How Two Sunken Ships Caused a War: The Legal and Cultural Battle Between Great Britain, Canada, and the Inuit over the Franklin Expedition Shipwrecks

Christina LaBarge

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr

Part of the Admiralty Commons, Archaeological Anthropology Commons, Canadian History Commons, Civic and Community Engagement Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Cultural Heritage Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, European History Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Historic Preservation and Conservation Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Indigenous Studies Commons, International Business Commons, International Economics Commons, International Law Commons, International Relations Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law of the Sea Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Leisure Studies Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, Other History Commons, Other International and Area Studies Commons, Other Legal Studies Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Recreation, Parks and Tourism Administration Commons, Regional Economics Commons, Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons, Tourism Commons, and the Tourism and Travel Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol42/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
How Two Sunken Ships Caused a War: The Legal and Cultural Battle Between Great Britain, Canada, and the Inuit over the Franklin Expedition Shipwrecks

Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate, 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. in the Program of Liberal Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2012. This article is a student note completed in Spring 2018. I would like to thank Professor Jeffery Atik and James Trotter for their advice with this note. I would also like to thank the hardworking editors and staff of the International and Comparative Law Review.
How Two Sunken Ships Caused a War: The Legal and Cultural Battle Between Great Britain, Canada, and the Inuit over the Franklin Expedition Shipwrecks

BY CHRISTINA LABARGE*

I. INTRODUCTION

The 2014 and 2016 discoveries of the Franklin Expedition shipwrecks HMS *Erebus* and HMS *Terror* in the Canadian Arctic solved a mystery that had gripped the public imagination for almost two centuries. Both the HMS *Erebus* and the HMS *Terror* contain important clues as to why the disastrous 1845 search for the Northwest Passage ended in the deaths of all 129 men on board. The discoveries also ignited a legal battle for ownership of the wrecks between Britain, the Canadian federal government, and the Inuit of Nunavut (the Canadian territory where the ships were discovered). Ownership has been contested because the artifacts have significant cultural heritage value to all three cultures and they generate substantial tourism revenue.

Although Britain has indicated it will assign ownership over the wrecks to Canada pursuant to a 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two countries, today, four years after the discovery of HMS *Erebus*, negotiations continue over which artifacts Britain will keep and how it will compensate Canada for recovering them. After much dispute, the Canadian government and the Inuit have also agreed to

---

* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. in the Program of Liberal Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2012. This article is a student note completed in Spring 2018.

I would like to thank Professor Jeffery Atik and James Trotter for their advice with this note. I would also like to thank the hardworking editors and staff of the International and Comparative Law Review.

1. *See infra* Part II. B., Part IV. A., Part V. A.
2. *See infra* Part II. B.
3. *See infra* Part III, Part IV. B.
4. *See infra* Part VI.
5. *See infra* Part V. C.
co-ownership of the artifacts once Britain assigns ownership to Canada in accordance with the MOU. 6

The debate over the Franklin artifacts has been not only about legal rights but also the right to define the legacy of the Franklin expedition to British, Canadian, and Inuit culture. 7 The expedition simultaneously implicates the British age of exploration, Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic and the Northwest Passage, and the impact of Western civilization on traditional Inuit culture. 8 Section II traces the history of the Franklin expedition. Section III provides an overview of the overlapping legal claims to the Franklin artifacts. Section IV describes the discovery of the HMS Erebus and the ensuing legal conflict. Section V lays out the subsequent discovery of the HMS Terror and the continuing legal conflict over both wrecks. Section VI discusses how global and national cultural heritage claims have influenced the legal battle for ownership over the Franklin artifacts. Section VII addresses the international conventions that provide benchmarks for proper shipwreck conservation to examine the various major issues which archaeologists will have to address when dealing with the Franklin wrecks and artifacts.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE FRANKLIN EXPEDITION

A. The Expedition and Its Disappearance

When Sir John Franklin departed from England in 1845 on his fatal expedition to the Canadian Arctic, he was a veteran British naval officer with a distinguished history of service in the Napoleonic Wars, the War of 1812, and three previous Arctic exploration missions. 9 He also previously served as governor of the British colony in what is now Tasmania. 10 After a scandal in Tasmania tarnished his reputation, Franklin and his wife believed that successful leadership of the 1845 expedition would rehabilitate his reputation and allow him to retire a hero. 11 The Royal Navy leaders, who thought Franklin was too old for the job, eventually overcame their qualms and appointed him commander of the expedition. 12 In May 1845, Franklin and his crew departed from London with much fanfare on the HMS Erebus and HMS Terror, with

6. See infra Part IV. B.
7. See discussion infra Part VI. A.
8. See discussion infra Part VI. B, VI. C, VI.D.
10. See id. at 4-5.
11. See id at 3-4, 6-8.
12. See id. at 6-7.
the goal of finding the Northwest Passage. The conversation with a whaler two months later near the Canadian Arctic archipelago proved to be the last contact the expedition had with the outside world.

**B. The Search Expeditions for the Franklin Expedition**

After several years of ominous silence from the Arctic, it was clear to those in England that the expedition had run into serious problems, if not disaster. The failure of the expedition to reemerge stimulated many search parties whose efforts gripped the public imagination. As one Franklin historian wrote, it was “the most extensive, expensive, perversive, ill-starred, and abundantly written-about manhunt in history.” From 1847 to 1859, nearly forty search expeditions hunted for any clue as to the crew’s fate. In 1854, explorer John Rae returned to England with horrifying news: the starving Franklin survivors, all of whom were now dead, had turned to cannibalism in their last days. The Inuit told Rae they had seen a group of starving white men in 1850 and had later discovered the bodies of about thirty white men. Rae located the site and confirmed that, given the state of the mutilated bodies, the survivors had “been driven to the last dread alternative.” He brought back various relics from the site, including Sir John Franklin’s Star of the Hanoverian Order of Knighthood and other objects inscribed with the names or initials of Franklin crew members.

Rae’s report outraged both Lady Franklin and the British public, and a “shock of horror … swept across the civilized world.” Britain immediately went up in arms and responded with total condemnation towards the Inuit. Rae must have been telling “the wild tales of a herd...”

---

13. See id. at 32-33.
14. See id. at 43.
17. See Watson, supra note 9, at xxx.
18. See Watson, supra note 9, at 156-57; See Scott Cookman, Ice Blink: The Tragic Fate of Sir John Franklin’s Lost Polar Expedition 176-78 (2000).
19. See Owen Beattie & John Geiger, Frozen in Time: The Fate of the Franklin Expedition xvi (2017); see also Watson, supra note 9, at 153.
20. See Watson, supra note 9, at 154.
21. See id. at 154-55.
23. See Schulz, supra note 16.
of savages.” Charles Dickens wrote a “long tirade against the lying, savage ‘Esquimaux’ in his own magazine,” even accusing the Inuit themselves of killing the Franklin survivors. This characterization of the Inuit continued to recent times: as late as 1997, in his book *Sir John Franklin’s Arctic Expedition*, R.J. Cyriax discounts stories that the Inuit murdered the survivors for their possessions because “it must have been obvious even to them that the course of events would shortly make murder unnecessary.”

As the furor over Rae’s gruesome discovery died down, the British public turned its attention from the Franklin search to the Crimean War. Lady Jane Franklin refused to give up hope, and, in 1857, she purchased the *Fox* and hired Captain Francis McClintock to perform one more search for her husband. McClintock’s expedition, itself trapped in the ice for an entire winter, made several key discoveries. McClintock’s lieutenant found notes in a cairn (a structure made of loose stones) in which survivors “briefly detailed Franklin’s death, their ships’ long imprisonment in sea ice, and the decision to abandon them.” They even discovered a ship’s boat with two skeletons in it and a number of other items from the ship. They also bartered with the Inuit for items clearly from the Franklin expedition, which the Inuit said they had gathered from a shipwreck nearby. Thanks to the note, Lady Franklin at last knew her husband died on June 11, 1847—long before the real suffering of the majority of the crew began. McClintock tried to comfort her by telling her that Franklin had “died with reason to hope his mission would succeed.”

In the late 1870s, an expedition sponsored by the American Geographical Society set out to look for any remaining Franklin documents or records. In stark contrast to the Franklin crew, they travelled over 3000 miles by dog sled, in -50°F weather, without any

---

24. See Watson, supra note 9, at 157.
26. See Watson, supra note 9, at 157.
29. See Watson, supra note 9, at 162-163; see also Beattie & Marsh, supra note 28.
30. See Watson, supra note 9, at 165.
31. See id. at 167.
32. See id. at 167–68.
33. See id. at 166.
34. See id. at 170.
35. See id.
36. See id.
fatalities, injuries, or ill health, because they had adopted Inuit clothing, diet, and means of shelter. While they did unfortunately discover that any surviving documents had been destroyed because the Inuit had left them to the mercy of the elements or given them to their children as playthings, they also found a number of skeletons and confirmed many of the Inuit oral accounts about the locations of the ships and their encounters with the Franklin crew members.

