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Destruction or Disruption: Political Violence Inconsistencies in Liberation Movements

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Destruction or Disruption: Political Violence Inconsistencies in Liberation Movements

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Abstract

 Political violence is seldom viewed as an appropriate means to achieving a goal. Despite extensive studies produced on the reasons for using political violence, the scholarly world fails to consider comparing why some groups choose violence while their counterparts do not. Why is violence such an attractive method to some organized political groups, but not to others? Drawing on case studies of liberation movements, I attempt to understand what impacts the outcome of political violence during these movements. This study cross examines the Algerian Independence War with India's nonviolent independence movement and the nonviolent independence movement of East Timor with the West Papua independence conflict in an attempt to answer why some independence movements are violent while others are not and what explains the differences in these outcomes. It is concluded via this study that cases utilizing political violence either had international allies that were non-influential: impoverished nations, largely located in the Global South, that have no substantial impact in the international world. In contrast, the nonviolent cases were able to garner international support from the Global North: nations that have immense power, sizable influence on international politics, and the ability to positively impact the liberation movement and its goal.

Dedication

To the refugees I met in Morocco,

Your stories are what inspired me to pursue this.

To those impacted by the Yugoslavia Wars that I met in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Your experiences highlighted to me the importance of this work.

I write this in the name of all of you; Your presence in my life is forever imprinted. I carry you

with me in everything I do.

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Introduction

Malcom X, a famous human rights activist during the US civil rights movement, said two important things about violence: "sometimes you have to pick up the gun to put the gun down," and "if someone puts their hands on you, make sure they never put their hands on anybody else again." Malcolm X's view on violence as sometimes being essential paved the road for its tolerance. In contrast, Mahatma Gandhi, influential political leader in India's independence movement, said the following: "an eye for an eye will only make the world blind," and "I object to violence because when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary; the evil it does is permanent." Both of these individuals greatly impacted political movements in their own communities, but had highly differing views on the modes in which to achieve change. While Malcom X seems to have tolerance for political violence as it is sometimes necessary, Gandhi took a starkly different approach in denoting violence of all kinds and specifically political violence in his endeavors.

Political violence is commonly denoted as violence utilized in order to achieve a particular political goal or, rather, violence motivated by political reasonings. More specifically, it is coined as heterogeneous actions meant to inflict physical, symbolic, and/ or psychological damages to anything from individuals to property with the innate intention of influencing individuals surrounding social, political, and/or cultural change (Bosi and Malthaner 2015). Almost every generation has known some kind of political violence ranging anywhere from authoritarian regime crack-downs, jihadist terrorism, civil wars, or independence movements. In fact, instances of political violence have exponentially increased over the past two decades (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project 2022).

Independence movements are defined as a self-identified nation or a group of peoples found within the territory of a sovereign state that seeks to separate from said state and form a

new sovereign state (Griffiths and Martinez 2020). Independence movements studied in the past have been found to be both bottom-up, stemming from societies and progressing further to the national government, and top-down with the government utilizing power and influence to convince the general public to support independence (Anderson 2019). Nonetheless, independence movements can be plagued with violence as such in the case of the Tamil Tigers, or it can be relatively peaceful from the pro-independence side, exemplified in the East Timor independence movement. Because of the stark ways that political violence can be viewed and the different ways it can be utilized with regards autonomous aspirations, understanding why these organized groups resort to violence in the first place allows for civilian communities and federal governments to create effective counter and even preventative measures.

The scholarly literature produced thus far has generated many theories as to why political violence is used, supported with extensive collections of data. Academia has formulated interdisciplinary studies surrounding independence movements, as well. With that said, there is a large gap in literature about the disparity in political violence usage within different independence movements. Understanding why violence may be effective is widely understood, but comprehending why violence is perceived by these groups seeking autonomy as the best approach is complex, especially if similar groups stay away from violence usage.

Continuous Existence of Political Violence

Political violence has globally plagued societies since the early days of early modern Europe, predating even the American Revolutionary War. The term violence and what is categorized as such must be first looked at in relation to the established norms of the given society in which violence is said to exist (Amputis et. al 2018). Violence alone can be given the primary definition of an action by a person, groups of people, or an institution against another

human being(s) that seeks to make said person subordinate to the perpetrator via extensive damage. Thus, political violence takes on that definition, but in relation to the politics within the community in which violence exists. Robert Applebaum, an academic specializing in the early instances of terrorism and political violence, notes some of the first instances of political violence including the assassination of Lord Darnley in 1567 (Campbell 2016). Niccolo Machiavelli, well-known diplomat, author, historian, and philosopher, wrote in one of his most famous pieces, *The Prince*, that there are two ways to fight: by law and by force. He goes on to further state that, while a man would act in the former and animals act in the latter, fighting by law may not always be efficient and, therefore, a prince should resort to fighting by force (Amputis et. al 2018). *The Prince*, acting as a guide to ruling over others within a constituency, continues further to say that rulers must be able to act as both a man and an animal as, sometimes in necessity, leaders are forced to act contrary to humanity, implying the use of force in violence. Even prior to that, the Old Testament consists of stories illustrating political violence between clans and tribes as they attempted to form a sustainable divine government (Miller 2012). The Bible exhibits higher levels of acceptance for violence as a resolving method within political disputes over legitimate rule. Freud believed that violence is within human nature.

It is a general principle that conflicts of interest between men are settled via the use of violence, especially since humanity existed for an extended period of time without an international law ruling that disputes ought to be settled peacefully (Hewitson 2016). Furthermore, the nature of our globalized world rests upon colonialism and colonialism is inherently violent as colonization and the maintenance or sustainability of a colony depends on violence. Colonialism implies a power imbalance that allows for the colonizers to speak the language of violence to create subordination from the indigenous people (Shaheryar 2020).

Why Independence?

The core of independence or liberation movements is characterized by the need, desire, and fulfillment of self-governance and, arguably, secessionism. Declaring independence brings about many benefits, those benefits increasing in numbers since 1945, including legal and international recognition and political or material advantages (Knotter 2021). Being recognized as a sovereign state, the primary goal of independence movements, allows for access to financial aid, conducting their own affairs, and admittance into major international organizations (Griffiths 2021).

The history of independence comes from the very beginnings of colonialism. Colonialism as a process is rooted in white supremacy and it creates and forms new structures into society that the colonialist powers believe need to be replaced. The maintenance of colonialism depends on violence and a power imbalance (Shaheryar 2020). Even the most passive and least destructive forms of colonialism are dependent upon violence; national liberation will never come from the elites and those in power. Thus, those wishing to be liberated cannot hope to appeal to the colonizer's rationality (Shaheryar 2020).

This paper is divided into multiple sections, including this introduction. The following section of background stands as an encompassing analysis and review of previous literature produced in both sectors of this study: political violence usage and independence. The third section will cover the methods of our research, including a brief description of how our specific cases were chosen. The fourth and fifth sections will be separated distinctly by the cases being analyzed and evaluated. Finally, our last section will concern our concluding remarks and a summary of our findings from the research.

Reasonings on Political Violence Usage

Political violence, both in practice and in theory, coincides with heightened tensions in which one party's dignity is being threatened. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that, in 2018, approximately 25 individuals were forced to migrate or flee their homes every minute due to conflict, war, and/ or persecution (UNHCR 2022). Political violence creates turmoil that leaves lasting consequences on the global community, but it does not appear from nothing. It is the result of root causes or radical ideologies, whatever they may be, including the ones mentioned below (Bosi and Malthaner 2015). Previous scholars have cemented their conditions leading to political violence work in the broad categories of cost imposition and sacred values, deterioration of economic livelihood and hope, and as it being a result of cultural norms and/ or threats to identities and marginalized communities. In this section, these three comprehensive reasons will be analyzed with the intent to both acknowledge the extensive efforts done on researching this topic and highlight the gaps that existing literature is missing.

Cost Imposition and Sacred Values

There have been many different schools of thought as to why organized groups resort to violence. A common one considers the framework of cost imposition in which groups will "strive to minimize its own costs in terms of lives and treasure, while imposing unsustainable costs on its adversaries," (Atran 2021) in hopes of reaching their desired political goals. While it is noted that this is mainly intended to apply to state versus state rivalries, the idea can transfer into conflicts with non-state actors that use violence, usually against civilians with which they are not in combat, to incite fear in order to achieve their political goals (Martin and Perliger

2012). The problem with this, however, is that it assumes these violent actors are rational and will be deterred by costs placed upon them from their rivals. Many acting groups that use violence, such as suicide bombers, consist of plenty devoted actors that are likely to withstand and accept such costly and extreme retaliation if they are fighting for their sacred values: any preferences or beliefs that these actors consider to be nonfungible (Atran 2021). Suicide terrorism is meant to impose these unmatchable costs in order to coerce states to abandon goals that the violent perpetrators denote as inappropriate (Pape 2003). In the same way, political terrorists (those who use violence as a way to instill fear for political purposes) are considered "to be ideological zealots, willing to kill and be killed in order to further 'the cause'" (Kirk 1983).

It is believed that political violence is accepted by groups when the ends they desire are perceived as absolutes (Kirk 1983): something that can only be met via the utilization of violence, such as sacred values. The colonized individual, a usual perception of violent perpetrators, believes that they cannot appeal to the rationality of the leader or colonizer as colonization has always been interconnected to violence usage. Instead, they recognize the need for land, food, etc. as essential to their survival and, therefore, are willing to risk their life for true liberation from the oppressive government (Shaheryar 2020). Interestingly, this concept could correlate to a possible reason that independence movements utilize violence. Declaring independence is no longer enough for independence to be granted and internationally recognized; Instead, recent scholarship has stated that independence, state recognition, and/ or emerging statehood is not so much fostered through formal and singular declarations of independence, but, rather, through continuous social processes perpetually in motion to produce and reproduce independence desires (Knotter 2021). Speculatively, if devoted actors willing to kill and be killed

for the cause of independence exist within independence movements, violence could be a justifiable way to keep the independence desires in motion and progress to the desired end.

Independence declarations usually specify grievances that are driving forces to the group's stated independence. A grievance is a self-reported claim or argument, often contested by the opposition parties, as to why those seeking independence deserve or are entitled to their independence (Griffiths and Martinez 2020). In asking perpetrators of political violence to justify their use of violence, they will connect it back to those grievances previously stated or declared (Sageman 2017). If these grievances are seen as nonfungible, absolute, or sacred, it could potentially increase the usage of violence by the devoted actors that hold that perception. At the same time, grievances are argued by other scholars as not being a justifiable reason for the use of violence as many people most likely share the grievances, but few turn to utilizing violence in the name of those grievances (Sageman 2017). Philosopher, Hannah Arendt, claimed that violence in liberation movements is not a political action that unites the community in its fight for liberation, but, rather, that violence is justified in liberation movements for short term goals (Correm 2020). Similarly to the devoted actors notion, the justification for using political violence within independence movements, according to Arednt, is instrumental as violence is a means to their end (Correm 2020). However, the gap in literature here concerning political violence within independence movements is that these things have never been empirically studied in connection to one another; it is speculative or philosophized at best.

Last Resort for Survival: There's Nothing More to Lose

Other scholars claim that the resort to political violence stems from economic conditions that exacerbate social living. The organized political group utilizing violence could perceive that

they "have less to lose," (Karakaya 2016) when using violence within a society that has more necessities than it has resources. In societies with youth bulges, for example, it is argued that violence becomes a more practical method of achieving goals as the youth bulges lead to increased competition and scarcity within labor markets as well as increases the citizens' perception of an unsuccessful future (Karakaya 2016). In another study, it is thought that political violence directly correlates to resource rents. More specifically, political violence is denoted to being conflicts between political parties or factions in an attempt to control local governments due to the existing unfavorable distribution of institutionalized resource rents (Fetzer 2022). Resource rents or revenue have been empirically studied to show high correlation between them and increasing incidents of violence against civilians (Fetzer 2022).

Violent conflict is also argued to stem from a sector of the society being left out or unrepresented in the winning coalition: if representatives of the minority group is not in the winning coalition, they cannot promise any incentives or additional resources to their supporters, thus leading to radicalization of demands and an increased desire in exiting and violence (Biziouras 2014). In alignment with independence stemming from increasing grievances with their government, large portions of analyzed independence grievances are associated with economic inequality or poor economic conditions (Bartesevičius and van Leeuwen 2022). Even in probing perpetrators of political violence about their justification for using violence beyond their stated grievances, they will state that it is due to circumstances or conditions and the pressure applied to them due to those (Sageman 2017).

John Rawls believes that political autonomy can be enjoyed by citizens within large modern societies where laws are created and facilitated via public officials, if these laws address fundamental matters that fulfill the norms of public reason (Weithman 2011). He goes even

further to claim that, if citizens within a community are to be and live as true equals, their demands of public reason must be satisfied by the elected or ruling officials; Those norms of public reason and creation of equality addresses economic conditions as well as social ones. For those with economic grievances, that is their norms of public reason. If left unsatisfied, those economic grievances could devolve into violent insurgency. More specifically, the norms of public reason are essentially expressions of demanded rights (Weithman 2011); poor economic conditions do not satisfy those rights.

It is also found that the choice of resorting to violence, specifically suicide terrorism, and its intensity occurs when the minority ethnic groups of the community rely on the majority leadership for their economic well-being (Biziouras 2014). When economic development favors one sector of the country, whether it be the majority ethnic group, or groups of communities over others within the state, and therefore leaves the other sectors at a disadvantaged position comparatively, it also increases probability of political violence being used (Bloom 2003). Generally, barriers to advancement in civil and professional society aid in an increased likelihood of violent conflict (Bloom 2003).

Organized groups that utilize violence could also do so in reaction to changes in their environment. The connection is made that "changes in the attractiveness of different tactics are themselves a function of changes in the environment within which these groups operate," (Martin and Perliger 2012). Thus, political violence correlates to issues or deprivations that stem from temporary changes to their surroundings, such as changes in economic conditions for the individuals or when comparing changes between others within the community (Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen 2022). Furthermore, other scholars have denoted that support for political violence stems from a conscious decision an individual makes when they start to view peaceful

protests as inefficient and incapable of bringing about a result, thus a change in their environment or their perception of their environment (Becker 2021). The decision to use political violence is not thought, or should not be thought, as an isolated decision, but, rather, one that is influenced by a complex structure of political, civil, economic relationships stemming from changing environments and the changes in actions of opponents and/ or allies (Bosi 2015). Changes in democracy levels are also correlated to increases or transitions towards utilizing terrorism among some political parties that undertake those shifts away from democracy (Martin and Perliger 2012).

