1-1-2002

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Michael Vitiello
J. Clark Kelso

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/lir/vol35/iss2/3
REFORM OF CALIFORNIA'S GRAND JURY SYSTEM

Michael Vitiello* and J. Clark Kelso**

I. INTRODUCTION

In theory, the grand jury is a remarkable institution. Praised by some as the "protector of the citizenry against arbitrary prosecution,"1 the grand jury involves ordinary citizens in the administration of criminal justice; and in California, the civil grand jury gives ordinary citizens the power to investigate local political entities to root out corruption.2

* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1974; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969. I wish to extend special thanks to my capable research assistants, Amelia Burroughs, Cristina Johnson, Michael D. Soejoto, and Kenneth Gino Zanotto for their efforts in putting this project together.

** Professor of Law and Director, Capital Center for Government Law & Policy, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1983; B.A., University of Illinois, 1980. I wish to thank my two research assistants, Ryan Marcroft and Brooks Braden, Governmental Affairs students Jason Ackerman and Michele Dias, and my executive secretary Priscilla Dodson, for their contributions.


2. In California, the grand jury serves two functions. The first is an indicting function. As part of that function, "[t]he grand jury may inquire into all public offenses committed or triable within the county" and present them to the court by indictment. CAL. PENAL CODE § 917 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001). The district attorney or the grand jury itself may initiate these investigations. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 918 (West 1985). The second and more expansive function of the grand jury is its power to investigate into "county matters of civil concern." CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 888, 914.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001). Under this heading, the grand jury has been given authority to inquire about unindicted prisoners; to investigate county prisons; to investigate ownership, transfer, or sale of real property; to investigate county officers, departments, or functions; and to investigate cities or joint powers agencies. See id. §§ 923,
Two recent events in California’s political history serve as reminders that well-designed institutions may be subject to abuse. First, San Diego County’s 1998-99 grand jury publicized its investigation of then Mayor Susan Golding in which it made a groundless accusation of misconduct in connection with efforts to pass a downtown ballpark measure. The grand jury failed to elicit evidence from Golding and brought no charges against her. Nonetheless, her political career was destroyed.

Second, critics also point to the indictment of Assemblyman Scott Baugh as similar evidence of the grand jury’s abuse of power. In 1996, an Orange County grand jury indicted Assemblyman Scott Baugh on four felony and eighteen misdemeanor counts of falsifying campaign records in 1995, during a special election. An Orange County superior court judge dismissed most of the indictments because the district attorney failed to present exculpatory evidence, which would have impeached the credibility of a key witness. Later, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office was removed from prosecuting the case and State Attorney General Bill Lockyer forwarded the matter to the Fair Political Practices Commission so the commission could determine “if the campaign reporting problems merit[ed] civil fines.”

924, 925, 925(a). After such civil investigations, the grand jury may release its findings, in the form of a final report, to the public. See id. §§ 928, 929.


5. See Karen Brandon, It’s Politics, But No Strange Bedfellows Allowed; San Diego Judge Mulls Mayor’s Fate, CHI. TRIB., July 8, 1999, at N4.


7. See Granberry, supra note 6, at B1.

These and other similar examples of perceived abuses of power have resulted in a call for the reform or abandonment of the grand jury. In 1999, when Governor Gray Davis vetoed Assembly Bill 527 (A.B. 527), he noted that “[t]he current operation of the grand jury . . . has served us well for 150 years,” and “there [was] no indication that the Law Revision Commission was asked to perform a study to determine the efficacy of this legislation.” In light of the governor’s veto, the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law’s Capital Center for Government Law and Policy (the “Capital Center”) decided to study the potential reform of California’s grand jury system.

In order to gain insight into the need for reform, the Capital Center invited attendance from various District Attorneys’ offices, defense attorneys, county grand juries, and public interest groups for two days of discussions where the authors of this Report solicited views on the merits of the grand jury system. A number of individuals and organizations attended those discussions and offered important insight into the grand jury system.

9. A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). Assembly Bill 527 provided that “[a]ny witness . . . who is or becomes the subject of a grand jury investigation . . . may have counsel present on his or her behalf while he or she is testifying.” Id. The bill also forbade counsel from objecting to questions or even speaking to the grand jury, from revealing anything heard inside the grand jury room, and from representing more than one witness in the same proceeding. See SENATE PUB. SAFETY COMM., COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B. 527, S. Reg. Sess., at 2-4 (July 13, 1999).


11. Founded in 1995, the Capital Center (formerly known as the Institute for Legislative Practice) “promotes effective government by providing [federal, state, and local] policymakers with nonpartisan information and analysis.” Capital Center for Government Law and Policy, at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/government_law_and_policy/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2001). Directed by one of the coauthors, Professor Clark Kelso, the Capital Center is one of “California’s leading [private] source[s] of nonpartisan legal analysis of public policy issues.” Id.


13. Attendees included: Jack Zepp, director, California Grand Jurors
This Report is divided into three sections. The first deals with the civil oversight role of the grand jury. The second addresses the issues relating to the grand jury's role in the criminal justice system, primarily focusing on Assemblyman Scott Baugh's proposed legislation. The third discusses concerns about the lack of diversity among members of the grand jury.

II. CIVIL GRAND JURY

A. Early History

With roots in twelfth century England, the grand jury has always been controversial. Praised by some for its role in protecting citizens from oppressive government, the grand jury served the Crown by helping it seize control of the administration of criminal justice from ecclesiastical and baronial courts. Popular perception of the grand jury as serving to protect citizens against oppression originated in the late seventeenth century.
with the refusal by two rogue grand juries to indict two prominent Protestant enemies of King Charles II.16 Indeed, that perception may account for the widespread adoption of the grand jury system in the colonies.

