



**Digital Commons@**

Loyola Marymount University  
LMU Loyola Law School

---

Theological Studies Faculty Works

Theological Studies

---

2008

## The global importance of 'illiberal moderates', an exchange: Partners in peace to precede a concert of democracies

Amir Hussain

Loyola Marymount University, [amir.hussain@lmu.edu](mailto:amir.hussain@lmu.edu)

Follow this and additional works at: [https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/theo\\_fac](https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/theo_fac)

---

### Repository Citation

Hussain, Amir, "The global importance of 'illiberal moderates', an exchange: Partners in peace to precede a concert of democracies" (2008). *Theological Studies Faculty Works*. 463.

[https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/theo\\_fac/463](https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/theo_fac/463)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Theological Studies at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theological Studies Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [digitalcommons@lmu.edu](mailto:digitalcommons@lmu.edu).

## The global importance of 'illiberal moderates', an exchange: partners in peace to precede a concert of democracies

Amitai Etzioni  
*George Washington University*

Amir Hussain  
*Loyola Marymount University*

Mohammad H Fadel  
*University of Toronto*

Jean Bethke Elshtain  
*University of Chicago*

Stephen Schwartz  
*Center for Islamic Pluralism*

Joergen Oerstroem Moeller  
*Institute of Southeast Asian Studies*

**Abstract** *The following is an exchange concerning the concept of 'illiberal moderates' and its implications for a new global architecture as well as for a worldview that sees the evolution of a global core of shared values which favour domestic and international security, in sharp contrast to the 'clash of civilizations' thesis. The original statement was published in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs (Etzioni 2006). A more extensive treatment can be found in Part III of Security first: for a muscular, moral foreign policy (Etzioni 2007b), which examines texts of four religious and two secular belief systems as well as review of relevant public opinion polls and 'traveller notes'. Here follows a brief summary of the main thesis, followed by comments from prominent scholars and Etzioni's response to these comments.*

### Opening move—Amitai Etzioni

As social analysis suffers from an over-abundance of terms, the introduction of any new term necessarily calls for justification. After a few lines concerning matters of definition, we shall see that the term 'illiberal moderates' serves to highlight a profound difference in one's view of the world, points to a major shift in the direction of foreign policy, and speaks volumes as to the question of what makes a good citizen. It serves to highlight that although large segments of the people of the world, Muslims included, do not favour western-style liberal-democratic regimes,

they abhor the use of force, terrorism and war. It calls attention to the deep difference between a foreign policy that seeks to rely on military force to democratize nations ('regime change') and which views all illiberals as a threat to global stability and national security, and a foreign policy that views all those who swear off terrorism and war as at least potential allies, as 'Partners in Peace' even if they are not ready to join a 'Concert of Democracies', thereby allowing gradual and largely home-grown democratization to follow.

#### *A new term, matters of definition*

I define 'illiberal moderates' as those who disavow violence (under most circumstances) but who do not favour a liberal-democratic regime or the full plethora of human rights (Etzioni 2006, 369; Etzioni 2007b, Part III). These illiberals are *moderate* not because they often hold intermediate beliefs, or hold them with limited certitude but—by definition—because they reject the use of force to impose their beliefs. True, those who hold strong beliefs—one-sided and unencumbered by doubt—are also prone to embrace the use of force to promote their beliefs, but the correlation is far from high. Thus many millions of evangelical Christians in the United States (US), sometimes called fundamentalists, subscribe to strong religious beliefs but do not support bombing abortion clinics, stoning homosexuals or driving them out of town, nor other acts of violence to impose their norms. Many ultra-orthodox Jews do not favour violent acts against Palestinians or Jewish atheists. The same holds for hundreds of millions of Muslims in nations such as Bangladesh and Indonesia. The widely used terms 'extremist' and 'radical' confuse the matter because they are sometimes used to refer to those who have strong beliefs and sometimes to those who are willing to apply force. The importance of highlighting the difference between these two orientations justifies the introduction of a new term: the contrast between 'moderates' and 'immoderates'.

Many moderates are '*illiberal*' in the political science sense of the term, not to be confused with the term 'liberal' as used in public parlance, which is employed by many in the US to refer to progressive people and by many in Europe to *laissez-faire* conservatives. Illiberals do not consider Westminster democracy the preferred political system, nor do they favour many human rights, such as freedom of speech and women's rights.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Other treatments*

A brief examination of two texts highlights the workload the term 'illiberal moderates' can carry. Amr Hamzawy writes that some Arab groups 'embrace

---

<sup>1</sup> When asked by those who conduct public opinion polls, some of those who state that they favour democracy and human rights, when probed, reveal that they would deny jobs and cut all social ties with Muslims who have converted to Christianity, would ban the sales of Salman Rushdie's *The satanic verses*, would refuse the publication of cartoons offending the Prophet and would require their wives and daughters to stay in the back of the house when guests are visiting. When these illiberals state that they do subscribe to democracy, their notion of what it entails is often quite non-western. Thus, David Brooks quotes a member of a prominent Egyptian family who argues that the meaning of democracy is obedience to the word of God (Brooks 2006).

nonviolence, pragmatism and democratic procedures' and adds that 'Islamist movements in these countries now see the wisdom of competing peacefully for shares of political power and working within existing institutions to promote gradual democratic openings' (2005, 1). Hamzawy's words, like scores of other such statements, combine the commitment to non-violence with a commitment to democratic procedures, contrasting them with those who favour violence and oppose democratic procedures, an opposition that obscures what I claim to be a very major third group which favours neither, namely, the 'illiberal moderates'.

Similarly, an often-cited RAND report, 'Building moderate Muslim networks' (Rabasa et al 2007), sees the challenge the west faces as being posed by 'radical' Islam, which relies on 'dogmatic' interpretations. It is contrasted with moderate Muslims, defined as those who share 'key dimensions of democratic culture' (13). This is a legitimate distinction but it harks back to the thesis that only democratic regimes are reliable Partners in Peace and that all dogmatic religious interpretations endanger our security. This, I argue, is not the case. Saudi Arabia and Yemen, for instance, are not threatening US security in the usual sense of the term.<sup>2</sup>

One may ask how our concept of 'illiberal moderates' differs from Fareed Zakaria's concept of 'illiberal democracy'. Zakaria considers democratic regimes to be those that hold free and fair elections and where the rule of the people prevails. But by his definition such a regime could include one in which there is an extreme tyranny of the majority (Zakaria 1997; 2003). Individual rights, the rights enshrined in the constitution that are not subject to voting, rights which cannot be set aside by the majority of the elected representatives, are defined by Zakaria as liberal. In his view there are illiberal democracies and liberal regimes that are not democratic. However, many other scholars consider a regime to be democratic only if it is also framed by a constitution that defends individual rights, arguing that all *bona fide* democracies are liberal ones. In any case, the line I draw is not between liberals and democrats—but between liberal democrats and those who reject both the democratic form of government and many individual rights. My main point is that it is a profound intellectual mistake, a morally dubious judgement and a gross foreign policy error to assume that all or even most illiberals also favour the exercise of violence and hence are dangerous jihadists.