Power Imbalances and Perceived Inequalities Create a Community

A third field of studied results as to why political violence occurs points towards power imbalances and perceived inequalities created by a multitude of things, including cultural imperatives and the perpetrators' perception of self and of the communities within which the violence exists. Some scholars believe that political violence is "culture-dependent" as the term of the violence (resistance, terrorism, etc) depends upon who is doing the description of the violence and where the violence is occurring (Bosi 2015). More specifically, Bosi states that political violence must be analyzed within the context of the societies' or communities' routine and normalized forms of political action as violent interactions are interwoven with vaster processes of political contentions. If a society seems to be more tolerant to violence usage, it is more likely for political violence to be used there.

Political violence is thought to have a common thread between all modes of it (war, insurgency, terrorism, etc) and a collective self-defense perception (Hollander 2008). Any kind of violence, political or otherwise (called 'common' violence) is a "form of self-help," (Ruggiero

2006). Historically, political violence was used as a way to put pressure on the elites and leaders in order to achieve political rights that could not be captured in a more peaceful way. Political violence utilizes the anger and passion from the public as the guiding force for their violence that is intended to seek reparations and revenge from the brutality and oppression of the old order or regime they are fighting against (Schwarzmantel 2011). Inequalities, in general, can lead to or cause violence in multiple different mediums, regardless of the motivations of those disadvantaged (Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen 2022). In Word War 2, the Nazis claimed to feel threatened by the Jewish community and convinced themselves that the only way to diffuse the threat is through complete elimination of the threatening community. This idea of political violence being justified via a perception of self defense could also connect back to the belief of political violence being perpetrated due to ideological and nonfungible beliefs. Islamic terrorists, for example, believed that they were being threatened via their religious and sacred beliefs being under attack (Hollander 2008).

When community members are exposed to attacks against their politics or political party, they perceive impoliteness and/ or malevolent motives coming from their opposition, with malevolent motives leading to increased identification or personal connection to violent protestors, devolving into higher acceptance of political violence (Muddiman et. al 2021). Those committing violent acts do not just die for their beliefs, but, in the framework of self defense, they also die for one another: those that they believe are integrally tied to their identity via family, culture, beliefs, etc. Each person in the group becomes immersed into the group identity in which they are more easily able to justify violence when their group is threatened (Atran 2021). Tensions leading to violence continue to increase when the government, colonial powers or otherwise, favor a particular domestic group to help with government administration over

others. If independence from colonial powers eventually comes to fruition, the majority group will desire increased political and economic power, leading the minority group to struggle for their continued power and/ or consider secession (Stavis 2008). Leaders will even sometimes use or encourage violence along the lines of ethnic cleavages, increasing, both, power imbalances and the perception of using violence as self defense from the disadvantaged side (Stavis 2008).

However, the most commonly overlooked problem concerning inequalities is that actual inequalities do not always translate accurately to perceived inequalities (Bartusevičius and van Leeuwen 2022). On that same note, though, perceived inequalities have a much higher correlation to violence and violent incidents than objective inequalities. Political struggles and violence can cause communities to be victims in ideological wars of supremacy between the conflicting parties (Khan and Bashir 2021). In fact, terrorism in certain conflicts contain the hope of deterring civilians from joining their opposition or the group with which they are in conflict, thus creating a destabilization of the opposition's recruiting power while simultaneously freezing civilians in fear of aligning with one side (Samaranayake 2007). The utilization of violence in contemporary times seems to lean more towards the desires of recognition and inclusion within political processes, directly addressing and undermining what the violent party views as defense for the sustainability of their self (Schwarzmantel 2011). This 'new' kind of political violence, in comparison to speculated driving forces of old political violence, focuses more on cultural character and the perpetrators' questions of beliefs and identity with their inclusion being essential to the recognition of their identity as being valuable. Violent engagement is thought of by the perpetrators as legitimate and necessary to their well-being, psychological and otherwise (Sonnenschein 2020).

The literature procured and published surrounding conditions in which violence may be adopted is immense. Cost imposition and sacred values as a driving force for violence usage explains the personal connection and identification to the cause that increases the desire to be victorious, something that violence is thought to aid in. Violence as a last resort for survival, particularly connected to worsening economic conditions, highlights the desperation organized political groups might face that eliminates all options for them except violence. The notion of cultures, identities, and inequalities leading to violence, of course connected to the other two categories, exhibits the interconnectedness of politics to individual livelihood, existence, and dignity, all of which are essential to human thrivability. The scholarly world does a stellar job of canvassing explanations for why violence may be adopted in general, but it is less insightful when concerning explanations for why some similar organized political groups choose to adopt nonviolence.

Nonviolence

As the modern world continues to evolve, increasing amounts of scholars begin to focus on a previously under researched sector of political science: nonviolence and nonviolent movements, actions, and resistance. Nonviolence and its corresponding modes of movement (protests, resistance, etc) have become not only a more tolerable form of impacting social change, but it has transformed into an increasingly effective action. Nonviolence movements can be defined as a movement in which the activists do not use physical violence or tactics with a goal or result of physical violence or destruction (Ryckman 2020). More specifically, nonviolent resistance is usually a civilian-based and civilian- fueled resistance method that attempts to execute conflicts, without the presence or mere threat of violence, through economic, political,

social means (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This can include anything from acts of commission, economic boycotts, symbolic protests, acts of omission, labor strikes, etc. Scholars have argued that governments are more responsive to widespread nonviolence protests in comparison to violent strategies (Welzel and Deutsch 2011), but what facilitates the ability of nonviolent means to be used to achieve political goals?

Demographics of the Country and Movement

One idea as to this disparity in these strategic choices include the size of the organized political group. Successful nonviolent movements (protests, boycotts, strikes, etc.) that result in the desired pressure on the state requires large numbers of people to be mobilized for the cause (Gallagher Cunningham 2013). Therefore, organized political groups hoping to be successful in their endeavors need large numbers of people to consider nonviolent means as an option. This could have aided the women in Liberia in their nonviolent independence movement during Liberia's second civil war in which over 2500 people would attend their nonviolent daily sit-ins (Adjei 2021). Violent tactics usually generate more attention than nonviolent ones and, thus, utilizing political violence does not need large numbers of people in order to attract momentum to their cause nor to place significant pressure on the state (Gallegher Cunningham 2013). With that said, due to the rise in social media coverage, usage, and the mass dissemination of information, nonviolence can garner much more international support and recognition than before, thus destabilizing the belief that violence will attract more attention (Chenoweth 2020).

Nonviolence and its attractiveness as a method is also seen to be more plausible within these large masses and mass patterns of behavior. Nonviolence mass movements are seen to be linked to development in the sense that, as development increases, modern shared values in

society increase, thus allowing for large numbers of people to mobilize and identify with the movement and leading to those mass patterns of behavior such as protests (Welzel and Deutsch 2011). Because of this notion that nonviolent resistance is perceived as less extreme, compared to violent extremists, nonviolent resistance not only requires more supporters, but also garners more supporters. Involving a large number of active people in a nonviolent resistance movement allows for the movement to achieve its goal of widespread defiance and interruption while bringing greater amounts of sustained pressure on their opposition (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). However, to counter this idea of larger groups being the only ones with the ability to adopt nonviolent resistance, some scholars have directly opposed that notion and state that larger groups are actually less likely to utilize nonviolence and more likely to engage in violence, specifically civil war, to achieve their goals.

Nonviolence and its attractiveness as a method of reaching political goals is also said to be impeded or impacted by the geographical features of the country within which the movement is occurring. Things such as a dispersed population, mountainous or rough terrain, and large size of a country's territory allow for violent means to increase in attractiveness as it could still create costs imposed on the state despite these geographic obstructions, whereas nonviolent movements, as detailed above, usually need a large group of people within close geographic proximity to mobilize to really make effective progress towards goals (Gallegher Cunningham 2013).

Diversity of Members and Morals

Nonviolence is also said to be used when the groups seeking achievement of political goals are identity-diverse and thinking about personal perception. The use of violence, of course,

impacts many people in destructive ways that could cause a division and, thus, resistance against their goals by both the civilian population and the government. However, groups using nonviolent tactics are more likely to achieve their goals as they avoid the creation of a hostile environment (Shaykhutdinov 2010).

Movements are able to utilize its advantage fully by fostering a commitment to nonviolence followed by resulting unity (Fukuda 2010). With more diverse groups trying to achieve a particular goal, it may be best to stray from the use of political violence as to make sure the violence does not separate and create opposition within the members of the mobilizing group. In fact, those engaging in nonviolent action usually hold a wide variety of individual beliefs and come from different socio-economic classes (Schock 2003), but they are united under their shared nonviolent methodologies and corresponding goal(s). Recognizing a group's grievances and desires through nonviolent means, thus, translates into heightened internal and external support for that group and their movement's goal (Stehpan and Chenoweth 2008). Nonviolence has also been perceived globally as a more legitimate and successful method to achieve a political goal, a perception shared also by the international community of world leaders and officials. Thus, if desiring for their goals to be deemed legitimate in nature and if hoping to receive international support for their cause, many groups will deliberately choose nonviolence (Chenoweth 2020). Commitment to nonviolent methods and/ or civil resistance aids in enhancing the movement's international as well as domestic legitimacy (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

Nonviolence occupies the optimal space between disrupting the system and being constructive with their progress and actions, increasing support for their cause among advantaged group members (Shuman et. al 2021). When these mobilized individuals do not retaliate against state oppression or violence thrust upon them, their opponents (usually the state)

loses moral credibility in the global perception; The utilization of nonviolent resistance fosters alienation of the violent regime or counterpart from the outside world, sparking the process of undermining the opposition's political, economic, and sometimes even military sources of power (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Furthermore, if the state were to attempt to repress nonviolent campaigns, usually via violent mechanisms, it may backfire, causing power shifts through declining obedience within the state as well as increasing mobilization against the state (Stephan and Chenoweth). Therefore, nonviolence could be utilized under the notion that it would, at the very least, hurt the perception of the violent opposition and, at most, raise the movement's moral standing in the international arena (Nepstad 2013).

The American Peace Society adopted a position on violence of condemnation against any rebels who utilize violence, stating that they are in the wrong for resorting to violence and not obeying the laws, thus being criminals, despite oppressive colonial or state rule (Losurdo 2010). The perception of being criminals and the notion of continuing a state of war in response to violence thrust upon the mobilized group could further repel these groups from using violence in the future, out of fear for tarnishing their reputation and damaging legitimate and accurate claims they have to their desired political goals. The political power of these movements is not based on their medium of achieving goals (through violence or nonviolence), but is determined by how the group garners collaboration amongst their members (LeNabat 2012). The public that could be potentially sympathetic with the cause are more likely to perceive nonviolent groups as less extreme, increasing the group's appeal to the public (Stehpan and Chenoweth 2008). Thus, if some members of a movement are not interested in violence, it is in the movements best interest to resort to nonviolence in hopes of increasing collaboration and dedication to the cause.

The global solidarity that comes from and within nonviolent movements helps to support the nonviolent collective that is mobilized, as well as helps to overcome differences and constrain authorities necessary for the success of the mobilized collective action (Hoynes 2014). Thus, utilization of nonviolence means to achieve goals could demonstrate the need for the global world to construct a positive perception of their cause and hopefully engage in supporting their endeavors. In fact, in cases such as the East Timor independence movement, their reliance on nonviolent strategies and tactics enabled them to gain support and assistance from other parties that were originally uninterested or neutral in the movement's fate (Fukuda 2010).

Nonviolence has been deemed as morally correct in comparison to violent tactics when attempting to achieve a particular goal. In religion, nonviolence is preached and violence is seemingly discouraged. In fact, Martin Luther King Jr., a leader for the civil rights movement and liberation of Black peoples within the US, found himself reflecting upon their fight, utilizing theology and philosophy to light his path of nonviolence. He utilized the words of Jesus from the Bible in which one should love their enemies and allowed Jesus to be center in his nonviolent vision for future equality (Cone 2001). Peacebuilding is called upon through a channel of active nonviolence in which the movement is to limit using force via the application of moral norms (McCarthy and Lushombo 2019). This application of moral norms is what paves the way for nonviolence to be used as violence usually goes against human ethics. Thus, nonviolence may be preferred over violent strategies when considering morals and ethics of each option. If a movement were to respond to violence with more violence, it would degrade the movement and their corresponding members to the morality level of their oppressors (LeNabat 2012). This degradation has a adverse effect than what would be desired, further calling into question the reputation, justice, and goodness of the cause. Foco theory, put forth by Che Guevara and Regis

Debray, operates on the assumption that, if an armed group were to fight against a target government, the general public would be inspired to join the movement. However, it has been proven as being the opposite: the general public would be inspired to join the movement when witnessing nonviolent action as there is not much at risk for the participants and it explicitly reveals the oppressiveness of said government (Zunes 2014). Because nonviolence allows for the glorification of the movement with the degradation of the regime (should they respond with violence), it allows those pursuing a goal to increase their own credibility vis-a-vis the government's response.

The scholarly and academic world is continuously developing literature surrounding nonviolence as means of resistance and the conditions in which this kind of resistance has the ability to be adopted. Nonviolence certainly aligns with a majority of human morals and bodes well for diverse groups wanting to enact social change as it does not come with the same consequences of a hostile environment born from violence usage. For organized political groups seeking recognition of their cause, the absence of this hostile environment via nonviolence establishes a moral high ground and platform for the international community to denote as just or good, contrasting with the other negative perceptions that come entangled with violence. Thus, utilizing nonviolence, as the already published academia explicitly states, gives more justification, support, and awareness to the group's goal, especially if violence is placed against them and they still choose to remain virtuous in their nonviolent resistance. For other groups, nonviolence may legitimately be the only option due to the geographic placements for those supporting the cause. Supporters of a cause existing within close proximity to each other makes the mobilization efforts much easier and paves the way for nonviolence to be as disruptive, if not more so, than violence, especially if it is a high volume of supporters within the same geographic

area. Nonviolence relies upon large sums of people as a collective to create enough disruption for social change, therefore implying that nonviolence can be adopted if the movement attracts masses. While the research on nonviolence resistance and its efficacy is still in its early development stages, the studies published thus far have laid the beginnings of a foundation from which future scholars can build upon when examining why nonviolence is adopted.

Despite the breadth of ideas and beliefs covered in the literature reviewed for both political violence and political nonviolence, the scholarly world fails to intertwine and cross analyze the two. There has been little to no research on comparisons of why some organized political groups choose violence as a mode for achieving their goals while others are swayed towards nonviolent resistance, a crucial comprehensive point needing to be discovered in order to effectively address the grievances being presented via these movements. The gaps in the literature of both the underdevelopment of nonviolence research in comparison to violence and the absence of cross examining the two modes paves the way for this study that attempts to address and add to those two academic spheres.