Like the United States today, past colonies were divided on the utility of the grand jury. In some colonies, service on the grand jury was "the most important public service" rendered by members of the public.17 Elsewhere, absenteeism was common, forcing colonial legislatures to impose fines on jurors who failed to serve.18

By the time the United States framed the Bill of Rights, the grand jury had become rooted in our legal culture.19 While the right to grand jury indictment is one of the few guarantees in the Bill of Rights that was never made applicable to the states,20 the Fifth Amendment requires federal prosecutions to commence with an indictment.21 Undoubtedly, the adoption of the right to a grand jury into the Bill of Rights reflected its importance during the period leading to the American Revolution.22

Beginning in the 1730s, when colonials began to clash with royal authority, the grand jury "became the bulwark of [the

16. See Schiappa, supra note 1, at 327-28. Some scholars cite this first refusal of the king's indictment edict as the beginning of a powerful citizens' grand jury. Id.
18. See YOUNGER, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that the great distances between colonial towns and poor road systems made attendance difficult for jurors). For example, some colonial grand jurors "supervised workmen clearing the commons, presented all idle persons, assisted the county justices in levying taxes, met with selectmen and constables to nominate tavern keepers, checked to see that Indian children were learning to read, and performed a host of other duties." Id. at 9.
20. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (holding that substituting a magistrate proceeding in lieu of a grand jury indictment did not violate due process); see also Beale Testimony, supra note 19, at 22-23 (explaining that the original constitution proposed to the states contained no provisions regarding the grand jury).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. See YOUNGER, supra note 15, at 19-33.
colonists’] rights and privileges.” Colonists lacked a representative assembly; absent a representative government, colonists used the grand jury to challenge royal authority. In Georgia, the grand jury claimed power to inquire into any matter that it saw fit. Despite a court ruling to the contrary, grand juries continued to act as local representative assemblies. For example, in addition to serving their function of determining whether to issue indictments, they protested abuses of power by royal governments, refused to enforce some laws, and proposed the adoption of new laws.

A few examples demonstrate why the drafters of the Bill of Rights enshrined the institution in the Fifth Amendment. In 1765, a Boston grand jury refused to indict Stamp Act riot instigators. In 1770, a Philadelphia grand jury proposed protests against the increase in taxes on tea. In 1774, an Essex County, New Jersey grand jury refused to follow a court’s charge to denounce colonial mob violence.

After the revolution, grand juries continued to perform civil oversight functions as they had in colonial America. Frontier states especially relied on grand juries. Similar to their role in the Colonial era, grand juries sometimes served as the only representative government body to which citizens could bring grievances. They used the indictment power to “bring order and decorum to boisterous frontier communities.”

Some states and territories expanded grand jury powers beyond the indictment. For example, they studied jail conditions and

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23. Id. at 21 (alteration in original).
24. See id. at 22.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 26-35.
28. See id. at 28 (observing that members of that grand jury included Paul Revere and Ebenezer Hancock).
29. See id. at 30.
30. See id. at 33.
31. See Beale Testimony, supra note 19, at 22 (“When the new federal and state governments were constituted, the grand jury was adopted in each jurisdiction.”).
32. See YOUNGER, supra note 15, at 72.
33. See id. at 73, 81.
34. Id. at 79.
35. See id. at 77-79.
treatment of prisoners, and examined toll roads and bridges.\textsuperscript{36} On their own initiative, some grand juries audited accounts of county officials and denounced or indicted officials guilty of corruption.\textsuperscript{37}

As developed below, California's grand jury system was born out of this pre-Civil War tradition.\textsuperscript{38} Like grand juries in other states entering the Union before 1860, the grand jury was "an integral part of its legal and governmental machinery."\textsuperscript{39}

### B. The Grand Jury in California

California has recognized the civil functions of the grand jury since the state's inception. Like the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, California's first constitution required that a criminal prosecution begin with an indictment.\textsuperscript{40} The requirement was excised with the 1879 Constitution, and one contemporary result is that grand juries spend most of their time exercising their civil oversight function.\textsuperscript{41}

The California Constitution states only that "grand juries shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county."\textsuperscript{42} But since 1851, legislation has specified its authority and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{43} For example, one early statute gave the grand jury the authority to inquire into "the condition and management of public prisons."\textsuperscript{44} They were also charged with auditing city books.\textsuperscript{45} In 1880, legislation added the specific power to investigate county

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\textsuperscript{36} See id. at 79-80.
\textsuperscript{37} See id. at 80.
\textsuperscript{38} See infra Part II.B.
\textsuperscript{39} Id. at 84.
\textsuperscript{40} See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8, \textit{repealed by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 23.}
\textsuperscript{41} See Doria, \textit{supra} note 15, at 1124 n.109. The grand jury is charged with civil oversight functions, often called the grand jury's "watchdog" function. \textit{See id.}
\textsuperscript{42} CAL. CONST. art. I, § 23.
\textsuperscript{44} 1851 Cal. Stat. ch. 29, § 214 (codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 919(b)).
government. Later legislation added similar authority to investigate city government and special districts.

Early legislation gave the superior court the responsibility for impaneling the grand jury each year. Judges of the superior court made two lists. One list contained the number of grand jurors required to complete court business. The second list contained the names of prospective grand jurors as selected by the judges. The list of names was given to the county clerk, who then wrote the names on identical slips of paper. The paper slips were deposited in the grand jury box, and a number of names were drawn according to the number of grand jurors required. Those names not drawn were rolled into the next year's juror selection.

