1-1-1993

Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs

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Recommended Citation
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John C. Barker*

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Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or "SLAPPs," are meritless suits aimed at silencing a plaintiff’s opponents, or at least at diverting their resources. To illustrate, a classic scenario pits a real estate developer against a neighborhood group opposed to a particular development. The local group distributes a negative flyer, publishes a hostile editorial in a local paper or protests to some government body. Group members might speak out at town meetings, for example, or pursue a more sophisticated strategy of reporting environmental violations to the state agency or the Environmental Protection Agency. The developer then responds with a SLAPP for defamation or interference with prospective business advantage. By definition, SLAPPs are meritless. If the hypothetical editorial damaged the plaintiff developer's reputation by

2. See id. at 8.
falsely accusing the plaintiff of criminal activity and was published by the
defendant local group with actual malice, this would not be a SLAPP.

The plaintiff developer in this scenario brings the SLAPP to silence
opponents and to discourage others from opposing the proposed develop-
ment. In addition, the SLAPP is used to tie up an opponent’s finances,
time and efforts until the project is approved or public outcry subsides.
Such suits are a subset of harassment, or “strike” suits, in that SLAPPs
are filed not for their merits but to intimidate defendants.

SLAPPs have an additional political dimension, however, that distin-
guishes them from other harassment suits. Citizen participation in
self-government is at stake, implicating the constitutional right to peti-
tion the government for redress of grievances. One objective of a
SLAPP is depoliticization: the removal of the controversy from the un-
tamed, fickle political/legislative arena to the manageable judicial arena
where rights are limited and enumerated.

As apparent from these initial portrayals, SLAPPs pit two sets of
fundamental constitutional rights against each other: (1) defendants’
rights of free speech and petition and (2) plaintiffs’ rights of access to the

4. Sharlene A. McEvoy, “The Big Chill”: Business Use of the Tort of Defamation To
Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 503, 505
(1990) (noting that such cases have been dubbed “nuisance suits”); Ron Galperin, Getting
SLAPPed, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, at K1, K1 (quoting Penelope Canan’s characterization
of such suits as “‘bogus lawsuits’”). But see Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/
SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L.
& POL. 417, 424 n.14 (1991) (stating that nuisance suits may not be solely to harass and are
therefore different from SLAPPs).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; see United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (stating that right to petition is “among the
most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights”).
judicial system and rights to non-falsely maligned reputations. Solutions to the SLAPP problem must not compromise any of these rights. Plaintiffs must be able to bring suits with reasonable merit and defendants must be protected from entirely frivolous intimidation suits designed to chill legitimate participation in public affairs.

Part II of this Article more fully defines a SLAPP, specifically examining a plaintiff’s motives for bringing such a lawsuit. Many existing defenses to SLAPPs and all the proposed solutions depend on threshold identification of a suit as a SLAPP; if it is not a SLAPP, an anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked.

The rest of the Article examines both partial and comprehensive solutions. Part III considers procedural measures, such as more specific pleading or acceleration of summary judgment. Part IV concentrates on substantive defenses to SLAPPs. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court nominally eliminated any “constitutional privilege for ‘opinion’” in defamation cases, but left collateral doctrines, such as the non-actionability of “rhetorical hyperbole,” intact. In the right to petition context, the Noerr/Pennington doctrine defines the perimeters of legitimate petitioning.


8. Id. at 2707.

9. See id. at 2706-07; infra part IV.D and accompanying text.

Part V discusses existing counteractions, or "SLAPP-backs." Abuse of process and malicious prosecution are the most prominent SLAPP-backs; although without the crucial modifications discussed, they are not necessarily the most effective way to deter SLAPPs. As a prelude to statutory solutions, part VI summarizes common-law approaches to awards of damages, costs and attorney's fees, in SLAPPs and SLAPP-backs.

Part VII surveys various state statutory approaches. Most state statutes and proposed bills have some provision for a defendant to recover costs and fees from a SLAPP. After that similarity, however, the statutes and bills diverge widely, from New Jersey's comprehensive bill protecting petitioners of government as well as defendants speaking out on public matters, to New York's narrow defamation-reform bill. California's recently enacted Lockyer bill\(^\text{11}\) does not follow other designs in allowing state intervention on the side of SLAPP defendants. Nor does it require specific pleading or allow damages awards, other than litigation costs and fees, to either defendants or plaintiffs. The Lockyer bill supplements existing legal protections by providing for very early judicial screening of potential SLAPPs that implicate First Amendment rights of speech and petitioning, and by allowing fee awards to SLAPP defendants. This Article suggests that these two features are necessary but not sufficient components of California anti-SLAPP legislation. Ultimately, part VII summarizes various state statutes and bills and their shortcomings in light of the goal of actually deterring SLAPPs. Because most large SLAPP plaintiffs would not be dissuaded from pursuing their SLAPPs by the prospect of paying the defense's fees, this Article concludes that states should look further for fair and effective solutions to the SLAPP problem. Part VIII recommends several components of a comprehensive anti-SLAPP bill that would be fair to plaintiffs and defendants alike.

II. IDENTIFYING SLAPPs

SLAPPs are by definition meritless suits.\(^\text{12}\) Plaintiffs intend not to win but "to intimidate and harass political critics into silence."\(^\text{13}\) The


\(^{12}\) See Pring, supra note 1, at 8.

\(^{13}\) Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 423; see also Robert H. Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25, 1991, at 6, 6 ("SLAPPs are lawsuits that can chill, intimidate or otherwise harass people into silence by making it prohibitively expensive for them to pursue First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition government.")).
classic SLAPP depicted in the introduction\textsuperscript{14} pits a small citizen group against a big developer, but these relative sizes are not universal.\textsuperscript{15} Public plaintiffs in SLAPP suits are common.\textsuperscript{16} Private SLAPP plaintiffs are usually private developers or landlords.\textsuperscript{17}

Estimates of the magnitude of the SLAPP problem vary widely\textsuperscript{18} and naturally depend in part on the definition chosen. Integral to any proposed anti-SLAPP solution is a definition of a SLAPP that is neither too broad nor too narrow. An overly broad definition would unfairly impede legitimate plaintiffs from their rightful access to the legal system, while an overly narrow definition might allow too many SLAPPs to be brought.

\textbf{A. The Public Interest Element}

Perhaps the most controversial definitional element of SLAPPs is the “public interest” element. Some commentators’ definitions limit SLAPPs to suits involving matters “of public interest or concern.”\textsuperscript{19} Similarly, the recently enacted Lockyer bill covers only suits involving First Amendment activity “in connection with a public issue.”\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{enumerate}
\item See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
\item Defendants can be well-financed organizations, such as the Sierra Club. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Paula Goedert, The SLAPP Suit Threat: Squelching Public Debate, 22 AM. LIBR. 1003 (1991); George W. Pring, "SLAPPs": Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: A New Ethical, Tactical, and Constitutional Dilemma, C534 ALI-ABA 937, June 25, 1990, available in WESTLAW, JLR Database.
\item Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 402 n.20 (1991) (citing Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & Soc’y REV. 385, 389 (1988)). Public plaintiffs have included state and local governments, \textit{id.}, public-employee organizations, Boyle, supra note 13, at 9, and “schoolteachers and city council members,” Galperin, supra note 4, at K1. Note that the recently enacted Lockyer bill exempts "any enforcement action brought [for Californians] by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor." Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(d)).
\item Philip Hager, Tide Turns for Targets of SLAPP Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at A3, A31 (noting that Penelope Canan and George W. Pring have found that 400 SLAPP suits have been filed nationwide since 1984, 14% of which originated in California): Slapping back at SLAPP suits, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 9, 1991, at B6 (editorial). Dan Walters estimates the figure to be “more than 1000 legal actions.” Dan Walters, First Amendment Under Assault, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 8, 1991, at A5.
\item Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401.
\item Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
\end{enumerate}
Aside from being vague, the public interest element creates two practical problems for SLAPP defendants. First, it creates a question of fact: whether the petitioning concerned a matter of public interest. Because a main goal of SLAPP opponents is to eliminate litigation or reduce the time of trial, adding extra issues on which to litigate could be counterproductive.21

Second, the public interest element is problematic primarily because SLAPP defendants are almost always motivated by some self-interest.22 If this fact alone is enough to disqualify a lawsuit from SLAPP-specific solutions, a loophole is created for SLAPP plaintiffs. For example, the homeowner H, adjacent to a lot that the SLAPP plaintiff-developer intends to develop, opposes that project not simply because it will be bad for H’s neighborhood or town, but because it will also be bad for H’s narrower individual interests of preserving H’s property value, view and lack of noise and traffic. This should not preclude H from obtaining SLAPP-prevention remedies, or make H’s petitioning activity illegitimate. Solutions for SLAPPs “must focus solely on the SLAPP plaintiff’s motive in suing, not the defendant’s objective in petitioning.”23

Vagueness of the terms “in the public interest” or “of public concern” could also, of course, work in a SLAPP defendant’s favor. Following the spirit of the First Amendment right to petition,24 the hypothetical homeowner H could argue that H’s activities are in the public interest even if entirely selfishly motivated.25 Circumventing the definitional limit by expanding the public interest element in this way effectively eliminates this element entirely—that is, it creates a tautology. One could argue that any petitioning activity is per se in the public interest because it enhances the democratic process and encourages responsive

23. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401; see also Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 44 (Neely, J., dissenting) (discussing right to petition unless petitioning activities are mere sham).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961) (“The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so.”).
government. In sum, if the public interest element is included in a statutory or other definition of a SLAPP, it is crucial that this element be broadly construed to allow for a SLAPP defendant's inevitable self-interest.

B. The Causes of Action Used

SLAPPs are difficult to identify because they are brought as ordinary tort actions. Thus, they are hard to quantify statistically. Also, because SLAPPs "masquerade as ordinary lawsuits," courts have a difficult time recognizing them.

Defamation is the most popular SLAPP cause of action. Many SLAPP claims are brought for business torts, such as interference with prospective business advantage or malicious interference with contract rights. Conspiracy is often added in order to "make all defendants joint tortfeasors." In California and New York, conspiracy is not a separate substantive tort but rather a theory to connect other tortious actions into a common pattern. SLAPPs have included an assortment of other causes of action, such as nuisance and intentional infliction of

26. This is supported by the prime importance placed on the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. See infra part IV.E.1 for a discussion of the importance of this right.

27. See Goedert, supra note 15, at 1003; Pring, supra note 1, at 7 n.6; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401.


29. Id.; see also Joseph Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 113 (1988) (stating that libel and slander are included among usual causes of action); Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401 n.15 (stating that defamation is one of six most frequently observed claims); Hager, supra note 18, at A31 (stating that defamation, interference with business and conspiracy are typical charges). But see David Sive, Environmental Litigation Countersuits and Delay, C427 ALI-ABA 1319, June 26, 1989, available in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA Database (stating that malicious prosecution is most frequently invoked tort, but noting that environmental countersuits assert defamation).

30. See Great W. Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1979); Brecher, supra note 29, at 113; McEvoy, supra note 4, at 504; Sive, supra note 29, at *2; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 401; Galperin, supra note 4, at K1; Hager, supra note 18, at A31.


emotional distress. Several of these causes of action, particularly abuse of process and malicious prosecution, are also used in SLAPP-backs.

C. SLAPP Plaintiffs' Motives

By definition, SLAPP plaintiffs have improper motives. SLAPPs are consequently difficult to spot without further factual analysis, thus complicating early identification. A SLAPP plaintiff's primary motive is to chill a defendant's speech or protest activity and to discourage opposition by others. Although most SLAPPs are unsuccessful at trial, some succeed in chilling the defendants' activities prior to trial by forcing them to back down. The large damage amounts sought in SLAPPs, averaging $9.1 million, are staggering to unsophisticated, inexperienced parties. In addition, plaintiffs often go after defendants' houses or farms, which can lower property values and discourage activity by other neighbors. Two of Professor Canan's four listed motivations for filing
SLAPPs concern their chilling effect: "The attempt to prevent expected future, competent opposition on subsequent public policy issues; [and] the intent to intimidate and, generally, to send a message that opposition will be punished."42

SLAPPs dissuade not only named defendants, but also their neighbors and their community.43 Commentator Joseph Brecher expresses concern about "a serious diminution in the critical watchdog role played by citizens and citizens' groups."44 Plaintiffs often name Doe defendants in their SLAPPs, so that anyone who steps forward after filing can conveniently be added.45 Some SLAPP defendants may be worried not only about financial exposure, but also about stigma in their community.46

defendant group protesting airport noise “can expect a tough time selling or refinancing [their houses] until the airport authority drops its claim”).


43. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 466-70; Pring, supra note 1, at 6; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 405. See also David Conn, Bill Would Help Activists Fight Nuisance Suits, BALT. MORN. SUN, Jan. 29, 1992, at 1C, in which SLAPP defendant Ruth Ann Snyder stated: “Attendance at [Bowie, Maryland's] zoning hearings dropped to about 50 from more than 200 before the SLAPP was filed.” Id.

44. Brecher, supra note 29, at 105. Brecher describes recent procedural encouragements of citizen involvement, such as relaxation of standing requirements, id. at 106-10; see also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) (standing conferred to student group suing for environmental harm based on “attenuated line of causation”); statutory allowances for citizens' groups, elimination of irreparable injury requirement for injunctions involving environmental statutory violations; easier intervention for public interest groups, Brecher, supra note 29, at 105-10 (describing Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983)); and citizen access laws such as the Freedom of Information Act, id. at 110. Assembled against these advantages for citizens are the obvious systemic and financial advantages of developers and other typical SLAPP plaintiffs. Brecher expresses concern that the pendulum will be drawn back by the latter's powerful magnet. Id. at 110-13.

45. Boyle, supra note 13, at 7 (describing case of condominium developer Joseph Cioccolanti); see also Putting a Stop to Unfair Suits, supra note 40, at A16 (describing case with 500 Doe defendants).

