic (Reichel 1993: 76). During these two periods, Germany’s national identity shifted sharply from being weak and fragmented to being strong and exclusive. However, after the end of the Nazi regime, Germany sought to erase any traces of National
Socialism and therefore erased this strong, nationalistic culture. The country was then physically split into two separate nations, fragmenting German culture.

After the defeat of the Nazi regime, there were significant concerns on how to create a German society that destroys any remnants of Nazi institutions or doctrines while also promoting democratic ideals and values (Holtmann 1993: 78). The post-war political culture in West Germany focused mainly on promoting stable democratic beliefs, particularly within local government (Holtmann 1993: 79). Because many had positive experiences with local self-government, there was a state culture that had great potential for democratic outcomes as rebuilt democratic institutions on the local level were held in high regard (Holtmann 1993: 83). West German citizens were well informed about politics and although there were still authoritarian patterns present within German political culture, such as passive acceptance of decisions from above, experiences with local government did provide stability to the integration of a democratic system (Holtmann 1993: 85-6). However, West Germany had significantly different political experiences than East Germany and therefore differing political cultures, yet reunification brought them together into one state, with supposedly a single political and societal culture based in the West German political system.

Reunification was seen as the creation of a new political community which would have a profound impact on the kind of national identity Germans would develop (Westle 1993: 272-3). For West Germans, this reunification may have appeared as simply an extension of the existing political community, however, for East Germans, it was essentially the complete dissolution of the previous community and an integration of its members into another political community (Westle 1993: 274). Feelings of loss and transformation within their political identity were much stronger for East Germans than they were for West Germans, which has significant implications.
in how they view their new political and cultural membership (Westle 1993: 274). Despite the fact that East Germans did see some disadvantages of reunification, the majority continued to support it due to the perceived advantages (Westle 1993: 276). However, national pride remained at low levels, particularly compared to pre-unification (Westle 1993: 278-81). Ultimately, a unified German culture was hard to develop, with East Germans continuing to feel like outsiders even today. This can impact German migration policy in that without a cohesive national identity, outside migrants are not seen as a significant threat.

This division and subsequent reunification impacts politics even today, as Germany is a single nation that continues to have deep political and cultural divides (Schweiger 2019: 18). Institutions in unified Germany continue to be dominated by the traditions and values of the former Wester German Federal Republic, which has resulted in many East Germans feeling as if they are second-class citizens (Schweiger 2019: 18). During unification, many East Germans felt alienated from the institutions and political processes of the Federal Republic and often felt governed by West Germans, while they also witnessed the destruction of their industries and traditions with no clear pathway of integration into the new economy (Schweiger 2019: 22). This cultural divide can be seen even today, as a significant number of East Germans identify themselves as such rather than simply Germans (Schweiger 2019: 24). These feelings of alienation and displacement impact anti-immigrant sentiment within the former East German, evidence of the “culture shock” they felt during a swift unification process that eradicated their established cultural social structures yet failed to integrate them into new ones (Schweiger 2019: 23). Globalization is seen by East Germans to be a significant threat, as it represents open borders and multicultural societies, while East Germans have been relatively secluded within their own society and economic system and have become increasingly attached to their cultural
heritage (Schweiger 2019: 26-7). This division can explain why, even though Germany has a relatively open culture which welcomes refugees, there is still push back against these policies, particularly in East Germany.

National Culture

As I have established, culture is intimately linked with national identity and belonging, yet because it is a social phenomenon based not only in history, but also values, ideals, and ways of life, it is able to change over time. There has been a recent debate on German culture, particularly German identity and how it is defined. Many have argued that Germans have determined their identity through an ethnic culture, however, others are now arguing that the idea of Germanness has become more closely linked to social integration and territory when it comes to defining concepts such as belonging and citizenship in Germany (Fogelman 2020: 61). The previous citizenship regime was an exclusionary ethnic model, most obviously represented in the differences in citizenship policies for immigrants who were of German descent versus those who were not (Fogelman 2020: 61). However, the concept of integration has become increasingly relevant within policymaking and immigration infrastructure, which some argue is due to the impact of European policies (Fogelman 2020: 60). This change involved a legal and institutional transformation of German politics which re-nationalized political membership with integrationist rather than ethnic values (Fogelman 2020: 66). Integrationism emphasizes the relationship between the state, nation, and territory in the framework of establishing the idea of belonging (Fogleman 2020: 67). Rather than emphasizing an inherent Germanness in those of German descent, there is now an emerging socio-political concept of belonging which focuses on “we in Germany,” which includes those who contribute to the economy and society, regardless of ethnic descent (Fogelman 2020: 66).
Refugee Policy and Culture

German refugee policy during the refugee crisis is known as an open-door policy based on a culture of welcome. However, it required the cooperation of the state, civil society, the public sphere, and the refugees themselves in order to integrate refugees into German society (Funk 2016: 289). This caused intense national debate about the effectiveness of these policies and the impact it would have on German society (Funk 2016: 289). Germany opened its borders to refugees who had come to Germany from other Member States, in violation of the Dublin III Agreement which requires refugees to apply for asylum in the first Member State they enter and allowed them to apply for refugee status in Germany (Funk 2016: 290).

The German Asylum Law and the Integration Law, both passed in July 2016, grants refugees either asylum or protected refugee status for three years or ‘subsidiary protection’ for one year, requiring asylum seekers to have a “well-founded fear of persecution in his country of origin...on account of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular group,” (Funk 2016: 290). Subsidiary protection is for individuals who have “substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of origin, including from international or internal armed conflict,” (Funk 2016: 290). These differing levels of refugee status are important as they determine whether or not an individual can bring their family, what access they have to benefits, and whether or not they have priority for job training or language courses (Funk 2016: 290). After their applications have been processed, refugees are distributed proportionately throughout Germany, and are required to remain in that area in order to receive full benefits (Funk 2016: 291). These policies allow refugees within Germany to live as full and equal members of society, and include state provisions for housing, medical care, and living expenses, as well as job training and language
courses paid for by the state in order to promote social and labor market integration (Funk 2016: 291). There has been significant push back and widespread criticism against these policies, particularly due to the fear of accepting Muslim refugees and the threat they may pose to German cultural identity (Funk 2016: 293-4).

Germany’s migration policies are known throughout the EU to be influenced by German “welcome culture,” which some argue was largely influenced by a moral obligation due to their National Socialist past (Conrad and Adalsteinsdottir 2017: 2). Taking responsibility for National Socialist crimes has been an important factor in German foreign policy since the end of World War II but has been particularly obvious in how Germany has come to be an international leader, taking on a prominent role in European cooperation (Conrad and Adalsteinsdottir 2017: 1). The impact of National Socialism influenced the way the German public viewed the refugee crisis, emphasizing Germany’s moral obligation to provide shelter for those feeling from war. This was seen when German citizens were welcoming in the first refugees arriving in Munich Central Station (Conrad and Adalsteinsdottir 2017: 8).

Collective guilt over the legacy of Nazi crimes, combined with 40 years of a divided nation which impeded the creation of a cohesive national culture after reunification as well as a shift from seeing the nationality in ethnic to civic terms have all contributed to a national culture in Germany that is more open and inclusive. This ultimately has allowed them to implement much more open refugee policies, such as opening their borders to refugees and becoming a leader in the EU migration regime. However, these impacts of German refugee policy stem from their national history, identity, and culture, and can ultimately put them in conflict with other Member States with different cultures.