### *Remapping the world*

In the past, there was a strong tendency to lump 'illiberal moderates' with those who favour violence because it was assumed that only liberals could be reliable Partners in Peace. Regime change was considered essential to ensure that illiberal nations would not bring war to other nations, harbour or support terrorists, or violently oppress their citizens. Often it was implicitly assumed that religious people tend to be fanatics and that fanatics tend to be violent people. Hence the 'separation of state and mosque' has been promoted by the US and its allies as a key element of the new Iraqi and Afghani constitutions. Moreover, it was assumed

---

<sup>2</sup>One may argue that their authoritarian regimes prepare the ground for future anti-western attacks, but so do attempts to democratize these nations by outsiders when these outsiders use force.

that the world is rapidly liberalizing and that the remaining illiberal groups could be marginalized if not altogether ignored.

In contrast, the term 'illiberal moderate' calls attention to the fact that billions of people, including hundreds of millions of Muslims, are not liberals, are not about to become liberals and that there is no way to make their governments into liberal democracies in the foreseeable future, while at the same time most of them do not favour terrorism and pose no threat to western security nor to world peace. The political and ideological trends in many countries show at least as much of an increase in fundamentalism and Islamist following as they do for liberalism. This is not to suggest that Islam is in principle incompatible with liberal democracy, but only that many Muslims who reject terrorism *currently and in the foreseeable future* do not favour democratization. If this observation is a valid one, lumping these 'illiberal moderates' with those who are pro-violence grossly misguides foreign policy. It vastly increases the ranks of those whom the US and its allies view as the foe, and pushes potential allies in the war against terrorism into the camp of those with whom we must contend.

#### *At least a global swing vote*

Polls suggest that large segments of the Muslim populations of North Africa, Turkey, Mali, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and India hold illiberal, moderate beliefs (Etzioni 2007b, 140). Though it should be noted that none of these polls were designed to assess the size of the illiberal moderate camp, and hence at best only allow an estimate of the numbers involved. If one adds non-statistical sources, such as observations by seasoned reporters, social scientists and travellers, one reaches the same conclusion I reached, namely that the majority of the citizens of the world, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, are 'illiberal moderates' (Etzioni 2007b, 134).

Assuming this observation is a valid one, it stresses the importance of focusing, for now, on dealing with the immoderate violent minority and not treating 'illiberal moderates' as a part of that camp. However, even if 'illiberal moderates' should constitute a minority, they are clearly the equivalent of the global swing vote between the liberals and the immoderates and as such are better courted than rejected.

#### **Comments—Amir Hussain**

I appreciate Professor Etzioni's opening sentence as I agree that there is too much jargon in social analysis. That said, he makes an excellent case for the use of the term 'illiberal moderates', and I support him in this usage. I appreciate his distinction between those who hold strong religious beliefs and those who are committed to violence because of those beliefs. This is much better than the common terms of 'extremist' or 'radical'. I also appreciate his observation that we need to get away from the idea that we can only make peace with 'liberals'.

In the case of America, I might push his observations further about the illiberal views held by many Americans to include scientific research guided by religious principles rather than by scientific theory (I am here thinking about stem cell

research, evolution and global warming). We need to recognize the 'illiberal moderates' in our own society as well as those in other countries. Often, we are aware of the diversity within our own societies as well as where our own groups may not live up to expressed ideals. However, we may not extend this same understanding to other groups. With regard to religion, Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith wrote in 1957 that 'Men generally tend to talk about other people's religions as they are and about their own as it ought to be' (44).

There are many Americans who are not in favour of extending full human rights to homosexuals. Our government comes up with creative definitions of torture, we are not in compliance with the Geneva Conventions and hold hundreds without trial in prisons that are known and those that are secret. Many of us would be classified as 'illiberal moderates'.

When the state kills in our name, we tend not to think of that as violence. By the end of 2001, some three months after the war in Afghanistan began, US Armed Forces with the help of coalition forces (including Canadian soldiers) had killed more than 3,000 Afghans in our war with them.<sup>3</sup> This was approximately equal to the number killed in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). Even more disturbing is that by conservative estimates, some 30,000 Iraqis had been killed by the fourth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, ten times the number who perished in 9/11.<sup>4</sup> All this took place ostensibly as part of the 'war on terrorism', even though there was never any demonstrated link between Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in Iraq and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. By comparing the numbers of victims I am not advocating any calculus of suffering. The loss of one person is already a tragedy, yet the losses among our enemies do not usually figure in our thinking.

Just as we are blind to the violence of our governments, we also tend to ignore the violence in our own cultures and lives. We may not think much about the history of violence in North America, particularly the violent impact of European colonialism on the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Christians may similarly forget or downplay the Christian affiliations and commitments of the Nazis, whose religion failed to stop them from carrying out the Holocaust. Or we may think that we abhor violence, yet blithely glorify it in hymns like 'The battle hymn of the Republic'. We may not think of the violence that is all around us. In contemporary America some 10,000 people are murdered annually by handguns and almost the same number die in handgun suicides.<sup>5</sup> Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in the United States in 1976, over 1,000 people have been executed across the country.<sup>6</sup> One of the most serious issues faced by young people in our cities is gang life. Our movies, television shows, video games and music all celebrate a culture of violence. In 2006, the Academy Award for best

---

<sup>3</sup> There is no accurate count of those killed in the Afghanistan war ('Operation Enduring Freedom'). Unknown News (2007) estimates civilian deaths at over 3,000 and Afghani troop deaths at over 8,000 by July 2004.

<sup>4</sup> In a December 2005 speech, President George W Bush estimated that 30,000 Iraqi civilians had been killed up to that point (Bush 2005). Other estimates put the number as high as 650,000 (Burnham et al 2006).

<sup>5</sup> One study cites 10,801 gun homicides and 16,586 suicides in 2000 (Lemaire 2005).