Searches for the Franklin expedition continued throughout the 20th century with each expedition slowly piecing together more clues. In the 1980s, forensic anthropologist Owen Beattie exhumed three Franklin sailors buried on Beechey Island. His discovery of high levels of lead in the bodies gave rise to the theory that lead poisoning had caused the sailors to make erratic decisions which greatly reduced their chances of survival. In 1997, after 150 years of searching, Great Britain and Canada came to an agreement about how they would proceed if the Franklin Expedition ships were ever discovered.

III. CONFLICTING LEGAL CLAIMS TO OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE FRANKLIN SHIPWRECKS BEFORE DISCOVERY: HIERARCHY OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE FRANKLIN SHIPWRECKS


The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the relevant international law regime for determining ownership over the shipwrecks. Under UNCLOS, the sovereignty of a coastal and/or archipelagic state like Canada extends beyond “its land territory and internal waters and … archipelagic waters, to an adjacent
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea." Therefore, under UNCLOS, Canada has undisputed jurisdiction over any wrecks found within its internal waters and territorial sea. However, under traditional maritime law, a state retains “flag state jurisdiction” over vessels flying the flag of that state. UNCLOS Articles 95 and 96 grant “complete immunity” to flagships that are either “warships on the high seas” or state-owned and operated ships “used only on government non-commercial service.”

HMS Erebus and HMS Terror would be considered British flagships under UNCLOS Article 29’s criteria: (1) they were Royal Navy ships; (2) they bore external marks, such as the British flag, distinguishing their nationality; (3) they were under the command of Sir John Franklin, a government-commissioned officer; (4) their names appeared in the service lists; and (5) they were manned by a Royal Navy crew. Complete immunity for flagships extends to the “territorial sea of another state, provided that the rules of innocent passage are respected.” Therefore, as Erebus and Terror respected the rules of innocent passage by not acting in a manner “prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State,” Britain retained flag state jurisdiction and sovereign immunity over the ships during their voyage to the Canadian Arctic.

Scholars disagree as to whether flag state jurisdiction and sovereign immunity extend to wrecks of flag ships that sink outside of the flag state territory. While some scholars opine that immunity is not retained after a ship sinks, others assert that sunken warships remain state property. While the law is unsettled as to the flag state’s right to be advised or consulted as to its flagship in another coastal state’s territorial waters, coastal states often do initiate contact with those flag states, whether because of “the belief that there is a legal obligation to contact the flag state … for reasons of diplomatic courtesy, or because of uncertainty over the international legal position.” Flag states rely on the state property argument when asserting their immunity claims over sunken flag ships.

45. See id. Part II, § 1, art. 2(1).
48. See id. at Part II, § 3, subsec. C, art. 29.
49. See DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 136.
51. See DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 19, 137.
52. See id. at 137-38.
53. See id. at 140.
which Britain clearly did in the MOU describing them as “two wrecked ships of Her Majesty’s Royal Navy within Canada.”

B. The Canada-Britain Memorandum of Understanding of 1997

In 1997, Canada and Britain signed the “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of Great Britain and Canada Pertaining to the Shipwrecks HMS Erebus and HMS Terror” (MOU) to create a preliminary solution for Britain and Canada’s competing claims to the artifacts. The MOU asserted that Britain would retain legal ownership and sovereign immunity over the wrecks and their contents, but assigned custody and control over the investigation, excavation, and recovery of the wrecks to Canada. Britain also stated its intention to formally assign ownership of the wrecks and their contents to Canada once either one was positively located and identified. However, Britain retained ownership rights over “any gold recovered from the wrecks,” and, more significantly, “any recovered artifacts identified by Britain as being of outstanding significance to the Royal Navy.” Current negotiations over the artifacts are proceeding slowly largely because Britain wants to retain some of the most significant artifacts from the wrecks pursuant to the MOU, as will be discussed infra.

C. Canadian Federal Law

The Canadian federal government has jurisdiction over wrecks within Canada under the Canada Shipping Act, which designates the Parks Canada Agency (Parks Canada) as the administrative body overseeing “the protection and preservation of wreck[s] … that have heritage value.” The Parks Canada Agency Act gives Parks Canada authority over “the implementation of the policies of the Government of Canada that relate to … national historic sites.” Internally, Parks Canada has created the Guidelines for the Management of Archaeological Resources, which establish federal authority and legal procedures over any archaeological sites and excavations on “federal lands and lands

54. See Can-Gr. Brit. MOU; see also DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 138.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
61. See Parks Canada Agency Act, S.C.1998, c 31 (Can.).
underwater." In 1992, to ensure that the wrecks would be under Parks Canada jurisdiction, the Minister of Canadian Heritage declared that once the wrecks were located, their locations would become National Historic Sites.

When Britain and Canada signed the MOU in 1997, the legal standing of the undiscovered shipwrecks was relatively clear. Britain retained legal ownership over the wrecks, while Parks Canada had the legal authority to conduct archeological excavations under Canadian federal law and the MOU. Neither party anticipated that a third entity would eventually claim joint ownership over the wrecks: the recently formed Canadian territory of Nunavut.

1. The Territorial Law of Nunavut

   a. The Formation of Nunavut

   Nunavut is a Canadian territory, officially formed in 1999 out of the Northwest Territory, which includes the traditional lands of the Inuit, the indigenous people of Arctic Canada. The territory is a vast area of more than 700,000 square miles (2 million square kilometres), with fewer than 40,000 residents, of whom 85% are Inuit. The Inuit embarked on the political campaign to create Nunavut in response to what they viewed as centuries of paternalistic mistreatment by the Canadian government. Most recently, in the early 1950s, the Canadian government—without consulting the Inuit—established permanent settlements in the Canadian Arctic and went to great lengths to end the traditional Inuit nomadic, subsistence-based lifestyle. Inuit were not consulted on the new government policies. Inuit children were forcibly removed from their homes and placed in residential schools where they received a Western education.

---


63. See id.

64. See Can-Gr. Brit. MOU, supra note 43.


67. See Rae, supra note 65; See also Ken Coates, The ‘Gentle’ Occupation: The Settlement of Canada and the Dispossession of the First Nations, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA & NEW ZEALAND (1999).

68. See Kikkert, supra note 66, see also WATSON, supra note 9, at 4, 5.

69. See Kikkert, supra note 66, at 15.
education, often suffering physical and sexual abuse while they were there.\textsuperscript{70}

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Inuit discussed creating a new territory through a land claim which they could govern themselves.\textsuperscript{71} It took two more decades for the Inuit to create a feasible plan that was ratified by the Canadian government and public.\textsuperscript{72} In 1993 the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act and the Nunavut Act were both passed into law.\textsuperscript{73} The territory officially came into being on April 1, 1999.\textsuperscript{74} The creation of Nunavut was a victory for the Inuit, who “overcame many obstacles to peacefully establish a government that they controlled within the Canadian state, thereby gaining control of their land, their resources, and their future.”\textsuperscript{75} The Inuit dispute with Parks Canada over control of the Franklin artifacts is the first time some of the rights being claimed by the Inuit in the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement are being tested.

b. Nunavut Jurisdiction Over Archeological Discoveries

Article 33 of the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act (Land Claims Agreement) gives the Nunavut government jurisdiction over archaeological sites and artifacts in its territory.\textsuperscript{76} Article 33 expresses the need for Inuit control over Nunavut’s archaeological record because of its “spiritual, cultural, religious, and educational importance to Inuit” and created the Inuit Heritage Trust for that purpose.\textsuperscript{77} Article 33 also granted the federal government and the Inuit Heritage Trust joint ownership of all archeological specimens in Nunavut not within areas administered by the Canadian Parks Service.\textsuperscript{78} These provisions, along with a provision giving the Inuit Heritage Trust authority to create a permit system for Nunavut archaeological sites, have played key roles in the power struggle between Parks Canada and Nunavut over the Franklin artifacts.\textsuperscript{79}

Nunavut’s internal authority is reinforced by Parks Canada’s Guidelines for the Management of Archaeological Resources (Guidelines), which states that land claims agreements “are legally

\textsuperscript{70} See \textsc{Watson}, supra note 9, at 204-205.
\textsuperscript{71} See \textsc{Kikkert}, supra note 66, at 15.
\textsuperscript{72} See \textit{id.} at 16.
\textsuperscript{73} See \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{74} See \textit{id.} at 17.
\textsuperscript{75} See \textit{id.} at 1.
\textsuperscript{76} See Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, S.C.1993, c 29 (Can.).
\textsuperscript{77} See \textit{id.} at 226.
\textsuperscript{78} See \textit{id.} at 229.
\textsuperscript{79} See \textit{id.} at 227.
binding and override [Parks Canada] policies and directives." The Guidelines also mandate, "Parks Canada must [further] adhere to sections and clauses in land claim agreements pertaining to archaeology and heritage on lands and lands underwater under its administration." As will be discussed infra, Parks Canada’s jurisdictional deference to Nunavut made it imperative for Parks Canada to quickly declare HMS Erebus a National Historic Site to bring it within their jurisdiction.