Costantini and Nash describe how plaintiff Boswell's representative phoned non-parties who had contributed only small amounts to a fund to publish the ad at issue in the SLAPP. See Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 454-55. Fred Starr was among those called. Id. at 467. Costantini and Nash note that:

Fred Starr's apology and guarantee to cease supporting the [defendant] Family Farmers' efforts were sufficient to forestall [his] being served as one of the John Does in the libel complaint. He testified that merely being named a codefendant by [plaintiff] Boswell would have jeopardized his ability to secure the bank loans he needed to farm his crops . . . .

Id.

46. Boyle quotes SLAPP defendant Catherine Cream: "I've done nothing libelous, scandalous or anything I should be ashamed of. I'm just an ordinary citizen; I go to work every day. I worry about paying bills. I'm no Cesar Chavez. I'm just Josephine Average. By filing
SLAPP plaintiffs' primary practical motivations are delay, expense and distraction. "The typical SLAPP ties its victims up in court for an average of three years." Although defendants may ultimately prevail, they may be unable to recoup their litigation costs or attorney's fees. Even if defendants win back their fees, they must pay them up front or risk loss because of default. Naturally, expenditure of significant amounts of money raises the ante for SLAPP defendants unaccustomed to such outlays. Strategically, SLAPPs divert defendants: During a SLAPP's pendency, the defendant's resources are tied up; a defendant organization may lose members; and while preparing for litigation, a small group or an individual will have no time to protest.

Plaintiffs' third primary motivation is depoliticization. The SLAPP moves the controversy away from the public or legislative arenas into the private judicial arena. Arguably courts are relatively isolated from the political process. More importantly, resolution of problems in court, except for occasional innovative equitable decrees, is a win-lose process in which only one party can win. In contrast, in a legislative setting, conflict resolution is accomplished by compromise and balancing competing interests. Conflicts crucial to community development may be best resolved in a legislative setting. As far as impact, in the political arena a small or poorly funded group can conceivably stir up significant SLAPP suits, people with the wherewithal can stifle small groups." Boyle, supra note 13, at 9.

47. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 404 n.36 (quoting Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 26 (1989)); see also Galperin, supra note 4, at K1, K15 ("[T]he average SLAPP asks for $9 million in damages and lasts about three years before getting resolved."); Mark Goldowitz, SLAPP Lawsuits and the First Amendment, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 23, 1991, at B13; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18, at B6 ("[T]akes an average of three years and thousands of dollars in legal fees to settle those meritless cases."); cf. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 426-28 (noting that Boswell SLAPP defendants ultimately won $13 million for libel, but it took eight years, including appeals).


49. McEvoy, supra note 4, at 525; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18.


52. Canan, supra note 42, at 23-24; McEvoy, supra note 4, at 506; Pring, supra note 15, at *937; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 403.


54. See id. at 428.
grass-roots interest, but a court outcome is more dependent on the parties’ financial backing and skill. Traditionally, courts eschew the political aspects of controversies and political lines of analysis. Legal issues are often arcane to the lay public. A judicial setting also “transforms the focus of the dispute,” by switching attention from the plaintiff’s actions, in the press or local political body, to the defendant’s actions, in court. Similarly, SLAPP litigation “transform[s] the dispute topics (for example, zoning becomes libel) and move[s] the forum.”

Professor Pring notes that as the third step in a cyclical process, SLAPP defendants can re-politicize the dispute by using a Petition Clause defense and by bringing their cause to the press or to the government. Allowing government intervention in a SLAPP would accomplish half of this third step by involving a public body, even though the dispute is still in a judicial forum. Finally, another motivation identified by Professor Canan is to use SLAPPs “as simply another tool in a strategy to win a political and/or economic battle.”

SLAPP plaintiffs may have other motives. Most crucially, SLAPP plaintiffs do not intend to win the litigation. “[P]revailing in the courts is not the goal of the plaintiffs. Rather, they seek to silence their critics by forcing them to spend thousands of dollars to defend themselves.” In fact, defendants win eighty to ninety percent of all SLAPP suits litigated on the merits. Specifically because winning is not a SLAPP plaintiff’s prime motivation, existing safeguards are inadequate. They focus on preventing plaintiffs from winning meritless suits. SLAPP plaintiffs,

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58. Id.; see infra part IV.E.
59. Government intervention is discussed infra in part III.E.
60. Canan, supra note 42, at 30.
61. For example, Professor Canan lists retaliation as another motive. Id. Certainly, SLAPPs can have devastating effects on their defendants. For example, SLAPP defendant Barbara Dolan and her husband “were faced with financial ruin. It took two years to fight this case, two years of personal agony . . . . My mother was already in fragile health, and it’s my belief the stress of the experience hastened her death. So even if the other side loses, there’s been cost to you.” Thomas Clavin, The High Price of High Ideals, WOMAN’S DAY, Sept. 24, 1991, at 51 (quoting Barbara Dolan).
62. Walters, supra note 18, at A3; see McEvoy, supra note 4, at 505-06; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 403.
63. Pring, supra note 15, at *23; Clavin, supra note 61, at 50; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18; see also Brecher, supra note 29, at 113-14 (stating that no SLAPP plaintiff has won SLAPP suit); Hager, supra note 18, at A31 (stating that 80% of SLAPPs are either dropped or won by defendant).
however, expect to lose their suits, and often concede the litigation costs, such as the defendants' attorney's fees, as costs of doing business.\textsuperscript{64} Thus, a Petition Clause defense or the specter of a malicious prosecution SLAPP-back will not necessarily deter the original SLAPP, which by that time may have accomplished the delay or diversion necessary for the plaintiff's project to be approved or even completed.

### III. Procedural Remedies for SLAPPs

Legislators, commentators and courts have proposed an assortment of procedural antidotes to SLAPPs. Some proposals, such as court-ordered discovery costs and specific pleading, are minor and clearly supplemental to larger remedies.\textsuperscript{65} Others, such as significantly accelerating initial court review on the merits, would serve as more formidable deterrents to filing SLAPPs. Any of these procedural fixes could be accomplished either by statute or by the rules of the court. Many are included in existing or proposed legislation, as discussed below.

#### A. Specific Pleading

Judge Neely's dissent in \textit{Webb v. Fury}\textsuperscript{66} suggested a mandate that pleadings be more specific if First Amendment rights are involved.\textsuperscript{67} The current default in notice-pleading jurisdictions is to require "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"\textsuperscript{68} but disfavored actions such as fraud require specific pleading.\textsuperscript{69} Greater pleading detail will facilitate the initial judicial triage that is essential to dismiss SLAPPs early. Its value would arise in conjunction

\textsuperscript{64} See Galperin, supra note 4, at K15 (stating that developers who file suits do not expect to win).

\textsuperscript{65} Commentators Costantini and Nash include removal as a possible alternative strategy to a direct SLAPP-back, for SLAPP defendants to quickly terminate litigation. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 477 n.230. The strategic value of removal would of course depend on the jurisdiction and the political biases of the respective state and federal courts therein. Conceivably, it could help either side. In addition, California and federal courts may have different standards for the petitioning privilege. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. Obviously, removal would not eliminate the suit, its chilling power, or its cost and delay.


\textsuperscript{67} Id. at 47 (Neely, J., dissenting). "[T]he danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise of first amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be required." . . . If necessary, the Court should invoke its rule-making authority and amend the Rules [of Civil Procedure] to so provide." Id. (Neely, J., dissenting) (quoting Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977)); see also Cosentino, supra note 16, at 423-24 (discussing Judge Neely's dissent in \textit{Webb}).

\textsuperscript{68} E.g., Fed. R. Ctv. P. 8(a)(2).

\textsuperscript{69} E.g., Fed. R. Ctv. P. 9(b).
with other procedural remedies outlined below, such as the acceleration of a heightened dismissal standard.

B. Discovery Costs

Discovery is usually the most expensive, time-consuming and intimidating litigation stage before adjudication on the merits. In addition to the harassment of the SLAPP itself, the liberal discovery allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides opportunities for further harassment. Judge Neely's dissent in Webb recommended that courts be allowed to order a plaintiff to pay for all of a defendant's discovery costs up front "in appropriate circumstances of gross imbalance of assets"; then, if the plaintiff wins at trial, the defendant would reimburse the plaintiff for those advance discovery costs. Mandatory payment of a defendant's discovery costs, like specific pleading, is a supplemental remedy, effective only in conjunction with more potent SLAPP-deterring measures.

California's recently enacted Lockyer bill provides SLAPP defendants with "a special motion to strike" that defendants can exercise within sixty days of filing a SLAPP. "All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed" as soon as such a motion is filed and until the court renders its decision on this motion. This provision effectively removes much of the intimidation associated with voluminous discovery requests by SLAPP plaintiffs.

C. Acceleration of Preemptive Judicial Review

Quick and early resolution of litigation is the single most important component of any court or statutory scheme to prevent SLAPPs. Expediting the SLAPP process will not only alleviate its chilling effect on defendants, but it will also create disincentives for plaintiffs seeking primarily to delay and distract their opponents. The earlier that threshold judicial review occurs, the less effective the SLAPP will be. The Colorado Supreme Court, in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court, essentially moved summary judgment review back to the dismissal stage of the litigation.

70. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Cosentino, supra note 16, at 408 n.54.
71. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 47 (Neely, J., dissenting).
73. Id. § 2 (to be codified at Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(g)).
74. 677 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Colo. 1984). Professor Canan asserts that "the average SLAPP suit lasts 36 months, but the motion [to dismiss based on constitutional protection] reduces the time to 4 months." Clavin, supra note 61, at 50.
Solutions to SLAPPS

California's recently enacted Lockyer bill establishes even earlier judicial review. A complaint involving First Amendment rights and a "public issue" cannot be filed—or if filed, is subject to an immediate motion to strike—before the court has tested its validity, using affidavits from both sides to ascertain whether the plaintiff has "a probability" of prevailing on the merits. The provision for input from both sides contributes to the fairness of this proposed remedy. Its immediacy would serve as a strong deterrent to SLAPPs because early dismissal before the defendant has spent much time and money would significantly neutralize a SLAPP's effectiveness. Of course the efficacy of such an accelerated dismissal is contingent upon the dismissal standard used—in this case, on exactly what "a probability" means.

D. Dismissal Standards

1. Threshold standards

Courts usually do not dismiss SLAPPs at the demurrer stage of litigation because the claims generally present some cognizable claim. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff's claim may be dismissed at this point only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Despite this formidable standard, some courts have dismissed SLAPPs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In Sierra Club v.

76. See supra part II.A for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the public interest component.
77. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
78. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 414; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Butz, the defendant timber company alleged in its counterclaim that the plaintiff environmental group "willfully" caused the government to reject the defendant's timber sales. The federal district court dismissed this counterclaim on three grounds: (1) The willfulness of the plaintiff's petitioning activity by itself could not remove constitutional protection; (2) the plaintiff's petitioning would have had to have been entirely for an improper purpose under the Noerr/Pennington sham exception doctrine, and this plaintiff had simply petitioned through the proper channels; and (3) the plaintiff could not be held liable for the government's action even if the plaintiff helped persuade the government to act.

In Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, the court dismissed the plaintiff's Sherman Act claim because the case involved a political zoning fight, rather than the requisite commercial dispute. The court also dismissed a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the plaintiff had not adequately specified what due process rights, if any, had been denied. In addition, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 because, inter alia, the court found no class-based discrimination.

In SRW Associates v. Bellport Beach Property Owners, a New York court summarily dismissed a SLAPP for failure to state a claim. The court rejected an injurious falsehood claim, finding no causation as a matter of law; no prima facie tort claim because the defendant's intent was not solely malicious; and no conspiracy claim because conspiracy was not a valid separate cause of action.

As the Lockyer bill's probability standard is as yet untested, one can only speculate what it will mean in practice. One commentator analogized it to a threshold test used in medical malpractice for punitive dam-

81. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In this case the plaintiff and defendant are reversed so that the SLAPP is the defendant's counterclaim.
82. Id. at 939. See infra part IV.E for a discussion of the Noerr/Pennington sham doctrine.
84. Id. at 1272-73.
85. Id. at 1272.
86. Id. at 1273.
88. Id. at 743-44. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33 for a discussion of conspiracy claims.
The frivolous lawsuit sanction rules, Federal Rule 1190 and California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, do not provide helpful analogies for the probability standard, because these rules are usually charitably applied. The criminal law's probable cause standard or the civil standard for summary judgment, a "genuine issue as to any material fact," might be more helpful.

The Lockyer bill's original language included a "substantial probability" standard. This language was the prime stumbling block for opponents of the anti-SLAPP statute such as the California Building Industry Association (CBIA). CBIA viewed a substantial probability as a preponderance presumably because "probable" literally means more likely than not. Requiring a plaintiff to meet a preponderance burden before discovery would no doubt impair the plaintiff's rights to due pro-

89. Goldowitz, supra note 47, at B13. Commenting on the "substantial probability" standard originally proposed in the Lockyer bill, Goldowitz stated:

[T]he same test must now be passed in order to pursue punitive damages against doctors, and an even more stringent test exists for punitive damage claims against religious organizations. It makes sense to provide similar extra protections for citizens willing to participate in our political process, particularly in these days of dwindling public participation.


90. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
92. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538-42 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting broad application of Rule 11); Brecher, supra note 29, at 136 (noting that California Supreme Court strictly construes sanction power). See infra part IV.B for a discussion of frivolous lawsuit rules.
93. To prove probable cause to search or arrest, police authorities must show a magistrate trustworthy facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the search or arrest is necessary. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (holding that anonymous letter whose facts police subsequently corroborated was sufficient to find probable cause). Significantly, only a probability is required, not a prima facie showing of a crime. Id. at 235. Although the probable cause requirement has been significantly weakened by many exceptions, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the principle may still elucidate the substantial probability standard, especially as both phrases share the elusive "probable" variable. The Gates case illustrates just how low the probable cause threshold is: A pivotal fact on which the court relied to find that the police had probable cause was that the suspect was going to Florida, a major drug-smuggling center. Gates, 462 U.S. at 243.
94. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
96. Id.
cess. Judging from the heavily litigated concept of probable cause, however, substantial probability was not intended to mandate a preponderance burden at such an early stage.

