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INTRODUCTION

ELECTION LAW AT PUBERTY: OPTIMISM AND WORDS OF CAUTION

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After reading the rich contributions to this symposium on “Election Law as Its Own Field of Study,” no one can seriously question whether election law is a subject in its own right, related to but apart from its very different parents, constitutional law and political science: res ipsa loquitur.¹

Symposium participants have pointed to some of the indicia demonstrating that election law stands on its own. It is taught in many fine law schools;² it is the exclusive subject of two casebooks;³

¹ For those political scientists in the reading audience, res ipsa loquitur is the well-known tort doctrine translated as “the thing speaks for itself.” For example, suppose that a barrel falls out of a window under defendant’s control injuring plaintiff. That very act proves the defendant’s negligence—res ipsa loquitur—because such incidents usually do not happen in the absence of defendant’s negligence. On the doctrine generally, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 39 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1998). I use this bit of jargon deliberately to make a point: those of us writing for both legal scholars and social scientists should not forget to make ourselves understandable to both groups.


an Internet-based discussion group for scholars on the subject has over 150 subscribers;\(^4\) and the number of law review articles and symposia on the subject has mushroomed in the last decade.\(^5\)

But perhaps an even better indicator is that the many leading scholars in the field participating in this symposium have used their contributions as an opportunity for self-reflection rather than for a self-congratulatory love fest. The luxury of self-reflection demonstrates the field’s maturity.

The exercise in self-reflection also shows a remarkable degree of diversity regarding issues facing the field, beginning with its proper name. I decided to use the term “election law” in this symposium, following the title of Daniel Lowenstein’s casebook.\(^6\) Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, co-authors—along with Pamela Karlan—of the other casebook in this field, object that the term “election law” may signal a “tedious focus on the narrow regulatory questions of most interest to political junkies.”\(^7\) In their view, the field is about “taking democracy itself out of the background and placing it squarely at the center of our inquiries.”\(^8\) Not coincidentally, their casebook is entitled “The Law of Democracy.”\(^9\)

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5. According to a rough count of law review articles available on Westlaw conducted by my research assistant, approximately four and a half times the number of election law-related law review articles and six times the number of law review symposia on election law topics have appeared since 1990, as compared to the pre-1990 period.


7. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by “Election Law” Alone, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1173, 1174 (1999). Lowenstein agrees that “nuts and bolts” election law questions have increased in number, but “we do not teach these issues and we do not write about them in law reviews; not because they are not there but because, for various reasons, we do not find them sufficiently interesting.” Lowenstein, \(supra\) note 6, at 1202.

8. Issacharoff & Pildes, \(supra\) note 7, at 1174.

9. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., \(supra\) note 3.
Political scientist Bruce Cain observes in his symposium contribution that scholars operating in this field—including Lowenstein and Karlan—have proposed broader institutional solutions to political problems than those dictated by the controversies in election law cases. The question, according to Cain, “is whether the field is really election law per se or whether it is political regulation.” Finally, Roy Schotland has perhaps the most descriptive and certainly among the most amusing of titles for his course in the subject, “Ballots, Bucks, Maps, and the Law.”

All of the participants agree about one thing: the study of election law serves important pedagogical purposes. Karlan, for example, shows how the study of election law can enrich thinking about constitutional law questions, and vice versa. Schotland demonstrates how election law can, among other things, help students challenge their preconceptions, partisan viewpoints, and cynicism. And Adam Winkler shows how election law can help us to think better about corporate law and the nature of the corporation.

But there are more points of controversy than consensus among the scholars. For example, Michael Fitts, a scholar known for drawing on political science insights in his election law writings, argues that in order for courts to effectively decide election law disputes, “some type of political black box, a pragmatic and evolving political process, is ultimately necessary.” Yet James Gardner, a scholar whose work in the field draws upon various traditions of political

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10. See Cain, supra note 3, at 1119.
11. Id.
13. See Karlan, supra note 2.
philosophy, contends that "the black box method is of highly questionable utility" in addressing normative questions about the role of elections in American politics.