Methods

This study aims to focus on why some organized political groups resort to violence in fulfillment of their liberation or independence cause and why others move down the path of nonviolent resistance to achieve the same goal. It is not enough to isolate nonviolence resistance instances and movements, but this study attempts to keep all other variables equal with the exception of the usage of violence or nonviolence. Thus, this study will compare similar instances where organized political groups in different movements are virtually fighting against

the same and living the same circumstances, but their resort to achieving their goal of liberation drastically differs.

Utilizing case studies, this project will explore, cross- examine, and compare the violent case of the West Papuan liberation fight with the nonviolent case of the East Timor independence movement. These two cases will be examined together due to their common process throughout independence desires. Not only are these two case studies inclusive of the same colonial power impacting them, Indonesia, but they are also similar enough on all previously presented notions that explain strategic adoption of methods in their fights. In both cases, the public is fighting for their 'sacred value' of independence that cannot be substituted or altered for fulfillment. In addition to this, their fight is also a survival mechanism when faced against the oppressively violent regime of Indonesia's colonization. Because of that oppressive violence, many in the liberation fights are denoted as unequal and inferior to the colonizing power. The common thread of their independence experiences allows for a meaningful cross analysis of why West Papua resorted to violence and bloodshed while East Timor led meaningful nonviolent resistance. This study will also examine the nonviolent Indian independence movement and contrast it with Algeria's violence-ridden liberation movement. As with the previous case set, these two cases are similar on all important and notable dimensions that have previously attempted to explain political violence usage. Thus, the similarities of these two case studies make for a particularly interesting research phenomenon on strategic decision making in the usage of political violence.

Through the examination of these cases' history, colonial experience, independence desire, and the other factors stated within the review of literature, this paper will discover certain conditions, all else remaining equal, that may lead to the adoption of nonviolence for achieving their liberation goal. As previously addressed, nonviolent resistance is a relatively new

researchable phenomenon, not vastly concerned within the world of social science. Due to that, this study will be providing a foundation of understanding under what conditions nonviolence may be more likely to be adopted and, thus, what conditions states should aspire to have to diminish violence presence.

Case Study Set 1: Algeria and India

Algeria: Historical Context of French Colonialism

France's colonialism in Algeria has been one of the most severe colonization processes to this day. It was one of totalitarian colonialism to the extent that it impacted all aspects of the Algerians' lives (Benlahcene 2020). Officially annexed by France in 1848, Algeria endured over a hundred years of colonial rule (Alvaredo et al. 2021), a rule with its purpose and goal of expanding the French empire and influence as well as 'civilizing' the indigenous population thought of as primitive and barbaric (Benlahcene 2020). In fact, at the start of France's invasion of Algeria, France described their action as a civilizing mission (Metz 1993). Thus, it meant to convert native Algerians through imposing European social values and relations (Loyal 2009). France altered the structure of Algerian society, culture and its traditions, and social institutions by imposing French language, the process of Christianization, and policies resulting in the erosion and deconstruction of Algerian native society (Benlahcene 2020). The attempt of France to dominate and assimilate or integrate Algeria involved either the refusal to recognize Algeria as having an original culture of its own or the conclusion that its culture was inferior and negative (Loyal 2009). Thus, so, too, were its people. By just the assumption of France being superior to Algeria, inequalities widened as Algeria's once free and vibrant state disappeared, despite the fact that France claimed all of its laws applied equally to all those in Algeria (Choi 2016).

French Colonialism: Nationality Inequalities

As this fusion and integration of Algeria into being one with France occurred, European settlers increased within Algeria. The ultimate goal of settler colonialism is to take over and permanently reside on land within the colony and to effectively replace the land's existing communities, in return setting up a new polity and eradicating the existing one (Choi 2016). These settlers further aided in France's process to transform and assimilate indigenous Algerians (Barclay et al. 2017). As the number of European settlers increased, the state of France seized parcels of land from indigenous Algerians and their tribes, villages, etc. (Metz 1993), resulting in impoverishing the indigenous communities and their forced relocation to make room for said colonists (Choi 2016; Benlahcene 2020). This resettlement policy pursued by France had a dual purpose: not only was it a way for France to control the native Algerians by destroying part of the basis of their social structure, but it was also meant to 'civilize' them under French rule (Loyal 2009). In fact, settlers took over approximately 27 percent of Algeria's arable land with the aim of changing their traditional societal infrastructure and confiscating the land of the natives (Benlahcene 2020).

The colonial administration of France gave significantly more liberties to these European settlers than the indigenous communities. An ordinance in 1845 established three different types of governmental administration in Algeria: self-governing communities, mixed governing communities, and total French control communities with each type of administration dependent upon the societal make-up (Metz 1993). While France considered all of Algeria as an integral part of their country, only Europeans were governed under French common law; In reality, the colonized and indigenous populations were governed by jurisdiction that answered directly to French authorities (Choi 2016). In places that were predominantly European settlers, full

exercise of self-government was allowed with elected mayors and councils. For communities

with either a mix of European settlers and indigenous people or fully indigenous communities, a

mixed government with appointed and few elected officials as well as a French administrator and

full French rule government were appointed, respectively (Metz 1993). It is even in this we see

the assimilation tactics of indigenous peoples deemed not civil or, rather, not European enough to

be entrusted with governing themselves. While settlers were considered French nationals with

full rights, native Algerians were classified as *indigènes*: a term meant only to signify their

differentiation from European settlers with unequal rights granted to them (Choi 2016).

French Colonialism: Religion Inequalities

The inequalities created by France were not solely on the basis of nationality, however,

and bleed into religion as well. At the time of invasion and annexation, the majority of Algerians

were Muslim (Choi 2016). As is usual with Western colonialism, Algerian society was then

divided into two: "the privileged Europeans… and the suppressed Muslim natives," (Benlahcene

2020). If a French national, a Muslim was both given protection of the French law while still

being allowed to follow Islamic law concerning their personal status (Metz 1993). However, if

an Algerian Muslim wanted to be a full citizen of France, they were required to renounce their

responsibilities under Muslim law pertaining to inheritance, marriage, and their religious courts

in order to be considered a citizen of France (Brett 1988; Metz 1993). While French citizens

within Algeria could elect and be elected to local political and administrative positions, Muslims

had to be appointed and could not hold more than a certain quota of council seats, nor could they

serve in the highest local offices of Mayor or Assistant Mayor (Metz 1993).

Algerian Muslims were prohibited from speaking publicly against France and its

government, could not travel within Algeria without a permit, nor could they pursue certain

careers at all or without proper authorization from the French administration (Benlahcene 2020).

Furthermore, in order to limit Muslim jurisdiction and influence, any Muslim judge were to be

appointed by the French authorities and were only allowed to preside over cases including

Muslim natives against other Muslim natives (Belmessous 2013). Furthermore, France embarked

upon a process of Christianization. They changed mosques into Catholic churches, created

Catholic institutions, and began spreading Christianity or Catholicism through education and

medicine (Benlahcene 2020). France and their local administrators within Algeria viewed Islam,

in any form, to be a menace to colonial control and, thus, banned Sufism, an integral part of

Algerian Islamic practice, and further suppressed their religious traditions and displays

(Trumbull 2007). Throughout a majority of France's colonial ruling in Algeria, Islam and

Muslims were subjected to silence socially, economically, and politically (Benlahcene 2020).

French Colonialism: Economic Exploitation

As is usual in colonization endeavors, France aimed to utilize Algeria as support for its

desired hegemony. Prior to France's invasion and annexation of Algeria, their economy was

largely based on trade via a barter system, valuing their customary rules of solidarity and honor

(Loyal 2009). However, along with the societal divisions that privileged the European settlers

and suppressed the native populations, economic opportunities for these two groups were also

not the same (Benlahcene 2020). France denoted Algeria's economy as subordinate to their own

via implementation of their capitalist agriculture (Loyal 2009). Agriculture and cultivation of

crops as well as commercial activity were at the forefront of France's colonial expansion, thus

explaining why their transformation of Algeria's economy rested upon that (Choi 2016). Of

course, the majority of Algeria's wealth gained from agriculture, trade, etc. was controlled by the

French and they utilized exportation to France of this food and raw materials to bolster their

nation's economy (Metz 1993). The most prosperous economic sectors within Algeria,

agriculture and mining, were fully integrated into the French economy with a vast majority of it

catering to and benefiting the colonists (Benrabah 2007).

While the native populations of Algeria and non-European migrant laborers were only

allowed to work in low-paying, unskilled jobs and tasks (Choi 2016), the European settlers grew

wealthy. These European colonists made approximately 48 times more in income than the

indigenous Algerian population (Benrabah 2007). Not only did they control about a third of

Algeria's arable land, but they also held a majority of the country's fertile land (Metz 1993).

Particularly in rural areas, European settlers possessed 30 times more land than Algerians

(Benrabah 2007). With this, the advantaged settlers profited off of their agricultural output,

equating to more than two-thirds of Algeria's agricultural production (Metz 1993). Thus, native

Algerians were nevertheless forced to sell their labor to the colonial farmers (Loyal 2009),

making their fate reliant on France and its settlers' successes. The same kind of disparity in

economic opportunities and income wealth persisted outside of Algeria's agricultural industry:

Europeans claimed the vast majority of capital and ownership, leaving little to the indigenous

and Muslim populations (Choi 2016).

Algerian War of Independence

The Algerian War of Independence was fought against France and French colonialism in

the name of national self-determination (Roberts 2002) and waged from 1954 until independence

was granted to Algeria in 1962 (Merom 2004). The main actor from Algeria in the war was the

Algerian National Liberation Front or the 'FLN,' an organized group that represented Algerian

nationalists (Metz 1993). At the beginning of the war, the FLN issued a proclamation claiming

its aim as "the restoration of the sovereign, democratic and social, Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles," (Roberts 2002). In response, of course, the French Minister of Interior claimed that "the only possible negotiation [for the FLN's goal] is war," (Metz 1993). The FLN proclamation also included their desire for the "internationalization of the Algerian problem" (Connelly 2001). In fact, one of the orders for the first FLN external delegation was to defeat France's attempts to define the War as an internal affair and, instead, take their case for independence to the United Nations (Connelly 2001). For the FLN, the immediate and central goal was Algerian self determination and sovereignty (Roberts 2002). Politically, the FLN took steps to persuade Algerian masses to support their independence cause and movement (Metz 1993). FLN's military campaign was meant not to physically liberate Algeria, but to break France's desire to remain in Algeria while also garnering the political support of the Algerian Muslim population (Roberts 2002). For the first half of the war, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) continuously increased its power throughout Algeria and established itself effectively as the driving force behind Algerian nationalist sentiment and independence (Merom 2004).

France, of course, was staunchly opposed to any Algerian demands or desires for independence. Particularly at the beginning of the war, the powerful elite politicians within France all shared the same sentiment: Algeria is France, and they were firmly committed to keeping it as such (Merom 2004). The keeping of Algeria as part of France was seen by the French political elite as symbolizing French greatness, while releasing Algeria from the nation would be seen as a decline of France as an important world power (Cohen 2002). By 1955, France and its governor general, Jacques Soustelle, became determined to restore peace via a reform program meant to improve economic conditions for the Muslim communities (Metz

1993; Atkins 2015), a plan implicitly thought to enact enough change to satisfy the nationalists into dropping their independence demands. This sentiment changed with the Philippeville massacre in August 1955: an escalation of violence on behalf of the Algerian insurgents that killed a large number of civilians (Atkins 2015). Originally, the FLN only attacked government or military targets, but a commander of a smaller FLN wing determined an escalation was needed (Metz 1993) for the French to take their demands seriously. Ultimately, this attack caused France to pursue stricter oppression measures and a retaliation effort that killed at least 1200 guerrilla fighters; The Philippeville massacre was the catalyst for the full-scale war in Algeria that broke out (Metz 1993).

By early 1957, much of Algeria was under the control of the FLN and any French controlled areas consisted of theoretical control: as night fell, the FLN emerged as dominant in those areas too (Roberts 2002). This represents a stark contrast to the beginnings of the war in which it was estimated, between 1954 and 1956, the FLN killed one European for every 6 Algerians killed by the French, highlighting the power asymmetry within the violence (Atkins 2015). As French influence and control decreased, France began making seccessions to other nations, namely and Morocco and Tunisia, promising them independence with interdependence as a way to not only keep their strong relational ties with France, but also as a way to prevent them from aiding the FLN (Connelly 2001). The French did not view nor accept the FLN as having the qualifications to be representatives on behalf of the Algerian public, therefore eliminating any option of discussion between the two sides to end the war (Crozier and Mansell 1960). This did not change throughout the duration of the war as even in 1959, 5 years after the war's official beginning, France refused to negotiate with the FLN, determined to portray them as agitators wanting to create a totalitarian dictatorship (Atkins 2015).

Ultimately, the Algerian War of Independence amounted to 100,000 FLN militant fighters versus 500,000 French troops (Fraleigh 1967). Throughout the war, the French forces utilized brutal torture against suspected nationalists within Algeria, including executions of thousands of Muslim Algerians (Hill 2009), while many Algerians began to embrace the FLN's utilization of terrorism and guerrilla warfare (Shepard 2009). However, the French government began to prepare their domestic constituents for the end of the war towards the end of 1961 (Todd 2009). The end of the War came in March 1962 from a military stalemate (Fraleigh 1967). From there, the French government signed the Evian Accords, establishing a ceasefire and the process leading to Algeria's Independence on July 5th, exactly 132 years after France invaded Algeria (Shepard 2009). Part of this agreement included amnesty for all individuals aiding or fighting for the FLN throughout the war while France still ruled until July (Cohen 2002). While some estimates put the war's death toll at 17,000 French soldiers, 3,500 French civilians, and as much as 578,000 Algerians (Shepard 2009), others claim that up to 1.5 million Algerians died as a result of the conflict with another 3000 having gone missing, presumably captured and tortured by French forces (Cohen 2002).

India: Historical Context of British Colonialism

India lived under direct British administrative control beginning in 1857 (Carey 2012), officially becoming a colony of Britain in 1876 (O'Boyle 2018). However, India has felt the presence of British colonialism via indirect political control extending from the British East India Company (Carey 2012;O'Boyle 2018) ever since 1757 (Rahman, Ali, Khan 2018). During this time period of colonization, India felt immense structural and societal changes to their lifestyles and livelihood.