An earlier version of this Article, submitted to the State Legislature, suggested a “substantial possibility” standard, which would placate business interests yet still provide an effective barrier to SLAPPs. The Governor’s Office of Planning and Research proposed a third wording for the standard of threshold review: A court could look for “evidence to substantiate the claim.” As discussed, a SLAPP is couched as an ordinary tort claim, and invariably some evidence supports such a claim. For example, the courts would find some evidence to support a claim where a defendant did make a derogatory statement about a plaintiff, even if the statement was clearly “rhetorical hyperbole.” The mere-evidence test would therefore be too porous. In contrast, the “substantial possibility” standard presents a workable compromise. It retains substantiality as a minimal screen, but does not demand probability of success, just possibility.

The language of the recently enacted Lockyer bill arrives at a different compromise standard. The word “substantial” has been deleted, but the word “probability” remains. Although retention of the word “probability” seems to carry with it the same problematic connotation of preponderance, this middle ground was apparently acceptable to business groups and to Governor Wilson, who approved the bill with the probability standard on September 16, 1992.

2. Factual review standards

For initial review of SLAPPs to be effective, courts should also use the summary judgment standard for factual deference, rather than the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. At the dismissal stage, courts accept all allegations of the complaint as true. At summary judgment, however, courts view facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Court review of suits initially believed to be SLAPPs

97. See supra note 6 for a discussion of the constitutional right of access to the judicial system. Constitutionally, the preponderance burden should not come into play until trial.
98. Letter from Richard Sybert, Director, Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, to Senator Bill Lockyer (April 28, 1992) (on file with author).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 167-81 for a discussion of rhetorical hyperbole.
100. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
will necessarily entail some close factual analysis, as SLAPP claims are almost always legally coherent.

California courts prefer to decide First Amendment-related cases at summary judgment: “[B]ecause unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights, speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable. Therefore, summary judgment is a favored remedy . . . .”

E. Government Intervention in the SLAPP

Proposed anti-SLAPP bills in New Jersey and Maryland, and a recent state statute in Washington, all provide for government intervention on behalf of SLAPP defendants. The government body must be one to which the SLAPP defendant initially petitioned. If the government body originally involved—prior to the SLAPP—does not choose to intervene, then and only then, may the attorney general intervene on the defendant's side. The subject matter of the original communication to the agency must have been something “reasonably of concern” to that agency.

Although only allowing government intervention on a defendant's side may seem inequitable, and may even raise potential equal protection issues, the Washington statute and the Maryland bill offset this effect by allowing a SLAPP plaintiff to recover fees if the defense is unsuccessful. Washington's more complex fee structure actually provides an ad-

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105. See, e.g., Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260, 268-69, 721 P.2d 87, 90, 96, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209, 215 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987); Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 450, 459, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374, 1379, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162, 167, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981). However, if the language at issue is clearly ambiguous and could be either fact or opinion, a jury should make the determination. Good Gov't Group, 22 Cal. 3d at 682, 586 P.2d at 576, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
107. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520. The government body or agency must have “receiv[ed] a complaint or information under [§] 4.24.510 . . . .” Id.
110. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.520; S. 51, supra note 106.
ditional disincentive for agency intervention, by allowing a plaintiff to recover fees and costs from the *agency* if the agency’s defense fails.\(^{111}\)

Allowing government intervention on behalf of SLAPP defendants could significantly reduce both the chilling effect and the prohibitive expense to these defendants. In addition, because of the government involvement, the dispute would not be entirely depoliticized, even though the dispute was moved to a judicial forum. Government involvement in general—not necessarily government intervention into the litigation as a party—may also assist SLAPP defendants by interrupting the chain of but-for causation.\(^{112}\) On the other hand, SLAPP plaintiffs’ aims of delay and distraction would be largely unaffected by government intervention, so this antidote is also supplemental. In other words, having the government on their side may reduce both the chill and the expense of defending a SLAPP, but the SLAPP will still subject its defendants to delay and distraction.

IV. **SUBSTANTIVE REMEDIES: DEFENSES**

A. *Precautions Before a SLAPP Is Brought*

Though easier said than done, the best defense to the chill of a SLAPP is to be informed rather than intimidated. A SLAPP defendant’s perseverance may well be rewarded, in that the eventual payoffs for a malicious prosecution SLAPP-back can be substantial.\(^{113}\) In addition, political involvement at a local level can ensure that local planning bodies are more responsive to citizens’ interests.\(^{114}\)

More specific precautionary measures include avoiding defamation, incorporating and obtaining insurance. Potential SLAPP defendants speaking out or expressing themselves in writing against a powerful de-

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112. E.g., Srw Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Property Owners, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743-44 (App. Div. 1987). In Srw Associates, the court found that the defendant’s allegedly false statements to the public did not directly cause the town board’s denial of the plaintiff developer’s building application. *Id.* Because the board knew independently that the plaintiff applied to build single-family residences even though the defendant mischaracterized the proposed buildings as “clustered,” there could be no but-for causation for the plaintiff’s injurious falsehood claim against the defendant. *Id.*; see also Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (“[I]iability can never be imposed upon a party for damage caused by governmental action he induced.” (emphasis added)).
113. For example, three farmers eventually won a multi-million dollar judgment against an agribusiness giant, J.G. Boswell Corporation. Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 426; Boyle, supra note 13, at 11; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18. By the time of this judgment, however, these farmers and many of their neighbors had long since withdrawn from any further political activism. See Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 468-70.
114. See McEvoy, supra note 4, at 531.
veloper or other public figure,\footnote{115} would be well advised to avoid \textit{ad hominem} attacks and follow one columnist's advice: "Don't get personal in your accusations . . . . [A]void insults or inflammatory charges."\footnote{116} This admonishment carries some chill, but could also encourage more rigorous preliminary factual investigation by citizen activist groups. Citizens' groups also can incorporate in order to keep SLAPP plaintiffs from threatening their homes and personal savings.\footnote{117} Once incorporated, a group can procure corporate liability insurance. Insurance coverage is an obvious, although not always reliable, protection for SLAPP defendants. Some homeowners' insurance policies cover legal costs.\footnote{118} SLAPP defendants have discovered, however, that insurance coverage may decrease or disappear once a SLAPP is filed.\footnote{119}

Insurance reform would be another statutory approach to protecting SLAPP defendants.\footnote{120} The state could either establish an insurance supplement fund for SLAPP defendants, or require that insurance carriers offer coverage or that carriers not reduce existing coverage.\footnote{121} A state

\footnote{115} An otherwise private individual who voluntarily inserts himself or herself into the community on one particular project or matter can be considered a "public figure" as to that project for purposes of defamation. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974); Walters v. Linhof, 559 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D. Colo. 1983); Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 451, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162, \textit{cert. denied}, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981). For a discussion of the significance of public figure status, see \textit{infra} notes 191-94 and accompanying text.

\footnote{116} McEvoy, \textit{supra} note 4, at 531; Clavin, \textit{supra} note 61, at 50.

\footnote{117} Sive, \textit{supra} note 29, at *2; Galperin, \textit{supra} note 4, at K15. Professor Sive notes that a corporate veil can be pierced if incorporation is fraudulent or accomplished solely to avoid operation of law. Sive, \textit{supra} note 29, at *1 n.3.

\footnote{118} Clavin, \textit{supra} note 61, at 50.

\footnote{119} \textit{E.g.}, Wegis v. J.G. Boswell Co., No. FO11230, slip op. at 10-11 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 1991). In \textit{J.G. Boswell}, once the SLAPP was filed, the defendant farmers lost some insurance coverage and were forced to obtain insurance from another company at greater cost. \textit{Id.}; Costantini & Nash, \textit{supra} note 4, at 465. "Indeed, [defendant's] new insurance company advised him to avoid involvement in political campaigns if he wished to reduce the deductible he had been required to take for personal damage insurance following the libel suit." \textit{Id.} at 468; \textit{see also} Regan, \textit{supra} note 39, at B1 (quoting researcher's findings that SLAPPS led to cancellation of insurance).

\footnote{120} This Article discusses only broad options in the insurance reform area; further examination is beyond its scope.

\footnote{121} Such a requirement may interfere with carriers' freedom to contract by telling them with whom to do business. See U.S. \textsc{const.} art. I, \textsection 10, cl. 1. Making a regulation, however, that applies only \textit{prospectively} could circumvent Contracts Clause challenges. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, \textsc{constitutional law} \textsection 11.8, at 405 (4th ed. 1991). In addition, the analysis in \textit{Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus}, 438 U.S. 234, 242-44 (1978), indicates that the Supreme Court would probably find that the Constitution permits such regulation of insurance coverage despite the regulation's impairment of existing insurance contracts, because the speech rights involved in SLAPPS are a "basic societal interest." See \textit{id.} at 242. Insurance carriers could argue that they detrimentally relied on the absence of such
insurance fund could be financed by collecting mandatory contributions from unsuccessful defamation plaintiffs or SLAPP plaintiffs. Such insurance reform proposals would require a narrow threshold test to identify that insureds were indeed victims of SLAPPs. For example, the statute could require an initial showing that free speech or the right to petition was involved, or a showing that the defendant could not get adequate coverage otherwise.

B. Frivolous Lawsuit Remedies and Ethical Duties

The existing provisions in professional ethical codes and sanction provisions in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, do not adequately deter SLAPPs. These provisions provide standards and enforcement proceedings that are lax and are not SLAPP-specific.

1. Duties under professional ethical codes

Under both the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the two American Bar Association codes, a lawyer cannot file a suit solely or merely to harass or to delay. Thus, the lawyer must have probable cause to bring the suit, and the suit must have some substantial purpose other than harassment or delay. If the suit is short on law, the lawyer's ethical duties are satisfied if the attorney has a good-faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Under the ABA Model Code and Model Rules, the lawyer need not subjectively believe that the argument will ultimately prevail, but must believe that the argument is made in good faith. Under the California Rules and the Model Code, the merely-to-harass standard is applicable only if the lawyer knows or should know that the suit is meritless. Duties under mandates, in setting loss-reserve amounts, but the industry is so heavily regulated that this reliance would be arguably misplaced. See id. at 250.

122. It appears that this particular proposal comes closer than many anti-SLAPP remedies to directly penalizing plaintiffs for using the legal system to bring meritless suits.


124. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3-200(B); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1.

125. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. The California Rules do not address this issue.

126. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3-200(A); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (omitting requirement of lawyer's knowledge).
the ethical codes are unlikely to effectively prevent SLAPPs, because citizen defendants are usually unaware of professional disciplinary options, because the bar and the bench are reluctant to report their colleagues’ misdeeds, and because SLAPPs are couched as legitimate torts and are not easy to recognize as meritless.

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 will not in practice or in principle prevent plaintiffs from filing SLAPPs for some of the same reasons that the ethical codes will not, such as lax standards and enforcement. Under Rule 11, a court can sanction a lawyer, client or both for bringing a lawsuit for “any improper purpose,” or for filing a lawsuit whose facts as pleaded have not been reasonably investigated or are not based on “existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” If, using an objective standard, either the improper purpose or the good-faith basis in law or fact prongs are violated, then sanctions are mandatory. The nature and severity of the sanctions are up to the court, but in practice they are hardly sufficient to deter SLAPPs.

Superficially, SLAPPs will always appear to be well-grounded in fact and law. SLAPPs will have no trouble passing the factual-basis aspect of a Rule 11 analysis because SLAPPs, although improper, invariably rest on some demonstrable facts or alleged statement by the defendant.

127. The California Business and Professions Code has no general policing rule. The American Bar Association codes both require lawyers to report their colleagues’ ethical violations to the appropriate professional authorities, unless their knowledge of those violations is privileged. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) & (c). Predictably, reporting under these two latter national provisions is infrequent. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 419. Cosentino recommends that SLAPP-reform schemes expressly require judges to report attorneys who bring SLAPPs to state disciplinary bodies. Id. at 427.

128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The lawyer filing the lawsuit must sign any “pleading, motion or other paper.” This signature certifies that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [the lawsuit] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Id.

129. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986). Sanctions may be imposed either on a party’s motion or on the court’s own motion even after the case has been dismissed. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 398 (1990).


131. For example, the sanction at issue in the Golden Eagle Distributing cases against a large Chicago-based law firm was in the amount of $3,155.50. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1534.
ants. The “not well-grounded in fact” standard will only prevent a lawsuit without factual support, such as an antitrust action against a non-competitor or an action in which the lawyers have been especially careless in reviewing the factual basis of the claim.

Courts also can impose sanctions if a claim has neither a legal basis nor a reasonable argument for a change in the law. As the Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. litigation demonstrates, courts apply this aspect of Rule 11 very leniently. In the predecessor action, the sanctioned law firm cited a 1965 California Supreme Court case to support the unavailability of tort damages for economic loss under California law, but failed to cite the landmark 1979 California Supreme Court case that allowed such damages if foreseeable. The trial court sanctioned the law firm for violating its “duty to disclose adverse authority.” The Ninth Circuit reversed, contending that a lawyer’s role is to advocate, not “to find all potentially contrary authority.” Thus, the standard applied by the Ninth Circuit will not

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133. E.g., Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 388-90 (sanctioning lawyers for insufficient prefiling investigation of claim for “nationwide conspiracy to fix prices” where lawyers merely telephoned several men’s stores in only four East Coast cities and inferred price fixing). In addition to determining that a pleading is well-grounded in fact and law, a court should “consider all the circumstances,” such as time pressures on the lawyer. Id. at 401.
134. Id. at 392; Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1534-39. Professor Sive observes that Rule 11’s language regarding “the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law” especially fits a developing area such as environmental law. Sive, supra note 29, at *5.
135. 809 F.2d 584, 586-89 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing).
136. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
139. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1535; see also Golden Eagle Distrib., 809 F.2d at 586 (Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing) (“How can a brief be warranted by existing law if its argument goes in the face of ‘directly contrary’ authority from the highest court of the jurisdiction whose law is being argued?”).
140. Golden Eagle Distrib., 801 F.2d at 1542. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the trial court’s Rule 11 sanction for the law firm’s misleading characterization of a United States Supreme Court exception. Id. at 1534-35, 1541. It found the district court’s “argument identification” requirement made too fine a distinction between whether an argument is based on existing law or is an argument for an extension or modification of existing law. Id. at 1540. This hair-splitting would lead to increased costs and complexity in litigation, which is at cross purposes with the “key objective” of Rule 11. Id. at 1540-41. However, five circuit judges expressed their strong disagreement, stating the firm should have made clear that the interpretation it was advocating was not established law. See Golden Eagle Distrib., 809 F.2d at 586 (Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing). Other circuits concur with this dissenting opinion and have held that if a jurisdiction clearly disfavors a particular lawyer’s argument, then that lawyer must so state and argue for an extension or modification of law. See, e.g., DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 766 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 952 (1990).
encompass SLAPPs because SLAPPs are couched as standard tort actions and will always be well rooted in existing law.