*Hungary*
History

Hungary’s history has had significant influence not only on how it defines its culture and community, but also in how it defines its relationship with Europe and therefore the EU and a European identity. Historical Hungary was known as a great power of medieval Europe (Nyyssonen 2006: 166). The Austrian-Hungarian Empire in particular was influential on concepts such as culture and identity, as it defined the nation as a spiritual and cultural community that is not constrained by a particular territory, which continues to be seen today (Pedersen 2008: 78). The defeat of Austro-Hungarian forces in World War I transformed the empire by greatly diminishing its population when it lost about two thirds of its former territory (Wilkin 2018: 14; Nyyssonen 2006: 166). Hungarians were forced to come to terms with this great loss of empire and many continue to feel that the nation is cut off from all those who belong in it (Nyyssonen 2006: 166). This continues to affect Hungarian identity today, as Hungarian political elites define the cultural community as extending beyond Hungary’s borders, rather than the political community within the territory. This ethno-cultural identification is used to exclude those coming in from the outside.

After World War II, an authoritarian regime was established with the win of the Communist Party in the 1947 election, which utilized an extensive secret police force to repress dissent and dissolve political parties (Wilkin 2018: 16). The Soviet authorities crushed a workers revolt that was a part of the 1956 revolution against Communist rule (Wilkin 2018: 16). This revealed feelings of political unity and historical continuity within the Hungarian population, as Hungarians continued to feel a sense of national and ethnic uniqueness even with the significant separation between the state and society (Nyyssonen 2006: 156-7). After this event, a gradual loosening of social and economic control by the government allowed Hungary to form more
independent cultural and economic structures (Wilkin 2018: 16). This political culture made it particularly easy for politics to develop as a dichotomy between “us” versus “them” after the fall of the Soviet Union, seen in the exclusionary culture Hungary has today (Nyyssonen 2006: 161).

National Culture

In post-Cold War Hungary, there was intense debate around the future of the Hungarian political and cultural community, as the post-communist liberal left argued the importance of Hungary fully integrating into Europe as a neoliberal capitalist democracy, while the political right emphasized a strong national state, underpinned by ethno-nationalist ideology, to build up Hungarian capitalism (Wilkin 2018: 6). During this time, Hungary formed a relationship with Europe as a source of cheap labor and raw materials that could be exported to the more powerful economies of Western Europe, establishing the core-periphery relations that were influenced by uneven social and economic organization and integration and which continue today (Wilkin 2018: 7). This lack of support from the more “core” economies of Europe resulted in diminished economic, social welfare, and political institutions in Hungary, leading to weak liberal ideas and practice and the subsequent emergence of illiberalism within the region (Wilkin 2018: 11). The post-communist emergence of a far-right social and political culture can be seen as a result of this relationship between Hungary and its regional and international relationships (Wilkin 2018: 13). There was a subsequent revival of religion and nationalism, taking intolerant and xenophobic forms (Wilkin 2018: 18). Deepening inequality within Hungary during this time resulted in many political parties being closely linked or funded by oligarchs who pushed neoliberal interests such as lowering taxes, reducing public services, and removing the rights of workers in order to push for lower wages (Wilkin 2018: 19). Hungary also became increasingly dependent on external financial investment from Japan and the EU, which limited the
government's ability to pursue policies separate from those that favor the international financial sector (Wilkin 2018: 20). This transition into democracy not only reveals how short of a democratic history Hungary has had, but also developed in a way that created instability and inequality, which promoted religious and ethnic nationalism that could be used to demonize those labeled as “other,” such as refugees.

Right wing politicians were able to mobilize this popular discontent with economic, social, and political inequality by targeting corrupt elites’ foreign investors, established political parties, and minorities such as Jews, Roma, or sexual minorities as the “enemies of the ‘real’ Hungarian people,” (Wilkin 2018: 22). These messages eventually hardened from a Conservative narrative emphasizing the importance of the traditional family, nation, and Christianity to one that promoted ethno-nationalism, intolerance, and an ethnically exclusive Hungarian national identity (Wilkin 2018: 22). These leaders criticized the EU but did not commit to leaving it, instead using the policies of other EU Member States to justify this move towards illiberal democracy, such as justifying the restriction of the media as a move to combat racism and intolerance that were causing harm to minority communities (Wilkin 2018: 22–4). This new political culture normalized prejudices against minority communities such as Jews, the LGBTQ+ community, the Roma, and refugees while blaming the EU and globalization as a threat to national identity (Wilkin 2018: 25). This new state was no longer grounded in communism but instead in an ethno-nationalist ideology in which the Hungarian nation is superior to all other forms of identity (Wilkin 2018: 27). There is an emphasis on keeping cultural values within the nation (Nyyssonen 2006: 169). This form of nationalism aims to protect all those who are considered Hungarian, whether or not they are inside the Hungarian territory, from those deemed as enemies, whether that is the EU, globalization, or migrants (Wilkin 2018: 27). The Hungarian
transition to independence after Soviet rule created a state which was based in Christian values, cultural nationalism, and exclusionary policies aimed at all those considered not a part of the Hungarian people. This kind of cultural community extends beyond national boundaries while at the same time is based in an ethno-cultural identity that excludes even those living within the Hungarian territory. Migration and refugees are seen as a particular threat to this kind of culture, as not only are they outsiders, but they are coming from a place that is believed to have different religions, values, and ways of life.

The new Hungarian constitution, which was passed in April 2011 and came into effect on January 1, 2012, also has significant implications for Hungarian culture and how that impacts their refugee policies (Chronowski 2019: 77). The drafting of the constitution occurred rapidly with little input from those outside the ruling party and almost no transparency (Chronowski 2019: 79). The constitution does not clearly define who exactly is included within the political community and alludes to a cultural nation separate from the political nation (Chronowski 2019: 82). A cultural nation refers to a much narrower concept of community which only includes individuals who belong to the majority national-ethnic group and share a common culture, language, identity, and historical experience (Chronowski 2019: 84). For example, in the preamble, it states that the “intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart,” which can imply a cultural nation that exists beyond territorial borders, such as the ethno-nation which existed during the 19th century (Chronowski 2019: 82). This includes individuals who may be living in and are citizens of other countries, yet their language, culture, and ethnic origin continue to connect them to the Hungarian cultural nation (Chronowski 2019: 84). Yet at other points it refers to the Hungarian people as including the political nation, which includes national and ethnic minorities (Chronowski 2019: 83). Within the document, there is even a distinction
between “we,” meaning those including the cultural nation, and “they,” the minorities that may be living within the political nation but are excluded from the cultural one (Chronowski 2019: 83). This document does not address the inequality and discrimination based on ethnicity within Hungary and can be detrimental to refugee policies and integration as it uses the term Hungarian “nationality” as equivalent to the Hungarian ethnicity, rather than political participation or citizenship (Chronowski 2019: 101).