<sup>6</sup> See the information provided by the Death Penalty Information Center at <<http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org>>.

original song went to 'It's hard out here for a pimp', which glorifies the sexual and economic exploitation of women.

Violence is therefore integrated into the very structure of our society. We live in a complex web in which the violence 'out there' is connected to our own violence in more ways than we may acknowledge. It is tempting to project our own violence to someone else, preferably someone—a nation, an ethnic group or a religion—that is markedly different from our own. Without excusing any of the violence committed by Muslims, one can see how it is often connected to economic exploitation, military occupation or the achievement of political goals. However, it is usually simply labelled as 'Muslim' violence, as if religion is the sole motivation for the violence.

Perhaps we share more with 'illiberal moderates' in the Muslim world than we might realize.

### Response to Amir Hussain—Amitai Etzioni

I could not agree more with the point that there are many millions of 'illiberal moderates' in the west. Indeed one of my major points is that the clash among different sub-belief systems occurs within all civilizations. I showed (in more detail in Part III of my book *Security first* than in the article this discussion follows) that Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Socialism are all subject to violent as well as non-violent interpretations—just like Islam. True, in different historical periods, the proportions of the followers of the violent *versus* non-violent interpretations of a given belief system have changed. At the moment, there might be more illiberal moderate Muslims than, say, Socialists, but it was the other way around during Stalin's and Mao's days.

Is there a difference between violence committed by a state and violence committed by non-state actors, for example terrorists? Undoubtedly so: by and large violence that is organized by states is on a larger and more systematic scale than that committed by non-state actors. The most telling examples are Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. However, a smaller scale evil is no more ethical or reassuring than a larger one. Violence constitutes the highest, most conclusive, definitive violation of one's rights—all of them.

Is there a moral equivalency between their violence and ours—whoever 'they' and 'we' are? Violence is always a foul means, which can be justified only under rare and special circumstances. This is what 'just war' theory is all about.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, morally speaking, there is a world of difference between attacking innocent civilians and protecting innocent civilians from an attack. There is also a profound difference between a war that is launched to advance true or imaginary interests, to avenge a slight or to control lands or oil and one that is launched after all peaceful means have been exhausted to protect one's community. The line I see does not separate the violent from the confirmed pacifists, but rather separates those who believe it is their sacred right or moral duty to kill people who do not share their view of divinity from those who use force to defend themselves when they are truly attacked and only after all means of peaceful resolution have been employed and failed.

---

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Walzer (2000).



**Comments—Mohammad H Fadel**

Professor Etzioni's concept of 'illiberal moderates', and their role in promoting global peace, raises the issue of the relationship of peace to pluralism. More specifically, is it possible to have a peaceful international order in the absence of agreement on the profound issues that have heretofore separated human beings? Etzioni concludes that just as domestic peace does not require agreement on these fundamental questions, neither should international peace. International peace requires a more modest commitment—namely, that states (or substantial majorities in all states) 'reject the use of force to impose their beliefs' (this article, 160). The willingness to eschew violence, Etzioni argues, should be the touchstone for determining the reliability of an ally in the international system, regardless of that ally's principled commitments to a robust spectrum of liberal moral values.<sup>8</sup> While I largely agree with the practical consequences of Etzioni's argument, I hope the following comments might cast some light on the deeper problems raised by such an approach.

In general terms, Etzioni's use of the term 'illiberal moderates' is roughly analogous to what the political philosopher John Rawls terms the 'reasonable'. According to the theory Rawls sets forth in *Political liberalism* (1996), a fundamental domestic characteristic of liberal regimes is that their citizens are 'reasonable', that is to say, that because they understand that pluralism is the natural and inevitable result of the exercise of reason under conditions of freedom, they refuse to justify state action on morally controversial grounds, including normative principles of liberal theory such as moral autonomy. At first glance, an 'illiberal moderate' is someone who satisfies the criterion of reasonableness set out by Rawls.

But is that in fact the case? For Rawls, a political commitment to non-violence alone, without anything else, is insufficient because it is unstable. Each person knows or suspects that social peace is the function of a certain balance of power and if that balance of power is changed, so might the social order. Accordingly, Rawls introduces two scenarios for social peace, a *modus vivendi* and an overlapping consensus. The former is political and, because its terms are subject to an ever-changing balance of power, unstable. The latter is moral and hence stable because its terms are justifiable by each person who is a party to that consensus, even though each person may have a different moral theory of justification. The important point is that the social terms of peace are recognized subjectively as moral, even if for different reasons, by all or substantially all citizens subject to it (Rawls 1996, 147–148).

The instability inherent in a *modus vivendi* is perhaps the best justification for a militant foreign policy which, in the words of Etzioni, 'views all illiberals as a threat to global stability and national security' (this article, 160). Presumably, architects of such a foreign policy fear that any cooperation received from illiberal

---

<sup>8</sup> It is not clear why it is appropriate to believe that strategies that are successful in generating peace within a polity can be successful between polities, especially given the radical asymmetry between the strength of commitments that is conventionally believed to be owed by citizens to fellow citizens and the weakness of citizens' commitments to non-citizens. In any case, I will assume for purposes of my comments that it is appropriate to analogize international politics to domestic politics in the fashion proposed by Etzioni.



regimes, because it is not grounded in principle, cannot be trusted. But why should this be so? Rawls, in explaining how an overlapping consensus might arise, argues that a *modus vivendi* might evolve into an overlapping consensus when, as a result of living under the rule of a constitutional regime, previously warring parties come to re-evaluate their views of others and recognize for the first time the possibility that it is possible to engage in productive cooperation with them (Rawls 1996, 158–159). Accordingly, they revise their own views to take into account this new experience. In other words, they learn the virtue of toleration because they experience it as something positive.

For Etzioni's argument to be persuasive he must assume one of two things. First, the commitments of 'illiberal moderates' to non-violence are principled or second, 'illiberal moderates', although their commitments to non-violence are not principled, may revise their commitments such that they recognize that use of violence is not justified regardless of the current balance of power. Neither of these propositions can be taken for granted, however. While I no doubt agree that most Muslims 'disavow violence (under most circumstances)', unless those circumstances that justify violence according to most Muslims are specified, their adherence to such an abstract principle is of little use in guiding policy.<sup>9</sup> Etzioni, as evidenced by his analogy of 'illiberal moderates' to 'swing-voters', seems to follow the second alternative: that individuals who are 'illiberal moderates' can be persuaded over time to be reliable contributors to global peace and stability, and for that reason it is foolish to put them on the same side as those who use violence to subvert global peace and stability.