One scholar, a proponent of civil grand juries, conducted an extensive study of the California grand jury system and documented

46. See id.
47. See id. at 5-6.
48. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 210, 241 (West 1872) (current version of § 241 at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 904-06 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001)) (providing that “[a]t the opening of each regular term of the County Court... and as often thereafter as to the Judge may seem proper, a Grand Jury may be impaneled,” and “in all counties there shall be at least one grand jury drawn and impaneled in each year”).
49. See Halsey v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. 71, 73, 91 P. 987, 988 (1907). Today, jurors may be nominated or they may apply for the position, depending on the county. Candidates are then interviewed by the court to determine if they meet the requirements set out in California Penal Code Section 893. If so, the candidate's name will be placed on a list of potential grand jurors. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 896 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001). The list is then given to the county clerk, who either places each name on a slip of paper or assigns each name a secret number, placing the numbers on slips of paper. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 900 (West 1985). As before, the slips of paper are drawn from the “grand jury box.” Id. § 902. The term of service for a grand jury has also been modified with time. “California grand juries in some counties lasted several years before being discharged.” Bruce T. Olson, The California Grand Jury: An Analysis and Evaluation of Its Watchdog Function 75 (1966) (unpublished Master’s thesis, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with the Loyola Law School Library) (using Solano County as an example, the grand jury was impaneled in 1934 and issued its final report in 1939). Today, the term of service for a grand juror is one year. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 905.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
50. See Halsey, 152 Cal. at 73, 91 P. at 988.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 75, 91 P. at 989.
numerous instances where grand juries performed effectively, suggesting that grand juries took their civil oversight function seriously. The study found that California's grand juries, from early statehood, have examined conditions in jails, treatment of indigent patients, accounting matters, taxation issues, public works, and law enforcement. During the early twentieth century, a number of states reformed their grand juries and ceded power to the district attorneys. Similar reform efforts failed in California because grand juries had gained the reputation as "enemies of municipal corruption."

At least some grand juries earned their reputation. For example, in the late nineteenth century, the grand jury took on the notorious political boss of San Francisco's municipal government. Boss "Blind Chris" Buckley was considered the henchman of the Southern Pacific Railroad. The San Francisco grand jury's final report in 1890 denounced fraud in local government and highlighted city officials who had "reaped tremendous personal profits" at the expense of the city. At various times, Buckley was able to get "machine men" on the grand jury to prevent serious investigation of corruption. That strategy failed in 1891 when a judge dismissed nine panel members as obvious "plants" and then directed the jury to make a complete investigation of all charges of corruption against local officials. As a result, Buckley took "an extended 'vacation'" and other politicians "took to their heels."

55. See Olson, supra note 49.
56. See id. at 71 n.76.
57. See YOUNGER, supra note 15, at 152-53 (citing Oregon, Missouri, Minnesota, and Arizona as examples).
58. Id. at 153.
59. Chris Buckley was the Irish-Catholic machine boss in San Francisco until he was run out of town by Progressives interested in municipal reform in the late 1890s. He was dubbed "Blind Chris" because he lost his sight as an adult. See id. at 199-203.
60. Id. at 200. For example, San Francisco grand juries pointed to "graft in street widening projects, padding of payrolls for political reasons, and purchases of land at exorbitant prices for public buildings." Id.
61. See id. at 200 n.32.
62. See id. at 200.
63. Id. Buckley's demise coexists with the rise of the Farmers' Alliance as a strong political party in California. The Alliance platform included the denouncement of railroad domination of city and state politics, not to mention a public takeover of the railroad industry. See John T. McGreevy, Farmers,
Further, the grand jury’s final report in 1891 not only led to indictments of public officials for fraud and bribery, but also led to the mayor’s appointment of a citizens’ committee to draft a city charter to remedy conditions that led to corruption.\(^6\)

Almost twenty years later, the report remained the impetus for continued investigation of municipal corruption in San Francisco.\(^6\)

The 1891 grand jury has been cited as the first attempt “at a comprehensive search under forms of law for the causes and persons ultimately responsible for the class of municipal dishonesty now known as ‘grafting.’”\(^6\)

Commentators point to other grand juries that have served well in rooting out corruption. Various grand juries in San Francisco rooted out corruption in the District Attorney’s Office, uncovering bribery by machine bosses and in the police department.\(^6\)

As one commentator observed, early grand juries proved that they could, “if necessary, unseat an entire municipal administration and using their power of indictment, take over a city and run it in the name of the people.”\(^6\)

Similar successes existed outside of San Francisco. A 1925 Yolo County grand jury made several specific recommendations relating to abuse of power.\(^6\)

For example, it recommended that the district attorney refund money illegally paid to his stenographer and recover sums not collected by the assessor, and that the sheriff not use prisoners to work on his ranch.\(^7\)

The Solano County grand jury, in which the same panel sat from 1934 to 1939, investigated a county


\(^{65}\) See id.

\(^{66}\) Id.

\(^{67}\) See YOUNGER, supra note 15, at 202-03; see also Municipal Corruption Report, supra note 64, at 7-8 (noting that the Oliver grand jury spent six weeks collecting evidence that showed venality and bribery of various municipal and legislative officials).

\(^{68}\) YOUNGER, supra note 15, at 208.

\(^{69}\) See Olson, supra note 49, at 74 (citing YOLO COUNTY GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT 1 (1925) [hereinafter YOLO FINAL REPORT]).

\(^{70}\) See id.
supervisor who subsequently resigned from office.71 Its investigation also led to voluntary repayment for roadwork on privately owned property.72 As summed up by one proponent of the grand jury system, reports like these were instrumental "in supporting legislation to improve accounting methods and other safeguards to minimize the early use of county road building as a political pork barrel."73

More recent examples exist. In Santa Clara County, one grand jury included an attorney, a financial consultant, several electronics engineers, a real estate agent, and a social worker.74 As a result, it was able to study a number of complex budgetary issues, including an investigation that challenged whether the water district should construct a new $40.5 million administrative building.75

These examples demonstrate the basis for faith in the grand jury system. When it works well, the system is a powerful example of democracy in action. The system empowers a group of concerned citizens to serve as a watchdog over public officials whose conduct may not otherwise be open to public scrutiny.76 Even if the grand

71. Before jury service was limited to one year (CAL. PENAL CODE § 908.2 (West 1985)), grand jury terms continued until dismissal by the courts. See Olson, supra note 49, at 76.