British Colonialism Strategy: Divide and Conquer

British colonialism utilized a divide and rule strategy which allowed for them to break apart their constituent base. The four basic pillars of the divide and rule strategy includes creating differences within the population, enhancing and heightening existing differences, exploiting said differences for the colonizer's benefit, and politicizing these differences (Morrock 1973). Divide and rule had long been used by colonial powers as a way to turn its colonies' diversity (ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, linguistic, etc) into their advantage (Morrock 1973), and Britain was no different in this. More specifically, this divide and rule policy implemented by Britain led to a division between Hindu and Muslim Indians as well as a division between the masses, the princes, and throughout the caste social system (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018). Britain structured their divide and rule strategy in such a way that encouraged the indigenous populations within India to direct their resentment towards native Indians rather than against the colonizing power creating and enhancing these differences (Morrock 1973).

Part of the driving force in perpetuating this divide and rule strategy was the British army. While diversity of race, ethnicity, caste class, etc. was desired within the recruits of the British army, this inevitably led to communities being sorted by the state and being officially pronounced suitable or unsuitable for military recruitment (Farooqui 2015). The main purpose of this strategy being utilized by the British army was to exclude groups otherwise known as disloyal during the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, a failed rebellion against the British East India Company (Morrock 1973). By the 1880s, Britain had separated Indian society and communities into the broad categories of martial and non-martial with martial communities being believed as to have significant physical features shared by all in the community as well as inherent behavioral traits (Farooqui 2015). Almost every ethnic or caste community within India had

entirely separate places in the British army (Morrock 1973), if designated as worthy enough to be

martial and as a way to foster intergroup segregation and secrecy. Communities in India

identified as sharing more Aryan characteristics were assumed racially superior to the other

Indian populations as well as being the martial communities (Farooqui 2015). Divide and rule

was not contained to military necessity, but was also utilized to create religious tensions via the

oppression of Muslims vis-a-vis Hindus (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018). It is stated that Punjab was

on the top of the hierarchy within Indian society, being favored the most, followed by Sikhs and

then Muslims, Hindus, the rural regions of Punjab containing majority Sikhs, majority Hindu

cities, etc. so on and so forth (Morrock 1973).

The British army also identified sub-divisions within the martial races and communities

with each sub-division being the inferior of the broad martial community (Farooqui 2015),

creating divisions within communities, such as favoring orthodox Sikhs over the non-orthodox

(Morrock 1973), and not just between communities. It just so happened that, as a result of this,

communities not possessing the desired physical traits were not expected to have high

intelligence or high goals (Farooqui 2015), further increasing division amongst Indian society.

The divide and rule strategy perfectly encapsulated Britain's goal of provoking one caste against

another, cementing caste divisions and disparity between communities (Rahman, Ali, Kahn

2018) as well as showcasing these inequalities to the entire Indian society. Thus, the 'less

valuable' communities turned their envy and frustration towards the successful classes, rather

than the colonizers that created these inequalities. In addition, those valued enough as 'martial

races,' the ones deemed suitable and desired for military futures, were subordinate to the British

members: the martial races were not to lead, but were meant to be led (Farooqui 2015).

Throughout the time in which divide and rule strategy was implemented, every class of Indian

society, no matter how valuable to Britain, faced inequalities making them inferior to the colonizers, as is usual throughout colonization.

British Colonialism Strategy: Education

British colonialism did not stop at inequalities within caste and class divisions: its colonization process had become far too sophisticated for that. Indeed, their colonialism poisoned the education system within India. Britain viewed their education system superior to any others, thus allowing for its strict implementation (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018). Britain's outward claim of introducing their own education system was based on civilization: to liberate the entire indigenous population from ignorance and civilize and culture them (Yousafzai and Khan 2017). In reality, it was meant to create total domination of the nation where, if Britain could convince Indian society that their foreign culture, education, etc. were better than their own, the territory would forever be Britain's to control.

Britain's education system was never meant to result in unification, but to produce societal loyalty to enable the continuation of British rule (Sharma and Ahmad 2019). The education system had no intention of being universal: it was specifically designed for the elites, both British and Indians (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018). Its sole purpose was to produce Indians native to the subcontinent, ethnically and physically Indian, but similar to their colonizer counterparts in thoughts and actions (Sharma and Ahmad 2019). Much of the British education system utilized themes reflecting positive colonial attitudes meant to promote their own interest in continued governance of the area (Yousafzai and Khan 2017). With the education being selective and only open to a select few deemed civilized enough, those who did receive English education often perceived themselves as superior to those who were not so fortunate (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018). From there, the education was meant to filter down from the upper classes

within India to the lowest classes of natives (Sharma and Ahmad 2019). Thus, aligned with Britain's previously discussed divide and rule strategy, the education system fostered two classes: those who received a British education and those who did not (Rahman, Ali, and Kahn 2018).

The downward filtration of education from elites to the uneducated also aided in oppressing Indian society under Britain. Given that the British education system had the sole purpose of creating a group of educated individuals that could and would assist Britain's colonial rule and strengthen their authority (Yousafzai and Khan 2017), only those able to speak and write in English, stemming from their educational opportunities, had the chance to be involved in the government with the rest effectively excluded (Sharma and Ahmad 2019). The exclusionary aspect of the education, resulting in exclusion from certain industries and careers, encouraged further class distinctions and fostered tensions within the Indian community (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018). Even so, those in government jobs were effectively alienated from their own culture and a majority of their fellow citizens (Sharma and Ahmad 2019), giving space for discontent to grow on either side of the privilege-division line. Despite this, employers seemed to prefer English education (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018), further cementing structural inequalities between privileged and oppressed communities on the basis of education.

British Colonialism Strategy: Legal System

British colonialism, in an attempt to oppress and continue their rule within India, implemented an entirely new legal structure on the basis of keeping them and their constituents superior and in power, while further suppressing the power of the native Indian population. Although initially the British law in India only applied to European residents in the region, in 1858 the British India Act was implemented which effectively transferred the powerful rule over

India from the East India Company to the British Crown directly (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018).

Almost immediately after this, Britain purged all previous legal systems, a majority of which

were based on religion, in place of their own legal system and jurisdiction.

In 1862, Britain implemented the Code of Criminal Procedure, significantly weakening

the legal power of the Indian population (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018). This Code did not allow for

Indian judges to call for the arrest or indictment of British or European individuals as well as

preventing them from trying cases in which a British person was the accused (Rahman, Ali,

Kahn 2018). Instead, only British judges could try cases in which a British individual was

accused and, if that accusation carried the death penalty, the British individual being tried had the

right to a jury of which at least half were required to also be British persons (Rahman, Ali, Kahn

2018). In this, of course, there are implicit biases that lead to, for lack of a better phrase, more

legal protections against British individuals than Indian subjects.

British law also was able to prohibit any opposition to their rule. More specifically, they

issued the Indian Press Act that prohibited publications speaking about the British Crown and

Government in a negative, hateful way (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018). Britain also implemented

laws allowing for them to prevent any meetings that could cause a disturbance of public

tranquility and peace (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018), a law that can be implied as preventing Indians

from orchestrating meetings meant to incite a rebellion against Britain's colonialism. While

Indians were able to be elected to legislative councils within the region, those positions holding

the most power or being at the center of said legislative councils were only to be nominated by

Britain (Rahman, Ali, Kahn 2018); No elections were allowed for those positions, prohibiting

Indian society from being able to hold powerful, impactful positions within their public

administration. Even within the police force, it was required for the district superintendent, the

position with the power to dismiss lower level police officers, to be European (Abbate 2013), highlighting the extremities Britain took in order to suppress and control leadership and governance within India.

India Independence Movement

India's independence movement, different from the previously discussed Algerian War of Independence, developed over an extended period of time and was relatively nonviolent in its nature. It is considered to be one of the biggest mass movements in modern times and was able to unite all socio-economic classes into political action for India's eventual independence. While complex and spanning an extensive time period, three main components were said to impact India enough to bring about its independence: the noncooperation boycott, the salt march, and the 'Quit India' campaign.

Officially launched in August 1920, the boycott first targeted legislative councils as elections were soon, but later came to include boycotts against British government affiliated schools and colleges, foreign cloth, legal courts, and even defaulting or not paying taxes (Chandra et. al 2016). Throughout the entirety of the boycott, Gandhi strongly emphasized the concept of swadeshi (Spodek 1971): utilizing domestic products rather than supporting foreign imported products. It was meant to mobilize Indian society against imperialistic consumption and, instead, encourage a lifestyle that gives priority to local goods (Giri 2004). The success of this campaign was largely due to being built upon grievances of Indian society that allowed nationalism to prevail and aid in the boycott's development (Spodek 1971). Eventually, the boycott was also adopted by the Indian Congress, allowing it to gain extensive momentum and support leading to substantial amounts of success (Chandra et. al 2016). Gandhi, along with

some of the most influential leaders of the Khilafat committee, began on a tour around the nation holding numerous meetings and greeting political workers, visiting places largely inhabited by Muslims as those were the areas which overwhelmingly endorsed his idea prior to its implementation (Chandra et. al 2016; Gordon 1973). It was on this tour that Gandhi continued to support and specifically emphasize noncooperation with the government in terms of economics: refusal to pay taxes and refusal to end the noncooperation, even if the government confiscated property of civilians, with the ideology that the government would be forced to ultimately produce a fair compromise (Spodek 1971).

While there were many sectors that the noncooperation movement touched, the most successful part of this boycott was the one concerning foreign cloth: swadeshi. The belief was that swadeshi could not fully take place without self-rule or self-government, highlighting how it was believed to contribute to India's desire for independence (Giri 2004). Swadeshi encouraged the Indian public to use and purchase indigenous products, while boycotting the foreign cloth imports (Spodek 1971), one of Britain's biggest imports and economic revenue industries in India. Civilians began burning foreign cloth in the streets and abstaining from shopping at stores that sold foreign cloth (Chandra et. al 2016). The swadeshi movement was to act as a barrier against imports until and unless the British government imposed a tariff (Spodek 1971) that would ignite more domestic development and production. As a result, the price of foreign cloth fell by almost 50%, causing British government revenue to observe a drastic decline (Chandra et. al 2016). The hole this boycott put in the economy allowed Gandhi's desire of wanting khaddar, handwoven goods made in India, to fill the market supply's gap (Spodek 1971). Thus, not only did swadeshi cause economic hardship to their colonizer, but it also awakened the general public's national spirit (Giri 2004). Eventually, committees across the country adopted that same

stance of noncooperation and specifically swadeshi, later turned into a resolution (Chandra et. al 2016). Swadeshi played an integral role in this broader noncooperation movement as abstaining from swadeshi was perceived negatively as unpatriotic; it was Indian society's duty to support local goods over foreign imports, thus heightening the prevalence of nationalism against imperial powers (Giri 2004).

The occurrence of these movements, whether the national non-cooperation movement or more localized movements that were sparked by the national one, not only disrupted civil society, but also deeply and negatively impacted the British government's stability in the region. The British began striking back in December 1921 by arresting those involved. Over 30,000 people were arrested, many of which were top leadership positions within the movement (Chandra et. al 2016). The Viceroy of India, Lord Reading, immediately halted all beginning-stage negotiations and continued its repression. Many associations of national volunteers thought to align with the noncooperation movement were forbidden (Low 1966). Public meetings were banned, midnight raids on offices involved in the boycott occurred frequently, and newspapers were prevented from publishing anything with anti-British sentiment (Chandra et. al 2016). If that was not enough, of course, any civilian disobeying the British government's orders were very quickly arrested (Low 1966). With civil liberties having been prohibited and banned as well as the increased imprisonment of political prisoners and another violence outbreak by local movements that refused to adhere to the nonviolent policy of the noncooperation boycott, Gandhi saw no option but to effectively end the movement (Chandra et. al 2016). Thus, in February 1922, after the Indian National Congress had fully ratified his decision, the noncooperation boycott was officially finished.

Though the boycott had ended, it was not the ending of India's struggle for self determination and independence. Again, another gesture of mass disobedience arose less than a decade later in 1930, unfolding into, arguably, the most impactful part of the general civil disobedience and nonviolent struggle that led to India's independence: the salt march. In March of 1930, Gandhi, along with some of his followers, marched over 200 miles to a seaside village that would then become the starting location of their next nonviolent campaign (Shani 2015). The purpose of this march was to, once again, oppose British rule in India (Chandra et. al 2016). More specifically, it sought to directly oppose the salt tax and the British monopoly on manufacturing and collection of salt (Shani 2015). Gandhi argued that, because salt is one of the greatest necessities of life and, consequently, integral to the survival of the poor, Britain's salt tax was one of the most inhumane taxes that a man's intelligence could ever implement (Shani 2015).

It was in April of 1930, almost a month after marching to the seaside village, that Gandhi directly opposed Britain's monopoly on salt (Shani 2015). The British monopoly on salt meant that the poorest individuals within India could not cultivate and gather salt individually to supplement their diets without paying extremely high taxes (Weber 2002), taxes that the lowest class could not afford. This small act eventually became the ultimate symbol of the independence movement and the expression of mass civil disobedience throughout the country: it sparked nation-wide nonviolent civil disobedience meant to oppose British rule (Shani 2015). The salt march was effectively a lesson in and about nonviolence, teaching Indian society that they are stronger than they thought and their oppressors are weaker than they are perceived to be (Weber 2002). To this day, it is considered to be the tipping point in which Britain's legitimacy in the

region waned and constituted a triumph over British imperialism by the Indian society (Shani 2015).

From even before the beginning of the march, as well as throughout it, Gandhi continued to prioritize nonviolence. In one of his most famous statements, he is quoted saying "'wherever possible, civil disobedience of salt laws should be started… Liquor and foreign- cloth shops can be picketed. We can refuse to pay taxes… I prescribe only one condition, viz., let our pledge of truth and nonviolence as the only means for the attainment of [independence or self rule] be faithfully kept,'" (Chandra et.al 2016). Thus, the march was not only about challenging British imperialistic power, but also demonstrating the proper, nonviolent way lives should be lived (Weber 2002). The perception of his peaceful march and explicit disobedience of the British government inspired many that, by the time he reached his seaside town destination, he had captivated the entire nation, all of them waiting for his instruction (Chandra et. al 2016).

As the movement built up and gained national support and focus, Britain was put into an increasingly difficult spot: if it did retaliate, it would be seen as a brutal regime against peaceful protestors, but, if it did not retaliate, its superiority and governance over India would slowly erode and disappear (Chandra et. al 2016). It was at this point that Britain took action in which almost 60,000 people were arrested, including Gandhi (Chandra et. al 2016). Despite Gandhi's imprisonment in May 1930, his salt march continued to prevail. Many continued this mass disobedience, even when met with British police forces utilizing violence and clubbing them with steel poles (Kurtz 2009) that, although devastating, increased international attention and sympathy for India's cause. Eventually, Gandhi was released from prison and the salt march ended in March 1931 when Gandhi was personally invited to attend Round Table talks that would discuss the possibility and opportunity for Indian independence (Kurtz 2009).