The influence of this separation of a cultural and political nation can be seen in Hungarian citizenship policies. The division of Hungarian territory in the early 20th century has been central to its political and national culture and has strongly influenced how it views the Hungarian cultural community. Reclaiming lost territory in order to “reunite the nation” was a central concern and resulted in an ethno-cultural conception of the Hungarian nation that continues today (Moreh 2019: 105). Even in constitutions written before the current one, it was emphasized that the Hungarian state continues to feel a sense of responsibility towards Hungarians living in other countries (Moreh 2019: 105). This ethnic nationalism has been increasingly prominent in the definition of the Hungarian community and subsequent legislation, ultimately pushing out any other civic definitions of nationhood that may have been present (Moreh 2019: 107). Those who can demonstrate that they are of Hungarian descent will have a simplified procedure to obtain Hungarian citizenship, one that does not include requirements such as residence, economic stability, and constitutional knowledge (Moreh 2019: 106). As these “external citizens” become official political citizens, they are given voting rights even if they do not reside within Hungary, which has significantly altered the political make-up of Hungarian electoral politics (Moreh 2019: 107). This policy represents the merging of the Hungarian
cultural and political nations, seeking to redefine the political community in ethnic terms (Moreh 2019: 108, 133).

Refugee Policy and Culture

Hungary has increasingly emphasized its border, both physically and symbolically, in order to fuel a fear of migrants and skepticism towards multiculturalism and open borders (Scott 2020: 667). In response to the refugee crisis, in 2015 and 2016 there was a militarization of the border areas as well as a fortification of the border itself (Scott 2020: 667). Hungary has positioned itself as a “defender of Europe’s borders,” the protector of “the West against attacks from the East,” and “a fortress of Christianity” (Scott 2020: 668). It has framed its migration policies and border regime as a protective barrier against threats to both national and European culture and identity (Korkut, Terlizzi, and Gyollai 2020: 402). This has created an overall Euroscepticism within the Hungarian public as well as a mistrust of multiculturalism within Europe (Korkut, Terlizzi, and Gyollai 2020: 402).

Since the crisis began, Hungary has implemented a border fence patrolled by armed police and military personnel as well as increased its surveillance mechanisms and inadmissibility criteria, including a blanket rejection of all asylum seekers coming through Serbia (Korkut, Terlizzi, and Gyollai 2020: 403). It also established an “eight-kilometer rule,” which allows the forced removal of undocumented asylum seekers within eight kilometers of the border fence, a rule which was eventually extended to the entire Hungarian territory (Korkut, Terlizzi, and Gyollai 2020: 403). A transit zone to submit asylum applications along the Hungarian-Serbian border was also created in order to not only securitize the border but also physically separate migrants from mainstream society (Korkut, Terlizzi, and Gyollai 2020: 403). The Hungarian government has argued that these policies actually promote EU solidarity, rather
than go against it, as Hungary is taking on its responsibility to protect the EU’s external borders and European Christians (Korkut, Terlizzi, and Gyollai 2020: 403).

Hungary’s communist past also has a significant influence on its refugee policy due to its influence on the politics of national identity and the established boundaries of the nation (Shevel 2011: 2). After the fall of the Soviet Union, post-communist countries experienced a significant influx of refugees and displaced persons yet had no existing political and legal infrastructure to accommodate them, and therefore had to completely recreate refugee and immigration regimes (Shevel 2011: 1-3). In addition, party politics, economic interests, and institutional structures which usually influence immigration policy were weak and therefore held little sway over the policy creation (Shevel 2011: 7). Instead, these policies were most heavily influenced by the salience of national identity within these countries at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as those with weak national identity did not see refugees as a threat while those countries that retained their national identity throughout communist rule were not as receptive to an increase in migrants (Shevel 2011: 2). Communist rule influenced national identity in many ways, shaping, transforming, and even strengthening it, often on an ethno-cultural basis due to the weak political and class institutions (Shevel 2011: 11). These identities then had significant influence in shaping the political systems that emerged after communism (Shevel 2011: 12).

When there is no strong agreement in establishing who constitutes the nation and what the boundaries of the community are, then no single group can count on preferential treatment within the state (Shevel 2011: 12). In order to justify preferential treatment, there needs to be an established group of “us” in order to determine a “them” to exclude from the nation (Shevel 2011: 12). This can actually lead to less discriminatory policies against refugees, as there is no one prioritized ethno-cultural group within society (Shevel 2011: 13). When a national identity is
already firmly established and defined, refugee policy will often be determined by political elites in power, as they are seen as both representing the interests of the dominant group but are not constrained by organized interests or previous legislative or institutional structures that affect non-communist states (Shevel 2011: 13).

Hungarian and European culture has been a key justification of current Hungarian refugee policy. Political elites have argued that as a border nation on the Balkan refugee route, it is their responsibility to protect European identity and values, particularly a Christian Europe (TendersInfo News 2017). They emphasize the importance of Christian civilization and identity within sovereign nation states, as not only are they defending European identity but also their own Hungarian identity and “the survival of the Hungarian community” (TendersInfo 2017). They believe that in order for a European identity to exist, it must be a cultural one that will extend beyond geographical barriers, and one of the greatest factors within this cultural identity is the Christian religion (TendersInfo 2017). Europe has come to represent Christianity, particularly the importance of the Christian faith and Christian values within these societies (Pedersen 2008: 128). Despite increased secularization, when one discusses European values and culture, they are often based within the Christian tradition rather than other aspects of European history (Pedersen 2008: 128). Hungarian elites have argued that the migrants entering the EU, predominantly coming from Middle Eastern Muslim countries, have inherently different traditions and cultures than those in Europe (TendersInfo 2018). This is an important component of Hungarian culture, because on the one hand it seems that Hungary is inherently against the creation of an EU culture because its ethno-nationalist culture is so exclusionary, on the other hand Hungary also extends this white, Christian culture to the EU, basing the cultural connection
on shared values rather than ethnicity. In both instances, refugees are seen as a threat because their culture is so distinct from Hungarian culture.

Hungary’s overall migration and citizenship policies have reflected both an emphasis on an ethno-political identity which extends beyond Hungary’s borders as well as a securitization of its borders in a self-proclaimed defense of European identity and culture (Scott 2020: 658). With these policies, the Hungarian government has challenged the EU’s authority as well as its core principles by reclaiming national sovereignty, which it believes the EU has infringed upon (Scott 2020: 659). This has resulted in the rejection of the Dublin agreement as well as increased Euroscepticism and warning that unregulated refugees will endanger EU identity (Scott 2020: 659). Euroscepticism reveals the tension between national sovereignty and membership in a larger, international political system and results in increased nationalistic and anti-immigrant rhetoric that fuels public anxiety (Scott 2020: 659). It also implies a general lack of connection and trust of the EU as a whole, which is often connected to Central and Eastern Europeans diverging from EU policies and norms, particularly around the regulation of borders (Scott 2020: 660).

Hungary’s negotiations with its border reflect xenophobic and political sentiments within Hungarian culture, however, it also represents a struggle over national identity (Scott 2020: 659). In its actions, Hungary is not attempting to dismantle the EU or even leave it, but instead may be challenging what it sees as a changing culture as the EU becomes more and more cosmopolitan (Scott 2020: 659). In securitizing its borders, Hungary is both protecting its own national identity as a smaller, peripheral country within the EU, while also protecting what it sees as the true European culture: white, Western, and Christian, as it believes that this is the superior culture and way of life (Scott 2020: 660).
RESULTS

Culture

According to the Eurobarometer survey, 2010 over 50% of both Hungarians and Germans felt very attached to their city, town, or village, with over 85% feeling very attached or fairly attached (see Table 1.1). This reveals that citizens from both countries have very strong attachments to their local communities and ways of life, which can impact their views on the importance of EU membership and integration. Ultimately, a higher percentage of Germans feel very attached to their city and even though slightly more Hungarians feel fairly attached, Germans show to be more attached to their city overall than Hungarians and are therefore the more exclusive country.