But for this argument to work it is critical to distinguish the role of a regime which is illiberal but moderate from its citizens who are 'illiberal moderates'. Etzioni alludes to this problem in footnote 4 to his essay in which he raises the possibility that authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, even though they would be deemed to be in the camp of 'illiberal moderates' in his view, may nevertheless constitute a national security threat to the United States by 'preparing the ground [for] future anti-Western attacks' (Etzioni 2006). He counters this argument by noting that forcible regime change from the outside, however, creates the same risk.

Yet there is a third option, which I believe is consistent with the notion of 'illiberal moderates' and with Rawls' insights on the manner in which a *modus vivendi* can evolve into an overlapping consensus: internal regime change. Supporting illiberal moderate elements within the civil society of authoritarian regimes on the condition that they respect formal democratic procedures, even if there is a risk that individual rights may not be robustly protected, seems to be the optimal strategy for at least two reasons. First, it gives populations living under authoritarian regimes reason to believe that the poor quality of their domestic

---

<sup>9</sup> Indeed, it would not be too difficult to argue that even Osama bin Laden would subscribe to this general statement. It is important to note that in none of Osama bin Laden's *fatwas* (religious opinions) prior to 9/11, in which he argues for the obligation of Muslims to engage in war against the United States or, more colourfully, the 'Crusader-Zionist Alliance', does he demand the US or Israel or anyone else for that matter embrace Islam. Instead, he accuses them of continuously and systematically violating, directly and indirectly, the 'rights' of Muslims. It is the cumulative effect of these violations of rights that justify violence, not theological differences. See, for example, bin Laden (1996; 1998).

politics will be improved, thus providing a good reason to eschew political violence. Second, it provides the real possibility that when 'illiberal moderates' are empowered through constitutional means, their views will evolve from merely formal democratic commitments to more principled ones.

If the concept of 'illiberal moderates' is to be used as a guide to formulating foreign policy, it must take into account the stark difference between an authoritarian regime and a formally democratic one, even if both are 'illiberal moderates'. The latter is more likely to contribute to stability in both the short and long term, whereas the former can only make a short-term contribution to global peace and stability. Accordingly, anti-authoritarianism, I believe, is a necessary corollary to any successful application of the concept of 'illiberal moderates' to foreign policy.

### **Response to Mohammad Fadel—Amitai Etzioni**

Professor Fadel provides the kind of profound commentary that I hoped would follow the original introduction of my thesis. His comments go a long way to deepen and enrich the analysis of the condition we face and the ways in which it is best tackled.

First of all, as I see it, the international system is in an even more primitive stage than many domestic ones. Therefore, in forming policies to cope with international relations one often must choose between the worst and less-worse options, rather than among good ones. A *modus vivendi* may indeed be unstable, but often it is vastly superior to war and armed conflicts.

Second, when setting priorities for foreign policy, a key question is one of sequencing. Neo-conservatives hold that democratization leads to security. I hold that this is like trying to build a roof on a house before laying the foundations and erecting walls. Providing basic security must be the first priority and it can, if necessary, be based on a *modus vivendi*—initially.

Third, security provides an essential prerequisite for the development of thicker and more stable shared understandings (hence, a security first foreign policy, not a security only foreign policy). In other words, security is a precondition for generating the conditions under which democratization and, over the longer run, stability can be advanced.

Fourth, there have been long periods in which such a *modus vivendi* has lasted, for example between South and North Korea following the Korean War. There were decades of ceasefire before the states involved began to move towards higher levels of shared understanding. The same is true about the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, relations between the states of Egypt and Israel, and many others. The fact that, in certain cases, ceasefires were followed by renewed wars, or did not lead to higher levels of shared understanding, does not show that delaying the end of armed hostilities in the quest of thick agreements is always preferable.

I leave it for another day to examine the concept of overlapping consensus. Like many other concepts and statements introduced by John Rawls (1996), it is an opaque one.<sup>10</sup> As I see it, if defined as a consensus on policies by people who

---

<sup>10</sup> For criticism of Rawls on this point see Neal (1990) and Galston (1991).

have incongruent basic values, it is too thin; if it entails a true normative consensus, it may well often be too thick to be relevant to many international situations.

The concept that economic and political development occurs in stages was once very popular in both academic and policymaking communities. It was later largely dismissed for both empirical reasons (several developments were found not to occur in the expected stages) and moral-political ones (the staging theory was used to justify delaying political development until ever higher levels of economic ones were achieved, especially by Asian autocrats). Nevertheless, the question stands: if one cannot introduce all the elements of a liberal democratic polity, civil society and modern economy at once, which elements are best introduced before others? Such sequencing recommends itself not because some elements are not valued or that a regime can fully evolve without them in the long run, but because the development of new regimes is much slower and more demanding than has previously been assumed. Jeffrey Sachs believed that communist regimes could 'leap' into free economic market-driven systems within two years (Sachs 1992; 1993; Sachs and Lipton 1990). Many neo-conservatives argue that nations could be democratized in even shorter periods (Muravchik 2002; Fukuyama 1989; Milbank and Wright 2004). Mountains of evidence show that this is not the case (Pei and Kasper 2003; von Hippel 2000).

I agree with Fadel that in the long run thinness will not do. The history of the European Union (EU) illustrates this point. It was initially founded to ensure that there would be no further wars between Germany and France, but eventually moved to much higher levels of transnational integration. The EU is now facing serious problems in part because, although it formed shared institutions, laws and regulations, it failed to form a thick enough set of shared values to legitimate these state-like developments and provide a normative underpinning for the policies involved (Etzioni 2007a). The same holds for the development of a new global architecture: it is best first advanced by establishing security, for example, through ceasefires.

For the same reasons I also strongly agree with Fadel's third option. We should neither continue to support authoritarian regimes (such as in Saudi Arabia) nor pursue a policy of externally imposed regime change. We should, as Fadel advocates, favour and support internal changes especially by reformist forces.<sup>11</sup> Here a subsidiary issue arises: these authoritarian regimes often weaken reformist groups to the point that, by and large, the only remaining viable opposition groups are non-moderate ones. If one begins political reforms with free elections, these non-moderate groups are likely to win, leading to a situation where there is one person, one vote, but for one time only. Hence free elections are best preceded by other steps such as rewriting the constitution, freeing of the press, allowing rival parties and maybe some measure of economic development.