Unfortunately, these Round Table talks did not result in Indian independence and, thus, the third large and impactful part of India's freedom struggle occurred: the Quit India campaign. Beginning in August 1942 and ending in September 1944, the 'Quit India' movement was effectively an ultimatum for the British government (Chakrabarty 1992): leave India and grant them their freedom and independence or face a mass movement with the goal of taking said independence (Greenough 1983). However, unlike the other movements on noncooperation in 1920-22 and the salt march in 1930-32, Britain had been preparing for this 'Quit India' movement for some time. As Congress began moving closer to 'Quit India' implementation, Britain began arming themselves with extensive power to meet the growing threat (Chandra et. al 2016). As the ultimatum of leaving India or facing a mass uprising was presented to Britain on August 8th, 1940, the day after, August 9th, 1940, was when Britain began to strike back, before the movement had even officially begun, banning national and provincial committees and arresting influential leaders (Greenough 1983; Chandra et. al 2016). It was fairly easy for Britain to retaliate before the movement officially began as they already had parts of their army stationed in India from the historical backdrop of World War II (Chakrabarty 1992; Chandra et. al 2016).

This movement was faced with the most brutal repression Indians had ever faced throughout their national freedom struggle: virtually any political activity, even if it was peaceful and largely thought of as legal, was considered illegal revolutionary activity at this time (Chandra et. al 2016). The British government open fired frequently on crowds in an attempt to disperse them, enacted censorship on news reports and publications, and even utilized more brutal repressive tactics such as torture, whipping, aerial strikes against the general publics (Greenough 1983), taking hostages, and burning entire villages. More than 50 battalions were deployed for this early suppression of the campaign (Chakrabarty 1992). It is noted that many

thought and perceived Britain's repressive actions as being as severe as martial law, despite

martial law never having been enacted (Chandra et. al 2016). However, none of this derailed or

discouraged the Indian public from continuing its fight. In fact, Britain's imprisonment of the

movement's top leaders actually helped the survival of the movement as the top-raking leaders'

absences allowed others to form new leadership in helping sustain the movement (Chakrabarty

1992). The Indian public's resistance tactics continued with forcibly hanging Indian national

flags on public buildings, physically removing and dismantling Britain's imposed infrastructure

such as railway tracks, cutting and removing telegraph wires, strikes at schools and colleges,

distributing illegal news and press, etc. (Chandra et. al 2016; Greenough 1983), all meant to

symbolically and physically weaken Britain's reputation and communication channels that

allowed for its strategic rule over the region.

While India was not granted independence in the immediate aftermath of this 'Quit India'

campaign, it did succeed in sewing doubts of the British Raj within Indian society. Many

government officials and police officers began to show signs of shifting loyalty. The presiding

Lord over the Indian Civil Service, Lord Wavell, told his colleagues in the British cabinet that his

men cannot be expected to uphold a firm policy of governance against the Indian society unless

they had a guarantee for the Raj to continue for the next decade (Chakrabarty 1992), signaling

doubt amongst the Indian Civil Service of Britain's ability to maintain power. Not only this, but

throughout the 'Quit India' movement, parallel governments started appearing in different

regions around the country (Chandra et. al 2016) with the purpose of opposing British

government and legitimacy in favor of these parallel governments' jurisdictions. The

development of these parallel governments was a distinct method of disobedience against British

rule implicitly saying that the country will refuse to listen to Britain and, instead, begin their own governance in this way until Britain vacates.

Even the police in some factions, most notably the Bihar police, increased in its dissident members, further indicating a shifting loyalty from British imperialism to support and sympathy for the Indian cause of independence (Chakrabarty 1992). One Indian publication even wrote that "'it is a matter of happiness that Indian policemen and their officers are sympathizing with us,'" (Sharma 1990) as it highlighted Britain's authorities meant to enforce their rule refusing to do such. Further sways of loyalty occurred when three Indian members resigned from the Viceroy's Executive Council in the wake of this movement (Chandra et. al 2016). Not only was this possibly the largest indication of Britain's weakening authority, but it was also the severest hit to their reputation as the resignation was one of some of the most important leaders for Britain within their colony.

It is true that Britain fairly easily contained this campaign and had been able to squander most of its impact. However, the campaign only officially ended at the end of World War II when the British government indicated its willingness and preparation to transfer power to India and effectively grant them independence (Ansari 2022). Thus, India was officially given its independence on August 15th, 1947, most likely due, at least in part, to the impact of the 'Quit India' movement and its record-high participation that aided in its large impact (Chandra et. al 2016).

Algeria and India Compared: a Difference in International Support

Algeria and India remain relatively consistent and similar on all factors noted by previous scholars' research. Thus, it can be concluded that any of those factors do not necessarily explain

the difference in why Algeria adopted violence while India utilized strategic nonviolence. However, a large difference is found when considering each movement's international support. Previous scholars have noted that nonviolence is more likely to be used when the country struggling has international support. While this is partially true, it is not just the presence of international support that matters, but the kind of international support. More specifically, what matters most is who or what nations the international support comes from. The difference between Algeria and India that explains their adoption of violence and nonviolence, respectively, is the power of their allies: India was able to garner support from some of the most influential, powerful nations during the time period of their independence while Algeria was not so lucky.

With Algeria's Independence War and struggle for independence being waged from 1954 until 1962, the most powerful players in the international world were the United States of America and the Soviet Union specifically, but some European nations also held some influence. Unfortunately for Algeria, they were not able to gain the support of those powerful nations during their quest for independence and freedom from French colonialism. France's strong and influential allies of Belgium and Portugal consistently cast opposition against Algeria independence and any resolutions that would result in such. (Saeed 2021). Many Global North nations actually sympathized with France in this fight to such an extent that the Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, to which all of the previously mentioned European nations were part of and had significant influence within, agreed to grant France a credit of $250 million (Fraleigh 1967) as a way to help France finance their war. Of course, with this organization and these nations investing heavily in France, they would not do so without the hope of France's victory, making it very clear which side of the conflict they supported.

Not only this, but, when the 'Algerian Question' of independence was brought to the United Nations numerous times, there was a stark contrast dividing the member states on either side of the conflict. The Algerian question was originally brought forth to the UN by a group of Asian and African countries, most of which were brand new nations and had just been admitted as members to the UN (Asselin and Kostrzewski 1962). Staunch supporters of Algeria from the beginning of the conflict included Egypt and the other Middle Eastern Arab states (Fraleigh 1967). Member states largely from the Global South argued in favor of Algeria stating that France had maintained its position in Algeria by force and that Algerians deserve freedom (Saeed 2021). The first attempt at getting the UN to intervene in the war failed due to the delegates from France and the United Kingdom stating that the United Nations could not intervene in a situation in which a state was attempting to maintain public order disturbed by rebels (Fraleigh 1967). Global North nations, such as the US and the UK, argued in support of France's claim that Algeria was a part of France, making their war an internal conflict and, consequently, prohibiting the UN from intervening according to the UN charter (Saeed 2021).

Algeria's support largely came from two places: the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the Colombo Plan member states at the time. This support included Burma, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, China, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Ghana, Laos, Nepal, Myanmar, the Philippines, Liberia, Libya, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, the Vietnam Democratic Republic (VDR), Sudan, Egypt, and, at the time, South Vietnam (later to be reunified with VDR) (Connelly 2001; Saeed 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China 2014). At the time of the Algerian question, all of those nations were considered Third World nations, whereas the ones supporting France were developed nations and highly powerful, highlighting a stark contrast in the type of

support. While it is true that those countries from the Bandung Conference represented more than half of humanity (Saeed 2021), it still was not enough to influence France to end its war and give Algeria its freedom. While it may seem like the supporters for Algeria outnumber and, thus, overpower those opposed to Algeria, many influential nations chose to abstain from the issue, both in the UN and publicly, for a majority of the war.

The US both voted no and abstained on different strong resolutions for Algerian independence (Saeed 2021). This was caused by their position in relation to the rise of communism and the USSR. While the US despised French colonialism, especially pertaining to the Algerian War, they could not afford to take a position either way: if they supported France, it was feared that Algeria would align itself with and look for support from the USSR, but, if they supported Algeria, it would heighten tensions between them and France, a key and essential ally in the fight of Europe against communism (Merom 2004). More concisely put, Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US, stated that the US' inability to make a strong position pertained to "'the possibility of either losing [the US'] whole position in the Middle East by offending the Arabs, or else risking the rupture of [the US'] NATO position by offending the French,'" (Connelly 2001).

In fact, while the West, especially the Western European states, did not give much in military aid to France, they had no objections with France withdrawing most of its troops from the NATO command and sending them to Algeria instead (Fraleigh 1967), highlighting the unspoken but clear positions in support of France. In general and throughout the entirety of the war in Algeria, the US remained in this position directly between wanting to support and strengthen NATO and its allies while attempting to maintain anticolonial sentiment in light of the growing USSR threat (Saeed 2021). Thus, Algeria was unable to garner support from the most

influential nation at the time, nor could they get support from the USSR as it did not have enough influence yet to impact Northern Africa (Merom 2004).

What is found here is that Algeria's internal support, while vast and consisting of a large number of nations, were not influential enough to exert pressure on France giving Algeria their independence. These allies found within the Global South were categorized as Third World countries, many having just been freed from colonialism themselves and not developed enough to make any impact in international affairs. With Algeria's inability to capture prominent and powerful allies, their desired fate of independence rested entirely on them and their community, making violence usage much more adoptable and, arguably, their only option.

Positively for India, they had a different experience with the international world. As previously mentioned, Britain had indicated some kind of willingness to grant India independence in the wake of their 'Quit India' movement, but that said independence would only be considered after the completion of World War II. However, certain conditions had set up the fate of their inevitable independence before the war as well as while the war was ongoing.

India's nonviolent resistance movement against British imperialism had gained support from countries such as Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, France, the United States, Japan, and China (Singh 2004), some of which were the most powerful nations at that time. Germany was the driving force behind the Axis powers in World War II and, thus, it comes as no surprise that they advocated for Indian independence from their opposition, Britain. The German government offered both arms and money in supporting India throughout its freedom struggle (Banerjee 2002) and it is speculated that, in return, they hoped India would join them or, at the very least, be an easy conquering ground for them. Similarly, the support for Indian independence from Japan and Italy came from their desires of obliterating the British empire. While the three,

Germany, Japan, and Italy, fought on the same side of World War II, Japan desired India's

independence in hopes of winning the war and expanding their territorial control into

south-eastern Asia, while Italy supported India because it would give Italy more economic

openings and opportunities within the Mediterranean and India due to its geographic location

(Prayer 2006). Whatever the reasons for supporting Indian independence may have been for the

Axis powers, the largest nations within it stood united against Britain's imperialism in India.

Interestingly enough, the most influential of the Allied powers, with the exception of

Great Britain, stood united as well in their support for Indian independence. Former President of

the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, perceived India's struggle as necessary to an entire

Communist revolution and believed supporting liberation movements around Asia, India

included, was "the duty of the Communists to help the colonial liberation [movements]," (Ray

1969). By early 1942, in the midst of World War II, President Chiang Kai Shek of China had

expressed support for Indian independence (Gokhale 2022). He stated that, while he would

continue to stand with the Allied powers against Japanese and German imperialism, Britain

should honor their agreement to the Atlantic Charter, transfer 'real power' to India, and that, if

freedom was to be denied to China or India, "'there could be no real peace in the world,'"

(Shukla 1975).

The Atlantic Charter is an agreement signed by the United States of America and Great

Britain in August 1941 with the purpose of publicly highlighting the US- Great Britain alliance

against the Axis powers and aggression as well as presenting their joint vision for a postwar

world. One of the points in this agreement states that both the US and Britain will "respect the

right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and [the US

and Britain] wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been

forcibly deprived of them," ("The Atlantic Charter" 2018). Thus, President Chiang Kai Shek's mention of Britain upholding their agreement to the Atlantic Charter was meant to highlight Britain's promise of all peoples having the right to self-government, a right Britain had ignored for India. In this, the US was in agreement with China. While official US foreign policy towards India had been oscillating, the US Congress, public, and media had continued unwavering support for India's independence (Singh 2004). Even President Roosevelt, as one of two signatories in the Atlantic Charter, supported independence for colonies (Sherwood 1996). Much of the American public found parallels between India's nationalist freedom struggle and America's colonial resistance that began their nation (Teed 2003).

Again, the US found itself in the same difficult situation that it was in when concerning Algeria's independence: they believed in India's cause for independence and an independent India could be an increasingly important ally to have against the Axis powers, but they could not afford alienating another big ally, Britain, during the war (Sherwood 1996), thus explaining their oscillating policy towards that situation. However, the US administration could not support Britain's imperialism in India indefinitely and throughout all time (Singh 2004). Upon the War's conclusion, the US position switched to one of supporting India's independence. At this point, a majority of international opinion was sympathetic to India's freedom struggle (Shukla 1975). Thus, after World War II was finished and between the pressure from the US, China's support for India, the continued anti-imperialist belief of the Soviet Union, as well as the obsolete and decimated Axis powers, Britain had no choice to, and arguably was forced to, grant India independence (Singh 2004). India found solidarity and unity amongst the biggest actors and actors of rising importance in the international arena. Knowing that they had outside support,

unlike Algeria who retained support after their struggle began and from trivial and insignificant global players, India was able to utilize nonviolence to achieve their goal of independence.

Case Study Set 2: West Papua and East Timor

West Papua: Independence from Colonialism to Foreign Occupation

West Papua has an interesting history with foreign occupation on the island. Beginning with Dutch colonialism, West Papua was integrated into and considered part of the Dutch East Indies, a group of islands within Southeastern Asia, in 1898 (Anderson 2015; Kusumaryati 2021). It is important to note for later discussion that West Papua's integration into the Dutch East Indies came almost 200 years after Indonesia's (Kusumaryati 2021). Indonesia, as an integral part of the Dutch East Indies, was granted independence from Dutch colonialism in 1949 (Anderson 2015) and thought of itself as the successor to the Dutch East Indies in the same way that Russia or Serbia considered themselves as the successor states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia respectively. Despite the majority of the Dutch East Indies being granted independence and forming modern day Indonesia, the Dutch retained control over West Papua with the understanding that its independence would be granted later on, claiming that this is done due to West Papuans' distinct people and territory separate from the similarities found within the Dutch East Indies and, consequently, Indonesian territory (Anderson 2015). Indonesia claimed the contrary in that all former Dutch East Indies were a unified single territory and belonged as the basis or foundation of its formation as a new state (Anderson 2015). Thus, Indonesia began a reunification propaganda campaign, again similar to Serbia's reunification campaign during the fall of Yugoslavia, meant to reunite West Papua with Indonesia (Anderson 2015).