IV. THE HMS EREBUS

A. The Discovery of the HMS Erebus

In 2008, Stephen Harper took office as Prime Minister of Canada and announced that the Canadian government would revive the search for the Franklin ships. Over the next seven years, it funded six search expeditions in partnership with public, private, and non-profit groups. Harper was motivated by both a genuine interest in the lost expedition and his political agenda to assert Canadian sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic and Northwest Passage, which is discussed infra. Harper believed his team would succeed where others had failed because they were consulting Inuit historian Louie Kamookak on Inuit oral history about the Franklin expedition.

Kamookak was central to the discovery of the Franklin ships and, shortly before his untimely death in March 2018, was appointed to the Order of Canada for his "relentless dedication to collecting and showcasing the stories of the Inuit of Nunavut." Kamookak was an Inuk.

81. See id.
85. See Canada launches new Arctic search for Franklin’s lost ships, supra note 82.
who was raised in the traditional manner before he was forcibly removed from his family and made to attend a residential school, where he first heard about Sir John Franklin. After he returned home, he became increasingly fixated on finding Franklin’s burial place and interviewed the elders of his tribe about stories that had been passed down to them through the generations. Over the years he pieced together an impressive collection of Inuit oral history, adding to the “long record of Inuit histories” regarding the Franklin expedition, and was considered the Inuit expert on the topic.

Jim Basilie, the Canadian billionaire co-founder of RIM (the firm which invented the Blackberry), was another key player in the discovery of the Franklin ships. In 2010, after three years of unsuccessful Parks Canada searches for the shipwrecks, Basilie was intrigued by a news broadcast about the expeditions. On a trip to the area near where the Franklin ships had been abandoned, Basilie saw a Russian icebreaker searching for the shipwrecks. Frustrated that other countries seemed more engaged in finding the wrecks than Canada, Basilie committed $10 million of his personal fortune to finding at least one Franklin wreck. He founded the Arctic Research Foundation in 2011 with Tim McDonald, another wealthy Canadian businessman. The Foundation brought much needed funding to the search, which continued for the next two summers without success.

The tipping point came in the summer of 2014 when, by chance, Kamookak met Ryan Harris, a Parks Canada archaeologist-diver. When Harris told Kamookak that his team was planning to search for the Franklin ships “off the northwest coast of King William Island,” “Kamookak suggested they search an area farther south.” When the expedition was prevented by sea ice from reaching its original search area, the team turned its attention to the southern area Kamookak had

---

87. See Watson, supra note 9, at 187, 207-11.
88. See id. at 211-12.
89. See id. at 225; Cracuin, The Disaster of Franklin, supra note 84, at 191, 202.
90. See Watson, supra note 9, at 298-99.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 299.
94. Id at 300.
95. See id. The Arctic Research Foundation partly funded the expedition that found Erebus in 2014, and also bought an Arctic research vessel, which discovered the Terror in 2016.
96. See McGoogan, supra note 15, at 390.
97. See id.
mentioned. On August 13, 2014, several archaeologists visited a small island off the west coast of the Adelaide Peninsula as part of their systematic search while survey boats continued their sonar scan of the sea floor. They found a piece of iron with telltale Royal Navy arrow markings, as well as two pieces of wood from a ship’s deck.

The team searched for several more weeks, moving ever closer to the small island where the artifacts were found, and, on September 2, 2014, they viewed the underwater sonar robot’s live sonar feed to see a ship standing upright on its keel in thirty-six feet of water, with the top of its deck just nine feet from the surface. Over the next weeks, marine archaeologists confirmed that the ship was Sir John Franklin’s flagship, the HMS Erebus. They brought up numerous artifacts, including the ship’s bell, to much fanfare from the Canadian government; Harper declared that the find solved “one of Canada’s greatest mysteries” and was “truly a historic moment for Canada.”

B. The Initial Conflict between Parks Canada and the Nunavut Government

After the discovery of Erebus, Parks Canada and the Nunavut government quickly realized they had very different ideas about who would retrieve and manage the artifacts. In spring 2015, Parks Canada applied to the Nunavut government for a permit authorizing its divers to retrieve artifacts from Erebus as part of its first official archaeological expedition to the site. However, relying on Article 33 of the Land Claims Agreement, the Nunavut government instead issued a permit that allowed the divers to visit the site but not to retrieve artifacts. When Parks Canada stated that the limitation was unacceptable, the Nunavut government informed the agency that they could be charged under the

98. See id.
99. See Watson, supra note 9, at 313-14.
100. See id. at 315.
101. See id. at 317-18
103. See Watson, supra note 9, at 322; See Franklin Ship Discovery: Stephen Harper’s Full Statement, supra note 102; see also Lost Franklin Expedition Ship Found in the Arctic, CBC News (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/lost-franklin-expedition-ship-found-in-the-arctic-1.2760311.
104. See Dean Beeby, Parks Canada Juggles Competing Claims to Franklin Shipwrecks, CBC News (Mar. 8, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/beta/news/politics/parks-canada-franklin-wrecks-artifacts-1.347
105. Id.
106. See id.
Nunavut Act if they did not comply, and Parks Canada reluctantly backed down. 107 Nunavut’s victory was short-lived: on April 8, 2015, the Canadian government officially added the Erebus wreck site to the Wrecks of HMS Erebus and HMS Terror National Historic Site of Canada which the Canadian government had created in 1992 before the wrecks were located. 108 Once the Erebus site was an official National Historic Site, it was firmly under Parks Canada jurisdiction because Nunavut’s permit regulations and archaeological policies applied only to lands within Nunavut not administered by Parks Canada. 109

However, Parks Canada’s authority over the wreck site was not absolute; as mentioned supra, Parks Canada’s Guidelines require the agency to “adhere to sections and clauses in land claim agreements pertaining to archaeology and heritage on lands and lands underwater under its administration.” 110 Additionally, Article 33 requires that any archaeological specimen found within an area of Nunavut administered by the Canadian Parks Service must be jointly managed in accordance with the provisions of Article 33. 111 Also, because the site is located on Nunavut territory, Parks Canada had to negotiate an Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement (IIBA) with the Inuit Heritage Trust. 112

Parks Canada appears to have ignored all these requirements until it was convenient to address them. Parks Canada took over the Erebus site, and because of the “urgent” need to protect the site, the agency was given a five-year window within which to negotiate the IIBA with the Inuit Heritage Trust. 113 In the summer of 2015, Parks Canada underwater archaeologists returned to Erebus and recovered artifacts with the help of Royal Canadian Navy divers. 114 Their many finds included small brass tunic buttons, a cannon, and ceramic plates that are part of the first major Franklin museum exhibition, Death in the Ice, which began at England’s

107. See id.
108. Order Amending the National Historic Sites of Canada Order, SOR/2015-88 at 1.
110. See PARKS CANADA, supra note 80 at 11.
111. See Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, S.C. 1993 at 229.
112. See id. at Art. 33.4 at 226; Order Amending the National Historic Sites of Canada Order, SOR/2015-88 at 3.
113. Id. at 6.
National Maritime Museum, and moved in March 2018 to the Canadian Museum of History in Gatineau, Quebec.\textsuperscript{115} Parks Canada’s handling of the \textit{Erebus} situation appears to have created bad blood between the two groups that continues to this day despite Parks Canada’s later conciliatory efforts towards inclusion, discussed \textit{infra}. One issue the two entities needed to resolve was that the then-undiscovered HMS \textit{Terror} almost certainly lay outside of the \textit{Erebus} National Historic Site boundaries.\textsuperscript{116} When found, the \textit{Terror} would be under Nunavut jurisdiction and Parks Canada would have to apply for Nunavut’s permission to recover artifacts from the \textit{Terror}.\textsuperscript{117} Nunavut clearly was not going to hand over ownership of the Franklin artifacts to Parks Canada without a fight; when IIBA talks began in 2015, the Inuit Heritage Trust stated that “ownership and control of Franklin artifacts is a priority because the Inuit want the objects to be displayed in local communities to enhance tourism.”\textsuperscript{118}

After their initial conflict, Parks Canada agreed in June 2015 that it would seek permission in the future from Nunavut’s director of heritage before divers removed any \textit{Terror} artifacts found on the seabed.\textsuperscript{119} The agency took further conciliatory actions over the next year by planning for Parks Canada and Nunavut to jointly manage the national historic site, as well as planning a Franklin visitor and field research center in the tiny Nunavut town of Gjoa Haven, near the \textit{Erebus} site.\textsuperscript{120} In March 2016, Parks Canada announced $16.9 million in funding for investigating \textit{Erebus}, continuing to search for \textit{Terror}, contributing to economic development in Nunavut, and “creat[ing] employment opportunities in local Inuit communities.”\textsuperscript{121} The Franklin Interim Advisory Committee, comprising Parks Canada, the Kitikmeot Inuit Association, the Government of Nunavut, the Inuit Heritage Trust, Nunavut Tourism, and local community representatives, was also created to advise Parks Canada

\begin{footnotes}
\item[116.] Beeby, \textit{supra} note 104.
\item[117.] \textit{See id.} at 4.
\item[118.] \textit{See id.} at 6.
\item[119.] \textit{See id.} at 4.
\item[121.] \textit{See id.}
\end{footnotes}
on the management of the National Historic Site until the IIBA is finalized.122