Table 1.1: Feelings of attachment to town, country, and the EU in Germany and Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Attached (%)</th>
<th>Fairly Attached</th>
<th>Not Very Attached</th>
<th>Not At All Attached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City, Town, Village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 2010.

There are similar patterns when analyzing how Germans and Hungarian feel towards their country, except with a 10-percentage point increase for those who feel very attached, with over 90% of both Hungarians and Germans feeling either very attached or fairly attached to their country. This reveals that national identity is more important than sub-national identity in both

---

1 Question Asked: Please tell me how attached you feel to... [your city/town/village], [our country], [the European Union]
countries during this year, which is significant as EU identity is ultimately most at odds with national identity when it comes to establishing a common cultural community. Overall, 94.5% of Germans feel very attached or fairly attached to Germany, compared to 94.2% of Hungarians, making German culture slightly more exclusive.

When it comes to attachment to the EU, feelings were not nearly as strong, but instead most citizens in both countries felt either fairly attached or not very attached, revealing that although they were aware of an EU identification within their identity, it was not particularly salient. Overall, Hungarians were more likely to say they felt not very attached or not attached at all compared to Germans, making them the more exclusive culture. However, although Hungarians are less attached to the EU during the 2010 survey, Germans felt more strongly attached to their town and country and are therefore the more exclusive culture overall for this year.

In 2014, as refugees began to enter the EU in greater numbers, Hungary became the more exclusive culture overall. When asked about attachments towards their city, town, or village, respondents in both countries had increased feelings of attachment, with 55.7% of Germans feeling very attached compared to 55.3% of Hungarians, as well as 33.8% of Germans and 34.3% of Hungarians feeling fairly attached (see Table 1.2). This came with a decrease in feelings of closeness on the country level, with only 59.5% of Germans and 59.1% of Hungarians feeling very attached to their country and only 32.2% of Germans and 32.7% of Hungarians feeling fairly attached. This represents an increase in attachment to their towns by almost 2 percentage points as well as a drop in attachment towards their countries by about 2.5 points. Again, most feelings of attachment towards the EU remained as either fairly attached or not very attached, however, there was a significant decrease in those who felt fairly attached to
the EU by almost 5 percentage points in Germany and 2.5 in Hungary. This was accompanied by a very limited increase in those who felt not very attached but a significant increase in those who feel not attached at all by almost 5 percentage points in both countries. Ultimately, Hungarians felt closer to their towns and country, and were therefore the more exclusive culture for this year.

Table 1.2: Feelings of attachment to town, country, and the EU in Germany and Hungary in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Very Attached (%)</th>
<th>Fairly Attached</th>
<th>Not Very Attached</th>
<th>Not At All Attached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City, Town, Village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: 55.7</td>
<td>G: 33.8</td>
<td>G: 8.5</td>
<td>G: 2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H: 55.3</td>
<td>H: 34.3</td>
<td>H: 8.4</td>
<td>H: 2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: 59.5</td>
<td>G: 32.3</td>
<td>G: 6.4</td>
<td>G: 1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H: 59.1</td>
<td>H: 32.7</td>
<td>H: 6.4</td>
<td>H: 1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: 9.5</td>
<td>G: 33.8</td>
<td>G: 36.6</td>
<td>G: 20.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H: 9.2</td>
<td>H: 34.1</td>
<td>H: 36.9</td>
<td>H: 19.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 2014.

During the peak of the refugee crisis, there was a slight increase in attachment towards respondents’ towns and countries in both Hungary and Germany. Table 1.3 demonstrates that 90.1% of Germans felt either very attached or fairly attached to their city, town, or village in 2016, compared to only 89.5% in 2014. In addition, 92.2% felt a positive attachment to their country, a 0.5-point increase from 2014. This was similar in Hungary, with 90.2% feeling attached to their town and 92.3% feeling attached to their country in 2016, compared to 89.6% and 91.8% in 2014, respectively. In all, Germans tended to be more exclusive when it came to their towns this year, yet Hungarians were more exclusive with their country. Regarding attachment to the EU, there was an increase in positive attachment from 2014 of almost 2 percentage points for very attached and 2.5 to 3 points for fairly attached. This came with a decrease in negative attachments of almost 2 percentage points for not very attached and 3 percentage points of not at all attached, signaling an increase in attachment towards the EU from 2014 to 2016. Overall,
although German respondents felt closer to their towns, Hungarians were ultimately more 
attached to their country and less attached to the EU and were therefore the more exclusive 
society.

Table 1.3: Feelings of attachment to town, country, and the EU in Germany and Hungary in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Very Attached (%)</th>
<th>Fairly Attached</th>
<th>Not Very Attached</th>
<th>Not At All Attached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City, Town, Village</td>
<td>G: 56.0 H: 55.8</td>
<td>G: 34.1 H: 34.4</td>
<td>G: 8.0 H: 8.0</td>
<td>G: 1.9 H: 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>G: 59.5 H: 59.4</td>
<td>G: 32.7 H: 32.9</td>
<td>G: 6.2 H: 6.1</td>
<td>G: 1.6 H: 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>G: 11.3 H: 11.3</td>
<td>G: 36.6 H: 36.7</td>
<td>G: 34.9 H: 35</td>
<td>G: 17.2 H: 17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 2016.

In 2018, after the strongest wave of the refugee crisis but when it was still ongoing, 
attachments to towns and countries did increase slightly in both countries but was a slightly 
larger increase in Germany than in Hungary. Positive attachments to towns increased by .2 in 
Germany compared to .1 in Hungary while positive attachments to the country increased by .4 in 
Germany and .3 in Hungary (see Table 1.4). Overall, attachment to the EU did increase in both 
Germany and Hungary, however, more Hungarians had a positive attachment to the EU 
compared to Germans. Germany was more exclusive this year than Hungary, which could be 
explained as a response to the policies Germany adopted, which allowed for significant amounts 
of refugees to cross into their borders, compared to the kind of rhetoric Hungary adopted during 
the crisis, labeling themselves as the protectors of EU culture.
Table 1.4: Feelings of attachment to town, country, and the EU in Germany and Hungary in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Very Attached (%)</th>
<th>Fairly Attached</th>
<th>Not Very Attached</th>
<th>Not At All Attached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City, Town, Village</td>
<td>G: 57.5 H: 57.2</td>
<td>G: 32.8 H: 33.1</td>
<td>G: 7.7 H: 7.8</td>
<td>G: 1.7 H: 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>G: 61.0 H: 60.9</td>
<td>G: 31.6 H: 31.7</td>
<td>G: 5.7 H: 5.7</td>
<td>G: 1.4 H: 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>G: 12.4 H: 12.4</td>
<td>G: 38.4 H: 38.8</td>
<td>G: 32.0 H: 31.9</td>
<td>G: 15.0 H: 14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 2018.

When analyzing how levels of attachment change over time within each country, I found that German respondents grow more attached to their city, town, or village throughout the four surveys, while attachment to their country as a whole decreases. Their attachment to the EU increased over time, however, it did decrease in 2014 and 2016, as the refugee crisis increasingly impacted their lives. Overall, German society became less attached to their country and more attached to the EU revealing a cosmopolitan identity which could imply a more inclusive culture.