A court can levy Rule 11 sanctions if a lawsuit is filed specifically to harass or to delay.\textsuperscript{141} The problem with SLAPPs is not their lack of arguable claims arising from arguable facts, but the impropriety of the SLAPP plaintiffs’ motives. A SLAPP’s legal basis invariably will be a standard tort principle; thus, the improper purpose component of Rule 11 is the only one applicable. One commentator argues that “unnecessary delay” can currently be sanctioned under Rule 11 and that any further, SLAPP-specific, judicial rule in this area would not be responsible.\textsuperscript{142}

A growing minority trend among federal circuit courts calls for a link between enforcement of Rule 11 and lawyers’ social responsibility— for reassessing lawyers’ ethical obligations as divided between their clients and the public.\textsuperscript{143} Under this approach, arguing a minority position or a position from dicta without identifying it as such, or failing to mention an unfavorable landmark decision—such as \textit{J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory}—would itself constitute filing a suit “for any improper purpose.”\textsuperscript{144} The Ninth Circuit, however, does not follow this position,\textsuperscript{145} nor would the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{146} And the standard of review for the imposition of sanctions by a trial court is abuse of discretion.\textsuperscript{147} Because Rule 11 sanctions are leniently imposed, leniently reviewed, and do not yield a high enough fine to deter SLAPPs, Rule 11 will not prevent SLAPPs.

3. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5

California’s version of Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5,\textsuperscript{148} offers a plaintiff a more generous standard than the federal

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{141} FED. R. CIV. P. 11; \textit{Golden Eagle Distrib.}, 801 F.2d at 1537; see also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that new Rule 11 is intended to prevent misuse of “judicial procedures as a weapon for personal or economic harassment”).
  \item \textsuperscript{142} See Sive, supra note 29, at *5-6. Sive also finds Rule 11 especially appropriate in the context of environmental SLAPPs, in which issues are usually of both law and fact rather than pure fact, so that Rule 11’s emphasis on the lawyer’s conduct rather than the client’s is appropriate. \textit{Id.} at *5.
  \item \textsuperscript{143} See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{DeSisto College, Inc.}, 888 F.2d at 755; \textit{Golden Eagle Distrib.}, 809 F.2d at 586-89 (Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing).
  \item \textsuperscript{144} See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{DeSisto College}, 888 F.2d at 755; \textit{Golden Eagle Distrib.}, 809 F.2d at 586-89 (Noonan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en banc hearing).
  \item \textsuperscript{145} \textit{Golden Eagle Distrib.}, 801 F.2d at 1539-42.
  \item \textsuperscript{146} See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (applying reasonableness standard to determine whether suit was filed for improper purpose).
  \item \textsuperscript{147} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{148} \textit{CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE} § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
\end{itemize}
A lawsuit must be frivolous to justify sanctions under section 128.5. As with Rule 11, the sanction amounts awarded are small, so the deterrent effect is negligible.

In sum, although one commentator lists lawyer disciplinary sanctions as an integral component of a reform program, it appears that sanctions alone will not prevent SLAPPs. Neither the ethical codes nor the frivolous lawsuit rules are rigorously enforced. Sanction amounts, when awarded, are too small to deter. It is easy for the lawyer to argue that he or she was unaware of the underlying improper purpose, or under the ethical codes, that the improper purpose was not the only purpose. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although courts have the power to award sanctions against clients, Rule 11 and section 128.5 may be more an incentive for a client to locate a less squeamish lawyer than to refrain from bringing the SLAPP at all.

C. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

A SLAPP may be brought for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, although the SLAPP defendant may be able to defeat some or all of the prima facie elements of this tort. Briefly, the elements of the tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage are: (1) an existing economic relationship between plaintiff and a third party that probably will economically benefit plaintiff in the future; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this relationship; (3) defendant’s intentional and successful disruption of the relationship; and (4) damage proximately caused by the actions of the defendant.

SLAPP cases have provided an important gloss on some of these elements. For example, the relationship between the SLAPP plaintiff and a third party must be economic, not regulatory. In Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski, a city was the third-party plaintiff and the plaintiff developer was required to obtain permits from the city. The court held that the developer and the city were not in an economic relationship.

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149. See Brecher, supra note 29, at 136-37.
151. Brecher, supra note 29, at 137.
155. Id. at 836, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
and that the only economic relationship the plaintiff had (if any) was with future home buyers.\textsuperscript{156} In addition, because the development had not yet been approved, the court found that there was no "existing relationship" with which the defendant could have tortiously interfered.\textsuperscript{157} More importantly in the SLAPP context, no privileged statement can constitute such tortious interference.\textsuperscript{158} As with all defenses against prima facie elements of SLAPPS, these substantive defenses allow defendants to win at trial, but do not thwart a SLAPP's effectiveness in delaying or intimidating.

\section*{D. Defamation and Opinion}

In the SLAPP context, which often involves environmentalists and slow-growth activists speaking out against development projects, the most relevant aspect of defamation jurisprudence is the opinion privilege.\textsuperscript{159} In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in \textit{Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.},\textsuperscript{160} federal courts do not expressly recognize a separate opinion privilege.\textsuperscript{161} The analysis of allegedly defamatory language in this context, however, remains largely unchanged. Both California and federal courts examine the language itself and its backdrop in the actual publication, as well as in its larger social and political setting.\textsuperscript{162} They consider whether that language is mere puffing or political bluster

156. \textit{Id.} at 841, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 323.

157. \textit{Id.}

158. \textit{See id.} at 841-42, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24 (explaining that privileged statement is one that falls within ambit of California Civil Code § 47, which was enacted to provide litigants utmost freedom of access to courts without fear of retaliatory lawsuits); Brody v. Montalbano, 87 Cal. App. 3d 725, 738, 151 Cal. Rptr. 206, 215 (1978), \textit{cert. denied}, 444 U.S. 844 (1979); Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 13, 20, 144 Cal. Rptr. 664, 669 (1978). These cases involved the absolute privilege for communications during legislative or judicial proceedings under California Civil Code § 47(2) (West 1982) (now codified at \textit{CAL. CIV. CODE} § 47(b) (West Supp. 1992)). \textit{See infra} text accompanying note 215.

159. The opinion privilege originally stemmed from dicta in \textit{Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.}, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974): "[T]here is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." \textit{Id.; see also} Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding principle that statements of opinion are not actionable); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 600-01, 552 P.2d 425, 427-28, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643-44 (1976) (holding that statements of opinion are constitutionally protected and not subject to suit for libel).


161. \textit{Id.} at 2707.

during a heated debate, or whether it conveys undisclosed knowledge of wrongdoing of which the defendant is accusing the plaintiff.163

The "undisclosed facts" analysis is parallel to that found in section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.164 The Court in Milkovich held that statements about matters of public concern that "imply an assertion of objective fact" that is both false and defaming, are actionable.165 The crux of the analysis is whether the alleged defamation actually accused the plaintiff of some verifiable wrongdoing or crime. For example, the Milkovich majority believed that the defendant's column accused the plaintiff of committing perjury.166

In contrast, had the defendant accused the plaintiff of being "a jerk," this would have been a nonactionable opinion or "rhetorical hyperbole."167 The defendant in Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc.168 used the word "shady" to describe the plaintiff bar owners. The court found this language to be rhetorical hyperbole because "shady" is an opinion word that cannot be proven true or false and because it does not depend on undisclosed facts.169 Similarly, the defendant in Letter Carriers v. Austin used Jack London's famous characterization of a scab as "'a traitor to his god, his country, his family and his class' " to describe the plaintiff.170 The Supreme Court easily rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendant was literally accusing the plaintiff of treason against the United States.171 In Karnell v. Campbell172 the defendant's statements that the

165. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
166. Id. at 2707.
167. Id. at 2705.
169. Id. at 48; see also Okun, 29 Cal. 3d at 452, 629 P.2d at 1374-75, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52 (stating that defendant's editorializing words such as "mysterious" and "amazingly" implied no hidden knowledge but rather colored defendant's letters to newspaper with opinion).
171. Id. at 284; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (noting jury determination that ad parody did not describe actual facts about plaintiff); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding that no reader could have believed speaker's use of word "blackmail" at public meeting meant speaker was accusing plaintiff of blackmail). In Hustler, evangelist Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine over a satiric ad parody that portrayed Falwell as a drunken reprobate having sex with his mother in an outhouse. 485 U.S. at 48. The Hustler Court decided that none of these depictions could "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about" plaintiff Jerry Falwell. Id. at 57.
plaintiff developer "robbed" and "raped" the defendant's town; got favorable zoning breaks "under false pretenses" and through "clever maneuvering"; and had to have known about a town government appraisal mistake were found by the court to be rhetorical and postured, because the statements implied no unknown facts. 

California and federal courts have adopted the "totality of circumstances" analysis from the seminal case of Ollman v. Evans. Essentially, this analysis looks at the speech, first by itself and then in its larger context. The rhetorical, posturing epithets just described are good illustrations of specific language that is not actionable. In addition, some courts have emphasized qualifying words that express doubt, such as "seems" or "appears." Simply adding such qualifiers, however, will not sanitize otherwise defamatory remarks. The Milkovich majority pointed out that "the statement, 'In my opinion Jones is a liar,' can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, 'Jones is a liar,'" and that such a "statement may still imply a false assertion of fact."

The totality of the circumstances analysis always considers the statements at issue as a whole and within their larger contexts. The typical SLAPP context of a political row involving a citizen, environmentalist or

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173. Id. at 1032.

174. Id. at 1035-36.

175. 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). Under the four-prong Ollman test, the court reviews: (1) the specific language itself; (2) the entire publication; (3) the surrounding circumstances; and (4) a reasonable viewer or reader reaction. Id. at 979. Other courts have applied a similar three-prong test which includes: (1) a reasonable viewer or reader reaction; (2) the surrounding circumstances; and (3) the specific language itself. Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1980); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260-61, 721 P.2d 87, 90-91, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209-10 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).

176. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979.

177. Genesis, 611 F.2d at 784; see also Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2712 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "when the reasonable reader encounters cautionary language, he tends to "discount that which follows"" (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985))).


179. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.

other protest group, will tend to suggest that verbal or written accusa-
tions are nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole. 181

The Milkovich opinion explicitly denied that the famous dicta in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 182—"there is no such thing as a false idea"—
had created a separate opinion privilege under the First Amendment. 183
Both the majority 184 and the dissent 185 stated that the existing constitu-
tional protections are adequate to protect freedom of expression without
the addition of a separate opinion privilege. These protections include:
(1) the Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps 186 requirement that a def-
amation plaintiff show the falsity of the statements on matters of public
concern that are at issue; (2) the rhetorical hyperbole and totality of the
circumstances analyses; and (3) the fault standards from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 187 and Gertz. 188 Milkovich is expressly based on
the Federal Constitution and in fact the Court rejected the defendants' independent state grounds argument. 189 As long as California courts fol-
low the perimeters of Michigan v. Long, 190 they could reaffirm a separate
opinion privilege under the California Constitution.

Finally, Milkovich reconfirmed the New York Times Co. actual mal-
lice standard, which was initially applied to public officials and later ex-
tended to public figures. 191 Note that public-figure status need not be

(finding that ad published by defendant farmers in context of "heated political campaign" over Peripher-
ral Canal contained "clear speculation"). But the Milkovich majority rejects a small-
town setting as a factor, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 n.9, and ignores the sports-page context, which the
state supreme court found "a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyperbole," id. at
2701 n.4. Contrast Olman, which stated that the context of an Op-Ed page article clearly
indicated opinion. 750 F.2d at 985.
183. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
184. Id. at 2706-07.
185. Id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. 418 U.S. at 347.
189. Id. at 347.
190. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701 n.5.
191. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that state court opinions are presumed to be based on
federal constitutional grounds unless opinion clearly states that it is based on adequate and
independent state grounds). The Lockyer bill addressed the "right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution," thus leaving open an independent state
grounds reading of this anti-SLAPP bill. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
191. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703; see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
134 (1967) (applying actual malice standard when plaintiff is public figure); New York Times
Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80, 285-86 (plaintiff must show with "convincing clarity" that defendant
had actual malice, requiring intentional or reckless disregard of defamatory statement's falsity).
permanent. Plaintiffs who prominently hold themselves out in the community on one particular matter or project are public figures as to that one matter or project.\textsuperscript{192} Thus, SLAPP plaintiffs must often show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, even though those plaintiffs are otherwise private individuals.\textsuperscript{193} In New York, the Gaffney-Lavalle Bill mandates an actual malice standard in defamation cases in which a plaintiff applies to a public agency for a permit or license, by making the plaintiff a public figure statutorily.\textsuperscript{194}

Overall, then, defamation law affords both SLAPP plaintiffs and defendants their respective protections. If a plaintiff stands accused of actual verifiable wrongdoing and can prove reckless disregard on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff’s defamation action will lie. On the other hand, defendants hurling opinionated and even outrageous epithets in the course of a heated political battle, without literally accusing plaintiffs of crimes or actual wrongdoing, can expect the full protection of the Constitution.