In addition to pointing the way forward for American foreign policy, this type of analysis, aided by the introduction of the term 'illiberal moderates', also shows that the forces with which the west must vie are of a much lower scale, and

---

<sup>11</sup> I make the same argument in *Security first* (Etzioni 2007b, 52–58).

potential allies are more numerous, than is claimed by those who see a clash of civilization between the west and Islam.<sup>12</sup>

### Comments—Jean Bethke Elshtain

I focus here on Etzioni's controversial discussion of religious belief systems, religion's key role in the current situation and how we are to come to grips with all of this if we reject the 'clash of civilizations' scenario. I draw here not only on his article in the *Cambridge Review* but also his book *Security first*.<sup>13</sup> Etzioni puts the major world religions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Hinduism here has played a less important role in the developments upon which he is focused)—on a Procrustean bed and they all come out with good and bad bits. Each features a 'major coercive and persuasive subsystem' (Etzioni 2007b, 102). I know the Christian tradition best and I would challenge rather strenuously Etzioni's reading of major figures like St Augustine and his brief recounting of important moments in Christian history. In fact, as major students of Augustine have said—and here I will not cite these important, definitive works—Augustine rejected the Theodosian settlement; rejected, therefore, the notion that coercive force should be used to bring people under the wing of the Christian faith.

Therein surely lies the rub: is coercion ever permitted to extend the boundaries of a religion? Can or should the faith ever spread by force of arms? Augustine's acceptance of coercion against some breakaway sects had to do with fights internal to Christianity—not with Christianity *versus* the pagans. With a bad conscience and constant questioning of himself, Augustine believed it necessary to call upon the secular arm to curb groups like the Donatists who engaged in assassination campaigns—Augustine himself narrowly escaped an assassination attempt—burning down Christian churches and so on. It was this disorder he sought to curb. Matters of doctrinal enforcement were a question of internal church discipline. The burden of Augustinian scholarship, then, is arrayed against the interpretation Etzioni offers: Augustine first, with caveats, went along with Theodosianism and then dissented from it, arguing there was no such thing as a 'Christian Empire'. Indeed, Augustine's characterization of Christians as 'pilgrims' and even 'aliens' in any political system in which they find themselves makes little sense if he indeed had offered a full-throated endorsement of the Christianization of the Roman Empire. Therefore, one must distinguish between measures to be taken by the faithful, internal to the body of the faithful, to teach doctrine and enforce it and what, by contrast, is assimilated into political life and turned into full-bore political imperatives.

It would be extremely helpful here to compare and contrast the just or justified war tradition within Christianity to the dominant strand of Islamic teaching on war—'just war' is the dominant strand in Christianity. Within just war teaching, a holy war is explicitly forbidden and is therefore never licit. That is why the Crusades were seen as a defensive effort—a response to five centuries of expansion of an

---

<sup>12</sup> A recent study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project indicates large and growing majorities of Muslims in Middle Eastern countries who oppose suicide bombings in all situations. See the complete survey online at Pew Research Center (2007).

<sup>13</sup> For my review of the entire book, see Elshtain (2007).

Islamic Empire by force of arms, destruction of ancient Christian communities in the Middle East and North Africa and so on. Be that as it may, to associate 'holy' with war, to sanctify it in this way, not only irked just war thinkers but led them to criticize the Crusades—then and later. To sum up Martin Luther's key text, 'On the war against the Turk': no, you do not make war on the Turk if he has not made aggressive war against you. The mere fact that he is Muslim offers no justification in and of itself. So a key question here is: does a faith offer internally, at the heart of the matter, a prophylaxis against calls to extend the faith by force of arms? Christianity certainly does and has since the 4<sup>th</sup> century, whatever the lamentable shortcomings of Christian practice—shortcomings over which Christians have *mea culpa*-ed themselves about to the point of masochism by now.

The dominant thread in Islam sees the extension of Dar al-Islam, to include more believers, as the most legitimate of all reasons for deploying force: this is the conclusion of serious Muslim scholars and the literature is vast. So if, in the Christian just war tradition, there are criteria through which one must go—barriers, in effect, to the deployment of armed force—you have to *justify* force; in Islam, you must search for ways to refrain from force. This had led some Muslim scholars—I am thinking here of Sohail Hashmi, for example—to say Muslims should privilege the Prophet's Medina period when he largely refrained from the most strident injunctions to kill Jews, Christians and infidels. This is a vital battleground within Islam and the stakes are huge. I do not think we help the cause by over-assimilating the traditions here. It simply is not the case that 'apologists for the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the Protestant spate of persecutions each reaffirmed Augustine's conclusion that Christian theology could condone acts of violence for a religious purpose' (Etzioni 2007b, 108). This is one of those rare moments when Etzioni is wrong. If they are deploying Augustine to that purpose, they have twisted him beyond all decent recognition. The chapter and verse on this is just overwhelming. There is much more to be said on this issue but I think I have probably said enough.

Finally, on whether we should be reassured that certain public opinion polls demonstrate that 'only relatively small minorities in numerous Muslim nations hold violent beliefs' (Etzioni 2007b, 140): if such polls are accurate this is indeed heartening, but one is never sure how much stock to place in such polls. However, is that where the *gravamen* of concern should lie?

It does not take very many people—a determined minority will do—to carry out suicide bombings, to blow up subways, to fly aeroplanes into buildings, to drive cars turned into gas bombs into airports, to set bombs to detonate in crowded train stations. A determined minority—well-funded by Iran, among others, which not only funds Hezbollah but other terrorist efforts—suffices. Etzioni calls the composite picture of Islamic men and women that emerges from the opinion polls 'illiberal moderates'. They do not support our versions of women's rights or our versions of religious freedom and so on. But they are also not ardent jihadists and they are not committed to violent jihad against the west on principle. Again, good news, surely. But we also know just how volatile all this is and we know that autocratic and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have for years deflected attention from the misrule they have perpetrated by fomenting hatred not only against Israel but against the west more generally. They have played this game very successfully and it will take years to sort this out.

### **Response to Jean Bethke Elshtain—Amitai Etzioni**

I am not so unwise as to try to debate my distinguished colleague on a matter which lies right at the core of one of her areas of specialization and rather far from my own. I merely will say in my self-defence that I had my readings of St Augustine and several other of my observations about various religious belief systems reviewed, corrected and reviewed again by colleagues who work in these fields, as listed in the acknowledgments of *Security first*.