In 1962, West Papuans began preparing for independence from the Netherlands, creating their national flag and electing representatives to the New Guinea Council (Anderson 2015). This New Guinea Council was set up the year before, in 1961, by the Dutch colonial government as a way to prepare the West Papuan people for independence that was to come in 1975 (Kusumaryati 2021). Indonesia, in return, began military incursions against Dutch occupation in the area (Anderson 2015). Indonesia established a People's Triple Command in late 1961 with the sole purpose of taking West Papua by force (McNamee 2020). As a result of this, and unbeknown to the West Papuan local population, the Netherlands entered into an agreement with Indonesia in 1962 that allowed for transferring West Papua first to the UN and then to Indonesia (Kusumaryati 2021).

This agreement included a condition that a vote be held within West Papua for the people to decide the future of their governance (Anderson 2015). This vote, called the Act of Free Choice, took place in West Papua in 1969, only allowing approximately 1000 hand-picked tribal leaders to participate rather than the approximately 800,000 indigenous Papuans on the island (McNamee 2020). This vote resulted in unanimous support for joining Indonesia, (Kusumaryati 2021), with the tribal leaders experiencing extensive intimidation at the hand of Indonesia, some even being threatened at gunpoint (Anderson 2015). Thus, the Act of Free Choice is seen largely by West Papuans as gross injustice, robbing them of their self-determination right (Elmslie, Webb-Gannon, and King 2011). However, it was declared and largely upheld by the world that West Papua was part of Indonesia beginning in May 1969. This marked Indonesia's invasion and foreign occupation of West Papua (Woodman 2022).

East Timor: Independence from Colonialism to Foreign Occupation

East Timor was first colonized by Portugal in the sixteenth century, 1520 to be exact, and continued the reign and control over the island with relative ease for the following 400 years (Staveteig 2007; Traub 2000). This was the norm until a coup occurred in Lisbon in 1974 causing the new Portuguese Junta de Salvacao Nacional to take power, later issuing a declaration of Portuguese withdrawal from all its overseas territories and implying the inevitability of East Timor's independence (Staveteig 2007). From this promise, multiple political movements and parties formed within East Timor, all of which occupied differing opinions and positions on the political spectrum: Fretilin was a left-wing movement that wanted full independence while UDT wanted to remain connected to Portugal and Apodeti advocated for autonomous integration into Indonesia (Staveteig 2007). A Macao meeting, held in June of 1975, included these political parties and Portuguese representatives, allowing for a space in which all involved could discuss and outline a plan for a transition of power from Portugal to East Timor, with Fretilin officially declaring East Timor independence in November 1975 (Lawless 1976). Thus, Portugal withdrew from East Timor in 1975 (Traub 2000), giving them a beginning taste of independence that would be proven later to be short lived.

In early December 1975, Indonesia began its invasion into East Timor resulting in at least 500 East Timorese deaths (Staveteig 2007; Lawless 1976). Despite a UN call for Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor two weeks after this first invasion, Indonesia continued to conduct violence and break into East Timor with an official second invasion occurring under three weeks after the first (Lawless 1976; Staveteig 2007). The remainder of 1975 and the very beginning of 1976 saw East Timor as a battleground with negative impacts on survival necessities, such as reliable and safe water, being felt (Lawless 1976). Ultimately, Indonesia officially annexed East

Timor and integrated it into Indonesian territory in 1976 (Staveteig 2007), thus ending East

Timor's mere months of independence from foreign occupation and beginning Indonesia's

occupation.

West Papua and East Timor: Indonesian Invasion, Policies, and Foreign

Occupation Impacts

Under Indonesian rule, both West Papuans and East Timorese have become significantly

disadvantaged and exploited, particularly in relation to the settler population and Indonesia's

transmigration program. This transmigration program, meant to incentivize Indonesians from

densely populated provinces to move and resettle in less densely populated areas, have

negatively impacted the West Papuan population (Anderson 2015). Those who elected to relocate

would be promised over 8.5 acres of land, subsidized income support, and agricultural training to

help start their economic prosperity (McNamee 2020). In a similar way, Indonesia pursued

transmigrant programs and initiatives to encourage Indonesians to migrate into East Timor for

better economic opportunities (Arenas 1998). Civil service positions or careers that could

influence public life and politics in East Timor were filled by such immigrants (Fukada 2000).

Indonesians and Indonesian transmigrants in East Timor occupied all higher, sometimes

executive, positions, while the East Timorese were only left with lower-level, borderline

entry-level, positions (Traub 2000). Profitable economic activities were monopolized by outside

companies (Fukada 2000) leaving little economic prosperity available to the East Timorese. In

both East Timor and West Papua, it is highlighted that Indonesia's transmigration program

privileged the prosperity and success of their migrants over the natives in both countries.

The transmigration program aided in relocating roughly 300,000 people to West Papua in under 30 years beginning in the 1970s (McNamee 2020), a significantly large amount compared to West Papua's population of roughly 900,000 in 1971 (Elmslie 2015). As a result, indigenous Papuans make up approximately 50% of the current population as compared to 96% in 1971 (Woodman 2022). Similarly, it is estimated that roughly 150,000-200,000 non-East Timorese live in East Timor, another large number compared to the 1980 population census data stating that East Timor's population then was 550,000 people (Pederson and Arneberg 1999). Because of the large number of Indonesian settlers into both West Papua and East Timor, this transmigration program was thought to Indonesia in not only preventing their secessions, but, arguably, gained Indonesia permanent, secured control of the regions as the first step of larger assimilation (McNamee 2020; Hajek 2000).

Part of this transmigration program was almost meant to establish Indonesian supremacy, similar to the colonialist policies and actions within the previously discussed case studies of Algeria and India. The transmigration program not only included physical relocation of migrants and displacement of local communities, but also cultural assimilation such as the mandatory use of Indonesian as the language of instruction within schools (Anderson 2015). Imposing a mandatory common language by the colonizing nation acts as a way of expanding their power and influence (Woodman 2022). This process of 'Indonesianization' that occurred in West Papua and East Timor, partially via mandatory use of Indonesian, was recognized and understood by the Indonesian government as a fundamental way to ensure these territories' unity with and development of Indonesia (Hajek 2000). With West Papua having over 1000 native languages spoken, the requirement of Indonesian language primacy and implementation resulted in the extinction of some of these native languages and, with it, cultural heritage (Anderson 2015).

Although in dispute, it is believed that there are roughly 15-20 indigenous languages within East Timor and two non-indigenous languages, Portuguese and Chinese, with the indigenous languages almost all having gone extinct and Portuguese and Chinese being banned from usage within East Timor in an attempt to prioritize and spread Indonesian (Hajek 2000).

The Indonesian government, through their prioritizing of Indonesian lifestyles and degradation of indigenous lifestyles, deemed Papuan and East Timorese cultural practices or traditions, beliefs, etc. as primitive and inferior that is in need of drastic modernization (Anderson 2015). In fact, the utilization of the Indonesian language elevated it to the perception of the language of modernity (Woodman 2022), while other tribal languages previously used became considered as uncivilized and barbaric. The mandated imposition of Indonesian language not only was to the detriment of Papuan and East Timorese indigenous languages, but aided in the transformation of these nations into integral parts of Indonesia (Hajek 2000).

Indonesia's transmigration program eventually led to displacement of West Papuans with part of the program's stipulations being that indigenous Papuans are only allowed to live in a transmigrant area with a ratio of one to nine; That is these transmigrant areas can only have one native West Papuan family for every nine non-Papuan families that live there (Anderson 2015). Because the settler population did not require the Indigenous Papuan's assistance for survival or prosperity, the settlers and the Indonesian state were able to adopt a strategy excluding the indigenous populations from this land (Woodman 2022). In fact, by the mid-1980s, approximately 7000 kilometers of land had been taken or confiscated from the indigenous populations, without any compensation or payment, and given to the newly arrived migrants (Anderson 2015). Again, another large number constituting roughly 20% of West Papuan land

being taken or confiscated (Elmslie 2015). Thus, not only does this program forcibly displace the native communities, but it impoverishes them as well.

Similarly, Indonesian occupation in East Timor was also characterized by mass resettlement of indigenous citizens and massive loss of life (Hajek 2000). Over 200,000 East Timorese were effectively displaced due to 150 new settlement areas designated for transmigrants (Weatherbee 1981). Within the span of four years, from 1975 to 1979, at least 300,000 East Timorese were forced to move into resettlement areas, making way for the transmigrants to settle in their previous place (Robinson 2008). These transmigrants were given land formerly utilized by East Timorese individuals, without any compensation for or agreement by the East Timorese, and thus resulted in the native East Timorese population being forced to move to infertile lands (Taylor 1999). These resettlement areas with infertile and inadequate land for cultivation, when coupled with the restrictions barring these indigenous inhabitants from returning to their previous arable land, further impoverished the community and exacerbated the threat on their survival (Weatherbee 1981).

Not only this, but many migrants were given privileged access to trade, markets, and other economic benefits, inevitably pushing indigenous traders out of this livelihood and thus increasing their poverty (Taylor 1999). It has been noted that Indonesia's transmigration policy is linked to their desire of indigenous population control (Franks 1996). In addition to this, the resettlement areas for the indigenous East Timorese often prohibited cultivation within it, increasing food scarcity for these populations (Taylor 1999) and presenting another threat on indigenous survival. The transmigration and resettlement policy was justified via the understanding that East Timor's 'backwardness,' or their inability to modernize came from the disbursement of their villages (Weatherbee 1981) with the influx of transmigrants from this

Indonesian policy being a way to modernize, improve, and save East Timor from its barbarity

and uncivilized lifestyle. It is even in this implication that we see Indonesia's superiority

complex in relation to East Timor's indigenous inhabitants.

In both West Papua and East Timor, the transmigration policy and forced resettlement is

not only politically motivated as an attempt to control and suppress the indigenous populations,

but it is meant for their forced assimilation (Adhiati and Bobsein 2001). One of its primary goals

was to preserve the unity and security of Indonesia by intermixing the ethnic groups (Human

Rights Watch 1999), but, in reality, it did not just intermix ethnic groups, but called for

Indonesian takeover of ethnic-indigenous areas. In 1984, the Indonesian government in West

Papua specifically called for up to 12 million new settlers to replace the indigenous Papuans in

the territory (McNamee 2020). In East Timor in 1999, an Indonesian government official stated

that there were over 9,000 transmigrant families, over 45,000 transmigrant individuals, and that

the government was preparing resettlement for an additional 100,000 indigenous East Timorese

for the additional impending transmigrants (Human Rights Watch 1999).

The Indonesian National Armed Forces, or TNI, had a slogan: biar tikus lari kehutan asal

ayam piara dikandang, translating to 'let the rats run into the jungle so that the chickens can

breed in the coop'; The slogan's meaning was one of cleansing and disposing of West Papuans

and East Timorese to make space for the Indonesian transmigrant settlers (Woodman 2022). The

result of this continued transmigration program was also rendering natives as a minority, a

traditionally distinct disadvantage in democratic systems and especially ones that are

ethnically-polarized (Anderson 2015). West Papua remained in the lead for the largest target

within Indonesia's transmigration program throughout the 1980s and 1990s due to its, as viewed

by Indonesia, secessionist tendencies and tensions (McNamee 2020).

The transmigration program enabling settler colonialism also negatively impacted the native Papuan and East Timorese communities via destruction of the environment. Transmigration allows for both the pacification of West Papua's indigenous and local population as well as economic exploitation of them, their land, and resources (Anderson 2015). West Papua is considered heavily abundant in gold, copper, oil, and timber (McNamee 2020). In fact, West Papua is considered to have the largest reserves of gold in the world and the second largest reserves in the world for copper (Eichhorn 2022). Thus, the increased mining activities for the gold and copper resources ordered by Indonesia had generated an estimated six billion tons of waste by 1997, much of which were dumped into either the mountains or a system of rivers leading to low-lying wetlands (Nakawaga 2008). The mining activities irreversibly contaminated local forests, turned water sources into turgid swamps, and forced indigenous Papuans to abandon their, consequently, contaminated hunting and fishing grounds (McNamee 2020).

The company largely at fault for these negative impacts, Freeport, had no obligation to compensate for the surrounding communities' losses (Eichorn 2022). Within an eight year period, an annual average of 1630 kilometers of forest was destroyed within West Papua for economic activity, the same activities that displaced and alienated West Papua's indigenous communities (Anderson 2015). Thus, because of West Papua's richness in resources, those living near resource-abundant areas are displaced with their fertile land being transferred to these new migrants, again, without compensation (Anderson 2015). Thus, not only did Indonesian colonialism result in devastatingly environmental degradation, but further suppression and disregard for the West Papuan indigenous communities.

East Timorese communities, too, felt the destruction of their environment as a result of Indonesian occupation. Because the land in which they were forced to resettle was infertile and

could not support the communities, many were forced to partake in unsustainable farming such as slash and burn farming (Down to Earth 1999). The communities found themselves having to burn fields to promote grass growth for potential cattle farming (Pederson and Arneberg 1999). Indonesia itself burned large areas of forest in an attempt to expose any Timorese resistance to their occupation that may have taken refuge in the woods (Down to Earth 1999). As little as 700 kilometers of forest had been burned in East Timor in the 1990s (Pedersen and Arneberg 1999). Indonesia's exploitation and extraction of sandalwood depleted East Timor's endowment of it, rendering it extinct in the country (Sandlund et. al 2001). The population growth that took place within East Timor, especially including the rapid influx of transmigrants, not only depleted and put strain on water resources and supply, but also exponentially polluted it (Down to Earth 1999). During the time of Indonesian occupation, less than half of the households in East Timor had access to clean water (Sandlund et. al 2001).

West Papua: The Free Papua Movement (OPM or Organisasi Papua Merdeka)

The Free Papua Movement, or the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka), was first founded somewhere between 1963 and 1965, the actual year is disputed among sources, with the intent to advocate for the autonomy of West Papua (Anderson 2015). Some sources claim that indigenous Papuans first began attacks against Indonesia in 1965 with the unification of these minor insurgent groups coming later to form the OPM (McNamee 2020). Nonetheless, the OPM stands as the first organizational attempt and effort for the West Papuan civilization to achieve freedom from their oppressors (Webb-Gannon 2014). Born out of an uprising against Indonesia in Manokwari, it has since then multiplied into numerous organizations, factions, having several leaders, etc. that all have collaborated in their shared struggle against Indonesian domination

over West Papua (Woodman 2022). However, Papuan nationalism has been prevalent in the region since the Netherlands colonial rule in the 1950s in which young Papuan nationalists advocated for their right to self-determination as a nation, thoroughly opposing Indonesian and Dutch intervention in their freedom (Chauvel 2021).