The Inuit had a very different perspective on the actions Parks Canada took and still felt they were not being treated as equal stakeholders in the Erebus site and artifacts. For example, when Parks Canada released details about the proposed Franklin research center in Gjoa Haven, an Inuit Heritage Trust representative said, “We were surprised to hear the news, and we were not directly consulted about our involvement on this one.”123 Gjoa Haven already has a museum devoted to Inuit traditional knowledge, the Nattilik Heritage Centre, and the Inuit Heritage Trust perhaps would have recommended expanding that center instead of building a new facility if they had been consulted.124

Additionally, in April 2016, Cathy Towtongie, a Nunavut representative, wrote a letter to Parks Canada minister Catherine McKenna expressing concern over the possibility that Inuit representatives would be excluded from the artifact negotiations, as any agreements would “directly impact Inuit treaty rights.”125 In May 2016, without responding to Towtongie’s letter, Parks Canada did negotiate about Franklin artifacts with the National Museum of the Royal Navy in Portsmouth, England.126 They did not include Inuit representatives and decided to consult with the Inuit only after they had reached an agreement with Great Britain.127 While a Parks Canada representative stated at the time, “Parks Canada is committed to exploring options for co-ownership of the artifacts with our Inuit partners,” Parks Canada seems to have intended for the Inuit to have “co-ownership” only on terms dictated by Parks Canada.128

122. See id.


128. See Beeby, supra note 126.
The two entities made progress towards Inuit inclusion when, in August 2016, Towtongie sent another letter to Parks Canada, which responded, “We will seek concurrence with the National Museum of the Royal Navy to include the Inuit Heritage Trust in all future discussions related to the transfer of the artifacts.” Towtongie described the response as “a first good step,” but added, “We want to sit with the government of Canada when they’re negotiating with Britain.” Later in August 2016, when Parks Canada announced their 2016 Franklin search expedition, they emphasized their continued collaboration with the Inuit, a claim that is questionable under the circumstances. It was in this tension-filled atmosphere that, in September 2016, the HMS Terror was found.

V. THE HMS TERROR

A. The Discovery of the HMS Terror

In September 2016, the next official search expedition set off to look for the Terror, with only nine days allotted for the search. An Inuk named Sammy Kogvik was part of the crew of the Arctic Research Foundation ship Martin Bergmann. Kogvik claimed that six or seven years prior, he was crossing the sea ice in Terror Bay on a snowmobile when he saw a pole of wood sticking out of the ice. He and his companion realized that it was a mast and they took photographs. The next day, his father-in-law followed the same trail and also saw the mast. When they returned to Gjoa Haven, however, Kogvik’s camera was gone; it had fallen out of his pocket. Without evidence of his find, Kogvik resolved to say nothing because he didn’t “trust” Parks Canada. In 2016, however, he mentioned the story to Adrian Schimnowski, the Bergmann’s captain, who got permission to detour the ship to Terror.

129. See Kassam, supra note 125.
130. See id.
132. See WATSON, supra note 9, at 324.
133. See id. at 325.
134. See id. at 326–27.
135. See id. at 327.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See Cracuin, The Disaster of Franklin, supra note 84, at 191; WATSON, supra note 9, at 327.
After a day of fruitless searching, the crew agreed to give up and move on to another bay, but as they motored out, a large object appeared on the sounder display. It was a ship with three masts, sitting in just under eighty feet of water. The ship was in such pristine condition that Schimnowski remarked, “[i]f you could lift this boat out of the water, and pump the water out, it would probably float.” On September 3, 2016, the HMS Terror had been discovered at last.

The find corroborated Inuit tales of mass death at Terror Bay and their encounters with starving white men nearby. Parks Canada’s news releases highlighted “the importance of Inuit knowledge” to the “extraordinary find,” although always in the problematic context of the “validation” of the truth of Inuit knowledge, discussed infra. In contrast to Harper’s exuberant press release stating the national importance of the discovery of Erebus, current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau celebrated the discovery of Terror via a short video and a tweet: “The second ship lost in the Franklin Expedition has been found! #HMSTerror lying off King William Island.” However, despite all the celebrations, the issues between Parks Canada and the Nunavut government regarding control of Erebus and Terror were still far from being resolved.

B. Control Over the Terror Wreck Site

The continued tension between Parks Canada and Nunavut is highlighted by two events that took place on September 26, 2016. First, Parks Canada officially confirmed that the discovered wreck was the Terror and stated, “[w]orking together to advance joint ownership of these historic artifacts is an opportunity to strengthen our Government’s

139. See Watson, supra note 9, at 327-28.
140. Id. at 329.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 331.
144. See Watson, supra note 9, at 332.
relationship with Inuit in Nunavut.\textsuperscript{147} Second, Nunavut premier Peter Taptuna wrote a letter on the same day to Prime Minister Trudeau accusing Parks Canada of taking the Erebus artifacts without permission.\textsuperscript{148} The letter was made public nearly a year later, just before the first exhibition of Erebus artifacts opened at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England, in July 2017.\textsuperscript{149} Many news outlets picked up the letter and drew public attention to the tension between Parks Canada and the Inuit Heritage Trust, increasing the pressure on Parks Canada to be more inclusive of the Inuit.\textsuperscript{150}

One positive outcome of increased inclusiveness and collaboration through the Franklin Interim Advisory Committee is the new Inuit Guardians program.\textsuperscript{151} In the summer of 2017, Parks Canada hired seventeen “Inuit guardians” from Gjoa Haven to watch over the National Historic Site and to make sure no unauthorized groups tried to visit the wrecks.\textsuperscript{152} Kamookak viewed this program as an important example of how the Inuit can be validly involved in management of the site, which is in their traditional hunting area.\textsuperscript{153} Another positive outcome is the Umiyaqtutt (Shipwreck) Festival, which was first held in September 2017 in Gjoa Haven and focused on the Franklin expedition and the historically “important role Inuit knowledge and community involvement” played in the discovery of the wrecks.\textsuperscript{154} Parks Canada also stated, in a new release

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{148} See generally, Jane Sponagle, In Letter to PM, Nunavut Premier said Parks Canada Took Franklin Artifacts without Permission, CBC NEWS (July 11, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nunavut-premier-letter-franklin-artifacts-1.4198611.
  \item \textsuperscript{149} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} Kate Kyle, Inuit Guardians ‘Happy and Proud’ to Protect Franklin’s Ships, CBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/inuit-guardians-happy-and-proud-to-protect-franklin-s-ships-1.4279482.
  \item \textsuperscript{153} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{154} Press Release, Parks Can. Agency, The Government of Canada Recognizes the National Historic Importance of the Wrecks of HMS Erebus and HMS Terror (Sept. 2, 2017),
that it was working with the Inuit Heritage Trust on an “Interim Memorandum of Understanding to ensure that all decisions regarding the artifacts will be made jointly while negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom continue.”

C. Official Assignment of Ownership Over the Wrecks

Just a short while later, on October 23, 2017, Britain formally stated its intention to assign ownership of the wrecks to Parks Canada. While Britain did not mention Nunavut, perhaps viewing the issue as an internal Canadian one, Parks Canada stated in its news release that it continued to be committed to co-ownership of the Franklin artifacts with the Inuit. This commitment was demonstrated when, on December 8, 2017, the Terror was added to the Wrecks of HMS Erebus and HMS Terror National Historic Site. The language of the Order Amending the National Historic Sites of Canada illustrates this shift: it states that the Franklin expedition is important to Canadians because it “paint[s] a clearer picture of Canada’s rich history of Arctic exploration” and is important to the Inuit because the story of the expedition is “as much a part of Inuit history . . . [as] Canadian and British history.”

However, as of December 2017, Britain had not officially assigned ownership to Canada. Britain reserved the right in the MOU to keep artifacts of “‘outstanding significance’ to the Royal Navy” and now wants to exercise that right to keep a “small representative sample” of artifacts. Canada, on the other hand, wants a “full transfer of the wrecks and artifacts” from Britain, and to arrange “long-term loan options for the U.K. to display important artifacts in museums in the U.K.” Costs present an additional complication: Britain will have to reimburse Canada for the recovery and conservation of any artifacts which it keeps.