Hungary experienced similar patterns, with an increasing attachment to their town and decreasing attachment to their country. Combined with an increasing attachment to the EU, with exception of during the refugee crisis in 2014 and 2016, they also reveal a more open, cosmopolitan identity.

Refugee Policy Analysis

Germany

In my analysis of German refugee policies, I found that all policies, both procedural and integration ones, included physical barriers, such as on what grounds an application can be considered unfounded (see Table 2.1). The ones on procedure also included mentions of detention centers, however, the Asylum Act 2016 was the only policy that mentioned the presence
of border control. In addition, there was no mention of financial barriers in any of the policies or mention of any kind of wall or fence that would prevent access to the country. When it comes to integration, both procedural and integration policies were very open, however, while integration policies became more open, the procedural policies stayed relatively the same. Whatever the Integration Act may be lacking in terms of integration, the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act makes up for, for example providing access to the healthcare or education system, however, neither includes any mention of access to financial services for asylum seekers. Each act also included different requirements for asylum regarding language, accommodation, labor, and education.

Table 2.1: German Refugee Policy Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Physical Barriers</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall/Fence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoint</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border control/Officers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounds for unfounded application</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention Center</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Financial Barriers</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application fee</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrance fee</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other fees</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Physical/Financial Barriers: 0 = no mention, 1 = No, 2 = Yes; Integration: 0 = no mention; 1 = prevented; 2 = access allowed but restricted; 3 = access allowed; 4 = resources provided to assist access; 5 = required
The Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act (2015) requires refugees to live within the reception center, however, it does allow for certain circumstances when refugees may be able to live outside of reception facilities. In addition, it provides a benefit to refugees for food, accommodation, heating, personal care, and healthcare. The German healthcare system will also provide vaccinations and other services from doctors and dentists, covered by an insurance company. It does require training in language programs; however, this language training is aimed to assist in labor-market participation rather than complete assimilation.

The Asylum Act (2016) is the only act which mentions the presence of border control officers and what they should do after they obtain an individual who requests asylum. It lays out more specific regulations for accommodation and how long individuals are required to live either in the reception center where they file their claim or in collective accommodation afterwards. This requirement ends once a person is officially granted asylum. This act also allows employment while an individual is awaiting their asylum decision.
The *Integration Act* (2016) lays the preliminary groundwork as to what kind of language training, employment, and accommodation benefit asylum seekers will have access to, as well as an integration course. However, the *Asylum Seekers Benefits Act* (2020) builds off of this and provides much more extensive provisions guaranteeing that the state will meet an individual’s need for housing and education in order to promote social and cultural integration into the community, particularly for children and young adults. It also includes a requirement for asylum seekers who are not enrolled in school to be employed and participate in job-related German language training.

**Hungary**

The Hungarian policies were easier to measure changes over time, as with the exception of *On the Detailed Rules of Asylum Procedures and Documents of Temporarily Protected Persons* (2004), the policies were all variations of *Act LXXX on Asylum*. Starting in 2007, the physical barriers present in the policies became more restrictive over time, and all but the 2007 policy mentions detention centers (see Table 2.2). The 2004 and 2015 policies both have mentions of border control as well as checkpoints, along with the policy from 2016. However, there is no mention of a wall or fence on the Hungarian border in any of the policies, despite the fact that one exists with the goal to impede migration and asylum seekers. In addition, there is almost no mention of any kind of financial barrier, with the 2007 policy explicitly stating that asylum seekers are not responsible for any costs during their asylum procedure, which is consistent with international law. As far as integration is concerned, integration measures significantly improve from the 2004 policy to the 2007 act, and then again from 2007 to 2014. There are then similar levels of integration from 2014 to 2016, the peak of the refugee crisis, with a slight decrease each year.
Table 2.2: Hungarian Refugee Policy Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wall/Fence</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoint</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border control/Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detention Center</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Other fees</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Barriers Overall   | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 |

**Integration/Exclusion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor Market</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Services</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare System</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education System</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Overall Access | 5 | 12 | 27 | 26 | 23 |

The main requirement established in *On the Detailed Rules of Asylum Procedures and Documents of Temporarily Protected Persons* (2004) regards accommodation, as it dictates that the refugee authority is responsible for designating a place of accommodation for each asylum applicant, and if they leave this place of accommodation for more than 24 hours, they are in...

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3 Physical/Financial Barriers: 0 = no mention, 1 = No, 2 = Yes; Integration: 0 = no mention; 1 = prevented; 2 = access allowed but restricted; 3 = access allowed; 4 = resources provided to assist access; 5 = required
violation of their application. Act LXXX on Asylum (2007) expands provisions and regulations for asylum seekers, restricting their ability to work outside of the reception center for a year after they submit their application. It also establishes an integration contract that determines the extent of benefits an asylum seeker may receive and holds them to other legal rules for their social integration. In addition, it establishes compulsory school attendance for school-aged children.

The On the Implementation of the Act on Asylum (2014, 2015, 2016) builds off of this act and establishes the healthcare benefits and services each asylum seeker is entitled to, in addition to reimbursements for schooling and education, housing support, and integration support in the form of a support-based integration contract that includes benefits that will help facilitate social integration, such as a free Hungarian language course. Part of this integration contract is for the asylum seeker to be continuously employed or in contact with the state employment agency in order to be actively involved in a job search if unemployed. It also establishes that all those under 21 will be subject to compulsory school and all costs will be covered by Hungary. In terms of accommodation, this act states that asylum seekers will have two months of free accommodation at the reception center, however, from that point on they must find their own accommodation with the help of the family support center at the refugee authority. However, they must take whatever accommodation is found for them unless they have good reason to reject it.

Comparatively, German policies have fewer barriers, nine total, but also fewer provisions for integration, with a total score of 73. Hungary has a total of 14 barriers but also has an integration score of 93. However, these numbers do not indicate what kind of integration they are promoting, civic integration that incorporates multiculturalism, allowing asylum seekers to enter
the community while still upholding their own values and ways of life, or assimilation, which ultimately forces refugees to conform to the dominant culture and disappear into it.
CHAPTER IV

Discussion: Assimilation or Multiculturalism?

Conclusion
DISCUSSION: ASSIMILATION OR MULTICULTURALISM?

Overall, I found that the levels of cosmopolitanism between my two case studies were very similar, with German slightly favoring the local and EU levels and Hungary favoring their country. However, the actual policies produced by each government are also very similar, with Hungary actually having more integration policies than Germany does. While my predictions were incorrect in that Hungary did not reveal to have a more exclusive culture based on levels of cosmopolitanism, they were correct in that similar levels of culture in the EU resulted in similar levels of integration within their migration policies.