Professor Elshtain also raises several matters that do not concern scholarship in any one specialized area. First is the implication that 'defensive' violence is justified (and hence the Crusades). This argument is used by bin Laden to justify killing 3,000 innocent civilians from 80 nations peacefully working at their desks in the Twin Towers—and by many other proponents of violence. We need much stricter criteria to ascertain when war is justified than, for instance, the claim that if the US is not going to kill 'them' in the Middle East, they are going to kill us here.

I also am not fully convinced that all of Christianity since the 4<sup>th</sup> century stopped legitimating violence. I will not rehash the complicated question of the role the Church played in Nazi Germany and during various communist regimes and look merely at the role of the Church during the military dictatorships in Argentina and Chile. Here, the Church unquestionably legitimated the torture, execution and 'disappearances' of hundreds of socialists, liberals and others because it considered the war against communism to be a holy one.<sup>14</sup>

I am particularly concerned by any implications that 'Islam' is monolithic, subject to one overarching interpretation as being in favour of violence. As to the suggestion that one can find polls that contradict those which I have assembled, thereby disproving my assertion about the plurality of antiviolenence beliefs among Muslims, I certainly agree with Elshtain that polls often differ. However, I note that in addition to the polls I presented, recent polls conducted by the Pew Research Center also found that a vast and growing majority of Muslims in the Middle East are against suicide bombings.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, as a former combatant myself (in Palestine 1946–1947), let me stress that the question of numbers makes a difference. It is true that a small number of terrorists, especially if they use weapons of mass destruction, could potentially lay an entire city to waste. However, as Mao Tse-tung pointed out, terrorists are like fish who thrive when they can swim in and feed off of an ocean of supporters (Tse-tung 1967), and are left high and dry when their fellow religionists and social networks oppose their ill doing. Anyhow, we should be wary of playing into their hands by defining as enemies all those who hold different beliefs than our own.

### **Comments—Stephen Schwartz**

There are 'illiberals' of several kinds and it is a gross political error to mix them up. If by 'illiberal' one simply means an extreme conservative or a religious

---

<sup>14</sup> For detailed account of the church's role in sanctioning torture and disappearances in Chile, see Cavanaugh (1998). Recently, some members of the clergy have been brought to trial for their role in supporting and covering up Pinochet's human rights violations (McCarthy 2007).

<sup>15</sup> See Pew Research Center (2007).



traditionalist, there should be no problem in dialogue with such a person. If by 'illiberal' one means an intolerant nationalist or inflamed chauvinist or imperialist, then one can argue case by case. It is obviously acceptable, in my view, to have dialogue with such ethnically 'illiberal' parties as the *Alleanza Nazionale* of Gianfranco Fini in Italy, the Catalan nationalist parties or the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ); all three have participated in or formed respectable governments. The Basque or Irish nationalists represent different and more challenging examples.

But there is a difference, and it has existed since the 1920s, between 'illiberal' parties in spirit and activist conspiracies that, acting on 'illiberal' ideas, habitually break the public peace. The Fascists of Mussolini and National Socialists of Hitler were different from old-fashioned conservatives or nationalists in that they were prepared to murder those they considered their enemies in contempt of existing institutions and law.

I am not opposed to dialogue with 'illiberal moderates' who have never assumed the consistent character of a mass law-breaking party. That is the problem with the Muslim Brotherhood—it has a past as a terrorist conspiracy, it established Hamas and maintains a paramilitary wing. It is not made up of civil and law-abiding 'neo-fascists' of the Fini type; rather, it is closer to Fini's antecedent, Mussolini, in that, like the Italian dictator, it is patient and accommodating to democratic institutions while deliberately undermining them. Few political scientists today ponder the time that passed between Mussolini's 'March on Rome' in 1922 and the final consolidation of Fascist Party power in 1926. But throughout its history Mussolini's party broke the law by committing assassinations and other acts of violence to impose its will.

It is one thing to resent or want to change liberal laws; it is another to claim impunity in rejecting them. In my view, real 'dialogue' with 'illiberal moderates' is only possible with those who have no history of defiance of law. In the world of Islam, groups like the Saudi Wahhabis, Muslim Brotherhood, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Deobandis, the forerunners of the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP) in Turkey and other 'illiberal' movements have a bloody historical trail. Most of them are *takfiri*, that is, they are intolerant of differences within Islam. *Takfir* is a most volatile form of intolerance.

Yes, there are 'soft' Wahhabis, Deobandis and AKP members. This brings up the definition of 'dialogue'. If dialogue means an attempt at partnership, I believe it is impossible with any Wahhabis. If 'dialogue' is possible with them, it must be debate based on opposition, which draws a firm line against them, aims at their defeat and grants them nothing more than the basic rights that should be accorded any religious trend so long as they remain non-violent. But such a dialogue cannot have as its goal an alliance between moderate Muslims and 'soft' Wahhabis. This is a mistake now being made by numerous Saudi liberal reformers who think they can enter a bloc with the discontented element among the Wahhabis in opposition to the monarchy.

Saudi King Abdullah is himself an 'illiberal moderate', and, paradoxically or not, I favour not only dialogue with him, but assistance to him in commencing a transition to normality in his country. The Saudi-Wahhabi cult is the number one threat to freedom in the world and it is impossible to elide them into some general Saudi Arabian category that can be defined as trustworthy allies of the west, especially after 9/11. Abdullah, however, has shown himself reluctant to break civil peace in the desert kingdom by acts of significant repression and loath to



support Wahhabi terror in Iraq or to defend Al-Qaeda. Nobody sane calls for an externally directed regime change in the Saudi kingdom. Some notable Shia Muslim leaders, such as Moqtada al-Sadr, have acted as 'illiberal moderates', but his record is one of defiance of the law from the outset. Other Iraqi Shia leaders have radical pasts but there is no clear historical record on their attitude towards permanent repudiation of settled law in the land.

An example from Jewish history is instructive: the Stalinist communists and Zionist revisionists—both of which, at various stages in their history, could be described as 'illiberal moderates'—were excluded from participation in the leadership of the Warsaw ghetto uprising. They were neither respected nor trusted, even though their members and weapons would have been useful in a life-and-death struggle.

Contempt for law and dedication to force as the main weapon of politics is not the same as radicalism *per se* or even revolutionism. Many revolutionaries defended law; for example, the liberal partisans of the Spanish Republic, or the supporters of José Figueres in Costa Rica in 1948–1949.

The art of politics is that of making distinctions, not confusing them. In my view the very term 'illiberal moderate' badly confuses political distinctions that today are matters of life and death for the whole planet.