\textbf{E. The Right to Petition the Government; Petitioning Privileges; and the Noerr/Pennington Doctrine}

1. The right and its importance

The right to petition the government for redress of grievances protects citizens’ rights of political advocacy.\textsuperscript{195} Petitioning activity includes lobbying the government, suing, testifying, demonstrating peacefully, writing letters and boycotting.\textsuperscript{196} First Amendment rights include “[t]he right of public debate, including the right to publish truthful statements, the right to demonstrate in public and the right to report violations or make complaints to government bodies.”\textsuperscript{197} Courts will not interfere with the exercise of the right to petition absent sham or fraud,

\textsuperscript{193} See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703-04.
\textsuperscript{194} McEvoy, supra note 4, at 528.
\textsuperscript{195} See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
\textsuperscript{196} See Pring, supra note 1, at 9-12. In Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), NOW’s concerted effort to boycott conventions in Missouri—a state that did not ratify the Equal Rights Amendment—was held to be conspiratorial but privileged because it was political, rather than economic or commercial. Id. at 304-06. NOW’s First Amendment rights to petition and freely associate "outweigh[ed Missouri’s] interest in protecting the business expectancy involved." Id. at 305-06.
\textsuperscript{197} Goedert, supra note 15, at 1003; see also Boyle, supra note 13, at 9 (describing Jay Property SLAPP, in which “an alliance of local, county and state civic, historical and environmental groups calling itself the Jay Coalition” got county to acquire plaintiff’s development land by eminent domain because of its historic value).
or in some cases, even with sham or fraud. The activity need not entail direct contact with the government or its representatives in order to be constitutionally protected as petitioning activity. For example, in *Webb v. Fury*, the court held that the defendant’s newsletter was protected, even if the defendant’s motive was subjectively malicious: “The right to petition includes . . . activity designed to influence public sentiment concerning the passage and enforcement of laws as well as appeals for redress made directly to the government.”

The right to petition is a powerful constitutional right and the most effective defense to a SLAPP. California and federal courts repeatedly stress the fundamental and paramount importance of the right to petition. A defendant’s failure to raise the right to petition defense does not waive it. Some state courts have found that the petition defense to SLAPPs is superior to defamation defenses such as those relating to the opinion-fact dichotomy, because petitioning may be privileged even if it includes knowingly false statements. And the right to petition does

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200. Id. at 42.

201. Pring’s study found that “raising the Petition Clause defense almost doubled [defendants’] chances of ultimately winning: [Defendants] won 57 percent of those SLAPPs in which the Petition Clause was never invoked, but 92 percent of those SLAPPs in which it was.” Pring, supra note 15, at *37.


204. See *Webb*, 282 S.E.2d at 42-43 (finding malice standard inappropriate in petition cases and concluding statements in publication absolutely privileged under First Amendment).

The dissent in *Webb* took issue with the court’s disregard of malice. *Id.* at 43 (Neely, J., dissenting). Dissenting Justice Neely opined that there should be no absolute privilege for petitioning activity and that knowingly false or fraudulent petitioning should not be protected. *Id.* at 44-45 (Neely, J., dissenting). Both the majority and the dissent seemed to agree, however, that if petitioning is merely to stop a competitor—or for some other sham purpose—and
not hinge on the case’s outcome on the merits. California courts have afforded defendants a potent petitioning privilege even if a plaintiff can show that a defendant was malicious. Significantly, the United States Supreme Court, in *McDonald v. Smith*, expressly stated that petitioning activity is not absolutely privileged and that “there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition . . . than other First Amendment expressions.”

Although the tolerance of actual malice is not entirely clear, courts have universally declared that common-law malice, or ill will, will not defeat the petitioning privilege. Because people or companies do not usually petition the government unless they have some personal or financial interest at stake, allowing personal bias or common-law malice to neutralize their petitioning privilege would effectively eliminate this privilege in all but those rare instances in which a citizen or group sought government participation solely for altruistic or civic-minded purposes. The landmark Supreme Court case of *Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.*, extended the petitioning privilege to defendants who were financially interested in the subject matter of their petitioning, and were therefore inferably malicious or at least selfishly motivated.

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2. The Noerr/Pennington sham exception to the petitioning privilege

Under the Noerr/Pennington doctrine, or sham exception rule, petitioning activity must at least partly make an attempt to influence government. Petitioning cannot be, for example, completely to prevent a competitor from gaining access to government; the petitioner must be genuinely seeking redress. A Massachusetts court in Bell v. Mazza refused to immunize petitioning per se. The plaintiffs sued on a theory of interference with constitutional property rights (their right to build a tennis court), and the defendants allegedly threatened, intimidated and coerced them in response; the fact of the defendants' petitioning activity in conjunction with the case was not sufficient for the court to dismiss the plaintiffs' state civil rights claim, especially considering the defendants' alleged wrongdoing.

Under the sham exception, a party's petitioning activity will not be constitutionally protected if it is solely for an improper purpose such as blocking another party's access to government or gaining an unfair advantage over a competitor. Basically, a party may have one of those malicious motives as long as it has some other, legitimate reason for its petitioning. As discussed, the petitioning defendant's "intent is irrelevant," except to the extent that a petition containing damaging falsehoods made with actual malice may remove the petitioner's privilege.

The majority in Webb v. Fury drew the line at whether the defendant's petitioning activity actually blocked the plaintiff's own access to government. In Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court, the original line of cases articulating the Supreme Court's sham exception rules was in the antitrust area. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 144. Subsequent courts, however, have applied the sham exception outside the antitrust setting. See, e.g., Matossian, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 136-37, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 536; Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Colo. 1984).

212. The original line of cases articulating the Supreme Court's sham exception rules was in the antitrust area. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 144. Subsequent courts, however, have applied the sham exception outside the antitrust setting. See, e.g., Matossian, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 136-37, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 536; Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Colo. 1984).


215. Id. at 1114. The defendant allegedly threatened to sue the plaintiffs' contractor, tried to induce the electric company to discontinue the plaintiffs' electric service, physically blocked one plaintiff's passage, and shouted "intemperate epithets." Id.

216. Id. at 1112-16.

217. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 41.


219. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 39-40 (holding that defendant must have "a design to thwart the plaintiff's input into the political process. Conduct which prevents a party from participating in [any of the] branches of government is not petitioning activity protected by" First Amendment (citation omitted)).

a Colorado court broke the sham exception into three elements. To defeat defendant's petitioning privilege, plaintiff must show that: (1) defendant's petitioning claims are without reasonable factual or legal basis;\footnote{Id. at 1369. The fact that the defendant lost in a previous suit in itself does not mean the previous suit was a sham. Id.} (2) defendant's "primary purpose . . . was to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other improper objective,"\footnote{Id. Commentator Sive objects to this element because it encourages discovery into a defendant's motives. Sive, supra note 29, at *4. Impropriety of motive, however, seems to be the essence both of the sham exception and the definition of SLAPPs in general. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972), provides good illustrations of improper motives, such as perjury, bribery and misrepresentation. In California Motor Transp. Co., the true intent of the defendant allegedly was to prevent the plaintiffs from invoking the processes of administrative agencies and courts. Id. at 518 (Stewart, J., concurring). Similarly, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), a private power company tried to freeze out municipal competitors and "'preserve its predominant position in the sale and transmission of electric power in the area' " through improper litigation. Id. at 379 (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).} and (3) defendant's action "had the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest of the plaintiff."\footnote{Id. at 1369. This element is really just a standing requirement. Sive, supra note 29, at *9.}

3. California's Section 47(b) privilege

California Civil Code Section 47(b) establishes a potent privilege for communications made during legislative or judicial proceedings.\footnote{Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b) (West Supp. 1992); see also Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 215-16, 786 P.2d 365, 370, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 644-45 (1990) (stating that privilege is applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to publication); Pettitt v. Levy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 488, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1972) (stating that privilege is absolute because it protects publications made with actual malice or with intent to do harm); Brecher, supra note 29, at 121 (stating that section establishes privilege for any publication or broadcast made during legislative or judicial proceeding or any other proceeding authorized by law).} The communication may be written or oral, and it may be a communication made outside formal agency proceedings in order "to prompt action by that agency."\footnote{Id. at 379 (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).} But a privileged statement must have "some connection or logical relation" to the proceedings regardless of whether the statement is made outside the courtroom or hearing.\footnote{King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 34, 104 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417 (1972).} Any official proceed-
ing authorized by law comes within the purview of Section 47(b). The privilege also implies that defamatory statements made in "proceedings which resemble judicial and legislative proceedings, such as transactions of administrative boards and quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative proceedings . . . having some relation thereto are absolutely privileged." Section 47(b) covers all papers and communications relating to litigation. Although this statutory privilege may immunize petitioners from liability stemming from their statements, those statements may be used as evidence against the petitioners in a subsequent action. The immunity applies regardless of actual or common-law malice. This potent privilege can block many different tort actions, such as defamation, abuse of process and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; subsequent malicious prosecution actions, however, are not barred by the Section 47(b) privilege.
The constitutional right to petition and California's statutory privilege for communications during legislative or judicial proceedings under Section 47(b) are the strongest defenses available to SLAPP defendants.\textsuperscript{233} Successfully raising these defenses at an early dismissal stage may undercut significantly the SLAPP plaintiff's efforts at intimidation, expense and delay. A SLAPP defendant will need companion protections as well, however, to eliminate the effects of the SLAPP. Only the specter of serious negative consequences will deter SLAPP plaintiffs.\textsuperscript{234} The defenses discussed above can only counter a SLAPP once it is filed; they cannot deter the plaintiff from filing it.

V. SUBSTANTIVE REMEDIES: SLAPP-BACKS

SLAPP-backs are separate countersuits or counterclaims to SLAPPs, usually for abuse of process or malicious prosecution, by SLAPP defendants. There is debate as to their effectiveness. While they may allow vindication, a SLAPP-back victory may be too little, too late. SLAPP-back theories are either rare and elusive—as with the constitutional tort theory in \emph{Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation} \textsuperscript{235}—or disfavored and difficult to prove—as with abuse of process and malicious prosecution.

The prospect of huge damage awards for the original SLAPP defendants "particularly in California,"\textsuperscript{236} may well discourage the initial filings of SLAPPs.\textsuperscript{237} Business groups and SLAPP plaintiffs contend that "the anti-SLAPP campaign could itself intrude on important legal rights . . . [and] could deter businesses and others from going to court with legitimate grievances because of the threat of big jury awards."\textsuperscript{238} Spectacular damage awards in SLAPP-backs are widely publicized\textsuperscript{239} but

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{233} See CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(b).
  \item \textsuperscript{234} See infra part VI discussing damages and attorney's fees.
  \item \textsuperscript{235} 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 853-54, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 817 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983); see also Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 445-46 (discussing briefly SLAPP-back theories).
  \item \textsuperscript{236} Boyle, supra note 13, at 8. For example, three farmers eventually won a multi-million dollar judgment against agribusiness giant J.G. Boswell Company. Costantini & Nash, \textit{supra} note 4, at 426.
  \item \textsuperscript{237} Clavin, \textit{supra} note 61, at 51.
  \item \textsuperscript{238} Hager, \textit{supra} note 18, at A3. Ron Galperin quotes law professor and development consultant Gideon Kanner: "These people [anti-development advocates] come out of the woodwork . . . and have become drunk with power. . . . [H]is advice to developers thinking about a lawsuit is 'don't do it.'" Galperin, \textit{supra} note 4, at K15 (alteration in original).
\end{itemize}
notably infrequent.\textsuperscript{240} Greater publicity can exert only a \textit{negative} effect on SLAPP filings, but sources disagree over whether it has had any effect at all.\textsuperscript{241} Ironically, well-publicized successful SLAPP-backs may also discourage legitimate plaintiffs from filing colorable claims—as opposed to SLAPPs. All of these considerations, of course, depend on the average size of the awards. If modest, potential SLAPP plaintiffs may include SLAPP-back awards with costs and fees as an acceptable cost of doing business.

Despite the questionable chilling effect of SLAPP-back awards, SLAPP-backs do not actually prevent the negative effects of SLAPPs, such as delay, initial cost and intimidation. Additionally, a SLAPP defendant cannot bring a malicious prosecution SLAPP-back until the SLAPP has terminated in the defendant’s favor.\textsuperscript{242} By the time a SLAPP victim can win a SLAPP-back years later, a plaintiff developer has probably long since broken ground or obtained government approval. Furthermore, the dim prospect of a SLAPP-back victory usually will not alleviate the chill of a SLAPP for the typical SLAPP defendant. Nor will most defendants be able to cover the litigation costs up front. Finally, a SLAPP-back will tie up a protest group’s resources even longer than defending a SLAPP.

In addition a SLAPP-back plaintiff—the original SLAPP defendant—may not be able to meet the requisite burden of proof on the merits. A malicious prosecution plaintiff, for example, must show that the plaintiff in the original suit had no probable cause to sue,\textsuperscript{243} which is a difficult threshold showing.

The SLAPP-back theories outlined below all share the elements of intent and damage.\textsuperscript{244} Commentators Costantini and Nash’s analysis of


\textsuperscript{241} Compare Hager, supra note 18, at A3 (“now the tide seems to be turning” and SLAPP-backs are deterring SLAPPs) with Galperin, supra note 4, at K1 (noting that SLAPP suits are on rise).

\textsuperscript{242} Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845-48, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1971); Asia Inv. Co. v. Borowski, 133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 837-38, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317, 321 (1982); Brecher, supra note 29, at 138. \textit{See infra} text accompanying notes 290-304 for proposals to modify this element so as to permit a counterclaim for malicious prosecution as part of the initial SLAPP.

\textsuperscript{243} Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal. 2d 489, 494, 289 P.2d 794, 798 (1955); Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 149, 114 P.2d 335, 337 (1941).