Yet how can this be explained in the context of the EU and the current migration crisis, particularly when there are such stark differences in Germany and Hungary’s cultures and responses to the migration crisis? One explanation is that while this data does show how Germany and Hungary interpret their national and European identities, which is a significant component of how culture influences migration policies among EU Member States, it is just one part of the picture. The histories of these countries and how they have defined national identity in the past is crucial to how they interpret these identities now. As was argued earlier, the division of Germany after World War II can significantly impact national attachment and therefore national pride, as seen in a stronger attachment on the local level rather than the national level throughout the survey data. This can also allow them to be more open to multiculturalism, as they are not as attached to a homogenous national community. Hungary’s victimization during Soviet rule, in contrast, has led to a strengthening of national pride and solidarity against a common enemy, resulting in a rejection of those deemed outside the cultural group, both inside and outside of their territorial borders. This has caused their approach to refugees to be much more assimilative in order to erase any diversity in society.
What my results do reveal, however, is that Hungary’s rejection of EU policies, which have been widely seen as a rejection of EU solidarity and integration, is not necessarily done in opposition to EU membership or even EU culture and identity. Instead, it is a protection of EU identity, values, and culture, which Hungary ultimately sees as an extension of their own white and Christian culture. Although Hungarians feel stronger connections to their country rather than the EU, they are still able to glorify their European membership (Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 572). This glorification of identity, whether it is national or European, often leads to anti-immigrant sentiment (Kende, Hadarics, and Szabo 2019: 578). This can be due to the dichotomy of Hungary being both an Eastern and Western European country. Today, Hungary is seen as being outside of the “core,” more powerful Western European countries of the European Union. However, as a majority Catholic country, Hungary has more of a historical connection with the Western European culture based in Catholicism. This has caused them to reject increased migration of refugees who are predominantly Middle Eastern and Muslim and has resulted in the creation of policies which promote assimilation for those who have already entered the territory.

Migration policies within the EU challenge the notion of a European identity and what exactly a European Union means for sovereign Member States. Many believe that the migration crisis reveals that Europe should be more of a political union rather than seeking cultural unity (Pedersen 2008: 77). Certain Member States, such as Hungary, argue that the attempt to create a cultural union through multiculturalism will ultimately end up with the clashing of certain societal values and cultural rights within Member States (Pedersen 2008: 81). This has created a division among Member State refugee policies and the type of integration they promote, either multiculturalism or assimilation.

Integration: Multiculturalism versus Assimilation
In my policy analysis, I measured the types of integration provided by each Member State and to what extent they are promoted. Integration is crucial to refugee policy as it is the point in which the refugees are welcomed into society, not just granted legal entrance. Integration refers to an individual functioning within a social environment which welcomes them in and enables them to live within a society (Bujalska 2019: 12). It is the active inclusion of migrants into the host society (Bujalska 2019: 12). Integration, however, is also inherently concerned with the impact a foreign culture will have on the host society, and therefore migrants are always at least partially assimilated into the foreign culture (Bujalska 2019: 13). This is easier to accomplish the more similar the two cultures are, such as sharing languages or values, and becomes increasingly difficult when the cultures are more different (Bujalska 2019: 15).

Integration includes economic advancement, educational attainment, and cultural acceptance (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 162). By participating in the labor market, paying taxes, attending local schools, and raising families, migrants become an increasingly valuable part of society and are able to claim a part of the culture as their own (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 162). Some policies can be either be used for integration or assimilation, for example, encouraging refugees to learn the dominant language can either be seen as reinforcing an ethnic-nationalism or as encouraging greater political, economic, and social participation (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 160). These different types of integration can encourage different ways for migrants to become involved in the host society. The type of integration promoted can not only have different results in how migrants affect the host culture but also how effective they are.

Multiculturalism is a type of integration which prioritizes the uniqueness and separateness of the foreign culture over cultural unity and harmony within the host country. This
allows immigrants and refugees to keep their own cultural practices and identities while simply becoming a part of the political community rather than the cultural one. However, multiculturalism has been blamed for the social isolation, poor economic integration, poor educational outcomes, and political radicalization of migrant groups (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 578). Because of this, many politicians no longer use the world “multiculturalism,” but instead use rhetoric such as “diversity policies” to promote a kind of civic integration which may require a written citizenship test or loyalty oath (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 578). While these policies of civic integration do promote an active integration of migrants into economic, social, and political institutions, they are often paired with multicultural policies and do not require migrants to fully assimilate into the host culture (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 579).

Civic integration emphasizes the importance of immigrants fully integrating into the host society through areas such as employment; understanding and respect of essential democratic values, such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and equality; and knowledge of the host country’s language, history, and institutions (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 587). These policies are usually paired with anti-discrimination laws in order to promote multiculturalism and a respect for other cultures to complement this integration and show that the national identity is able to accommodate diversity (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 587). In order for these policies to be considered civic integration rather than assimilation, these provisions must be voluntary, with language training and other integration programs provided free of charge but with no connection between participation and a continuation of residency or social benefits (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 588). This voluntary approach allows immigrants to exercise their right to integrate and utilize supportive programs and resources but does not deny them the right to keep their previous cultures and values in order to meet certain requirements of integration (Banting and Kymlicka
Another indicator of how multicultural these civic integration policies are rather than assimilative is determined by how open the host society is to the expression of difference or whether or not immigrants are allowed to keep their religion or even an attachment to their home country (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 589). Civic integration policies promote national identity, unity, and a common language in order to provide migrants with greater employment and social opportunities (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 592). Proponents of civic integration see integration as a cultural issue, arguing that complete blindness to cultural difference through pure multiculturalism policies will ultimately result in inequality in the rights, belonging, and participation of refugees in the dominant culture (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 160). Combined with multiculturalism, civic integration allows migrants to be integrated into the community while still maintaining their own culture and traditions. However, if these policies are not supplemented with multicultural practices, they become assimilative and oppressive to minorities who are forced to change their behavior in order to fit into the dominant culture (Banting and Kymlicka 2013: 592). However, some argue that this kind of assimilation is more beneficial to society as a whole, as multiculturalism and civic integration promote multiple loyalties among migrants, and without a primary loyalty to the nation, the national community will fragment (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 160).

The alternative to, and opposite of, multiculturalism is assimilation, in which migrants must change their behavior and embrace the culture of the host country (Bujalska 2019: 12). Assimilation negatively affects social diversity, as it promotes “sameness” in order to reduce alternative perspectives, usually forcing the refugees to change in some way during the assimilation process (Bujalska 2019: 18). This is difficult when the migrants do not speak the same language or share the same religion as the dominant group, which can cause tensions when
the migrant’s religion conflicts with the values, norms, or principles of the host country (Bujalska 2019: 16). In addition, when the immigrants have different facial features or skin color from the country they are attempting to assimilate into, it can be more difficult (Bujalska 2019: 16). However, if immigrants or refugees are able to assimilate into the host culture, they prove to the community that they will have a positive impact on society, which can lead to increased job opportunities and better community relations (Bujalska 2019: 17). Some EU Member States have proposed an “integration contract” that is obligatory for migrants or refugees to sign and agree to participate in language and cultural assimilation courses (Lesinska 2014: 47). Another method of assimilation is to use education to create a unified national culture and homogenize the nation (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 397). Education is used to define the borders of “imagined communities” and help bind together members of a nation in order to increase solidarity (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 398). Public education has been found to be one of the most effective tools in establishing a collective national conscience and strong feelings of national identity (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 398).