72. See id. (interview with Mr. William Jones, Solano County Road Commissioner (Feb. 23, 1965)).

73. Id. From the 1950s through the 1970s, grand juries investigated issues such as county welfare needs and the efficacy of county assistance programs for children, corruption in the California State Legislature, and the accountability and economics of city school systems. See also Harold W. Kennedy & James W. Briggs, Historical and Legal Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 43 CAL. L. REV. 251, 263 (1955) (citing Fresno v. Roberson, M. & Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 888, 269 P.2d 252 (1954)).


75. See id. Savings to cities and counties are often touted as one of the benefits to the public of an active grand jury. For example, one Solano County grand jury member cites "instances where there has been at least $5,000 paid back to the City because of the rooting that the Grand Jury did." Roundtable, supra note 12, at 6.

76. Complexity of modern government may keep ordinary citizens from close scrutiny of government. Grand jury proponents cite modern complexity of government as one of the reasons for maintaining civil oversight functions.

[Reports of grand juries are] much more essential . . . in these days
jury does not uncover fraud or corruption, it may uncover incompetence or inefficiency. Participation on the grand jury educates jurors about their local government, and in turn, the grand jury reports educate the public at large. As summarized in a 1962 law review article, "[a] grand jury is a short-lived, representative, non-political body of citizens functioning without hope of personal aggrandizement. It comes from the citizens at large and soon disappears into its anonymity without individual recognition or personal reward and without ability to perpetuate itself in the public hierarchy."

Despite the considerable support for the grand jury system in some quarters, the system has its detractors. In assessing whether to reform the civil grand jury, one must be mindful of the lack of recent systematic data on the functioning of the grand jury. There has been no recent attempt to chronicle how often jury abuse takes place or how often grand jury reports lead to the stunning successes like those...
cited above. It cannot be denied, however, that the grand jury system has deep historical roots, including its role as watchdog. In theory, the civil grand jury has potential for social good, and in many instances, it has fulfilled that potential.  

C. The Statutory Powers of the Civil Grand Jury

While the California Constitution provides for the grand jury, its specific powers are governed by various statutes. Hence, changes to the grand jury system, except for its abolition, do not require constitutional amendment.

Under current legislation, requirements of service on the grand jury are limited. A person needs to be at least eighteen years old and a United States citizen to meet the county residency requirement, and be "in possession of his natural faculties, of ordinary intelligence, of sound judgment, and of fair character." Depending on the county, prospective grand jurors are either nominated or apply to serve, are interviewed by a superior court judge, and then are selected at random to fill seats on the panel. Compensation is set by the county, but must be at least ten dollars a day for days on which grand jurors perform certain work for the grand jury.

In addition to authority to issue indictments, the grand jury is empowered to "investigate and report on" local government and to weigh allegations of misconduct by public officials. The grand

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80. Some examples of grand juries fulfilling their potential are the recent savings to city and county governments, both large and small, by Solano and Santa Clara County grand juries, and the long history of the San Francisco County and City grand jury's targeting of graft and corruption in government. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 6, 9-10.

81. The statutory powers given the grand jury were combined into the California Penal Code in 1959. See Karl Kinaga & Robert F. Jordan, Some Limitations and Controls of the California Grand Jury System, 2 SANTA CLARA LAW 78, 78 (1962).

83. See id. § 896.
84. See id. § 890.
85. Id. § 925. Indeed, the grand jury must exercise its watchdog functions. For example, "The grand jury shall inquire into the willful or corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every description within the county." Id. § 919(c). "The grand jury shall investigate and report on the operations, accounts, and records of the officers, departments, or functions of the county including those operations, accounts, and records of any special legislative district or other district in the county..." Id. § 925.
jury operates in secret during its investigations and deliberations. At the end of its term, the grand jury must issue a final report to the presiding judge of the superior court. The judge may then submit the report "for comment to responsible officers, agencies, or departments, including the county board of supervisors" if the court finds that the report is in compliance with limitations imposed on the grand jury. If the

The California Supreme Court has said that the grand jury has three basic functions:

[T]o weigh criminal charges and determine whether indictments should be returned ((CAL. PENAL CODE) § 917); to weigh allegations of misconduct against public officials and determine whether to present formal accusations requesting their removal from office ((CAL. PENAL CODE) § 922; see Gov. Code, § 3060 et seq.); and to act as the public's "watchdog" by investigating and reporting upon the affairs of local government (e.g., §§ 919, 925 et seq.).

McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1162, 1170, 751 P.2d 1329, 1332, 245 Cal. Rptr. 774, 777 (1988). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 924.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001). See id. § 939.2. The grand jury also has "free access, at all reasonable times, to the public prisons, and to the examination, without charge, of all public records within the county." Id. § 921.

See id. §§ 929, 933, 933.06, 939.9, 939.91. Jurors, with the permission of presiding judges, often issue interim reports before the end of the jury term. Interim reports are incorporated into the final report. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (1973 Grand Jury), 13 Cal. 3d 430, 434, 531 P.2d 761, 763, 119 Cal. Rptr. 193, 195 (1975); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 933(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 2001) (discussing the deadlines for submitting a final report); Telephone Interview by Amelia Burroughs with the San Francisco Superior Court (May 23, 2000). All reports have statutory limitations. The report must be approved by the presiding superior court judge who may "require the redaction or masking of any part of the evidentiary material, findings, or other information to be released to the public including, but not limited to, the identity of witnesses and any testimony or materials of a defamatory or libelous nature." CAL. PENAL CODE § 929 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001). Final reports must have the concurrence of at least three-fourths of the grand jurors. See id. §§ 916, 940. Jurors also must be available for forty-five days after their term has expired to explain the report. See id. § 933(a). All final reports must be supported by documented evidence. See id. § 916. A person unindicted but investigated by the grand jury may require the grand jury to issue a report declaring that there was no evidence with which to find an indictment. See id. § 939.91(a); see also John M. Feser Jr., The California Civil Grand Jury: From Watchdogs to Watched Dogs, 30 McGeorge L. Rev. 748, 756 (1999) (providing a useful critique of CAL. PENAL CODE § 929 enacted by Chapter 79).