158. Order Amending the National Historic Sites of Canada Order, SOR/2017-273 at 6 (Can.).
159. Id.
160. Beeby, Britain Drag On, supra note 59.
162. Beeby, Britain Drag On, supra note 59.
163. See id.
Without factoring in those costs, Canadian taxpayers have already spent over a million dollars on the *Death in the Ice* exhibition which went to England before its current location in Canada, including “shipping the artifacts to Britain, insuring them, and providing a team to set them up.”\(^{164}\) It is unclear how long it will take to resolve these issues in order for a final transfer of ownership to take place.\(^{165}\)

In whatever way the specific details are resolved, it is clear that the shipwrecks and many of the Franklin artifacts will remain in Canada and will be jointly managed by Parks Canada and the Nunavut government. The next section will discuss the cultural significance of the artifacts to British, Canadian, and Inuit cultures to explain why this legal battle took place and why the artifacts are so meaningful for each entity involved. It is worth noting that despite the current positive outcome of joint management between Parks Canada and Nunavut, Parks Canada missed an important opportunity to treat Nunavut as an equal partner and stakeholder from the beginning. The federal agency treated the Inuit with the same paternalistic condescension as the generations before it, ignoring the legal rights which the Inuit had gained via the land claims agreement in its handling of the *Erebus* situation in 2014 and creating an atmosphere of distrust which has permeated the negotiations ever since. Even while proclaiming its cooperation with the Inuit two years later in 2016, Parks Canada has left them out of negotiations with Britain until public attention in 2017 forced it to be more inclusive. The Nunavut government has done an excellent job of using media attention to pressure Parks Canada to collaborate with them; ultimately, however, it is a shame they had to do so in order to force the federal government to acknowledge their legal territorial rights.

**VI. THE FRANKLIN SHIPWRECKS AS UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE OBJECTS**

**A. Definition of Cultural Heritage**

The concept of “cultural heritage” explains why Great Britain, Canada, and the Inuit have gone to great lengths and expense to recover and control the Franklin artifacts. This section will examine cultural heritage from a global and nationalist perspective, and will then discuss Great Britain, Canada, and the Inuit’s cultural heritage claims to the

---


165. See id; See Beeby, *Britain Drag On*, supra note 59.
How Two Sunken Ships Caused a War

Franklin artifacts. At its core, cultural heritage includes “almost anything man made or given value by man.” More specifically, cultural heritage has “economic, cultural, political, or social” aspects. Cultural heritage can be tangible (archaeological sites, artwork, etc.) or intangible (oral traditions, music, dances, etc.). Legally, historic shipwrecks are “underwater cultural heritage” (“UCH”), and are formally protected by both UNCLOS and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (“CPUCH”). CPUCH defines UCH as “all traces of human existence having cultural, historical, or archaeological character which have been partially or totally underwater, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years.” Ultimately, cultural heritage is significant because of the values assigned to it by society. The following discussion emphasizes three main cultural heritage values which the Franklin artifacts possess: 1) expressive (storytelling) value, 2) the value of preserving archaeological and historical evidence, and 3) economic value.

First, the Franklin artifacts have an expressive value for modern society. Cultural heritage objects each have their own “unique sum of inherent values” based on their physical characteristics, aesthetic appeal, and other values which the objects represent, such as religious or moral values, emotional connections, and “feelings of nostalgia for people, events, and cultures.” As physical links to the past, the objects “reflect the common heritage of humankind.” In this regard, the Franklin artifacts fascinate us as tangible remnants of the British sailors who lived and died in the Canadian Arctic. Not only do they evoke our pity for the sufferings undergone by the crew members, but they also carry different

166. See CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE (2010) (“Attempts to describe what ‘cultural heritage’ is tend to use general terms understood intuitively as reflecting a culture which is inherited from the past.”). See also ALESSANDRO CHECHI, THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE DISPUTES (2014) 17-22 (“The terminology used reflects different ideological approaches, whereas the criteria relate to qualified historical, scientific or artistic values or interests; to the age, or to the fact that cultural objects belong to certain periods or styles or environments.”).
167. See FORREST, supra note 166, at 2.
168. See id. at 2-3.
170. CPUCH, supra note 169.
171. See FORREST, supra note 166, at 2-3.
172. See id. at 4-5.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 5.
cultural meanings when viewed from the lenses of British, Canadian, Inuit, or global culture.

Second, like all archaeological objects, the Franklin artifacts “embody and preserve information” about the past. Historic shipwrecks are “time capsules” because they uniquely represent the world at the time they sank more than archaeological sites on land ever can. Scholars can add to the historical record by examining what the Franklin sailors ate, drank, wore, and read from 1845 to the time they left the ships. That information, in turn, may shed some light on the enduring mystery of why the Franklin sailors made the fatal decision to abandon their ships.

Third, the Franklin artifacts have economic value, which is comprised of intrinsic value, attributed value, and value as a “tourist resource.” While scholars wrestle with the implications of the “commodification” of cultural heritage, it has become an “important industry” and tourist revenue from cultural heritage sites “provide direct economic benefits” to the States in which they are located. Here, the Franklin artifacts are not made of valuable materials, so they do not have a high intrinsic value. However, they have a high attributed value because of the story-telling (expressive) value attached to them and because of their ability to draw large numbers of tourists. Although the artifacts do not have a permanent home yet, in the four years since the discovery of the Erebus they have already drawn thousands of tourists, from several minor exhibitions to the first major exhibition, Death in the Ice, which has already taken place at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England, and is now at the Canadian Museum of History.

Cultural heritage can play important roles both globally and nationally. Globally, the “common heritage of humankind” is an emerging concept that describes the “general interest of the international community in the conservation and enjoyment of cultural heritage.” While a specific culture may have a stronger claim than others, its claim is not exclusive. As one scholar writes, “[t]he history and development of our species is one history, and the culture of the world is greater than

---

176. See id.
177. See id. at 340.
178. See id. at 5.
179. See id. at 7.
180. Death in the Ice: the Mystery of the Franklin Expedition; CANADIAN MUSEUM HIST., http://www.historymuseum.ca/event/the-franklin-expedition (last visit Sept. 8 2019); Death in the Ice: The Shocking Story of Franklin’s Final Expedition, supra note 111.
181. CHECHI, supra note 166 at 19.
182. FORREST, supra note 166, at 13.
the sum of individual cultures.” The Franklin expedition impacted many cultures; thus, the general claim of humankind to witness and interact with the Franklin artifacts exists concurrently with specific cultural claims.

Nationally or in a group setting, cultural heritage can play an important role as a “symbol of national identity . . . cultural pride . . . community spirit and common history.” A specific group’s cultural heritage is “the sum of practices, knowledge, and representations that a community or group recognize as part of their history and identity.” If a group claim exists, then “members of that group, individually and collectively, must be entitled to access, perform and enjoy such cultural heritage as a matter of right.” There are three distinct cultural heritage claims to the Franklin artifacts held by Great Britain, Canada, and the Inuit. As will be argued below, the assertion of these overlapping cultural heritage claims to the Franklin artifacts has been a driving force behind the struggle for their control and ownership.

B. British Cultural Heritage Claims to the Franklin Expedition

Because HMS Erebus and HMS Terror were British flag ships, Great Britain has clear legal ownership over the wrecks and their contents. Great Britain also has the primary cultural heritage claim over the Franklin expedition and artifacts viewed through the three cultural heritage values.

The Franklin artifacts have evident expressive value for British culture, as “[s]ince at least the Elizabethan era, English identity ha[s] been bound up with English seamanship and imperial expansion.” The British obsession with discovering the Northwest Passage began as early as the eighteenth century, when Parliament passed an act in 1745 which offered a reward of twenty thousand pounds for discovering a “North-West Passage through Hudson Strait” (over four million pounds in today’s currency). The Franklin artifacts are tangible relics of Victorian England, which had an “obsession with polar exploration among the

183. See id. at 11.
184. See id. at 10.
185. CHECHI, supra note 166, at 20-21, (citing F. FRANCIONI, CULTURE, HERITAGE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION, TO CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2008).
186. See id.
187. See supra, part III. a. i.
188. See supra, part VI. a.
189. Schulz, supra note 16.
190. See CYRIAX, supra note 27, at 3.
In the years leading up to Franklin’s expedition, “[t]he many unsuccessful attempts which had already been made by British explorers . . . the important scientific discoveries which were expected to result, and the desirability of exploring every part of the Dominions, had rendered the discovery of the passage a matter of national concern.” In addition to discovering the passage, the Royal Society (Britain’s premier scientific organization) was eager to participate in an “international cooperative program” that worked to complete “the magnetic survey of the globe” to locate magnetic North—part of Franklin’s mission was to take magnetic observations from the Arctic. Polar exploration was a good political move as well; after the end of the Napoleonic wars, the victorious British navy had found itself with “a shortage of available naval battles” and “a shortage of new places to plant its flag.” As a result, the search for the Northwest Passage “gave England a new way to assert its naval prowess and its national identity.”

In addition to their expressive value of this period of British history, the artifacts have archaeological and historic value for British culture. Archaeologists can study the artifacts for clues that might reveal what doomed the expedition’s crew (theories include lead poisoning, scurvy, and malnutrition). By revealing what Victorian explorers ate, wore, read, etc., the artifacts will add to the British historical record. The artifacts also have an economic value by bringing tourists to see museum exhibitions, as discussed supra.