Of all the areas of disagreement and discussion in these papers, I am struck most by two divergent views on perhaps the central question facing the field: whether the study of election law holds promise to affect political change in positive ways. Some scholars in the field have used election law to discover the sometimes hidden political assumptions of judges in deciding election law cases and to propose political solutions to the legal problems they present. Scholars who have what I will term the "optimistic" view of election law laud this role for the field, while other scholars—some of whom admittedly engage in the same practice themselves—have what I will term the "cautionary" view of election law.

Daniel Ortiz, for example, falls into the optimistic camp. His paper argues that election law has moved us "away from a largely rights-based, individual-centered view of politics, to a more pragmatic and structural view of election law as a matter of institutional

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21. See, e.g., Fitts, supra note 17, at 1137 (discussing how Fitts's own work on political parties may help "resolve one of the central dilemmas of constitutional law—defining majority will.")
arrangements."  To Ortiz, this is a positive development: "we may hope that as election law develops as a discipline, it will lead the courts, and the courts will follow."  Issacharoff and Pildes are similarly sanguine about the field's focus: "the central question is how deep into existing practices a robust, functional, historically-aware understanding of democracy will penetrate."

In contrast, Cain, Fitts, and Gardner suggest greater caution. Cain suggests that political scientists may have played too strong a role in—among other cases—the political party cases, "using the courts to get what cannot be achieved by normal political means."  Fitts argues that election law may bring too much transparency to our political process, thereby undermining the process's public legitimacy.  Gardner argues that political science analysis of election law issues can create an aura of scientific verifiability, thereby obscuring the fact that normative decisions are for courts or society to make, not for political scientists.

Whether optimism or caution are in order, scholars on both sides of the divide trace the genesis of the issue to the Warren Court, and its decision in Baker v. Carr to reject Justice Frankfurter's argument that election law issues like apportionment of legislative districts are non-justiciable political questions.  In the line of cases following Baker, beginning with Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that voting districts must be apportioned according to one-person, one-vote principles, rather than through an accommodation of regional interests.

22. Ortiz, supra note 3, at 1218.
23. Id. at 1226.
24. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 7, at 1183.
25. Cain, supra note 3, at 1118.
26. See Fitts, supra note 17.
27. See Gardner, supra note 19, at 1168. This is not the appropriate forum for me to respond to Professor Gardner's specific critique of my work on compulsory voting. See id. at 1168-70. For present purposes, I will just say that there is no such thing as bad press, and at least it is better to be called a "pathologist," id. at 1170, than "pathological."
29. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 7, at 1180; Cain, supra note 3, at 1111.
Following these cases, we now have courts deciding whether a host of election law practices like political patronage, campaign finance regulation, ballot access provisions, and congressional term limits are consistent with various constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and the Qualifications Clause.

To borrow from Ortiz, where the courts have led, election law scholars surely have followed. And so scholars have debated the merits of the Court's election law decisions, beginning with whether the Court in *Reynolds* should have imposed strict formal equality in the creation of electoral districts. Similarly, when the Supreme Court recently declared that states may enact ballot access restrictions and other restrictions on third parties in order to protect "a healthy two-party system," it did not take election law scholars too long to examine the holding. The more critical scholars declare it a protection of the Democratic and Republican party "duopoly" or a political "lock-up."

The field of election law is driven not only by these court cases, however. Lowenstein's article demonstrates that it is also driven by "the evolving interests and styles of legal academics and political

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31. Thus far, the Supreme Court has not revisited its pre-Warren Court precedent that challenges to the initiative process under the Guarantee Clause are non-justiciable. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). This holding also has been subject to criticism by election law scholars. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 3, at 669-75; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 3, at 284-85.

32. Among the original modern cases on these subjects are: United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Qualifications Clause challenge to a term limits law); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (First Amendment and Equal Protection challenges to campaign finance regulations); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (First Amendment challenge to patronage practices); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (First Amendment challenges to ballot access laws).

33. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3, at 1110-11 (discussing the Reynolds's unintended consequence of preventing metropolitan traffic control plan in the San Francisco Bay Area).


35. Hasen, Duopoly, supra note 20, at 332.

scientists. Does that mean that academics are too dangerous to be trusted with election law scholarship?

As dangerous as it might be to have law professors and political scientists debating the merits of election law judicial decisions, the two alternatives are worse. One alternative is to push the cautionary view to its logical limit, and say that election law issues involve normative decisions to be made by courts without second-guessing by scholars. A second alternative is to return to an era when these questions were non-justiciable, in effect leaving these questions to the outcome of political struggles in the legislative and executive branches.

Neither of these alternatives is politically realistic or normatively palatable. Consider the first alternative, abandoning the critical enterprise of election law. As bad as scholars may be at discerning how election laws affect political outcomes, it is hard to believe that most judges would make better decisions on these issues in a vacuum. In fact, judges often rely upon their unstated understanding of political science in making their decisions, as the Supreme Court apparently did in its recent decision that political stability could be enhanced by a healthy two-party system. It is better that election law scholars explore those assumptions and make them transparent to judges who will revisit these issues at a later time.

Nor is a return to non-justiciability of election law issues likely or desirable. Baker let the genie out of the bottle, or to use another legal metaphor, after Baker we are no longer in a position to unring the bell. What would happen to our democratic process if courts were to declare that they would no longer adjudicate a claim that a legislature passed a statute keeping a political party off the ballot because the members of the legislature do not want political

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37. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1211.
38. See Hasen, Duopoly, supra note 20, at 332 (noting that the Supreme Court decision in Timmons "seems to reflect an uncritical reliance on a substantial normative political science literature, the 'responsible party government' position, that argues for protection of the two-party system").
39. Only Justice Thomas in recent years has suggested a return to non-justiciability of election law issues. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 913 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We would be mighty Platonic guardians indeed if Congress had granted us the authority to determine the best form of local government for every county, city, village, and town in America.").
competition? What if the courts would no longer adjudicate whether a school board could decide to exclude some adult citizen residents from voting in school board elections on grounds that they did not have enough of a stake or interest in the election? Or, what if the courts would no longer adjudicate whether a public employee working for the sheriff's department may be fired because the employee is a Republican and the new sheriff is a Democrat? We would be worse off in a system without judicial review of election law cases even if a court would have decided most of these cases against the complaining party: "getting one's day in court" is part of the remedy itself. But in any case, election law scholars then would bring their analyses to bear on the political branches of government, especially to the people in those states with an initiative process. Whether the political process would self-correct some of its greater abuses is an open question, but election law scholarship would remain a necessary component in any self-correction.

Consequently, no matter what happens, election law scholars do not need to look for another line of work. Already there are predictions of a litigation explosion following the next round of redistricting after the 2000 census. Other issues, such as campaign finance and term limits, continue to be hotly debated in the courts, legislatures, and by the people through the initiative process.

The cautionary words of some symposium participants are worth heeding, but only up to a point. To the extent that courts consider the arguments of election law scholars—even scholars urging caution—we have a responsibility to recognize the limitations in

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40. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 34.
42. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 347.
45. Justice Scalia, for example, cited Professor Fitts's work in arguing that patronage practices should be upheld as constitutional because the practice arguably helps the two-party system. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1603-07 (1998)).
our ability both to accurately predict the outcome of election law changes and to provide normative justifications for one or another view of the law.

But I remain in the optimists' camp, believing that the field—whatever we should call it—can be especially useful in fulfilling the Warren Court's promise of greater political equality. Caution can be especially dangerous in promoting inertia and discouraging innovation. Caution in election law scholarship counsels against thinking creatively and counter-intuitively about subjects central to the functioning and fairness of the American polity.

I propose that we reconvene this symposium in ten years to see how election law has progressed from puberty to adulthood—and perhaps to see how we have progressed to middle age and beyond, as well. Let's throw caution to the wind.