### **Response to Stephen Schwartz—Amitai Etzioni**

Dr Schwartz, like many an intellectual, is in the tree business; I am dealing with forests. He is right that one can draw all kinds of additional distinctions, ultimately not only among different belief sub-systems, but also among individuals. My goal is to call attention to the difference between those who champion violence and those who reject it under all but very limited conditions. I tried to show that this line is of great moral and political import and divides the 'pie' rather differently than the line that separates liberal democrats from all others. Most significantly, such a line leaves most Muslims on the side of peace, while the liberal democracy litmus test, I fear, leaves many more on the other, wrong side, of the divide.

To turn to some of the 'trees', the Basques and the Irish nationalists—and of course Hitler and Stalin—to which Schwartz refers, all legitimated violence; hence they do not confuse the issue. They are not 'illiberal moderates', but illiberal terrorists. I hope Schwartz will reconsider his opposition to talking with people where 'there is a history of violence'. Otherwise there are going to be very few people to talk to or with.

### **Comments—Joergen Oerstroem Moeller**

#### *First observation*

Tolerance and respect used to sit on the front seat among values governing our societies. This is not any longer so. We see the rise of self-righteousness not only inside Islam, but also in many western cultural circles. People are so convinced that their view is the only one and everybody else is wrong; that they have the right, and in some cases the obligation, to impose their view upon others, if necessary by force.

Extremists go to the extreme, invoke God as inspiration, and even take the stand that God has given them the right and asked them to persecute and if necessary kill people who advocate alternative beliefs. These extremists go for the jugular, taking the destruction of other cultures, civilizations and communities as their mission.

The problem now is that globalization can only survive with a certain amount of respect and tolerance for others and their chosen values. The conflict is aggravated as minorities originating in one culture migrate to countries with another culture. They do so to reap an economic benefit, but refuse to adapt to the culture of the country where they have chosen to live. A gap opens up between economic behaviour and cultural values. This problem may not be so visible in the US, but is prominent in Europe and is beginning to arise in parts of Asia.

Migration is the trigger for religious freedom and adaptation to societal values. People migrating to make a living in another country may bring along their religion and societal values. They may be much more in tune with the religion and society from which they come than where they now live. The size of migration into established countries and societies, temporary residence reducing the incentive to adapt, and modern means of communication opening the door for continuous contact with the home country and its culture all permit constant comparisons between differences in cultural behaviour and values.

The stumbling block will rarely be religious freedom since such freedom is accepted in most countries, apart from countries primarily in the Muslim world with an adverse policy to immigration, and indeed is frequently written into constitutions. The problem arises when adaptation to new societal values is rejected by a minority preferring values other than the prevalent ones. A minority exposed to cultural pressure, even cultural imperialism, may often feel the need to enhance their own self esteem and choose symbols to signal where they belong. But the inescapable effect is that they distance themselves from the majority, closing ranks within their own caucus. The reaction among the majority is predictable; they take this closing of ranks as an affront, a signal that the minorities have decided not to adapt, that the minorities deem the dominating culture to be not good enough. This explains the debate in Europe about the headscarf. It does not matter in itself. It is rarely seen as a religious symbol, but it is frequently perceived as a cultural signal.

Europe is the place where the dilemma between religious freedom and societal values is playing out. The agonizing choice that the Europeans now face is whether they want to cement the traditional European identity or adapt to make room for cultural minorities with the inevitable imperative to adjust traditional European values. Will the majority of the Europeans rally behind a more multicultural Europe?

### *Second observation*

The decisive point will be whether the right balance can be struck between acknowledging religious freedom and European societal values. Can some kind of congruity be found between Islam, a traditional theocratic religion, and secular European societies?

At the present junction the world is focused primarily, but not exclusively, upon Islamic religious extremism. But there is an interesting parallel to what happened about a hundred years ago with socialism and Bolshevism. Bolsheviks constituted

a small, even very small, minority inside the socialist movement. Both groups adhered to the same overall goal and political philosophy. The socialists looked for a peaceful way to get there; the Bolsheviks opted for armed struggle in the form of terrorism. By superior intellectual force, cunning and organizational skills, combined with a ruthless and uncompromising belief in a historic mission, the Bolsheviks managed to use socialism as a vehicle for taking control of Russia.

Something similar seems to characterize religious sentiment and in particular Islam. An overwhelming portion of Muslims do not support armed conflict or terrorism. They want to improve their lot, as was the case for the socialists. But a tiny group of extremists work inside the organization and use it for their purpose, which is total power. These elite are well-organized, intellectual, with a high level of education and often masquerade as ordinary citizens. They are the general staff officers of the terror movement while the ordinary citizens are the conscripts.

The main risk for society is unawareness of this. Apparently, *bona fide* organizations may serve as a blind for much more sinister forces without a large number of members knowing that they are being used for a cause that is not theirs. Al-Qaeda may play the same role inside Islam that Bolshevism played inside the socialist movement.

### *Third observation*

The danger for countries and societies protecting themselves is that measures against the hard core of fundamentalists or extremists may antagonize the rank and file of the larger organization. The challenge is to strike the right balance and dichotomize the extremists from the rank and file instead of turning them into a propitious recruiting ground.

### *Concluding remarks*

The threat against the globalized, high-tech and sophisticated society has nothing in common with conventional conflict focusing on control of territory. It is about our societies' ability to function and to withstand disruptive attacks. Traditional armed forces do not play a significant role. The citizens do. Unless an overwhelming majority is comfortable with societal values, room will open up for a disruptive attack by small groups of extremists. The analysis must unveil not who the potential enemy is, but how we rally a majority around societal values regardless of religion, ethnicity and original nationality. As a first step we need to clarify what our societal values actually are.

### **Response to Joergen Oerstroem Moeller—Amitai Etzioni**

Professor Oerstroem Moeller correctly points out, to use my terms, that 'illiberal moderates' are more likely to legitimate violence and thus lose their moderate status than liberal moderates. True believers, especially when not curbed by strong beliefs in individual rights and political freedoms, are more prone to favour violence than those who hold their views with a greater degree of doubt, self-examination and see value in the beliefs of others. However, this correlation is

much lower than is often assumed, especially by liberal, secular, progressive thinkers. Most 'illiberal moderates' forswear violence. Hence it is an empirical mistake, which leads to wrong-headed policies, to hold that the west cannot and should not ally itself with true believers, especially of the religious kind.