For these reasons, Britain insists on its right to retain significant Franklin artifacts pursuant to the MOU, which complicates negotiations with Canada. As Britain’s intention to transfer ownership of the wrecks and their contents to Canada acknowledges the symbolic importance which Canada has placed upon the Franklin expedition (as well as the logistical and financial common sense of keeping the wrecks in Canada), Britain’s insistence on keeping significant artifacts forces a reciprocal acknowledgment that the Franklin expedition was a British expedition of

---

191. Schulz, supra note 16; See BEATTIE & GEIGER, supra note 19, at 18.
192. CYRIAX, supra note 27, at 160-61.
194. Schulz, supra note 16.
195. Id.
196. See BEATTIE & GEIGER, supra note 19, at 65, 86, 240, 254; See CYRIAX, supra note 27, at 136.
197. See DEATH IN THE ICE: THE SHOCKING STORY OF FRANKLIN’S FINAL EXPEDITION, supra note 115.
198. See supra, part V. c.
British sailors, intent on opening yet another corner of the globe to the British empire.199

C. Canadian Cultural Heritage Claims to the Franklin Expedition

Over the course of the 170 years since its disappearance, the Franklin expedition has come to play an important role in both Canada’s national identity and its claim over the Northwest Passage. In 1845, when Franklin set out for the Canadian Arctic to find the Northwest Passage, Canada was still a British colony with no independent interest in the expedition.200 Canada became an independent nation twenty-two years later, in 1867.201 The numerous searches for the Franklin expedition helped open up the Canadian Arctic as the searchers mapped “all the Arctic waterways, revealing several possible North West Passages.”202

As Canada places similar archeological, historic, and economic value on the Franklin artifacts as Great Britain, this discussion will focus primarily on the differing expressive values which the artifacts hold for Canadian culture. In her lecture on Franklin’s role in Canadian literature, Canadian novelist Margaret Atwood states, “the Franklin disaster did not take root in the Canadian imagination immediately; possibly because, at the time, the whole thing . . . was thought of as too British.”203 However, by the 1920s, the Franklin story was considered central to the “Canadian literary imagination,” and was told and retold in poems, radio dramas, and novels over the rest of the twentieth century.204 By now, writes Atwood, Franklin himself has been “adopted by Canadians as one of their own.”205 Today, the Franklin Expedition has taken on dimensions of national importance: it has been described hyperbolically as both “the

199. See Defence Secretary Announces Exceptional Gift to Canada, supra note 156.
204. Atwood, Concerning Franklin, supra note 203, at 7, 17.
205. BEATTIE & GEIGER, supra note 19, at 1, 7.
single most eventful mythological moment” in Canada’s history and as one of Canada’s “most compelling Arctic myths.”

Former Prime Minister Harper has been one of the strongest advocates for adopting the Franklin Expedition into the Canadian national mythos. Harper’s “Northern Strategy” was a “comprehensive Arctic policy” which included military, security, energy extraction, science, and maritime regulations. The Northern Strategy was heavily focused on Canada “firmly exercising” its “long-standing, well-established” sovereignty in the Arctic, in part to establish the Northwest Passage as “internal historic waters” under UNCLOS. If the Northwest Passage is historically Canadian, Canada can control which foreign ships use the passage; if the Northwest Passage is an international strait, as the United States and some other countries have asserted, then ships from the international community can move freely through the passage without Canada’s permission. This issue is especially pertinent as the Arctic warms, sea ice melts, and more ships are able to navigate the passage.

Harper overtly used the Franklin Expedition to promote his Northern Strategy by tying the expedition to Canada’s origin story and Canadian Arctic sovereignty. When he announced the discovery of Erebus, Harper proclaimed, “Franklin’s ships are an important part of Canadian history given that his expeditions . . . laid the foundations of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.” This “integration of the Canadian North into the nation’s psyche” retroactively creates a sense of Canadian ownership over the Arctic. Problematically, the Canadian-centric

---

208. CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY, supra note 207.
213. McDiarmid, supra note 211.
interpretation of the Franklin Expedition reinvigorates the old Victorian perspective of the Arctic as an “empty, unpeopled wasteland” whose history began "not with the arrival of the Dorset and Inuit thousands of years ago . . . but with the recent arrival of the . . . British navy." This exclusionary perspective is evident in the initial cavalier treatment of the Inuit claim to the Franklin artifacts by Parks Canada.

D. Inuit Cultural Heritage Claims to the Franklin Expedition

The Inuit of Nunavut have the final cultural heritage claim to the Franklin Artifacts. It is rare for an indigenous group to claim Western artifacts as part of their culture: the usual narrative centers around Western societies appropriating indigenous or ancient artifacts. However, the Franklin artifacts have a strong expressive value for the Inuit because the expedition’s presence in the region actually impacted the lives of the local Inuit. Sir Franklin was not the first European explorer to voyage to the Canadian Arctic in search of the Northwest Passage. As early as the sixteenth century, the British explorer Martin Frobisher came to the region looking for a northern trade route to the Pacific. Shipwrecks from subsequent explorations caused the Inuit “to change their travel and trading patterns to take advantage of the scarce wood and metal resources the sites offered.” According to Inuit oral history, when the Netsilingmiut Inuit made their ritual trip to King William Island in 1846, they witnessed Franklin crew members attempting to escape the island to reach civilization far away on the mainland. One elderly Inuit lady described the men as “thin, starved, and ill; they were black around the eyes and mouth and were not wearing any fur clothing.” They gave the starving men seals they had hunted, and attempted to lead them across the ice bridge connecting the island to

---

218. See id.
221. See WATSON, supra note 9, at 53, 184.
222. KLUTSCHAK, supra note 37, at 73-74.
the mainland before it melted in the spring.\(^{223}\) Slowed down by a heavy sledge and weak from malnutrition, the Franklin sailors never made it.\(^{224}\) Several years later, Inuit boarded one of the abandoned ships and “carried off countless useful items before she also went down.”\(^{225}\) Tools made out of Franklin relics became prized family heirlooms – for example, a metal sword was broken into shards for use as snow knives\(^{226}\) and “Kamookak’s own great-great-grandfather had a Franklin dinner knife that he turned into an ice chisel.”\(^{227}\)

The years in which the Franklin Expedition crew were trapped were also a time of great suffering for the local Inuit.\(^{228}\) The winters that Franklin and his men weathered in the ice “were so severe that they became part of Inuit legend.”\(^{229}\) The Inuit fled south and blamed “the white men [ ] for unleashing malevolent spirits upon the island.”\(^{230}\) Out of this harsh and difficult time came what the Inuit believed was a curse attached to King William Island that was related to the deaths of Franklin and his crew.\(^{231}\)

There is a general consensus that if Franklin and his men had respected Inuit knowledge of how to survive in the harsh Arctic climate, most of them would likely have survived.\(^{232}\) One of Franklin’s predecessors, Sir John Ross, survived a similar situation in which he and his men were trapped in the ice by copying the Inuit diet and constructing igloos.\(^{233}\) Thirty years later, the American Geographical Society travelled over three thousand miles by dog sled, in -50°F weather, without any injuries because they had adopted Inuit clothing, diet, and means of shelter, as did famed Arctic explorer Roald Amundsen, who later became the first to navigate the North West Passage and the first to reach the South Pole.\(^{234}\) Unfortunately, Franklin and his men refused to emulate native habits, relying instead on tinned food (which possibly induced lead poisoning and scurvy) rather than seal and salmon, and on woolen mittens

\(^{223}\) See WATSON, supra note 9, at 333.

\(^{224}\) See id.

\(^{225}\) Id. at 273.

\(^{226}\) See Kyle, supra note 152.

\(^{227}\) Weber, supra note 220.

\(^{228}\) See WATSON, supra note 9, at xxix.

\(^{229}\) Id. at xxix, 199.

\(^{230}\) Id. at xxix.

\(^{231}\) See id. at 191, 214.

\(^{232}\) Brannen, supra note 217.

\(^{233}\) BEATTIE AND GEIGER, supra note 19, at 29-30.