Since 1965 and the construction of the OPM, partially stemming from the Act of Free Choice that occurred in 1969, there has been sporadic violent clashes between anti-Indonesian forces or rebels and the Indonesian troops stationed within the West Papuan territory (Savage and Martin 1997). In fact, the OPM expanded and grew dramatically after the failure of the 1969 Act of Free Choice, especially with the defection of some Indonesian army members that then turned to join and support the OPM (Webb-Gannon 2014). Some members of the OPM collaborated to create the Proklamasi Kemerdekaan, or Independence Proclamation, in 1971 that formally declared the West Papuan territory and its civilians as free and independent from Indonesia (Webb-Gannon 2014). Unfortunately, and as to be expected, the proclamation was not acknowledged by Indonesia (Webb-Gannon 2014) with the OPM, in return, launching low-level attacks at Indonesia throughout the 1970s (McNamee 2020).

Over time, the OPM and its different factions became increasingly militant, causing reprisal attacks from Indonesia that, at some points, burned down entire villages within West Papua (Anderson 2015). Following the creation and beginning operations of the mining industries and such that decimated the environment and forced oppression into all indigenous Papuans lives, as previously explained, the West Papuan communities participated in civil unrest, prompting Indonesian forces to clear out and wipe the surrounding villages close to said economic activities including killing, detaining, and torturing any Papuans thought to be involved in the armed resistance against the Indonesian state (McNamee 2020). Papuan

resistance to any policies or measures taken by Indonesia, whether violent resistance or otherwise, were met with increased militarisation and oppression (Anderson 2015). West Papua continues to be the most heavily militarized area of Indonesia with approximately 45,000 troops stationed there (Anderson 2015) despite the area housing less than 10% of Indonesia's population (McNamee 2020). By the 1980s, violence in West Papua had escalated into a low-intensity armed conflict continuing to this day with as many as 100,000 people being killed, mostly civilians killed by Indonesia (Anderson 2015).

Indonesia viewed the opposition to their regime found within West Papua as representing a rebellion against the modernity the regime was claiming to instill; In reality, West Papuan resistance to Indonesia poses a threat to Indonesia's nation-state building attempt and process (Anderson 2015). Indonesia's claim of West Papua is rooted in historical ideology; Because Indonesia views itself as the successor state of the Dutch East Indies, and with West Papua having been a part of that, West Papua is rightfully part of Indonesia (Viartasiwi 2018). A connection has been drawn between the case of West Papua and Algeria: with France claiming that Algeria is France, Indonesia effectively claims that Papua is Indonesia (Woodman 2022). Papuans that refuse to conform, that is refusal to agree to Indonesian rule, are guaranteed to be crushed by Indonesia's armed forces via imprisonment, dismissal from government posts if applicable, and sometimes death (Anderson 2015) as they are seen as treasonous and betraying their nation.

The Indonesian government's portrayal of the conflict as an insurgency taken on by rebels has long been used as an excuse or reason for Indonesia's torture, looting and burning of villages, mistreatment of individuals, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary detention against West Papuan civilians (ACAPS 2022). Indonesia pursued Operation Clean Sweep in 1981 with the

intention of removing Papuans from specific areas to make way for transmigrants, an operation that resulted in the killing of at least 2,500 Papuans by Indonesian government estimates or as much as 13,000 Papuans, as claimed by Dutch journalists (Anderson 2015). Thus, widespread torture or violence has become the norm and is used as a mode of governance by Indonesia in West Papua (Anderson 2015). However, things were thought to turn around and provide hope for the West Papuan communities when Indonesian ruler, Suharto, was forced from power in 1998 with the new president, B.J Habibie, initially making efforts to recognize and apologize for the brutalities of the past regime (Human Rights Watch 2023).

The fall of Suharto's regime allowed for Indonesia to democratize, giving Papuans the opportunity to elevate their own accounts of what occurred and present their political concerns without fear of persecution (Viartasiwi 2018). When pro-Papuan independence activists arrived at a speech by then-Indonesian President, B.J Habibie, in late 1999 demanding, once again, for Papuan independence, all progress made towards elevating Papuan people and their dialogue was immediately suspended and resulted in an increased crackdown by Indonesian security forces (Human Rights Watch 2023). Eventually, the Indonesian government changed once again, bringing with it hope for Papuan independence that never came. Instead, the Indonesian state presented the Special Autonomy Law of 2001 which meant to give West Papua a certain degree of autonomy and, hopefully, appease the local Papuans enough to forgo their independence movement and demands (Anderson 2015).

Although a symbolic gesture of Indonesia's implied willingness to include and coordinate with West Papua in their political goals, little changed on the ground and within West Papuan territory. By late 2001, the Indonesian government had changed once again with a more hard-lined and anti- Papuan independence leader coming to power, leading to a handful of the

independence movement's leaders being jailed and one assassinated (MacLeod 2011). West Papuans reverted back to their guerilla warfare campaign after seeing disregard for their political desires within this law, thus resuming and escalating clashes between the OPM and Indonesian military, resulting in increased Indonesian militarization of the area and an increased death toll (May 2021).

Support for West Papuan independence grew and continued to be met with mass arrests and violence by Indonesia (May 2021). The Indonesian security forces facilitated, often indiscriminate, acts of violence including torture, rape, arbitrary detention, assault, shooting and killing civilians in an attempt to search for OPM or other militant group members, but with no regard for separating violent perpetrators with peaceful civilians (Anderson 2015). The rest of the conflict to current time has been characterized by regime changes in Indonesia, and thus changes in their policies towards West Papuan violent unrest, as well as sporadic clashes between Indonesian forces and West Papuan guerilla fighters. West Papua formulated a parallel government, the PDP, as a way to formally oppose Indonesian occupation (MacLeod 2011). With the formulation of this parallel government, the OPM actually declared a ceasefire with the hope that Indonesia would agree to peace talks with their newly established government and discuss the prospect of their independence (ULMWP 2020). Of course, this did not come and the steps the Indonesian government took to weaken the independence movement proved successful as the PDP almost immediately collapsed with nothing taking its place (MacLeod 2011).

Fighting and clashes between Indonesia and militant groups within the OPM and West Papua's independence movement continues to this day with no end in sight. Indonesia has severely restricted access into West Papua for foreign journalists and the outside world (Anderson 2015), preventing the West Papua independence movement from gaining recognition

and momentum outside of the island. Since the Suharto regime in Indonesia invaded and took control of West Papua in 1969, approximately 500,000 West Papuans are estimated to have been killed when fighting for their independence (Shahtahmasebi 2023). Demographic projections predict that Papuans, representing over 96% of West Papuan population in 1971, will constitute less than a third of West Papua's population in 2020, highlighting how Indonesia's brutality contributed to the disappearance and endangerment of West Papuan communities and culture (Anderson 2015). Despite all of this, much of the violence that has ensued and currently is occurring goes unreported by West Papuans due to fear of reprisal attacks, thus these numbers and figures being reported could be severely underestimating the bloodshed and loss that this conflict has created.

East Timor Independence Movement

Upon the change of government in Portugal that was deemed the catalyst for growing East Timor's domestic independence desires, several political parties formed within the territory with the two most popular obese being the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) (Fukada 2000). After failing to create a coalition and devolving into a civil war between the parties, Indonesia found its justification for intervening or, rather, invading, thus leading to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in December 1975 with its declaration of annexation coming in July 1976 (Fukada 2000). FRETILIN, the winner of the civil war that Indonesia claimed as reason for their intervention, met Indonesian forces with strong resistance via guerrilla warfare that lasted for up to two years post-invasion (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

Because of FRETILIN's extensive network throughout the region, Indonesia prioritized campaigns meant to sever those network ties and restructure East Timorese society in such a way that would prevent the growth and strength of FRETILIN. These campaigns led to decimation of entire villages with the East Timorese death toll from 1976-1980 being estimated at over 100,000, potentially over 230,000 out of the pre-invasion population of 650,000 (Fukada 2000). By the 1980s, Indonesia's brutal regime had destroyed the discussed armed resistance along with about one third of East Timor's population (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Indonesia's reliance on their armed forces to control and govern their occupation of East Timor was thought to eventually lead to their success in integrating East Timor into Indonesia fully, but it was this very militarized and terror approach that strengthened the East Timor resistance movement (Fukada 2000).

Nationalism in East Timor grew exponentially, particularly with the younger generations taking the lead throughout the resistance. Because of the economic inequalities the East Timorese faced and the influx of transmigrants taking jobs, the younger generations gravitated to the front of the resistance with the perspective that Indonesian colonizers, same as previous Portuguese colonizers, robbed them of their livelihood and culture (Fukada 2000). It was against this distaste for Indonesia that the resistance movement distanced itself from the use of violence throughout the mountains and reshaped into urban nonviolence (Hess and Martin 2006). The leaders of the previously armed and violent FRETILIN switched to desiring increased mass support for the struggle, meaning that the abandonment of violence was necessary to reach that goal. Thus, Xanana Gusmao, leader of FRETILIN, stepped down in September 1989 and, instead, formed the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM): a larger umbrella organization meant to include and intertwine all factions of the independence movement,

specifically non-partisan and thus allowing all East Timorese to participate in the struggle regardless of political affiliation (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Fukada 2000). The clandestine front of the CNRM is what spearheaded and was thought of as the center of the nonviolent political resistance in East Timor that eventually led to their independence being granted (Fukada 2000).

The clandestine front and the Executive Committee of the CNRM, meant to monitor and supervise activities, worked collaboratively in an attempt to have the nonviolent demonstrations coincide with foreign dignitaries and journalistic visits to the nation and its urban centers (Fukada 2000). In 1998, East Timorese youth ran to the altar during a visit from Pope John Paul II, shouting pro-independence rhetoric and showcasing pro-independence banners in an attempt to increase both domestic and international support for their cause via the media coverage at the event (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). While many of the youth demonstrators were able to evade capture, Indonesian forces were able to secure a small number of them, resulting in their capture, torture, and then eventual killing (Stephan 2005).

Similar protests and demonstrations were to occur throughout the next years, including during the visit of a US ambassador (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). In this visit, Indonesia convened the demonstrators, beat, and killed them (Stephan 2005). However, one of the larger turning points in this movement occurred in 1991: the Dili Massacre. The Executive Committee of the CNRM planned a peaceful memorial in November 1991 in honor and memory of a East Timorese youth killed by Indonesian forces, eventually devolving into violence sparked by Indonesian military troops (Fukada 2000). Indonesia's troops fired on and beat the mourners, leaving the CNRM to report at least 271 dead and Indonesia reporting 50 dead (Hess and Martin 2006). Despite the devastation and brutal force perpetuated by Indonesia in an attempt to quell

East Timorese society, demonstrations and protests continued and actually increased after the event (Fukada 2000), in part due to the broadcasting of the event by Western media (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

It was the clandestine front that planned and led nonviolent campaigns within East Timor and Indonesia, developing a large network of activists that relied upon nonviolent protests and educational campaigns to raise awareness about the situation (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). East Timorese individuals soon came to realize that Indonesians and East Timorese have a common enemy in the leader of Indonesia, Suharto (Martin et. al 2010). Thus, part of their nonviolent campaign was aimed at not only educating Indonesians on the brutality of their leader within East Timor, but also to coordinate with Indonesians and Indonesian organizations who were fighting against the incompetence of Suharto (Stephan and Mundy 2006). After 1991, East Timorese students met with Indonesian professors, religious leaders, and student groups in an attempt to bridge the gap between them (Martin et. al 2010).

East Timorese students stationed in Indonesia for university became increasingly active, forming student organizations with networks including pro-democracy organizations and Indonesian human rights groups (Fukada 2000). These East Timorese students utilized additional nonviolent resistance methods at optimal times and locations, such as various sit-ins within foreign embassies in Jakarta (Stephan and Mundy 2006). Students, both East Timorese and Indonesian, within Indonesia began to openly challenge Indonesian government and Suharto's regime, initially holding rallies off campus and then moving to off campus locations as a result of Indonesian police crackdown (Martin et. al 2010).

The CNRM convened its first National Conference in April 1998 as an attempt to convey its purpose of a unified front for the independence movement and resistance to Indonesian

occupation. It was at this convention that the Magna Charta was adopted with its hope to be the basis of an independent East Timor's constitution and the change of the CNRM's name to the National Council for Timorese Resistance, CNRT (Fukada 2000). Following this, Indonesia, too, changed its strategy of opposition to the CNRT. They increased the frequency of arrests and detentions for large numbers of people in an attempt to decrease the numbers of those engaging in social unrest (Fukada 2000). In Indonesia, too, Suharto's regime and Indonesian military continued to strike back at the student protestors, resulting in the killing of students and the temporary shutdown of Jakarta (Martin et. al 2010). The lack of armed resistance to Suharto's government aided East Timorese well in their movement as it garnered more popular support within both Indonesia and East Timor (Johansen et. al 2012). The growing distrust in Suharto, the massive protests, and the alienation and division amongst Suharto's administration coupled with the Asian financial crisis of 1997 led to the nonviolent overthrow and forced resignation of Suharto in May 1988 with B.J. Habibie taking his role (Stephan and Mundy 2006; Hess and Martin 2006).

Habibie's interim presidency was one characterized by the desire of restoring stability and credibility to Indonesia. Thus, Habibie pushed through a series of political and economic reforms including the release of political prisoners, establishment of a free press, and a proposal to discuss varying ranges of autonomy for East Timor (Fukada 2000). In June 1998, Habibie presented a proposal of special autonomy status for East Timor in exchange for their recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over their country (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This special autonomy proposition included giving East Timor privileges that were not enjoyed by other Indonesian provinces including its own provincial symbols and a separate police force (Anwar 2010). In response to this offer, East Timorese individuals went to work planning protests that

rejected special autonomy as being the final destination of East Timor's future (Stephan 2005). These protests coupled with mounting international pressure to be discussed later resulted in Habibie announcing that independence would be an option for East Timor if they rejected the special autonomy proposal (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This two option scenario proposed by Habibie in January 1999 stated that, if special autonomy for East Timor without any future referendum or discussion on the topic was rejected by its citizens, then East Timor would be granted independence and begin separation from Indonesia without an intermediate process (Anwar 2010).

In May 1999, an agreement was signed by Portugal, the United Nations, and Indonesia for a UN-supervised referendum deciding on the fate and final status of East Timor (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). On the final days leading up to the referendum, East Timorese youth campaigned door-to-door encouraging civilians to register to vote and support East Timor independence while Indonesian military instilled an atmosphere of terror, killing between 3,000 and 5,000 pro-independence individuals, in an attempt to have the outcome of the referendum be one of special autonomy only (Stephan 2005). On August 30th, 1999, the referendum was held with over 98% of eligible voters participating and over 75% of those voters electing to reject the special autonomy proposal from Indonesia (Liddle 2000; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Stephan 2005).