CAL. PENAL CODE § 933(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 2001). The affected
report concerns the operations of any public agency, the agency has ninety days to respond. Every elected officer or agency head, however, must respond to grand jury reports “pertaining to matters under the control of the governing body, and every elected county officer” within sixty days. The law does not require implementation of those recommendations, but only a response.

Until recently, the law did not prevent a response of “no comment” to a recommendation. Presently, however, a responding person or agency must comply with the requirements of section 933.05 of the California Penal Code. The respondent must agree or disagree with each finding. In the case of disagreement, the reason must be explained.

There are also specific requirements regarding implementation of recommendations. If a recommendation has not been implemented, there must be a time frame for implementation, a description of a study to analyze the recommendation, or an explanation with regard to why the recommendation will not be implemented.

Typically, the grand jury submits its final report at the end of its one-year term. As a result, officials file their responses to the report sixty or ninety days after its submission when the grand jury has already been dismissed. Grand jurors have limited immunity for work performed as grand jurors, but remain liable for defamation for statements made in their final report and may be found guilty of a misdemeanor if they violate their oath of secrecy.

agency receives a copy of the grand jury report prior to its public release. See id. § 933.05(4)(f).

90. See id. § 933(c). However, there are no enforcement powers or penalties for reports that go unanswered by agencies and officers.

91. Id.

92. See id.

93. See id. § 933.05(a)(1)-(2).

94. See id.

95. See id. § 933.05(b)(1)-(4).

96. See id. § 933.05(c).

97. See id. § 933(a).


99. See Brooks, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 1290, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503.

100. The oath is found at CAL. PENAL CODE § 911 (West 1985 & Supp.
D. The Contemporary Critique of the Civil Grand Jury

In preparing this Report, the Capital Center invited persons interested in the grand jury process to attend two days of discussions about grand jury reform.\textsuperscript{101} No one who attended urged abandonment of the grand jury’s watchdog function. Perhaps that is not surprising. Those closest to the process recognize its potential for social good. Nonetheless, grand juries have been the subject of considerable criticism, often because of perceived abuse by a specific grand jury. What follows is a discussion of those criticisms.\textsuperscript{102}

According to critics of the grand jury system, the grand jury is a waste of public money because grand jury reports are as inept as their members.\textsuperscript{103} Whether or not grand jury reports are inept, they are ignored.\textsuperscript{104} Often motivated by their own agenda, grand juries abuse their considerable power.\textsuperscript{105} Others, sometimes supporters of the grand jury system, suggest that the grand jury system would improve if grand jurors were provided with greater resources and better training.\textsuperscript{106} A separate issue in this Report is the concern about the lack of diversity on grand juries.\textsuperscript{107} Some of these criticisms overlap and will be considered together.

1. Ineptitude

While some commentators list lack of time and lack of training as separate issues,\textsuperscript{108} those concerns relate to grand jury competence. Since prosecutors are not required to begin criminal prosecution by

\textsuperscript{101} See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 1.
\textsuperscript{102} See Doria, supra note 15, at 1132-33 (stating that after anti-grand jury sentiment swept the United States, “[o]nly California and Nevada mandate the annual impanelment of grand juries to initiate and conduct broad civil investigations.”).
\textsuperscript{104} See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 10.
\textsuperscript{105} See id. at 15.
\textsuperscript{106} See id.
\textsuperscript{107} Critics emphasize that grand juries lack diversity, a concern that is discussed in Part IV, infra. See Dave Thom, Visions of Grandeur: California Citizens Are Trying to Restore the Glory Once Held by Civil Grand Juries, THE RECORDER, Sept. 21, 1995, at 1, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
\textsuperscript{108} See, e.g., Doria, supra note 15, at 1137-42.
grand jurors spend most of their time investigating local government and preparing the grand jury's annual report. Despite the time invested in those reports, "the grand jury is widely belittled and almost totally ignored." For example, some county supervisors admit that they "pay little attention to the grand jury reports..." Although estimates vary, some former grand jurors estimate that "less than 20 percent of... recommendations were acted upon." Lack of implementation of grand jury recommendations is explained by a number of factors. First, once the grand jury files its final report, officials do not respond until one or two months after the grand jury has been dismissed. The new grand jury, with its own work ahead of it, pays little attention to those responses. Recommendations, thus, die a quiet death.

Grand jurors are inept because standards for service are low. Issues facing local government have become increasingly complex, beyond the competence of lay jurors. As a result, grand jury

109. California prosecutors always had the option of beginning criminal proceedings with an indictment or with an information (preliminary hearing). However, with the California Supreme Court decision in *Hawkins v. Superior Court*, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586-87, 586 P.2d 916, 917, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 436 (1978), all defendants who were indicted were also entitled to a preliminary hearing. *See id.* As a result, prosecutors rarely used indictments, to avoid wasting time and governmental resources, as the indictment would have to be followed by an information. In 1990, California passed Proposition 115, which among other things, amended the state constitution to provide that "a defendant is not entitled to a postindictment preliminary hearing... ." *Doria,* *supra* note 15, at 1124-25.


112. *Id.*

113. *Id.*

114. *See Roundtable,* *supra* note 12, at 12.

115. *See id.* at 11.


117. As one argument goes, in recent years there has been an increase in bureaucracy that has made it near impossible for a panel of ordinary citizens to understand the inner-workings of local government and to make effective and workable recommendations to local agencies. *See id.* at 1140. Critics have also stated that local government "has become too complicated and too technical for a citizen without training in government to effectively assist people who are holding office." Hasemeyer & Krueger, *supra* note 111, at A1. Bruce T. Olson, formerly the executive director of the American Grand Jury
recommendations are not simply ignored because they can be, but because they should be. Inept grand juries produce inept recommendations.