\textsuperscript{244} \textit{See infra} notes 252-300 and accompanying text.
the *Thompson v. J.G. Boswell Co.* 245 case illustrates the pitfalls of proving wrongful intent on the part of the original SLAPP plaintiff. 246 The largest farming company in California, the J.G. Boswell Company, SLAPPed three small farmers who had taken out a newspaper advertisement opposing Boswell’s position on the hotly contested Peripheral Canal. 247 In the first trial the judge rejected Boswell’s libel claim because a reasonable reader could in no way infer allegations of an actual conspiracy from the advertisement. 248 In the second action, the SLAPP-back, the plaintiffs had to prove Boswell’s wrongful intent in the first action through both circumstantial and direct evidence. 249 The circumstantial evidence of ulterior motives pointed out that Boswell was rich, sophisticated and politically powerful—he had his own political action committee; he had invested over $1 million before the advertisement appeared in the newspaper and wanted to protect his investment; and he often played “hardball,” which included using litigation and boycotting suppliers who did not support his political causes. 251 Direct evidence that the first action was not brought in good faith showed that Boswell never investigated his alleged losses from damage to his reputation; he consulted inexperienced local counsel rather than his regularly retained large firm; and he decided to sue even before consulting his local lawyer. 252

### A. Abuse of Process

Abuse of process entails using an otherwise proper or legitimate lawsuit for some improper, collateral purpose. Its elements are: (1) an “ulterior motive”; (2) wrongful use of process; 253 and (3) proximate causation of damage or harm. 254 A plaintiff in the first action—the de-

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247. *Id.* at 428. The Peripheral Canal proposition would provide an alternative method of transporting water to the arid part of the state.
248. *Id.* at 440.
249. *Id.* at 446-47.
250. *Id.* at 454-57.
251. *Id.* at 448.
252. *Id.* at 463. It should be noted that, although the Family Farmers won their SLAPP-back suit against the J.G. Boswell Company, Boswell’s original libel suit effectively silenced the Family Farmers for the remainder of the political battle over the Peripheral Canal. *Id.* at 470.
254. Costantini & Nash, *supra* note 4, at 444-45. As with the petitioning defense, defendant’s common-law malice or ill will is not a sufficient “ulterior motive,” or most suits would qualify. *Id.* at 445.
fendant in the abuse of process SLAPP-back—must have used the first lawsuit as a threat or to blackmail. For example, in Spellens v. Spellens, the California Supreme Court found that the defendant husband had abused the process of the courts against his plaintiff wife. When the plaintiff wife sued her husband for marriage by estoppel, the husband tried to seize the wife’s car, not because he thought he had a legitimate claim to the car but because he wanted to force his wife to drop her main cause of action.

Abuse of process and malicious prosecution have distinct focuses. Abuse of process aims at properly issued process that is subsequently used “as a threat or a club, . . . a form of extortion.” Malicious prosecution, on the other hand, focuses on an action that never should have been brought. Abuse of process, then, is procedural in that it is unrelated to the merits of the underlying original action. Consequently, a plaintiff in the second suit or counterclaimant in the first suit need not win a first suit on the merits before initiating an abuse of process action. Nor is the initial plaintiff’s probable cause to bring the SLAPP relevant in an abuse of process case. Therefore, the abuse of process theory may be attractive to a defendant when the plaintiff’s initial action was legitimate—that is, not a SLAPP. To illustrate, assume a defendant really defamed a plaintiff; but when the plaintiff later makes it clear in a private conference that the defamation action is solely to force the defendant to drop the defendant’s collateral complaint to an environmental agency about the plaintiff’s development, the defendant may have an abuse of process claim.

B. Malicious Prosecution

The most common SLAPP-back theory is malicious prosecution. Huge potential damage awards are its major attraction. Its major drawback is the delay caused by the prima facie requirement that the malicious prosecution plaintiff must have won the initial suit in which he or
she was the defendant.\textsuperscript{261} Much of the scholarly discussion on malicious prosecution in the SLAPP context centers around this latter element, of which some commentators have proposed modifications such as allowing malicious prosecution as a counterclaim in the initial action, the SLAPP, rather than waiting until the second action, the SLAPP-back.\textsuperscript{262}

The prima facie elements of malicious prosecution are as follows. The plaintiff must show that the defendant “initiated or took an active part in the commencement or maintenance of” the first—malicious—action.\textsuperscript{263} The malicious prosecution plaintiff must have won the first action, or the action must have “terminated in plaintiff’s favor.”\textsuperscript{264} The defendant must not have had probable cause for bringing or maintaining the first suit—\textsuperscript{265}the SLAPP. Finally, plaintiff must show that the original plaintiff filed the first action maliciously, for an improper purpose.\textsuperscript{266} In malicious prosecution, the filing of the suit itself is improper because the plaintiff had no probable cause and a malicious purpose.\textsuperscript{267} Basically, the malicious prosecution plaintiff contends that the predecessor action was brought without any “relation to the merits of the claim” and that the original plaintiff did not believe that claim was valid.\textsuperscript{268}

Malicious prosecution defendants have an advice-of-counsel defense.\textsuperscript{269} To successfully raise this defense, defendants must show that they acted in good faith in seeking and in following their lawyer’s advice during the first action.\textsuperscript{270} The defendant must have sought and followed

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 149, 114 P.2d 335, 337 (1941).
\item See Brecher, supra note 29, at 138-40; infra text accompanying note 288.
\item Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1157, 1169, 728 P.2d 1202, 1209, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 575 (1986); Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 443.
\item Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal. 2d 489, 496, 289 P.2d 794, 798 (1955).
\item Id.
\item Oren Royal Oaks, 42 Cal. 3d at 1169, 728 P.2d at 1209, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
\item Malice is difficult to prove. A plaintiff cannot show evidence of a pattern of similar improper lawsuits for the purpose of proving defendant’s guilt or liability, because such a pattern is irrelevant. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1960 & Supp. 1992); Larson v. Larsen, 72 Cal. App. 169, 172, 236 P. 979, 980-81 (1925). Although Larson was a criminal case, this principle also applies in a civil setting. Id. In addition, because malicious prosecution focuses on the impropriety of filing the suit without probable cause, the plaintiff’s conduct after filing is also irrelevant. Brecher, supra note 29, at 127.
\item Part II.C supra discusses SLAPP plaintiffs’ improper motivations.
\item Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 383, 295 P.2d 405, 411 (1956); Brecher, supra note 29, at 127. Brecher adds that an improper purpose might include suits brought “primarily because of hostility or ill will,” or merely to deprive defendant “of the beneficial use of his property.” Id. Brecher’s ill-will category seems contrary to the Noerr/Pennington doctrine, at least if petitioning activity is entailed. See supra part IV.E.
\item Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 810, 816, 60 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803 (1967); Brecher, supra note 29, at 126; Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 444 n.87.
\item Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 444 n.87.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the attorney's advice before commencing or maintaining the first action and must have made "full, fair and complete disclosure" to the lawyer of all relevant information known by the defendant. Finally, the defendant must have believed that the plaintiff was liable.

The central element in the SLAPP debate is that the first action must have been "terminated in [the plaintiff's] favor." First, the malicious prosecution plaintiff need have won only some substantial aspect of the first action. For example, in *Sierra Club v. Superior Court*, the court remanded the case after the Sierra Club successfully argued that an incorrect administrative standard had been used. After it won that battle, however, the Sierra Club lost the war, because the developer was eventually allowed to build. The developer sued the Sierra Club for malicious prosecution based on the action that resulted in the remand, but the court found that the favorable termination element had not been satisfied.

The gravamen of the "favorable" element is whether the dismissal or other termination of the first action went to the merits. "A termination is therefore 'favorable' if its nature is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused. If, on the other hand, 'the dismissal is on technical grounds, for procedural reasons, or for any other reason not inconsistent with his guilt, it does not constitute a favorable termination.' " Terminus on technical grounds such as laches, collateral estoppel or the running of the limitations period are not on the merits, whereas dismissal for lack of evidence constitutes favorable termination because it indicates that the plaintiff had no case in the first action.

Commentator Brecher proposes that the common-law malicious prosecution action be allowed as a counterclaim in the first action, con-

271. Id.
272. Id.
275. Id. at 1143, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
276. Id. at 1144, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 745-46.
277. Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 750, 602 P.2d 393, 394, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 694 (1979); Jaffe, 18 Cal. 2d at 151, 114 P.2d at 339.
279. Lackner, 25 Cal. 3d at 751-52, 602 P.2d at 395, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (running of statute of limitations); Jaffe, 18 Cal. 2d at 150-53, 114 P.2d at 338 (dismissal for lack of evidence); Asia Inv. Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d at 838, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (laches); Brecher, supra note 29, at 126 (collateral estoppel and laches).
A plethora of reasons for the current scheme make it an elusive target, even for Brecher. In theory, the defendant in the first action cannot pursue a cause of action for malicious prosecution in the second action until the first action is resolved in his or her favor; this is the "metaphysical difficulty." Following this logic, allowing a malicious prosecution counterclaim in the first cause of action is essentially allowing an action before its statute of limitations has started running. In addition, mixing malicious prosecution evidence against the plaintiff into the original action could prejudice the jury against the plaintiff's base cause of action. Furthermore, the judge will decide a counterclaim that seeks only declaratory relief, thus raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions by the court and the jury.

Malicious prosecution traditionally has been judicially disfavored. In the interests of judicial economy, waiting for favorable termination of the first action could obviate some second actions for malicious prosecution. Finally, because of the advice-of-counsel defense and because the plaintiff's lawyer in the first action could conceivably be a co-defendant in a malicious prosecution claim, the lawyer and the client could be in conflicting positions. Thus, allowing malicious prosecution as a counterclaim in the same action could force the plaintiff to retain different counsel.

Brecher counters many of these arguments mainly by recommending bifurcation of the original claim and the malicious prosecution counterclaim, which would solve the problem of prejudicial evidence. He also recommends that claims and counterclaims be tried by the same fact-finder—whether judge or jury—to eliminate the problem of an inconsistent verdict. He points out that many of the claims are environmental suits or public-interest claims in which the party is seeking injunctive relief. Because statutes of limitations seek to "repose" and prevent stale claims, as do many injunctions, Brecher proposes that their goals are compatible, thus mitigating the concern with statutes of limitation expressed by the court in Babb v. Superior Court. Brecher remarks that allowing malicious prosecution counterclaims could actually


281. Babb, 3 Cal. 3d at 846, 479 P.2d at 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 181.

282. Id., 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182.

283. Id. at 847, 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182. But see Jaffe, 18 Cal. 2d at 159-60, 114 P.2d at 342-43.

284. Brecher, supra note 29, at 139.

285. Id.

286. 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971); Brecher, supra note 29, at 139.
reduce litigation, by obviating a second trial. He further contends that if public-interest or petitioning activities are involved, public policy should favor malicious prosecution counterclaims. Such public-interest situations could be identified using the criteria set forth in California Civil Procedure Code Section 1021.5.

With the current requirement that the first action—the SLAPP—terminate in favor of the party who will be the malicious prosecution plaintiff, the only aspect of malicious prosecution that might deter SLAPPs is the prospect of large damage awards. Although spectacular, large damage awards are rare. Malicious prosecution has serious drawbacks for the SLAPP defendant, in particular, delay and expense. Even Brecher's proposal to allow malicious prosecution counterclaims in the SLAPP itself is viable only with bifurcation, as described. Any comprehensive SLAPP remedy needs to intercept a SLAPP at a much earlier stage to render it ineffective. Malicious prosecution serves merely as a last resort.

C. Other Possible SLAPP-Back Theories

SLAPP-back theories other than abuse of process and malicious prosecution are available. These include intentional infliction of emotional distress, federal statutory civil-rights claims, frivolous lawsuit remedies, and the constitutional tort theory.

The California Court of Appeal in Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation recognized "an action for damages for violation" of

287. Brecher, supra note 29, at 139.
288. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980); Brecher, supra note 29, at 139-40. See supra part II.A for a discussion of using the public interest element in SLAPP identification. See infra part VI.B for a discussion of recovering attorney's fees under § 1021.5.
289. For the most noteworthy of a large damage award in a SLAPP-back suit, see supra note 239 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
The rights in Laguna were those of free speech under Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution. In the SLAPP-back in Wegis v. J.G. Boswell Co., the court recognized a constitutional tort claim based on speech and petitioning rights under the California Constitution. Under the constitutional tort theory, the SLAPP plaintiff must have "intentionally deprived" the SLAPP defendant—now the SLAPP-back plaintiff—of his or her constitutional rights, and the deprivation must have caused damage or harm. As constitutional speech and petitioning rights are invariably involved in a SLAPP, the constitutional tort is a particularly appropriate SLAPP-back theory.

All SLAPP-back theories share the disadvantages of delay and cost to the SLAPP defendants. Although SLAPP-backs may provide eventual vindication or, ultimately, substantial damages, their specter usually will not deter the original SLAPPs, which are designed to delay, intimidate, distract and depoliticize. By the time the SLAPP-back is initiated, it is usually too late.

VI. DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION COSTS

What damages, if any, can SLAPP defendants recover? Should the damage component of an anti-SLAPP scheme aim to make defendants whole, or rather to prevent plaintiffs' unjust enrichment? Defendants can obtain tort damages by suing under the SLAPP-back theories discussed previously. Because most of these theories require a showing of

296. Id. at 853, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 835. As far as the self-executing nature of the constitutional right, the Laguna court analogized to the self-executing right to privacy in the California Constitution. Cf. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975) (applying new provision to California Constitution recognizing right to privacy against covert police surveillance of university classes); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 828-30, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-42 (1976) (providing cause of action for unauthorized transmittal of private university transcript to scholarship and loan commission).


298. Id. slip op. at 10; see also Laguna Publishing Co., 131 Cal. App. 3d at 853-54, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (holding that California Constitution gives plaintiff right to sue for damages for infringement of right of free speech and press); Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 445-46 (citing Laguna).

299. Laguna Publishing Co., 131 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (affording direct action for damages for intentional constitutional violation); Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 445-46. In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986), the United States Supreme Court made it clear that a person whose constitutional rights have been violated may not recover for the pure or abstract infringement of those rights; rather he or she must have suffered actual damages. Id. at 307-10.

300. See supra part II.C for a discussion of SLAPP plaintiffs' motivations.

301. See supra part V.
a SLAPP plaintiff's malice in pursuing the SLAPP, punitive damages may be possible. In addition, a few common-law and statutory theories are available for recovery of litigation costs and attorney's fees. The one element that the SLAPP-specific statutes or bills have in common is some provision for the recovery of costs and fees.  

Plaintiffs can of course recover damages—or fees under the theory in Brandt v. Superior Court 303—if their lawsuits are not SLAPPs. 304 Both the Washington anti-SLAPP statute and a proposed Maryland bill allow a plaintiff to recover both costs and fees if the plaintiff's suit is successful. 305 Adding this provision to California's Lockyer bill apparently made the bill more politically palatable 306 and will help safeguard a plaintiff's legitimate rights to bring nonfrivolous—nonSLAPP—lawsuits.