\(^{234}\) Brannen, supra note 218.
and coats rather than naturally insulating seal or caribou fur.\textsuperscript{235} As a result, “Franklin’s entire crew died of starvation and exposure in an area where, for generations, the Inuit had raised their children and tended their elderly.”\textsuperscript{236}

Inuit knowledge also provided crucial pieces of information which led to the discoveries of both \textit{Erebus} and \textit{Terror}.\textsuperscript{237} \textit{Erebus} was discovered after Kamookak recommended a search area farther south than the team had planned, based on Inuit oral history about where the ship had sunk, and Sammy Kogvik directed searchers to the \textit{Terror} in Terror Bay after he told them of seeing a ship’s mast sticking out of the water of the bay a few years before.\textsuperscript{238}

The Inuit have had to strongly assert the historical significance of the Franklin artifacts to their culture and their legal rights under Nunavut law to jointly manage the artifacts, especially as this is the first time that some of those rights relating to archaeological specimens are being tested.\textsuperscript{239} The laws of Nunavut have given the Inuit the legal platform with which to push back against the highly publicized narrative of Inuit inclusion, which Parks Canada proclaimed somewhat disingenuously before 2016.\textsuperscript{240} Even today, the official narrative centers too much on the “validation” of the truth of Inuit knowledge. Franklin scholar Adriana Cracuin points out,

\begin{quote}
Beyond the use value of Inuit knowledge of the ships’ locations, where else have the Canadian searches shown room for or interest in Inuit perspectives on, and potential critiques of, the value of the searches themselves? For too long Canadian and British authorities have framed the issue solely in terms of the truth of Inuit knowledge, rather than in terms of how Inuit occupancy of the Arctic should entrust them as partners in decision-making.\textsuperscript{241}
\end{quote}

This “selective acknowledgement” of Inuit knowledge plays into the larger issue of Harper’s Northern Strategy perspective of the Arctic as an “empty, unpeopled wasteland” rather than a region which indigenous

\textsuperscript{235} See \textsc{Watson}, supra note 9, at xxvi-xxix. See also \textsc{Beattie and Geiger}, supra note 19, at 145.
\textsuperscript{236} See \textsc{Schulz}, supra note 16.
\textsuperscript{237} See supra Part IV, Section A; see supra Part V, Section A.
\textsuperscript{238} See \textit{id}.
\textsuperscript{239} See \textsc{Beaumont}, supra note 215.
\textsuperscript{240} See \textit{id}, at 211.
\textsuperscript{241} Cracuin, \textit{The Disaster of Franklin}, supra note 84, at 191, 203.
peoples have inhabited for thousands of years. By using the media to publicize their side of the story and their experience of exclusion, the Inuit of Nunavut have been able to “re-indigenize those ships, those spaces, those histories, and fold them into a larger Indigenous history,” as Cracuin suggests.

Parks Canada has recently announced its own initiative to collect Inuit oral history on the Franklin Expedition to “fill gaps in contemporary research on the history of the wreckage sites.” Although Kamookak and other historians have already collected Inuit oral history about the Franklin Expedition, Parks Canada has the technological resources to record valuable interviews with Inuit elders and conduct worthwhile archival research. Parks Canada still seems to be out of step in its perspective on Inuit involvement, stating somewhat patronizingly, “[m]aybe it’s time to put more of the focus on the Inuit [rather than on European explorers]” and “[i]t’s important that the Inuit stay involved – for their own sake as well as Canada’s.” Despite this tone, Kamookak thought the project was a good idea, as preserving Inuit oral history through modern technology will allow it to be passed down to future generations in a more concrete form.

The proximity of the wrecks to the Inuit community in Gjoa Haven is a tangible link between modern Inuit and their ancestors who interacted with Franklin and his men. For the Gjoa Haven residents, the shipwrecks have become a “community treasure,” not only because of their historical significance, but because of their high economic potential to draw tourists to the sparsely populated, underdeveloped region. Cruise ships are already planning excursions to the region to visit sites related to the Franklin Expedition, discussed infra.

242. See id. at 191, 202.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. See id.
impoverished region, increased tourism is life-changing, in ways both
good and bad. Gjoa Haven faces high rates of unemployment and a
housing crisis, and is ill-equipped at the moment to handle increased
levels of tourists. Cruise ships could also pollute the sensitive hunting
and fishing grounds upon which the community depends for survival.
However, the money from tourists is creating jobs and opportunities in a
community where they are desperately needed. Gjoa Haven is working
to expand the Netsilik Heritage Center to house Franklin artifacts, funded
by Parks Canada and the Arctic Research Foundation. The hamlet’s
leaders are working to carefully balance these competing priorities in
order to preserve their community’s identity while welcoming in the
wider world. Hopefully, Franklin’s legacy in the area will be a positive
one for Gjoa Haven residents.

That the Franklin artifacts have significant cultural heritage value to
Great Britain, Canada, and the Inuit is indisputable. Great Britain’s
primary claim over the artifacts as relics of the Royal Navy and the age
of British exploration and empire has been reinforced by the exercise of
its right to retain significant artifacts, although which artifacts it will keep
remains to be seen. Within Canada, there has been clear tension between
the Franklin expedition as a symbol of Canadian sovereignty and the
Franklin expedition as experienced by the Inuit whose ancestors lived and
interacted with the expedition and the region in which it was lost. This
tension explains the struggle for ownership which has taken place
between the two levels of Canadian government since the discovery of
Erebus in 2014. Fortunately, however problematic the process of
reaching a compromise of joint ownership and management between
Parks Canada and Nunavut, this positive outcome has created a unique
opportunity for the heritage of all three cultures to be acknowledged and
respected as future exhibitions are curated, artifacts are discovered, and
more answers to the riddle of the Franklin exhibition are uncovered.

250. See Watson, Franklin wreck fortunes, supra note 248.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 241; see also Brockman, supra note 248; As Franklin’s Lure Brings People North, Gjoa Haven Seeks its Share of Tourism Dollars, CBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2017, 8:41 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/franklin-expedition-tourism-1.4293653.
255. See Watson, Franklin wreck fortunes, supra note 248.
Once ownership over the Franklin Artifacts is resolved, Parks Canada archaeologists must navigate many archaeological protocols for the conservation and recovery of the shipwrecks and artifacts. This discussion will focus on the international conventions which provide benchmarks for proper shipwreck conservation that govern the various major issues which archaeologists will have to address when dealing with the Franklin wrecks and artifacts. Three international conventions dealing with the conservation of underwater cultural heritage (UCH) are applicable: UNCLOS, the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (CPUCH), and the 1999 Charter for the Protection and Management of Underwater Cultural Heritage promulgated by the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS Charter).


The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been generally recognized as providing inadequate protection for UCH but needs to be discussed as it is the main source of international maritime law. Within UNCLOS, Articles 149 and 303 provide for treatment of archaeological and historical objects. Article 149 indicates,

All objects of an archaeological or historical nature found in the Area shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archaeological origin.

Problematically, Article 149 does not clarify which objects qualify as “archaeological” or “historical,” or which preferential rights are to be...
given to which States or how conflicting rights claims are to be resolved.\textsuperscript{260}

Article 303 more specifically covers “[a]rcheological and historical objects found at sea,” but simply establishes a general State duty to “protect or preserve underwater cultural heritage in various maritime zones beyond coastal State jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{261} Further provisions of Article 303 left in place existing maritime law regimes without resolving existing conflicts of law.\textsuperscript{262} UNCLOS therefore created a system of archeological conservation in which “each state party has been left with the task of establishing its own legal regime for the protection of underwater cultural heritage and how to cooperate on its protection with other nations.”\textsuperscript{263} Thus, UNCLOS was primarily focused on the right of the nation-state to deal with UCH in whichever manner it felt was appropriate based on its own law. The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (CPUCH) is generally viewed as the international community’s answer to UNCLOS’s ambiguity towards historic shipwrecks and marine archeological sites.\textsuperscript{264}

\textit{B. 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage}

Unlike UNCLOS, CPUCH sets forth archeological benchmarks for all UCH projects based on the global concept of cultural heritage as the common heritage of humankind.\textsuperscript{265} CPUCH expressly focuses on the “protect[ion] and preserv[ation] of the underwater cultural heritage” that is “an integral part of the cultural heritage of humanity and a particularly important element in the history of peoples, nations, and their relations with each other concerning their common heritage.”\textsuperscript{266} However, CPUCH has been unsuccessful as an international convention, with only fifty-eight countries subscribing to it as of the time of this writing, because it sets forth its archeological principles as mandatory rather than as permissive best practices.\textsuperscript{267} Canada has “yet to make a decision regarding ratification” of CPUCH.\textsuperscript{268} However, Parks Canada does follow the substantially similar principles set forth by the 1996 ICOMOS Charter on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{260} See DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 31-32.
\item \textsuperscript{261} See FORREST, supra note 166, at 329.
\item \textsuperscript{262} See id. at 328; see also DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 35.
\item \textsuperscript{263} See Gongaware, supra note 257, at 205.
\item \textsuperscript{264} See id. at 205; see also, Vadi, supra note 257, at 863.
\item \textsuperscript{265} See CPUCH, supra note 169; DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 60, 126-7; supra VI. a.
\item \textsuperscript{266} See CPUCH, supra note 169, at Preamble.
\item \textsuperscript{267} See id.; DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 238; Vadi, supra note 257, at 866.
\item \textsuperscript{268} See PARKS CANADA, supra note 80, at Appendix 6.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Protection and Management of Underwater Cultural Heritage, upon which CPUCH was largely based. Because the principles are presented in a permissive manner and the Charter is not internationally binding, it has been accepted by a far wider audience (as of today, ICOMOS has over 10,000 individual members, 320 institutional members, 110 national committees, and 28 international scientific committees). The two most important archaeological principles are discussed below with reference to differences between the ICOMOS Charter and CPUCH when necessary.