Moreover, in those cases when a grand jury recommendation is followed, it may turn out that the recommendation did not originate with the grand jury, but was identified by a local official.118 Thus, at best, the argument states that the grand jury merely spends time "reinventing the wheel, treading in the footsteps of predecessors whose reports have been ignored."119

A related argument is that grand juries are especially inept because county government is now too sophisticated for a citizen’s panel, thus, resulting reports are "naive" and "simplistic." Here, competing demands may increase the problem of grand jury competence. As one commentator observed, "[w]hen superior court judges were solely responsible for selecting potential grand jurors, the panel tended to mostly include people from the business sector."121 That resulted in the criticism that grand juries "reflect[ed] only the upper classes of society . . . ."122

Many grand jurors believe that one year of service is too short a time in which to become familiar with the local government.123 By the time grand jurors are oriented, a good part of their term has passed. Knowledge of that fact may lead to stalling by local officials.124

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118. See Hasemeyer & Krueger, supra note 111, at A1 (stating that the grand jury identified "a pattern of recommendations that simply restated problems brought to the attention of the jury by government officials.").


120. For example, a former San Diego County grand juror called the grand jury "[a] venue for the highly opinionated who’ve figured out a way to make taxpayers fund their pithy insights . . . ." Van Nuis, supra note 103, at B9. The implication is that because grand jurors may investigate anything they want, many jurors spend their time investigating topics of interest to them, not necessarily topics of interest to the general public. See id.

121. Doria, supra note 15, at 1140.

122. Id.

123. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 11-14.

124. See id. at 13.
Historically, some grand jurors and their critics have questioned whether grand jurors receive adequate training.\textsuperscript{125} Despite reform efforts to increase training for grand juries, grand jury advocates continue to question whether adequate training is available.\textsuperscript{126}

2. Abuse of power

Critics claim that grand juries may abuse their power.\textsuperscript{127} The grand juries do have broad powers, which invites abuse. In addition, specific grand juries have gone beyond their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{128}

According to the critics, grand jury secrecy also contributes to the potential for abuse.\textsuperscript{129} While secrecy encourages witnesses to come forward, unsupervised grand jurors go astray. Unchecked, grand juries "expose individuals to attack or allegations of misconduct, and those individuals may be unable to defend themselves due to the secretive nature of grand jury proceedings."\textsuperscript{130} Even if charges are not brought, a person's reputation may still be damaged when the grand jury investigates him or her.\textsuperscript{131}

A recent episode in San Diego provides fuel to grand jury criticism. The 1998-99 San Diego County Grand Jury's final report issued a "factually and legally groundless accusation, in violation of the standards of due process," accusing Mayor Susan Golding of misconduct in connection with efforts to pass a downtown ballpark measure.\textsuperscript{132} According to the presiding judge, the grand jury abused

\textsuperscript{125} See Doria, supra note 15, at 1139-42.
\textsuperscript{126} The California Grand Jurors Association (CGJA), for example, believes that most jurors receive only an introduction to county officials and a few tips on interviewing techniques. They advocate a comprehensive training program that includes history and statutory authority of the grand jury, investigative and interviewing techniques, report writing, and the importance of continuity. See generally CAL. GRAND JURORS ASS'N, GRAND JURY TRAINING GUIDELINES (1998).
\textsuperscript{127} See Doria, supra note 15, at 1133.
\textsuperscript{128} See id. A former grand juror summed up the potential for abuse as follows: "You take 19 eager 'civic watchdogs,' equip them in lavish chambers in the Tony Hall of Justice, repeatedly tell them how oh-so-important they've become, hand them subpoena power on a silver platter and turn them loose on local government for a year." Van Nuis, supra note 103, at B9.
\textsuperscript{129} See Doria, supra note 15, at 1134-35.
\textsuperscript{130} Id. at 1133.
\textsuperscript{131} See id. at 1133-34.
its power by “ignoring the statutes, ignoring the case law, ignoring the constitution, ignoring its counsel, ignoring the district attorney—indeed, ignoring common sense—and in so doing it has violated its public trust.”

E. A Response to the Critique

Neither proponents nor critics of the grand jury system can point to a recent systematic study of the California grand jury to substantiate claims made about its functioning or malfunctioning. Such a study is well beyond resources available to the authors of this Report. Hence, the debate about abandoning the civil watchdog function of the grand jury is based on anecdotal evidence, rather than on any definitive study. Claims of abuse are based on specific examples, rather than on a systematic measure of abuse. Proponents of the grand jury system similarly rely on anecdotal evidence, often their own experiences in arguing in favor of the system.

Absent definitive data, the burden of demonstrating the inadequacy of the civil watchdog grand jury should fall on the critics of the system, for at least two reasons. First, in theory, the civil watchdog function makes sense as a check on governmental abuse. Concerned citizens, who have limited tenure and do not serve for personal gain, have the potential to check abuse of power by entrenched public officials whose work is not otherwise open to public scrutiny. Lay citizens bring common sense to the task, but

133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Brandon, supra note 5; Todd S. Purdum, San Diego Grand Jury is Mouse with a Roar: The Citizens Panel Flexes Seldom-Used Muscles in a Direct Challenge to Mayor Susan Golding, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, July 5, 1999, at A1, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers. Both use the example of San Diego’s former Mayor Susan Golding being charged with “willful misconduct” as an example of grand juries run amok.
135. See, e.g., Roundtable, supra note 12, at 11-12 (discussing the answers of Dan Taranto and Jack Zepp when asked whether the civil oversight function is effective).
136. According to two commentators:
A grand jury is a short-lived, representative, non-political body of citizens functioning without hope of personal aggrandizement. It comes from the citizens at large and soon disappears into its anonymity without individual recognition or personal reward and without ability to perpetuate itself in the public hierarchy. Grand
are not part of local political establishments. As one writer stated, the grand jury is "the citizen's personal entry into government and justice. As such it has its justification, and because it is such, it should be retained."