Upon the announcement of these results, Indonesian soldiers and pro-autonomy East Timorese militias began a campaign of total destruction: burning buildings, forcing roughly 400,000 East Timorese to flee, specifically targeting foreign journalists and UN staff (Schulze 2001). It is estimated that hundreds, if not thousands, of East Timorese were killed in this backlash from the referendum, hundreds of thousands were forced out of their homes, and the

capital city, Dili, was completely destroyed (Liddle 2000). Nevertheless, per the tripartite agreement signed in May 1999 and according to Habibie's two option proposal, Indonesia was now to give East Timor independence. The violence ensued for the rest of 1999, only coming to an end when the UN Security Council voted in favor of sending Australian-led UN international troops to calm the area in September 2000 (Anwar 2010; Schulze 2001). In October 2000, the UN Transitional Administration was established in East Timor and, after two years of a transitional period, East Timor was given its independence in May 2002, effectively becoming the world's newest independent state (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

West Papua and East Timor Compared: a Difference in International Support

The cross-comparison of West Papua and East Timor makes for a distinctively interesting phenomena in which one country utilized nonviolence and the other utilized political violence as the primary means for achieving their independence goals, despite the independence movements coinciding with one another and discussing separation from the same foreign occupier. West Papua and East Timor remain relatively consistent and similar on all factors noted by previous scholars' research. This coupled with Indonesia as the occupying state in both cases and the implementation of the same policies across both cases, thus, does not explain the difference in adopted methods for achieving their independence goal. However, similarly to Algeria and India, there is a very large difference in the international support, both quantitatively and qualitatively, between these two cases.

As stated within the discussion of Algeria and India, it is not just the presence of international support that determines a usage of nonviolence versus violence, but the kind of international support. The difference in the adoption of violence versus nonviolence in West

Papua and East Timor, respectively, relies upon the power and support of their allies. Despite West Papua receiving some international support, the countries giving that support are so miniscule that they have no imprint on the international world. East Timor did not have much support at the beginning of their movement, hence the use of violence, but was able to switch to nonviolence once international support began to appear, particularly from the time period's powerful nations.

The good news for West Papua is that international support for their independence cause continues to increase to this day. However, their violent movement has been going on for decades due to their inability to capture the right kind of international support: allies that are powerful enough to exert extensive pressure and influence onto Indonesia for West Papua to be freed. Vanuatu, a small Southern Pacific island nation, is one of the few nations that has continuously supported West Papuan independence (Tasevski 2021). Vanuatu has willingly acted as a confidant and safe haven for West Papua, providing asylum for those fleeing West Papua out of fear of persecution (Tasevski 2019). Vanuatu, along with some other island nations in the South Pacific, have increasingly been bringing the West Papuan problem to the international stage. Specifically, the Pacific Island governments have been discussing West Papua's violent occupation for years at the political Pacific Islands Forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, and occasionally the United Nations (Blades 2020).

In part due to this increased internationalization of the conflict, West Papua received record-breaking support at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2016 from the seven nations of Nauru, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu, Tonga, and Vanuatu (OPM 2016). In one instance in 2019, a petition signed by 1.8 million West Papuans was delivered to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights advocating for a United Nations

investigation into the human rights abuses they face and an internationally supervised referendum on the future of West Papua (Tasevski 2019). Thus, it is shown that lack of internationalizing the conflict is not the problem as West Papua has continuously done that, but the problem is the obstacles from the world powers and regional hegemonic nations of which West Papuans face.

With the West Papuan independence movement beginning in the 1960s with no end in sight, the most powerful player in the international world has consistently been the United States with some European nations holding significant influence. In the special scenarios of West Papua and East Timor, Australia acts as a regional hegemonic state for the South Pacific, making their stance and support also highly coveted. Specifically with the United States, and similar to the conditions that led them to not directly support Algeria or France throughout Algeria's War of Independence, their support of Indonesia over West Papua comes from a fear of communism spreading: if they opposed Indonesia's desire to overtake West Papua, they feared it would push the country towards Communism just as a way to oppose the US (Simpson 2004). Thus, while the US knew that Indonesia would not follow through with the required referendum as stipulated in the New York Agreement in 1962, they were in a precarious position of not wanting to make an enemy out of a country that had long been flirting with communism. The following United States administrations held onto this position of supporting Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua (Tasevksi 2019), with the reasons for doing so varying across time.

The United States, Australia, and other European countries' support for Indonesia in present times seems more tied to economics rather than the fear or threat of communism. Both the United States' and Australia's support for Indonesia is born from the understanding of Indonesia as the fourth most populous economic market and Southeast Asia's largest market

(Tasevski 2021). Britain, too, vehemently opposes West Papuan independence and believes that supporting such would question the sovereignty and integrity of Indonesia (Tasevski 2019). Maintaining diplomatic relations and alliances with Indonesia acts, in modern times, as securing loyalties throughout the growing regional threat of China posed against the West (Hamid and Lin 2020). Thus, opposing Indonesia would not only close off the mass amounts of economic revenue they receive from said market, but jeopardize their strategic alliances. In fact, in an attempt to maintain good relations with Indonesia, both Australia and the United States have supported Indonesian security forces through defense cooperation and counterterrorism efforts (Blades 2020). It is speculated that Britain, too, has aided in some form of training for Indonesian security forces as a strategic strengthening tool of the alliance between them and Indonesia, but the government has refused to publish a clear answer on that (James 2021).

Even Timor-Leste, formerly East Timor, refuses to support West Papua's independence from Indonesia as they desire to maintain positive relations with Indonesia as their most important and largest neighbor (Tasevski 2019). West Papua's immediate neighbor, Papua New Guinea, also sides with Indonesia continuously via supporting Indonesian sovereignty in West Papua and respect for said control despite the high domestic political risk for their country if they fail to address the human rights problems in West Papua (Blades 2020). Nevertheless, West Papua's failure in extracting support from the largest global powers hinders their movement's efficacy. With the United States and Australia being deeply entrenched and focused on maintaining and improving their strategic alliance with Indonesia, West Papua's movement will continue to be limited in progress and impact due to its lack of capturing support from regional hegemons (Tasevski 2019). However, more positively for West Papua, within Jakarta itself,

pockets of communities believe their movement has a serious chance for success if international support is allowed to increase and develop (Van den Broek and Szalay 2001).

Unlike West Papua, East Timor did not fail in capturing strategic and influential allies, although the road to get there was quite uneven. At its initial development, East Timor's independence movement lacked international support. Because of FRETILIN's violent response to Indonesia's invasion, international governments viewed the conflict as a war with no side morally superior as both engaged in violence (Hess and Martin 2006). Thus, many global powers initially supported Indonesia. In fact, it is a fact that the invasion of East Timor began less than 24 hours after the United States' President at the time, Gerald Ford, ended his visit in Jakarta (Lawless 1976). During 1970 and the beginning of this invasion, the Suharto regime was supported by major international funding and monetary organizations as well as multiple Western governments (Martin et. al 2010).

In the same way that the United States initially reasoned their support for Indonesia over West Papua, the United States' original reasoning for supporting Indonesia came from their perception of FRENTILIN having Marxist/ Communist ideologies (Muižarajs 2019). Australia, Britain, and the United States, along with others, all engaged in the sale of weapons to Indonesia and provided training for their military in their fight against East Timor (Hess and Martin 2006). In fact, the Indonesian forces that invaded East Timor were partly equipped with American weaponry (Lawless 1976). The only country to come out and condemn Indonesia's invasion at its onset was China, claiming that the independence desires of the East Timorese represented an integral part of the third world's problems against imperialism and colonialism (Lawless 1976). Needless to say, East Timor's initial violent fight against Indonesia's invasion did not bode well for them in acquiring international support.

The positions of the international world, however, slowly began to switch after news media circulated from the Dili Massacre in 1991. Luckily for East Timor, the massacre fully coincided with large geopolitical shifts at the end of the Cold War, causing Indonesia to lose its grounding as an integral force fighting the spread of communism (Muižarajs 2019). With the fight of communism being one of the primary reasons Indonesia garnered support for their invasion from some of the largest Global North powers, the dissolution of communist fears came with the decrease in support for Indonesia, especially after the circulation of the Dili Massacre's violence. Upon seeing this incident in which civilians were peacefully attending a memorial in which Indonesia openly fired on them, Australia's position shifted first. Seeing this destruction reminded Australia of how the Timorese were integral in preventing an Australian invasion by the Japanese throughout World War II with this reminder and awareness of Indonesia's brutality sparking the Australian press to investigate and publish stories of more Indonesian troop brutality in East Timor (Lawless 1976). The peacefulness of the East Timorese that was met by Indonesian violence garnered more international support, highlighting to East Timor that nonviolent demonstrations could expedite their independence goal.

Though previous Western and powerful nations' governments published positions in support of Indonesia, grassroots levels of support were consistently prevalent throughout the United States, Britain, Portugal, Australia, and others (Hess and Martin 2006). These grassroots movements only picked up in effort and support after the Dili Massacre. The East Timor Action Network was formed as a conglomerate representing numerous human rights organizations within the United States. In response to the Dili Massacre, it was able to apply an exorbitant amount of pressure onto the United States for their alignment with Indonesia and involvement in the conflict (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Successfully, this pressure applied by the East

Timor Action Network resulted in the United States Congress passing a resolution that cut

International Military Education Training funding to Indonesia (Lawless 1976; Hess and Martin

2006). Many other countries followed suit, including Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada all

cutting aid to Indonesia (Muižarajs 2019).

Interestingly enough, the positions the United States and Australia purported when

concerning East Timor and West Papua stand in contradiction to one another. The United States,

as previously stated, put restrictions on military aid sent to Indonesia in the 1990s due to their

alleged war crimes in East Timor (Hamid and Lin 2020), but refuse to continue that presently

during the West Papua conflict despite a similar amount of war crimes, if not more, being

committed by Indonesia in West Papua. Australia's bipartisan support of Indonesia over West

Papua, too, stands in contrast to their support for East Timor's independence from Indonesia

despite similar violence and suppression methods being used by Indonesian forces (Tasevski

2019).

While Australia respects Indonesia's sovereignty within West Papua, the Australian

Prime Minister, John Howard, wrote to President Habibie in Indonesia and advocated for East

Timor's independence from their occupation (Anwar 2010). The drastic difference we see here in

these nations' support, or lack thereof, for these two cases begs the question of how and why

these nations choose to support one's independence movement over the other. Nevertheless, East

Timor's independence referendum proposed by Indonesia came as an attempt to appease the

increasingly tense and hostile international community as well as a way to guarantee the

continued flow of funding from the World Bank and the IMF to Indonesia in light of their

economic crisis (Schulze 2001). The renewed international support for East Timor's cause

exerted extensive influence on Indonesia's policy, resulting in the establishment of the referendum and their eventual independence (Cotton 2000).

For one reason or another, East Timor's ability to garner international support aided in their switch from violent to nonviolent tactics. When initially using violence, the powerful and developed Global North nations such as the United States, Britain, and Australia aligned themselves strictly with Indonesia. However, upon realization of the inhumane brutality being used by Indonesian forces and the resiliency of the East Timorese, all of them switched sides in the conflict. It was in this switch that the East Timorese began using nonviolence, for they had succeeded in internationalizing their movement enough to garner attention and support from the nations that could actually make a difference.

In contrast, West Papua's failure in capturing support with extensive strength and influence needed to end their conflict did not come from their failure to internationalize. In many instances, they succeeded quite well in internationalizing their conflict in some of the same ways as Algeria did, including presenting the problem at the United Nations General Assembly numerous times. What prevented West Papua from not only receiving their independence, but forcing them to continue utilizing destructive nonviolence, was the rigidity of the Global North nations. Whether it was for self-interest or future strategic positioning, these powerful, Global North nations were not swayed by West Papua's cause, thus resulting in their escalation in violence to save themselves and the continuation of the conflict up to and through present time.

Conclusion

In both case sets, Algeria- India and West Papua-East Timor, the societies faced brutality and inequality at the hand of their colonizer. Both of the case sets' civilians were fighting against

historically strong empires and nations, fighting for the same sacred value that cannot be substituted: independence. All other factors remained similar and constant between the cases in each set, but one devolved into violence and the other relied largely upon nonviolence: why? It is true that all cases in question had international support and that their supporter's advocacy of their cause did help the movement garner more importance and international attention. However, it is the kind of international support that created this dichotomy in strategies used to achieve independence.

Because India garnered support for their independence from the most important, powerful, and influential nations at the time before, during, and after World War II that coincided with their independence movement, nonviolence was an accessible strategy for them. Knowing that they had support from the outside world that could put significant pressure onto Britain to free them, nonviolence was adaptable. Similarly, East Timor's seizure of support from the most pertinent and powerful Global North nations in question as a result of one-sided violence highlighted to them the benefits and efficacy of nonviolent usage. Because their support exponentially increased due to the circulation of one-sided violence, nonviolence became a plausible and preferred strategy as an attempt to continue increasing support that would inevitably result in their independence.

Algeria, on the other hand, had no international support for their cause when it began, causing them to need violence as no other nation was there to 'save' them. When they were able to internationalize their movement, the only nations that supported them were ones that had virtually no pull or authority strong enough to pressure France in ending their colonialism. West Papua, in contrast from all of the above, has been growing their international support, beginning initially with Vanuatu and spreading to include a handful of other South Pacific island nations.

While their international support has grown, and will most likely continue to grow, their international supporters are largely minor, impoverished Global South nations. Just like Algeria, these nations cannot provide adequate pressure onto Indonesia to release them. That, coupled with the Global North turning a blind eye to the issues in West Papua, has enabled Indonesia to continue occupation within and over West Papua, further cementing West Papua as part of their state and slowly diminishing hope for West Papua to ever be given their freedom.

    While all nations previously analyzed had some kind of international support for their cause, not all resulted in victory and strategies in achieving their independence goals split evenly: half relying on political violence, and the other half primarily using nonviolence. It is concluded that nonviolence usage in independence movements is dependent upon captivating support and aid from Global North, powerful nations with the ability to exert significant influence in the international community. To further ensure the accuracy of these findings, further research should be done, especially in other categories of conflicts. This includes exploring these findings within the realms of territorial conflicts, transnational conflicts, intrastate, and interstate conflicts. Because of the shift in international procedures and norms in the post-Cold War system, it is also important to discern these findings within the context of the current international order and behavioral models.

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