A. Damages

1. Compensatory tort damages

SLAPP-back plaintiffs can recover their actual, out-of-pocket losses if their SLAPP-back is successful. 307 The most obvious out-of-pocket losses caused by a SLAPP are costs and fees. Theoretically, the SLAPP-back plaintiff can claim these in California courts under the California Supreme Court's Brandt theory. 308 Brandt allows recovery of attorney's fees that are in effect tort damages—fees that would not have been incurred but for the defendant's tortious action. Therefore, a SLAPP-back


303. 37 Cal. 3d 813, 693 P.2d 796, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1985); see infra part VI.B.3 for a discussion of the Brandt theory.

304. At the risk of sounding circular, SLAPPs are by definition meritless, so plaintiffs who win on the merits were not in fact SLAPP plaintiffs.


306. The Lockyer bill, in various incarnations, had been vetoed three times by Governors Deukmejian and Wilson. Governor Wilson finally approved the amended version, which was enacted on September 16, 1992. The new statute includes the following provision: "If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5." Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)).

307. See McEvoy, supra note 4, at 527.

308. Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 819-20, 693 P.2d 796, 798, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 (1985) (holding that when insurer's tortious conduct reasonably compels insurer to retain attorney to recover benefits due under policy, insurer should be liable in tort action for that offense, including attorney's fees).
plaintiff who has incurred fees to defend against a SLAPP may recover attorney's fees under Brandt.309

Other direct losses might include lost wages or property.310 As a proximate result of the SLAPP, defendants might have lost valuable insurance coverage or access to financing.311 Because lost profits are generally too speculative to calculate, a majority of jurisdictions disallow their recovery as tort damages, but California has allowed the recovery of economic losses in situations in which the losses are directly foreseeable.312 SLAPP-back compensatory damages may include damage to the original SLAPP defendant's reputation.313

2. Emotional distress damages

Although SLAPPs certainly cause mental anguish,314 it is not clear whether damages for emotional distress are recoverable. California case law does not require any physical manifestation or symptoms of emotional distress for recovery of emotional distress damages.315 Malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims, however, do not seem to include mental anguish damage components, and SLAPP-back plaintiffs may not recover for violation of their constitutional rights in the abstract, without showing any actual damages.316


310. For example, in Wegis v. J.G. Boswell Co., No. FO11230, slip op. at 10-11 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 1991), if the defendant farmers had lost, they would have been forced to sell their farms, "thereby betraying the family's memory and future." Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 465.

311. See, e.g., Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 467-68; supra note 121 and accompanying text.


314. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the chilling effects on SLAPP defendants.


316. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307-10 (holding that student could only recover compensatory damages for denial of sufficient suspension procedures if student proved actual injury).
In the alternative, a SLAPP-back plaintiff could initially sue on a theory of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Expressly allowing damages for emotional distress is a possible component of an anti-SLAPP statutory scheme.

3. Restitutionary recovery

Victor Cosentino proposes an inverted restitutionary recovery model.\textsuperscript{317} His plan is "inverted" in that the plaintiff will pay, and it is "restitutionary" in that it focuses on the wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, rather than on the victim's loss—as in tort—or on the victim's expected gain—as in contract.\textsuperscript{318} Cosentino's plan is based on the premise that the specter of paying the defendant's fees and costs will not deter most SLAPP plaintiffs, whereas significant restitutionary awards will.\textsuperscript{319} For example, if the plaintiff developer is protecting a project worth $1 million to the plaintiff, by SLAPPing the defendant citizen group, the SLAPP will no doubt be cost-effective to the plaintiff if the plaintiff eventually need only pay out $25,000 in fees. However, if a plaintiff developer stood to lose the entire $1 million profit by losing the SLAPP, then presumably the plaintiff would never risk the SLAPP.

Cosentino's theory is based on true deterrence: Plaintiffs will never bring a SLAPP if they have nothing to gain. His model arrives at the starting figure for the restitutionary award by using the damage amount claimed by plaintiff in the SLAPP.\textsuperscript{320} For example, if the plaintiff developer SLAPPs the defendant citizen group for $1 million in profits allegedly lost as a result of defendant's defamation, the model uses the $1 million figure to measure the restitutionary recovery. The model also leaves room for adjustment of this figure "based on the plaintiff's ability to pay."\textsuperscript{321} This restitutionary model accurately reflects the insufficiency of costs and fee awards for truly deterring SLAPPs.

Unfortunately, the drawbacks of this proposed restitutionary scheme exceed its advantages. First, the plaintiff's gain in filing the SLAPP would not be directly at the defendant's expense. In reality, this is a but-for causation issue in disguise: Would the defendant's opposition to the plaintiff's project actually have prevented the entire project but-for the SLAPP? Alternatively, without the SLAPP, would the defendant's oppositional activity only have cut into the plaintiff's profit? Obviously,

\textsuperscript{317} Cosentino, \textit{supra} note 16, at 417, 427.
\textsuperscript{318} See \textit{Keeton et al.}, \textit{supra} note 153, § 94, at 672-73.
\textsuperscript{319} Cosentino, \textit{supra} note 16, at 415-18.
\textsuperscript{320} \textit{Id.} at 410 n.70.
\textsuperscript{321} \textit{Id.} He provides no further explanation of this qualification.
practical difficulties of proof predominate these questions. Second and most important, the plaintiff's profit on the project comes mostly from the plaintiff's skill or investment and may be only tangentially related to the SLAPP. Therefore, such a draconian damage measurement as Cosentino recommends would excessively punish the plaintiff's wrongful SLAPP. A SLAPP plaintiff may well deserve to be punished for the damage traceable to the SLAPP, but it cannot be assumed that without the SLAPP's effectiveness the project would not have gone through anyway. The third drawback to this recovery scheme is the traditional concern that the risk of losing the plaintiff's entire profit would chill not only SLAPP plaintiffs but also plaintiffs with borderline tort claims that they believe are legitimate.

4. Punitive damages

SLAPP-back plaintiffs can recover punitive damages if they can show malicious intent.\textsuperscript{322} The SLAPP-back theories outlined above, such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process, are all intentional tort theories and so require wrongful intent as a prima facie element.\textsuperscript{323} In \textit{Wegis v. J.G. Boswell Co.},\textsuperscript{324} the plaintiff farmers were awarded $10 million in punitive damages for malicious prosecution, abuse of process and tortious violation of constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{325} Judge Neely's dissent in \textit{Webb v. Fury}\textsuperscript{326} recommends that if a SLAPP plaintiff loses at trial, the SLAPP defendant should get more than that defendant's full costs "if... it becomes apparent that the plaintiff actually was using the legal process in the same despicable way that he had alleged the defendant had [been], namely, to oppress citizens who have legitimately exercised first amendment rights."\textsuperscript{327}

The amount of punitive damages traditionally is within the jury's discretion.\textsuperscript{328} Judge Neely suggested in his \textit{Webb} dissent, however, that "the court should exercise its equitable powers to impose costs against

\begin{footnotes}
\item[322] See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 29-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223 (1975). Grimshaw, the exploding Pinto case, makes clear that the malice needed for punitive damages is not evil intent, but instead "conscious disregard of the probability" that an injury to another will ensue from the actor's conduct. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (quoting Dawes v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322-23 (1980)).
\item[323] See supra part V.
\item[325] Id. at 2; Costantini & Nash, supra note 4, at 426, 428.
\item[327] Id. (Neely, J., dissenting).
\end{footnotes}
the plaintiff in excess of [the defendant's] actual loss from defending the case, in essence fining those who file frivolous cases.329 Because the crucial First Amendment rights of free speech and petition are involved in the original SLAPP, jury determination of punitive amounts would seem more consistent with the policies underlying the Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover330 line of cases. In reviewing punitive damage amounts, the jury can consider a SLAPP plaintiff's wealth and degree of culpability and the possible deterrent effect of punitive damages on other similarly situated plaintiffs.331

5. Statutory combinations of damage measures

Anti-SLAPP statutory schemes can of course call for any combination of these damage remedies. At a minimum, most statutes or bills allow a court to award litigation costs and attorney's fees.332 On the other end of the spectrum, Cosentino's proposed restitutionary damage measure would award SLAPP defendants damages in the amount of the plaintiff's anticipated profits.333 SLAPP defendants may be able to recover compensatory damages and punitive damages in SLAPP-backs, but as discussed, by the time a SLAPP-back is won, the original SLAPP has long since accomplished its desired purposes of delay, expense and distraction.334

More immediate, statutorily imposed damage schemes would more effectively deter SLAPPs. The larger the amounts prescribed by statute, the more they will deter SLAPPs and support First Amendment rights. The smaller the prescribed amounts, the more they will bolster a plaintiff's rights of access to the judicial system and the less they will intrude on a plaintiff's otherwise legitimate profits. The middle ground would be to statutorily allow SLAPP defendants to recover their actual damages

331. The United States Supreme Court in Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1044, and the California Court of Appeal in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), held that the following factors should be weighed when assessing the jury's award: (1) the reprehensibility of the SLAPP plaintiff's conduct; (2) the wealth of the defendant; (3) the amount of the compensatory damages; (4) the amount that would actually serve as a deterrent to the defendant and others; (5) the relation between the amount of the compensatory damages, any statutory penalties and the amount of punitive damages; (6) the effects on third parties; (7) the harm to defendants; and (8) all the costs of the litigation. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1044-45; Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 818-19, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
334. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
proximately caused by the SLAPP—once it was identified as a SLAPP—including their damages for emotional distress, which is a major repercussion of a SLAPP. In addition, it is imperative that a statutory damage scheme provide for both the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant should recover actual damages from the SLAPP and the plaintiff should in turn recover rightful damages if the suit is determined not to be a SLAPP and successfully litigated.

B. Attorney's Fees

1. The American rule

California and federal courts follow the American rule that each party in a lawsuit must pay its own attorney's fees. The policies behind the American rule are to protect poor plaintiffs from the burden of paying their opponents' fees; to encourage parties to use the judicial system; and to relieve the court system from the administrative duty of computing costs and fees. The rationale for the English rule, in contrast with the American rule, is to discourage meritless actions such as SLAPPs. Under the English rule, in any case in which fees are awarded, the fees go only to the prevailing party.

2. Statutory fee awards

A provision for awarding costs and fees to SLAPP defendants is a necessary component of any anti-SLAPP statutory scheme, although the prospect of adverse fee awards may not by itself be enough to deter SLAPP plaintiffs. As discussed, one of a SLAPP's prime chilling factors on SLAPP defendants is expense. A fee-awarding provision is the lowest common denominator of the anti-SLAPP statutes and bills surveyed for this Article. All the existing common-law and statutory exceptions to the American rule award fees after trial, as discussed in

338. See, e.g., Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1052 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 493 U.S. 1064 (1990). To prevail, a party must somehow alter the legal relationship between it and the other party: It need not win on all issues, but merely must win on one significant issue. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 783 (1989) (holding that teachers' victory on significant First Amendment issues, although other parts of litigation continued, was sufficient for teachers to receive fees under private-attorney-general theory).
339. See supra part II.C.
340. See supra note 332 for a list of bills and statutes.
Very early resolution is the crucial element that a SLAPP-specific statute awarding costs and fees could add to existing exceptions.

3. Common-law exceptions

Three existing common-law exceptions to the American rule are particularly applicable in the SLAPP context. First, "when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,'" the prevailing party is entitled to a fee award under the "inherent power in the courts." This exception is particularly applicable to SLAPPs. In addition, California state courts have adopted two exceptions rejected by the federal courts: (1) fee awards for private attorneys general; and (2) fee awards if those fees are essentially tort damages. Because the SLAPP dynamic reverses the roles, the defendant, however, would be the recipient under these various theories.

4. Statutory exceptions

Statutory exceptions to the American rule also are permitted. The statutory authority for the fee award must be express; the judiciary does not have the power to create new exceptions sua sponte. These provisions can be SLAPP-specific, as found in the recently enacted Lockyer bill, or SLAPP parties can rely on existing fee statutes such as

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341. See infra notes 354-72 and accompanying text.
342. See supra part III.C.
348. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021; Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263, 269.
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5. The primary advantage of a SLAPP-specific fee award is immediate review, before trial.

Section 1021.5 represents the codification of the private-attorney-general fee recovery exception. Usually, the statute awards fees to the plaintiff. In County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance, however, fees were awarded to the defendants because the defendants' self-interest was outweighed by an important public interest. More specifically, the statute allows the court to award fees if:

1. [there is] an important right affecting the public interest:
   a. a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public
   b. the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and
   c. such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery.

In determining whether the party claiming attorney's fees (the PCAF) should be awarded the fees, courts must consider the PCAF's advancement of "the public's, rather than [the party's] own private interest." The PCAF's interest in the suit must "transcend personal self-interests." Courts have read section 1021.5(1)(c) as requiring the PCAF to show that the cost of the suit, including fees, to the PCAF was "out of proportion to [the PCAF's] individual stake in the matter"; so if the PCAF's cost was less than the amount at issue in the case, the PCAF should not recover fees.

Section 1021.5 is complex and so qualified by case law that it will not provide an adequate vehicle through which SLAPP defendants may recover attorney's fees. In addition, as discussed in part II.A, the public-interest element in section 1021.5 narrows the statute's applicability.

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350. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5.
354. Id. at 858, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 850; see Brecher, supra note 29, at 134.
355. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5.
357. Abalone Alliance, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 869, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
358. Brecher, supra note 29, at 133 (quoting County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 89, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (1978)).
359. Id. at 134. Brecher notes that in Schwartz v. City of Rosemead, 155 Cal. App. 3d 547, 660, 202 Cal. Rptr. 400, 409 (1984), the PCAF wanted $22,000 in fees, but the PCAF would have lost $100,000 if the development had gone through, so the court awarded no fees. Id.
ity, thereby excluding many SLAPPs. Many SLAPP defendants are self-interested, but their constitutional petitioning rights should still be protected.