Second, the institution has a long historical pedigree. Although we should not perpetuate an ancient institution simply because of tradition, history suggests that the grand jury has served well. For every publicized instance of grand jury abuse, far more numerous examples surface where the grand jury has served its intended purpose. Recitation of examples of effective performance by a grand jury is anecdotal evidence, similar to that cited by grand jury critics. Because of its long history, those who seek abandonment of the system ought to bear the burden of proof that the system does not work.

The following is a response to some of the specific criticisms of the grand jury.

1. Inept grand juries

Proponents of the grand jury system recognize a need for additional training for grand jurors. They also express concern that

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1. Inept grand jurors

Proponents of the grand jury system recognize a need for additional training for grand jurors. They also express concern that juries are not remembered by the names of the individual members, but are recalled or forgotten by what they may have accomplished or failed to accomplish.


139. See supra Parts II.A-B.

140. One proponent of the grand jury civil oversight function characterizes the grand jury as “the flashlight that is shining on the problem.” Roundtable, supra note 12, at 12. Sherry Chesny, a three-time grand juror in Placer County and present training coordinator for the CGJA, says that to end the civil oversight function of the grand jury is to “take out that citizen element [from government].” Id. at 10. She also responds to the critics’ argument that government does not listen to the grand jury: “Government doesn’t work quickly, it does not turn on a dime ... [and] if you really look ... some of those recommendations are going to be implemented two years from now, three years from now.” Id. at 13. And Clif Poole, a current member of the Solano County grand jury responds to critics: “[T]he credibility of the local citizen holds more weight with the public than does government inspecting government ....” Id. at 6.
by the time the grand jurors begin to feel comfortable with their role, they are well into their limited tenure. In effect, proponents themselves admit that the grand jury system can be improved.  

It does not follow that grand jurors are inept. Numerous examples exist of effective grand juries. While the current composition of grand juries may not be sufficiently diverse, those able to serve are often retired professionals. Indeed, as one superior court judge has observed, the grand jury in his county “welcomes the ‘average Joe’ who didn’t go to college and ha[s] a working-class job,” but stated that “membership doesn’t reflect that.” Even though requirements for grand jury service are minimal, evidence does not suggest that uneducated, and unqualified people are volunteering to serve.

Even if not “inept,” grand jurors feel inadequate to do the job because of time constraints. That is, by the time they feel comfortable in their role as grand jurors, much of their tenure has elapsed. One obvious answer would be to extend the term of the grand jury. However, that solution is of limited value. Some counties have difficulty filling their grand jury ranks because of the length of service. Addressed in more detail below, another answer may be to improve the quality of training. Current training is


142. See *Lick*, *supra* note 74.

143. *Id.*

144. *See id.*


147. *See infra* Part II.F.
limited and does not use simulation to train grand jurors to conduct interviews or write reports. More hands-on training might improve the competence of those who serve.

Also as discussed below, in order to achieve greater diversity of membership, greater outreach is essential. Community outreach should invite participation by all members of the community. If those efforts are successful, the quality of the prospective panel should improve.

2. Inept reports

Undoubtedly, improving the quality of the pool of prospective grand jurors and the training of those who serve should improve the quality of their reports. However, evidence of incompetent reports is equivocal.

One serious criticism of grand jury reports, cited as evidence of incompetence, is that few recommendations are acted upon. Estimates vary, with one study suggesting that fewer than 20% are acted upon, while another found that approximately 30% of grand jury recommendations are acted upon. Even on the assumption that only about 20% of their recommendations are acted upon, that does not support a charge of incompetence. By comparison, elected representatives place far more bills in the hopper than are adopted.

148. The training needs that remain unmet in most counties are researching skills, how to verify statements and find documentation, interviewing techniques, and how to synthesize a final report. Telephone Interview by Amelia Burroughs with Sherry Chesny, Training Coordinator, California Grand Jury Association (May 24, 2000).
149. See infra Part IV.D.
150. See Hasemeyer & Krueger, supra note 111.
151. See Olson, supra note 49, at 251.
152. For example, in the 1997-1998 Legislative Session, a total of 2818 assembly bills were proposed. Of those, the total sent from the assembly to the senate was 1813 (64% of total). The total number of assembly bills enrolled and sent to the governor was 1430 (51% of total). And, the total number of assembly bills approved by the governor was 1102 (39% of total). See California Assembly Legislative History, 1997-1998.

The myth of an incompetent grand jury based upon the number of proposals enacted by local governments may also be considered in another light. Legislatures are professional; grand juries are (for the most part) voluntary. Legislatures have a bevy of staff and in-house counsel to help them draft and analyze bills; grand juries have county counsel, possibly the D.A., and a presiding judge to help.
As in sports, percentages are deceiving. If a quarterback completes 20-30\% of passes attempted, the quarterback is incompetent while a batter achieving a 30\% success rate may end up in the Hall of Fame.\textsuperscript{153} Grand jury critics do not explain why a 20-30\% success rate is a poor achievement. The rate may be a result of a number of factors, including intransigent public officials. However, given the relatively low cost of grand juries, a 20-30\% success rate seems to be a good return on the investment.

Another reason why more recommendations may not be implemented is that grand jurors have been excused from service by the time public officials must respond to their reports. One remedy in use by some grand juries is to file interim final reports.\textsuperscript{154} Those reports can become public during the early part of the grand juror’s tenure, forcing a response within the term of the grand jury and allowing follow-up by the grand jury.\textsuperscript{155} Further study of whether such a procedure produces a higher adoption of recommendations should be conducted in the future.