C. 1996 ICOMOS Charter on the Protection and Management of Underwater Cultural Heritage

1. In Situ Preservation

Both the ICOMOS Charter and CPUCH find in situ preservation of UCH fundamentally important. Shipwreck sites are distinct from terrestrial archaeological sites because “at the time of sinking, the wreck captures a point in time in history.” If marine archaeologists can examine historic shipwreck artifacts in situ, they can make unique contributions to the historical record. However, CPUCH states “[t]he protection of underwater cultural heritage through in situ preservation shall be considered as the first option” (emphasis added), while the ICOMOS Charter uses the more permissive “should be considered as a first option” (emphasis added). In situ preservation is encouraged in the belief that “archaeological deposits may be ‘safest’ left in the natural environment in which they are found.” UCH artifacts are waterlogged and require expensive conservation procedures to prevent them from rapidly deteriorating once they are brought to the surface. Because archaeological resources are limited, the in situ preservation preference

269. See ICOMOS Charter, supra note 256; DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 57.
270. See ICOMOS Charter, supra note 256.
271. See id.; See CPUCH, supra note 169.
272. See FORREST, supra note 166, at 340.
274. See ICOMOS Charter, supra note 256.
275. See DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 315.
276. See id. at 319, FN 44 (2013); see also WATSON, supra note 9, at 270-272. For example, in the late 1970s, when an amateur archaeologist discovered a Franklin search ship, the HMS Breadalbane, he wanted a souvenir. Ignoring the pleas of the trained archaeologist accompanying him, he yanked off the ship’s wheel. The wheel was fractured and transferred to Parks Canada archaeologists, who had to keep it from disintegrating without the ability to use special conservation procedures for waterlogged artifacts. 30 years later, the wheel is still too fragile to be displayed and has cost over $100,000 in conservation attempts.
ensures that any archaeological project to recover UCH has been thoroughly planned, arranged, and funded.\textsuperscript{277}

However, UCH sites and artifacts are not safe from disturbance simply because they are located on the seabed; \textit{in situ} preservation can leave a site exposed to “risk of illicit excavation” or storm damage.\textsuperscript{278} Therefore, recovering the artifacts is often the only definitive way to ensure that they do not disappear.\textsuperscript{279} For these reasons, \textit{in situ} preservation of the \textit{Erebus} and \textit{Terror} artifacts would be quite problematic.\textsuperscript{280} For example, although the frigid water has kept both ships and their artifacts in a remarkable state of preservation, the summer after \textit{Erebus} was discovered, underwater archaeologists identified artifacts of interest and then were forced to wait for five days while a severe storm hit the wreck site.\textsuperscript{281} When they returned, there was zero visibility and “almost every artifact that had been documented had moved … some artifacts that were just lying on the deck had disappeared.”\textsuperscript{282} With each year that passes, the odds increase that another destructive storm will hit the wreck sites and scatter artifacts.

The wrecks and artifacts are also in danger from tourist expeditions to the wreck sites, which disturb the water and contribute to their deterioration.\textsuperscript{283} In January 2017, Parks Canada discussed teaming up with a tour company, Adventure Canada, which had created an “Out of the Northwest Passage” themed cruise whose itinerary included potentially snorkeling over the wreck of the \textit{Erebus}.\textsuperscript{284} Perhaps because of the conservation issues raised, the tour company no longer includes a trip to the \textit{Erebus} wreck. Instead, tourists will visit Beechey Island where three Franklin expedition sailors were buried, to “pay respects.”\textsuperscript{285} While this decision reflects an increasing awareness of the damage tourism expeditions can do to the wrecks, it is no guarantee that other cruise ship lines and tourism companies will not try to visit the wrecks themselves.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{277} See DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 318.
\item \textsuperscript{278} See id. at 315-316; FORREST, supra note 166, at 341-42.
\item \textsuperscript{279} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{280} See WATSON, supra note 9, at 321; see also Beeby, Parks Canada, supra note 100.
\item \textsuperscript{281} See Maev Kennedy, Artefacts from Franklin’s Fateful Arctic Voyage to Go on Show in London, THE GUARDIAN (July 6, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2017/jul/06/sir-john-franklin-arctic-voyage-greenwich-exhibition; see also WATSON, supra note 9, at 323.
\item \textsuperscript{282} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{283} See Bob McDonald, Discovery of Franklin Expedition Ships Pits Science Against Tourism, CBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2016, 5:23 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/terror-erebus-arctic-tourism-1.3765559.
\item \textsuperscript{284} See Cruise Ship Passengers to Visit HMS Erebus Wreck this Summer, supra note 249.
\item \textsuperscript{285} See Into the Northwest Passage 2017, supra note 249.
\end{itemize}
However, the hope is that the Inuit Guardians stationed at the site will report any unauthorized ships and tourist expeditions during the times of year when the weather would permit access to the sites. Regardless of these precautionary measures, preserving the Franklin artifacts will be best accomplished by recovering the artifacts and conserving them on land, not in situ.

2. Prohibition Against Commercial Exploitation

The ICOMOS Charter and CPUCH both agree that commercial exploitation of UCH is “fundamentally incompatible with the protection and proper management of underwater cultural heritage” because “material recovered from an archaeological site should be kept together as a collection so that it is available for public display and research purposes.” Many archaeologists feel that a strong prohibition against commercial exploitation is essential because commercial artifact recovery from shipwreck sites for commercial sale has often resulted in irreversible damage or destruction of the sites and other artifacts. However, CPUCH’s blanket prohibition on “the involvement of commercially motivated organisations” was viewed by many to be too restrictive, as archaeological projects to recover UCH are prohibitively expensive and often require partnerships with commercial operators almost of necessity. Therefore, the CPUCH drafters compromised by including two exceptions to the prohibition. First, Proviso (a) allows “the provision of professional archaeological services,” which allows for the common practice of hiring professional archaeologists to provide archaeological assessments and other services. Second, Proviso (b) provides guidance as to how to dispose of cultural artifacts without violating CPUCH.

Many commentators find CPUCH’s utopian prohibition against commercial exploitation to be one of the main reasons why many states have not yet joined. Few states have the financial resources to implement CPUCH’s mandated wholly noncommercial approach to

286. See Kyle, supra note 152.
287. See CPUCH, supra note 169, at Annex; DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 210.
288. See id. at 211. For additional arguments against commercial exploitation of UCH, see id. at 219.
289. See id. at 233.
290. See id. at 211.
292. See DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 235.
293. See id. at 238; Vadi, supra note 257, at 866.
recovery of UCH.294 In fact, the Canadian Franklin search expeditions were partially funded by Shell Canada, a partnership which would have been prohibited if Canada had joined CPUCH.295 Second, upholding a purely noncommercial standard for archaeological excavation means that archaeologists who have previously assisted commercial operations could be sanctioned or punished by the archaeological community.296 As a result, “it is very difficult for private companies to hire archaeologists who are both qualified and satisfy professional ethics and the standards of the 2001 UNESCO Convention.”297 Therefore, CPUCH has made it quite difficult for States to transition from old models of dealing with UCH to a model that complies with CPUCH’s standards. The permissive, non-legally binding ICOMOS Charter has put forth the same principle in an aspirational format, which has allowed it to be adopted widely.

The ambiguity of UNCLOS’s rules, and the fact that Canada has not acceded to the more stringent rules of CPUCH, means that the Franklin artifacts will be dealt with under international law primarily according to the conservation principles set forth in the ICOMOS Charter and Canada’s internal archaeological policies. Fortunately, Canada can follow the conservation best practices set forth in the ICOMOS charter while leaving intact the commercial relationships which are practically necessary to the endeavor but would be prohibited by CPUCH.

VIII. CONCLUSION

We are finally gaining answers to the enduring mystery of the Franklin expedition, yet many questions still remain. It is not clear which significant artifacts will be claimed by Britain, nor whether the final resting place of the Franklin artifacts in Canada will be in a major Canadian city or in a tiny Nunavut town. However, the artifacts that remain in Canada will be jointly managed by Parks Canada and Nunavut: a significant victory for the Inuit, which came only after Parks Canada mishandled the situation and the Inuit successfully asserted the rights for which they had campaigned for decades. The legal dispute over controlling the artifacts came as a result of overlapping cultural heritage claims based on the variety of symbolic and actual roles the expedition has played in British, Canadian, and Inuit culture. As ownership claims continue to be further defined, additional artifacts recovered, and future

294. See id. at 866. For further arguments about the positive side of allowing commercial exploitation of UCH, see DROMGOOLE, supra note 46, at 220.
296. See Gongaware, supra note 257, at 209-10.
297. See id. at 203, 210.
exhibitions planned, each culture will have the opportunity to refine its narrative about the expedition. Under the ICOMOS charter, it is likely that all of the artifacts will be removed from their in situ locations and conserved on land in Canada to be displayed for future generations.

When Franklin and his crew set off from England, they were filled with “good humour” and excitement for the voyage ahead of them. As the ice master Thomas Blanky wrote in his last letter home to his loved ones, “We are all in good spirits, one and all appearing to be of the same determination, that is, to persevere in making a passage to the northwest . . . do not allow any person to dishearten you on the length of our absence, but look forward with hope, that Providence will at length of time restore us safely to you.” Sadly for Blanky and his fellow crew members, Providence had a very different fate in store for them than the triumph of discovery; however, they have achieved a different kind of immortality in the modern world.

298. See WATSON, supra note 9, at 34.
299. See id. at 37.