Calls for assimilation began to be more pronounced as the refugee crisis went on, as public fears of the disintegration of national unity and identity began to increase (Lesinska 2014: 43). Some argued that mass migration, particularly from cultures that were different from Europe, combined with multicultural policies would ultimately destroy national identity (Lesinska 2014: 43). On top of this, Muslims were accused of being “enemies of the Christian West,” and of not making an effort at integration and because they prioritized their religion over the host culture (Lesinska 2014: 43). Islam is framed as both a culture and religion which is fundamentally different or even opposed to Western norms and values (King, Le Gales, and Vitale 2017: 431). This revival of assimilation policies also reflects the growing prominence of
ethno-nationalism and national culture and identity within some Member States (Lesinska 2014: 43). These policies aim to “purify” the “polluted qualities” of migrants in order to maintain the dominant European culture (Alexander 2013: 545). They increasingly focus on culture and how Muslim immigrants may have cultural practices that are against European values, such as gender equality, and are therefore anti-liberal and anti-democratic (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 163). Both elites and the public within certain Member States feel that non-Western, non-White, Islamic people threaten the very culture of the EU with their unfamiliar physical appearances, religious practices, and political beliefs and are even a threat to European democracy (Alexander 2013: 543, 547).

Germany

The integration model in Germany is overall one of civic integration, as it tends to view refugees and immigrants as temporary guests, and therefore focuses on adapting them to German society and the labor market without forcing full assimilation into the social sphere (Bujalska 2019: 19). German refugee policies come from a model that establishes a duty not only to allow refugees to enter Germany but also to provide the necessary conditions they need to be full and equal members of German society (Funk 2016: 291). This includes housing, medical care, and living conditions, but also job training and language courses that are paid for by the state in order to promote further social and labor integration (Funk 2016: 291). However, there remains an emphasis on the active participation of migrants within German society, therefore there is a push to learn the basic values and principles necessary to integrate into German culture, as well as to be abstain from excessive nationalistic or religious behavior and to participate within the education system and the labor market (Bujalska 2019: 19). This can be seen in the requirements for education, labor participation, and language courses in their asylum policies, all of which will
allow refugees to be more active in German society. The language courses teach the German language, particularly job-relevant language, but also legal and social norms (Funk 2016: 291). Combined with Germany’s more civic identity, this reveals that their integration methods promote a more open society in line with the multicultural values of the EU. However, there is no indication that refugees are forced to give up alternative identities and culture completely, but instead are given the resources to thrive within German society.

The German education system, however, does emphasize more integrationist methods and values rather than multiculturalism, revealing the fine line that exists between civic integration and assimilation. The German education system has been criticized for failing to acknowledge the diversity refugees bring and how that may benefit the classroom overall (Timm 2016: 2). Refugee students often attend regular German classes in order to integrate with German students in addition to taking German language classes (Timm 2016: 3). The overall goal of this education is one of civic integration, as it seeks to prepare refugee students to graduate and integrate into the labor market through gainful employment, so that in the future they do not need to rely on welfare (Timm 2016: 3). While this may also benefit social integration, as employment is a crucial part of it, this type of education pushes assimilation rather than multicultural integration, as it expects students to adapt to the system and adjust quickly (Timm 2016: 3). However, studies have shown that the education system ultimately benefits when refugees are able to remain connected to their culture while at the same time integrating into the host country’s culture, as it brings diverse perspectives to the classroom and introduces German students to different identities (Timm 2016: 3). This reinforces the need to have multicultural policies in place to complement civic integration measures in order to ensure that the priority is to give refugees the necessary resources to be included in the community, rather than forcing
them to assimilate into it. Comparatively, however, the German education system does not force assimilation on students to the extent that the Hungarian education system does, as will be discussed in the next section.

**Hungary**

The general support of EU membership seen in Hungary is evidence to the fact that Hungarians are not looking to leave the EU, as they realize that it is ultimately in their political and economic self-interest to remain a part of the Union (Scott 2020: 663). The cultural conception of the nation reveals that the Hungarian government is instead it seeking to protect a certain kind of culture, the white, Christian culture that represents not only a European-ness but also a Hungarian-ness, regardless of territorial border (Scott 2020: 664). This attitude is impacted by certain events in Hungary’s past, such as the injustice Hungarians continue to feel due to past territorial loss, which has created the notion that the Hungarian nation moves beyond its borders, as well as the widespread idea that national sovereignty and unity must be maintained even within EU membership (Scott 2020: 664). At the same time, Hungary argues that it is protecting traditional values and the integrity of a European identity (Scott 2020: 664). The 1920 Trianon Agreement solidified the Hungarian identity as being a cultural community rather than a strictly national one, which also resulted in its conception of a European identity as being one of ethnicity and culture in addition to territory, ultimately making it more difficult to accept refugees into it, as they are seen as cultural and territorial outsiders (Scott 2020: 665).

Hungary’s migration policies seek to reduce the visibility of refugees, either through physical separation or assimilation (Scott 2020: 668). This has been achieved through the securitization of migration and borders, through actions such as fence building as well as anti-immigrant discourse, in order to instill a distrust of migrants within the Hungarian population.
and prevent them from interacting directly with refugees (Scott 2020: 668). This is seen through the larger number of physical barriers Hungary has within their refugee policies as compared to Germany. The implementation of barbed wire fences and internment camps along the Hungarian border with Serbia was justified as Hungary fulfilling its duty to protect Europe’s historical legacy and Christian culture, as they believe Muslim migrants will ultimately threaten not only Europe’s security but also their identity (Scott 2020: 669). These types of policies also restrict migrants into certain spaces in which they are invisible in mainstream society (Scott 2020: 169).

This is seen in their integration policies when it comes to accommodation, as refugees are separated into certain accommodation and are unable to leave it while their asylum claim is being processed.

This extends beyond a physical separation to also a cultural disappearance, forcing refugees to assimilate into Hungarian society so that their cultural differences are no longer evident. This is seen in their integration policies, many of which include requirements for schooling, labor, language training, and participation in an integration contract. This contract shifts these requirements from one that could be promoting a civic integration to forcing assimilation, as if refugees break this contract at any point, whether that is by rejecting the housing recommended them, failing to attend school, or being unemployed and not active in a job search, they are at risk of violating their asylum agreement and losing access to their benefits. This reveals that it is Hungary’s ultimate goal to have migrants disappear into their society, whether that involves a physical separation while their asylum claims are being processed or by cultural assimilation after their claim has been accepted.

Hungary’s education system has also been used to achieve this goal, as it is a requirement for those who wish to remain in Hungary to attend school (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 400).
However, refugees are often grouped automatically with Roma children, another minority group within Hungary, and separated from ‘ethnic’ Hungarian children (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 400). When it comes to acknowledging multiculturalism in the classroom, many teachers opt instead to erase the differences between students and label any unfair treatment or conflict as normal bullying, rather than due to a student’s refugee status or any other ethnic, religious, or cultural aspects (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 405). Ignoring any issues that arise between students is a way to distance refugee students from Hungarian students and reduce the visibility of any conflict that may arise from integration (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 408). When difference is acknowledged, it is usually in the context of an East-West narrative, in which the East represents irrationality, backwardness, and lacking in modernity and the West is a symbol of rationality, development, and civilization (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 410). Within this context, teachers are seen as the way to civilize those from the East, integrating them into Western norms in a way that erases their previously “primitive” cultural traditions (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 410). Difference is seen as a negative concept to have in the classroom, with those who have different cultural characteristics being associated with social deprivation, poor knowledge of the language, a lack of cultural capital, and carriers of illness (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 413). Difference is seen as “a cultural, social, or biological deficit that can be tolerated,” but must ultimately be assimilated into the dominant culture, rather than accepted (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 415). Ultimately, school integration takes on an assimilative role, as it is closely aligned with Hungary’s nation-state ideology (Szilassy and Arendas 2007: 415).