In sum, any statutory fee provision should, within the narrow SLAPP context, broadly permit fee awards. Statutes should at a minimum provide fee awards to SLAPP defendants. In order to realistically deter SLAPPs, statutory schemes also should provide for awards of compensatory or even punitive damages.

VII. STATUTORY REMEDIES

Recently, a compromise anti-SLAPP statute, the Lockyer bill, became law in California. Although the political fortunes of the Lockyer bill or of the proposed anti-SLAPP statutes in other states are beyond the scope of this Article, both their political popularity and their opposition should be mentioned. The California legislature has overwhelmingly passed all of the anti-SLAPP bills. The major California printed press have consistently endorsed the anti-SLAPP bill. Predictably, California development interests have been wary of the anti-SLAPP bill. Governors Deukmejian and Wilson vetoed previous versions of the Lockyer bill, on the grounds that existing protections against SLAPPs were sufficient.

Existing protections, however, do not in practice deter SLAPPs. Because SLAPPs are not brought to win, remedies that prevent frivolous

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361. See supra part II.A; Sive, supra note 29; Cosentino, supra note 16, at 421.
363. Cosentino, supra note 16, at 425 n.164, notes that California Senate Bill 341 (predecessor to the current statute) passed 33-5 in the Senate and 77-0 in the Assembly.
365. Sive, supra note 29, notes that unfair delays could cause development projects heavy costs; but, in fact, the anti-SLAPP expediting provisions of the Lockyer bill would assist both defendants and plaintiffs in this respect. Hager, supra note 18, quotes Richard J. Lyon, a lobbyist for the California Building Industry Association, as saying that SLAPPs are "'a very glamorous media issue, . . . David versus Goliath . . . but the problem that exists out there is comparatively very small, given the total development of our state.'" Id. at 31.
366. Hager, supra note 18; Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18, at B6; Walters, supra note 18. Governor Wilson wrote: "I am concerned that the pleading hurdles, specifically, the evidence test, provided in this bill are higher than for deterrents for other malicious lawsuits, for example, volunteer directors [sic] immunity." Letter from Governor Wilson to the California Senate (Oct. 14, 1991) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
claims from winning, such as SLAPP-back damages, will not discourage SLAPPs. Delay is a prime goal of SLAPP plaintiffs, and existing remedies are usually slow, ranging from summary judgment after discovery, to SLAPP-backs after trial. Only accelerating judicial review of a potential SLAPP's merits will provide a real disincentive. Furthermore, existing remedies do not prevent the chilling effect of SLAPPs on the exercise of constitutional speech and petitioning rights, which are vital to preserving participatory democracy.

Finally, a statutory approach is more appropriate than a decisional or rule-of-court approach because SLAPP disputes are quintessentially political. As discussed, SLAPP plaintiffs intend to remove the dispute from the political and public arenas to the courtroom. There they can better control the balance of power. And a protracted, arcane litigation process may help remove the dispute from the public eye.

Opponents of SLAPP-specific statutory remedies are especially concerned about inhibiting plaintiffs' constitutional rights of access to the legal system. But SLAPPs are by definition frivolous suits over which such a constitutional protection would not extend. Thus, to protect plaintiffs' rights of access to the courts, anti-SLAPP statutes must carefully identify SLAPPs. Existing remedies such as malicious prosecu-

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367. See supra part II.C, for a more detailed discussion of SLAPP plaintiffs' motivations for bringing SLAPPs.
368. See supra parts III.B, IV, V.
370. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 43 (W. Va. 1981) (characterizing underlying dispute as "a vigorous exchange of ideas which is more properly within the political arena"). See Cosentino, supra note 16, at 428, and supra part II.C for a discussion of SLAPPs' depoliticization of the issues involved.

Some, such as politicians not wishing to incur the political disfavor of business interests, may prefer that this delicate issue be relegated to the courts. Although courts traditionally avoid political questions, SLAPPs do involve the frivolous use of the judicial system, and courts have not been reluctant to use their power to dismiss SLAPPs. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Webb, 282 S.E.2d 28. Under the Supreme Court's analysis of political questions in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), courts have apparently had no difficulty finding judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issues presented by SLAPPs. With First Amendment rights being the most salient legal issues involved, there is certainly no "textually demonstrable commitment" of exclusive power by the Constitution to one of the political branches. Judicial involvement would not be disrespectful of the legislature's territory, or an embarrassing usurpation of its power. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Hence, the arguments for keeping regulation of SLAPPs in the political branches are policy arguments as opposed to strictly legal ones.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
372. See supra notes 212-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Noerr/Pennington sham exception.
373. See supra part II for a discussion of identification issues.
tion "often require defendants to go to trial and spend substantial amounts of money and time in order to prevail. Rather than incur the expense and the trauma, many citizens withdraw. Others, scared off by the threat of lawsuits, never enter the fray at all."374

The single, most pivotal benefit that statutory solutions to the SLAPP problem offer is a very early resolution of the claim.375 To do this, legislation must specify criteria by which to identify potential SLAPPs. Anti-SLAPP statutes and bills commonly single out suits that involve and possibly threaten a defendant's First Amendment rights of free speech and petitioning for redress.376 The public-interest-related element is the second most frequent threshold identification factor in anti-SLAPP legislation.377 As discussed, limiting the scope of an anti-SLAPP provision to public-interest-related litigation can provide too wide a loophole for SLAPP plaintiffs, because SLAPP defendants petitioning the government are almost always motivated by some self-interest.378 New Jersey's Russo bill creates two classes of SLAPP defendants: (1) those who communicate to a public entity about anything "reasonably of concern" to that entity; and (2) those who express opinions "concerning a public issue which affects" them.379 Only with the second class does the bill specify a public issue, although issues in the first class must concern a public entity. Because California's recently enacted Lockyer bill already exempts any publicly prosecuted litigation,380 it should eliminate the prerequisite that the potential SLAPP must be "in connection with a public issue" to be covered.381

374. Slapping back at SLAPP suits, supra note 18, at B6.

375. See supra part III.C for a discussion of expedition of initial judicial review. For example, a provision of the recently enacted Lockyer bill allows the court to review a potential SLAPP on its merits soon after filing, before discovery. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)). At that time, the court examines the pleadings and supporting affidavits from both sides to determine whether "there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." Id.

376. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500-.520 (West Supp. 1992); Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)) (specifying the "right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution"); S. 51, supra note 106; A. 190, supra note 106. The California, New Jersey and Washington statutes each have policy-statement preambles that decry the chill of SLAPPs on public participation.

377. See supra part II.A for further discussion of the public-interest element.


379. A. 190, supra note 106.

380. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2. California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(d) will provide that "any enforcement action brought in the name of [Californians] by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor" will not be covered by the anti-SLAPP statute. Id.

381. Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)).
What an anti-SLAPP statute should really address is not whether the defendant’s petitioning concerns a public issue, but whether it is in good faith. The Washington statute covers only “a person who in good faith communicates a complaint or information to any” government body.\(^{382}\) The New Jersey bill contains identical language and adds that a defendant must also be without actual malice.\(^{383}\) Analogously, the Maryland bill also requires good faith on the defendant’s part.\(^{384}\) Although the Noerr/Pennington doctrine already protects against bad-faith or sham petitioning,\(^{385}\) California’s newly enacted statute could sensibly add this qualification of threshold petitioning activity.

**VIII. COMBINING REMEDIES TO CREATE THE BEST ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE FOR CALIFORNIA**

The Lockyer bill contains three crucial features.\(^{386}\) First, the anti-SLAPP protection is triggered by involvement of the defendant’s First Amendment rights of speech and petitioning, under either the Federal or California Constitution. Most crucial, the bill provides for judicial review at a very early stage. Once the pleadings are filed and the suit is identified as a potential SLAPP, involving First Amendment rights, both sides can submit affidavits. The court will then evaluate the merits of the case using the “probability” test.\(^{387}\) Finally, a SLAPP defendant may recover any litigation costs and attorney’s fees, upon dismissal, from the plaintiff.

The Lockyer bill further provides that if a SLAPP defendant motions to strike frivolously or “solely... to cause unnecessary delay,” then the plaintiff may recover costs and fees. The court uses a section 128.5 standard for this determination.\(^{388}\) Discovery also is suspended until the court decides on the special anti-SLAPP motion to strike.\(^{389}\)

Several possible additions and modifications to the California statute arise from the foregoing discussions of common-law and statutory solutions to the SLAPP problem.

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383. A. 190, supra note 106.
384. S. 51, supra note 106.
385. See supra part IV.E for a discussion of the Noerr/Pennington sham exception.
387. See supra part III.C for a discussion of the “probability” test.
389. Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g)). See supra part III.B for a discussion of the discovery issues.
1. **Eliminate any threshold public-interest-related element.** As far as the threshold identification of a SLAPP, which would trigger the bill's coverage, the public-interest element\(^{390}\) should be eliminated in order to avoid excluding self-interested but legitimate petitioning activity by a SLAPP defendant.

2. **Require specific pleading.** To facilitate the initial judicial review, where constitutional speech or petitioning rights are involved, the statute should mandate specific pleading.\(^{391}\)

3. **Use a substantial possibility test.** Rephrase "probability" as "substantial possibility." The handful of SLAPPs dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)\(^{392}\) would have failed a substantial possibility screen—usually because they lacked a prima facie element—let alone a probability test. This alteration would not significantly dilute the statute, but would be politically expedient.\(^{393}\)

4. **Award real damages to defendants.** Most critical for SLAPP defendants, the legislation should award actual, out-of-pocket, tort damages to SLAPP defendants, rather than just costs and fees.\(^{394}\) A defendant's damage measurements should allow for emotional distress recovery—an inevitable consequence of a SLAPP—but not for punitive damages. Punitive damages should be available if the defendant is willing to subsequently pursue a SLAPP-back\(^{395}\) at the defendant's own expense.

5. **Award damages to a prevailing plaintiff.** This and the next suggested addition to the current statute are important for preserving fairness for SLAPP plaintiffs. The statute should award a plaintiff reasonable damages if the plaintiff prevails.\(^{396}\) Currently, plaintiffs may recover costs and fees "if the court finds that [the defendant's] special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."\(^{397}\) This may not be enough.

6. **Defendant must petition in good faith to be protected.** The statute should protect a defendant's constitutional petitioning

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\(^{390}\) See *supra* part II.A. California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(b) will cover only First Amendment activity "in connection with a public issue." Act of Sept. 16, 1992.

\(^{391}\) See *supra* part III.A.

\(^{392}\) Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); *see, e.g.*, *supra* text accompanying note 91.

\(^{393}\) See *supra* text accompanying note 98.

\(^{394}\) See *supra* part VI.A. Defendant's damages should serve to make defendant whole, rather than to relieve the SLAPP plaintiff of any unjust enrichment. See *supra* discussion following note 331.

\(^{395}\) See *supra* note 322-31 and accompanying text.

\(^{396}\) See *supra* text accompanying note 306.

\(^{397}\) Act of Sept. 16, 1992 § 2 (to be codified at Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)).
activity only if that activity is in good faith and not merely to harass or to improperly obtain an advantage over the plaintiff. 398

7. **ALLOW STATE INTERVENTION ON THE DEFENDANT’S BEHALF.** 399 The intervention could be permissive—at the government agency’s discretion—or mandatory, where the agency would statutorily be a necessary party to the litigation.

8. **PROVIDE UP-FRONT PAYMENT OF DEFENDANT’S DISCOVERY COSTS.** If a potential SLAPP survives the initial early review, yet the court still recognizes its potential as a SLAPP, then the court should order the plaintiff to advance the defendant’s discovery costs if and only if the defendant can demonstrate its inability and plaintiff’s ability to pay these costs. 400 The statute allows suspension of discovery while the court is deciding the motion to strike, but this may not eliminate the intimidation and expense factors associated with burdensome discovery in a SLAPP.

9. **GUARANTEE EXISTING INSURANCE COVERAGE.** Finally, an anti-SLAPP statute cannot permit a SLAPP defendant’s existing insurance coverage to dry up as a result of filing the SLAPP. 401 This could be accomplished by mandating continued coverage, unless other unrelated underwriting factors have changed. If the lawsuit is a SLAPP, the requirement to maintain coverage cannot harm the insurance carrier because the insured defendant will inevitably prevail, thus incurring no insurable losses. Another possible method of ensuring continued coverage would be through a state insurance fund, possibly funded by fees charged to unsuccessful SLAPP plaintiffs.

**IX. CONCLUSION**

SLAPPs are difficult to deter because their plaintiffs are not motivated by winning the claim. Instead, SLAPP plaintiffs wish to tie up the defendants as long as possible and to drain them of their financial, political and sometimes personal resources in the process. Existing remedies, from sanctions for frivolous lawsuits to SLAPP-back theories such as malicious prosecution, are not designed for such a situation in which the plaintiff has no expectation of winning, but sues merely to take up the defendant’s time and money. Supplemental statutory remedies are essen-

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398. See *supra* part IV.E for a discussion of the *Noerr/Pennington* sham exception.
399. See *supra* part III.E.
400. See *supra* part III.B.
401. See *supra* part IV.A; text accompanying note 121.
tial to provide for judicial review at an early enough stage in a SLAPP to render it useless.

An anti-SLAPP statute must include several provisions that protect a plaintiff’s right of access to the courts. SLAPPs must be defined narrowly, focusing on suits challenging a defendant’s constitutional right of free speech and petition. A prevailing plaintiff should be guaranteed the same compensatory damages or costs and fee awards as defendants may now recover under various statutes and bills. The threshold review should only screen out those suits that lack any substantial possibility of success on their merits. Finally, the Noerr/Pennington sham exception to the right to petition should be codified in the anti-SLAPP statute, which should cover only good faith petitioning.

Along with the other minor recommendations outlined above—specific pleading, state intervention, discovery costs in advance and state-guaranteed continuation of insurance coverage—this statutory blueprint strikes a fair balance between a plaintiff’s right of access to the courts and a defendant’s rights of free speech and petitioning. The point here must not be to stop developers or polluters but to allow the political process to evaluate their projects that impact their neighbors and their communities. A statute including all the preceding provisions should effectively deter SLAPPs, a mission for which existing judicial remedies are inadequate.