Next, Oerstroem Moeller raises the same issue within the context of immigration to western societies, especially to Europe. He correctly observes that many of the immigrants initially are, and quite a few remain over time, illiberal. The question arises to what extent must they become not only moderates but also liberals? In my judgement, the right answer here is going to be different from the one applied so far both to international relations and to newly forming regimes in previously violent nations. Societies that have established liberal democratic regimes did so over centuries, after establishing domestic peace following civil wars (such as the US, United Kingdom and Switzerland, among others), religious wars (as in much of Europe) and nation-building wars (for example Germany and Italy). The political development in these nations moved beyond the security-building stage to the building of thicker shared values, which in these cases are liberal ones. Immigrants who seek to become citizens of these nations and members of these civil societies can be expected to accept these framing values. This does not mean that they must assimilate in the sense of giving up their sub-cultures, but they must give up those rituals and policies that violate rights and democratic processes, for instance, honour-killings and forced marriages.<sup>16</sup>

Comparing violence-legitimizing Muslims to those socialists who legitimated violence is a fair analogy.<sup>17</sup> However, it highlights the same thesis I seek to flag. The proper response to such socialist threats was not to attempt to ban or suppress all forms of socialism, which includes many democratic and above all non-violent, moderate expressions, but instead to focus on the violent ones. It seems that a highly effective antidote to Stalinism were the teachings of social democrats, because they appealed to a similar set of basic values. Similarly, an effective antidote to those who promote a violent version of Islam is to ally ourselves with moderate Muslims rather than branding all Muslims as terrorists or try to repress a major religion and its followers. These moderates can be Partners in Peace, whether or not they are also liberal democrats.

## Conclusion

I am indebted to my colleagues for many excellent and profound comments on a conception that I hold to be of much import to our empirical, political and moral considerations in dealing with foreign policy. I share the quest for a world of democratic nations, respecting rights, working together to fashion a just world. However, given the harsh international reality, one should not allow such visions to stand in the way of asking which steps must come first; how can one build the widest and most reliable base for world peace, as one works for a still better world?

Evidence shows that a focus on security will find most people as at least potential Partners in Peace, even as many are far from ready to join a Concert of

<sup>16</sup> The same may not be true for asylum seekers (see Etzioni 2007a).

<sup>17</sup> For more on this analogy see Etzioni (2007b, Part III).

Democracies. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the thesis that democratization is the only reliable way to make a nation into a peace-loving one and that democratization can be readily achieved, I hold that democratization requires first the provision of basic security and then considerable effort and time, especially by those directly involved.

## References

- bin Laden, Osama (1996) 'Declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places', <[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa\\_1996.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html)>, accessed 5 December 2007
- bin Laden, Osama (1998) 'Declaration of the world Islamic front for jihad against the Jews and the crusaders', <<http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen2.htm>>, accessed 12 December 2007
- Brooks, David (2006) 'Keeping faith in democracy', *New York Times*, 26 February
- Burnham, Gilbert, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy and Les Roberts (2006) 'Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey', *The Lancet*, 11 October, <<http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf>>, accessed 4 January 2008
- Bush, George W (2005) 'President discusses war on terror and upcoming Iraqi elections', Speech delivered at Park Hyatt Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 12 December, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051212-4.html>>, accessed 4 January 2008
- Cavanaugh, William T (1998) *Torture and the eucharist: theology, politics, and the body of Christ* (New York: Blackwell Publishing)
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke (2007) 'Liberty and security for all?', *New York Sun*, 29 August
- Etzioni, Amitai (2006) 'The global importance of illiberal moderates', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19:3, 369–385
- Etzioni, Amitai (2007a) 'Community deficit', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45:1, 23–42
- Etzioni, Amitai (2007b) *Security first* (New Haven: Yale University Press)
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989) 'The end of history?', *National Interest*, 16, 3–18
- Galston, William (1991) *Liberal purposes* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Hamzawy, Amr (2005) 'The key to Arab reform: moderate Islamists', Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief 40, Washington, DC
- Lemaire, Jean (2005) 'The cost of firearm deaths in the United States: reduced life expectancies and increased insurance costs', *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, 72:3, 359–374
- Luther, Martin (1528) 'On the war against the Turk', trans. Robert C. Schultz (1967) in *ibid.* (ed) *Luther's works, vol. 46, The christian in society* (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press), 157–205
- McCarthy, Julie (2007) 'Priest's indictment reopens wounds in Chile', *Weekend Edition Saturday*, National Public Radio, 20 October
- Milbank, Dana and Robin Wright (2004) 'Off the mark on cost of war, reception by Iraqis', *Washington Post*, 19 March
- Muravchik, Joshua (2002) 'Democracy's quiet victory', *New York Times*, 19 August
- Neal, Patrick (1990) 'Justice as fairness: political or metaphysical', *Political Theory*, 18:1, 24–50
- Pei, Minxin and Sara, Kasper (2003) 'Lessons from the past: the American record on nation building', Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief 24, Washington, DC
- Pew Research Center (2007) 'A rising tide lifts moods in the developing world: sharp decline in support for suicide bombing in Muslim countries', Pew Global Attitudes Project, 24 July, <<http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=257>>, accessed 5 December 2007
- Rabasa, Angel, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H Schwartz and Peter Sickle (2007) *Building moderate Muslim networks* (Washington: RAND Corporation)
- Rawls, John (1996) *Political liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press)
- Sachs, Jeffrey (1992) 'The economic transformation of Eastern Europe: the case of Poland', *American Economist*, 36:2, 3–11

- Sachs, Jeffrey (1993) *Poland's jump to the market economy* (Cambridge: MIT Press)
- Sachs, Jeffrey and David Lipton (1990) 'Poland's economic reform', *Foreign Affairs*, 69:3, 47–66
- Smith, Wilfred Cantwell (1957) *Islam in modern history* (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
- Tse-tung, Mao (1967) *Quotations from Chairman Mao* (Peking: Foreign Language Press)
- Unknown News (2007) 'Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq', <<http://www.unknownnews.net/casualties.html>>, accessed 4 January 2008
- von Hippel, Karen (2000) *Democracy by force: US military intervention in the post-Cold War world* (New York: Cambridge University Press)
- Walzer, Michael (2000) *Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations* (New York: Basic Books)
- Zakaria, Fareed (1997) 'The rise of illiberal democracy', *Foreign Affairs*, 76:6, 22–43
- Zakaria, Fareed (2003) *The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad* (New York: WW Norton and Company)