CONCLUSION

My analysis revealed that despite similar levels of cosmopolitanism and integration within their refugee policies, Germany and Hungary are ultimately pursuing different forms of
integration within their migration policies. Germany, which I argued has a more open culture due to a collective guilt over its National Socialist past as well as a weak national identity due to the division of Germany in the latter half of the 20th century, is more open to refugees entering their society. During the refugee crisis, Germany has pursued policies of civic integration, which respects the varying cultures and identities migrants may have while also providing them with the resources necessary to participate in the political, economic, and societal spheres of German life. Hungary, on the other hand, has much more exclusive culture, due to the loss of territory after World War I which has resulted in the creation of a cultural Hungarian identity that extends beyond its border but excludes anyone who is not deemed ethnically Hungarian. Hungary has extended this cultural identification to the rest of Europe, which it deems white and Christian, and therefore sees the predominantly Middle Eastern and Muslim migrants as a cultural threat to the unity of the European identity. Therefore, they have more exclusive refugee policies which include more physical barriers to entry as well as an emphasis on assimilation rather than civic integration in their integration policies. This research has also established that not only is national culture a significant influence on the openness of migration policies, but national culture can be expanded within the context of the EU to encompass an exclusive European culture, rather than the multicultural identity the EU is generally understood to have.

Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research

This study does have a few limitations which may have impacted my results. My culture measure, cosmopolitanism, is just one aspect of culture which may impact migration policy. While it is an important aspect of culture, particularly in the context of EU migration policy when national and international identities can determine who citizens respond to an increase in immigration, it is not completely comprehensive. I attempted to account for this by
contextualizing the data as much as possible with the histories of each case study and how identity has been defined in the past and present. In addition, I used my analysis of assimilation and multiculturalism within each country to demonstrate how culture can also affect the implementation of migration policies. In addition, I analyzed asylum policies from each of my case studies in order to demonstrate how migration regimes are impacted by culture. However, an analysis of these policies is not a comprehensive demonstration of whether or not countries are in compliance with EU law.

The Hungarian policies analyzed were in line with EU law and regulations, however, Hungary has continued to violate EU refugee law throughout the refugee crisis. In 2015 and 2017, the Hungarian government passed laws creating transit zones, specific camps where asylum seekers were required to submit their asylum requests (DW News 2020). In May 2020, European courts ruled that the conditions in these camps were holding asylum seekers in unlawful detention, as if asylum seekers left the overcrowded camps, they terminated their asylum procedure and were banned from reapplying (Verseck 2021). This reveals the disconnect between policies and reality, as legally the Hungarian government is allowed to have designated reception centers for refugees and asylum seekers, and even require them to stay there, however, in reality this has resulted in the unlawful detention of refugees, as they are held in inhumane conditions and prohibited from leaving.

In 2018, the EU commission accused Hungary of obstructing asylum seekers’ right to request asylum, as the Hungarian government had militarized the border with Serbia, installing a thirteen-foot-tall fence with barbed wire, floodlights, and loudspeakers (Hinshaw 2018). Asylum seekers were only permitted to enter through a pair of gates, creating a bottleneck on the other side of the fence (Hinshaw 2018). Hungary’s response to this accusation was again to argue that
they were simply protecting the European identity by preventing refugees from entering and changing EU culture (Xinhua News Agency 2018). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled again on Hungary’s border policies in 2021, stating that Hungary’s policy of escorting refugees through the gates back to the other side of Serbia also violated EU law, as it is equivalent to deportation without adequately assessing their asylum claim or appeal (Verseck 2021). This reveals another disconnect between Hungarian policies and their treatment of refugees, as there is no mention of the border fence in their asylum policies, and they state that refugees and asylum seekers are permitted to remain in Hungary while their claim is being heard or appealed. This reveals that asylum policies may not be the only indication of compliance with EU law among Member States, and the de facto treatment of refugees must also be analyzed in future research.
APPENDIX A: POLICY ANALYSIS CODE

**Barriers To Entry**

**Physical Barriers**
1. Is there a wall or fence? (0=no mention, no=1, yes=2)
2. Is there a checkpoint (0=no mention, no=1, yes=2)
   (Checkpoint defined as points in country or on border where documents are checked).
3. Is there border control/officers/agents (0=no mention, no=1, yes=2)
   (This would include Individuals patrolling border, border area, able to make arrests).
4. Does the policy include grounds for an unfounded asylum application? (0=no mention, no=1, yes=2)
   (Safe country of origins, office reading asylum applications can determine that an individual is free from political persecution, residence/entry bans)
5. Is there mention of a detention center? (0=no mention, no=1, yes=2)
   (guarded accommodation, restricted accommodation)
6. How many physical barriers overall? (total from above questions)

**Financial Barriers**
7. Is there an application fee to apply for asylum or visa (yes=1, no=0)
8. Is there an entrance fee to enter the country as an immigrant or refugee (yes=1, no=0)
9. Is there any other fee applied? (yes=1, no=0)
10. How many financial barriers overall? (total from above questions)
11. How many barriers overall? (total from physical and financial barriers)

**Integration or Exclusion**
12. Do refugees have access to the Labor Market?
   (Jobs, apprenticeships, job training, employment)
   ● 0 - No mention
   ● 1 - Prevent
   ● 2 – Allowed, Restricted
   ● 3 - Allow
   ● 4 - Resources provided for refugees to access to job market
   ● 5 - Required

13. Do refugees have access to accommodations?
   (Accommodations include housing, public housing, housing services)
   ● 0 - No mention
   ● 1 - Prevent
   ● 2 – Allowed, Restricted
   ● 3 - Allow
14. Do refugees have access to Language Services?
   (Language training, classes, requirement, assistance)
   - 0 - No mention
   - 1 - Prevent
   - 2 – Allowed, Restricted
   - 3 - Allow
   - 4 - Resources provided for refugees to access to job market
   - 5 - Required

15. Do refugees have access to Financial Services?
   (Financial services, banking, bank account, lending, assistance)
   - 0 - No mention
   - 1 - Prevent
   - 2 – Allowed, Restricted
   - 3 - Allow
   - 4 - Resources provided for refugees to access to job market

16. Do refugees have access to the Healthcare System?
   (Healthcare, doctors, hospitals, health access)
   - 0 - No mention
   - 1 - Prevent
   - 2 – Allowed, Restricted
   - 3 - Allow
   - 4 - Resources provided for refugees to access to job market
   - 5 - Required

17. Do refugees have access to the Education System?
   (School, education, university, college)
   - 0 - No mention
   - 1 - Prevent
   - 2 – Allowed, Restricted
   - 3 - Allow
   - 4 - Resources provided for refugees to access to job market
   - 5 - Required

What is the overall access score? (total from inclusion/exclusion questions)
APPENDIX B: EUROBAROMETER COMPARISONS BETWEEN HUNGARY AND GERMANY

Feelings of Attachment in German and Hungary 2010 (Source: Eurobarometer 2010)

Feelings of Attachment in German and Hungary 2014 (Source: Eurobarometer 2014)
Feelings of Attachment in German and Hungary 2016 (Source: Eurobarometer 2016)

Feelings of Attachment in German and Hungary 2018 (Source: Eurobarometer 2018)
APPENDIX C: EUROBAROMETER COMPARISONS WITHIN GERMANY AND HUNGARY


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