However, critics argue that even when recommendations are adopted, they were based on suggestions of public officials—ideas that would have been implemented but for the grand jury report.\textsuperscript{156} Again, such charges are hard to document. Proponents of the grand jury system have a response to the criticism: Even if some of their suggestions did not originate with the grand jury, often, the suggestions may not have been implemented because public officials


\textsuperscript{156} See Hasemeyer & Krueger, \textit{supra} note 111, at A1.
were dragging their feet. The added pressure brought by the grand jury may have made the difference between an idea remaining bogged down in red tape and being implemented.

Ironically, critics fault grand juries for reinventing the wheel, that is, by advancing suggestions made by other grand juries or urging ideas suggested by public officials, and arguing that their recommendations are ignored. To some extent, their criticisms are contradictory. Absent greater power to command compliance (a questionable power to extend to the grand jury), grand juries persuade through public opinion. If the recommendations of one grand jury are not acted upon, but have merit, it is hard to see why a grand jury should be criticized for urging the same recommendation in a subsequent report.

3. Abuse of power

The specter of abuse of power by grand juries is overstated. Undoubtedly, instances exist, but critics understate the constraints imposed on grand juries.

First, grand juries have no power to impose their recommendations on local government. At best, if public officials are not responsive to grand jury recommendations, the grand jury can influence policy only through public opinion. Given their limited tenure and the reality that jurors have usually disbanded by the time public officials must respond to their recommendations, grand jurors have limited power to impose their ideas even by appealing to public opinion. That is, some of the limitations on the effectiveness of the system serve as checks on potential for abuse.

157. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 11-12 (estimating that probably half the time county governments say they have already fixed a problem contained in a grand jury final report, they did not start to address the problem until the grand jury began investigating).

158. See Gillett-Harris-Duranceau & Assocs. v. Kemple, 83 Cal. App. 3d 214, 147 Cal. Rptr. 616, 620-21 (1978) (giving as examples, limited term of service, training, oversight by the presiding judge, the use of legal counsel to answer questions about the scope of authority, the potential liability for defamation (the California Supreme Court has said that this option provides an important balance in power), legislative provisions, and the need for a consensus (and the resulting deliberation among jurors)).
Second, while specific examples demonstrate that the system is subject to abuse, if the system is otherwise worth retaining, the occasional abuse may be a cost that we ought to accept in light of other benefits. Checks already exist to deter abuse. The most obvious limitation on irresponsible grand jury behavior is the threat of a defamation lawsuit. Grand jurors are not immune from liability for defamation. In addition, while a grand jury need not seek legal counsel, it may invite input from county counsel or the district attorney, either of whom may urge restraint by the grand jury. The grand jury also works with a presiding superior court judge who may exercise some degree of guidance to prevent a grand jury from irresponsible behavior. Finally, a grand jury report is not the product of a few people; a report requires a super-majority of its members. Achieving the necessary majority may require building consensus among panel members, increasing the quality of the grand jury’s deliberations, and reducing irresponsible behavior.

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159. Again, the investigation of San Diego Mayor Susan Golding is often cited as an example. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

160. See Doria, supra note 15, at 1133 n.203 (citing McClatchy Newspaper v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1162, 1178, 751 P.2d 1329, 1336-37, 245 Cal. Rptr. 774, 781-82 (1988)).

161. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 930 provides that information in grand jury reports regarding an unindicted person or official is not privileged. Thus, there is no protection to grand jurors from defamation actions that are the result of statements made concerning unindicted individuals in the final report. See Brooks v. Binderup, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1287, 1294, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 501, 505 (1995) (holding that even though statute requires juror secrecy, jurors were not prohibited from offering evidence available from sources outside grand jury proceedings); Gillett-Harris-Duranceau & Assoc. v. Kemple., 83 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219, 147 Cal. Rptr. 616, 619 (1978).

162. See Doria, supra note 15, at 1134 n.207. At least one writer has suggested that the threat of potential lawsuit may overdeter aggressive investigation by the grand jury. See id. at 1135 n.220.

163. See id. at 1129.

164. See id. at 1129-30.

165. Adoption of final reports may only happen when twelve of the nineteen members of the grand jury concur. If the grand jury has twenty-three jurors, at least fourteen jurors must concur. If the jury has eleven jurors, at least eight members must concur. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 916, 940 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001); see also Unnamed Minority Members of the 1987-88 Kern County Grand Jury v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1344, 1346, 256 Cal. Rptr. 727, 728 (1989) (upholding the requirement of a super-majority to issue a grand jury report and prohibiting minority members from issuing a minority report).
The available evidence simply does not support the case that California should abandon the civil watchdog function of the grand jury. Instead, anecdotal evidence suggests that it can work well. Theoretically, it remains a worthwhile instrument of participatory democracy. In subsequent discussions, this Report considers other issues relating to the functioning of the grand jury. Specifically, it considers questions relating to budgets for grand juries, the diversity of those who serve on grand juries, and increasing the qualifications for those who serve on grand juries. These discussions make specific recommendations affecting the civil grand jury, but none of those suggestions urge dramatic reform of the system.

F. Training

This Report’s critique of the grand jury system begs the question, how can California improve the civil grand jury? Even the most ardent supporters and participants in the system recognize the need for greater competence on the part of grand jurors. This section discusses efforts to improve grand jury competence through legislation requiring training for grand jurors, some thoughts on the effectiveness of current training, and specific recommendations for a pilot program aimed at creating better training for new members of county grand juries.

1. Recent legislation

Prior to 1997, a judge presiding over a grand jury was required to give new grand jurors “such information as it deems proper . . . as to their duties.” In the minds of grand jurors, they lacked sufficient information or training to perform their jobs adequately.

166. See supra Part II.E, and infra Parts II.F.2, IV.
167. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 11.
169. See RESTRUCTURING AND FUNDING, supra note 141, at 8; Robert Presley, County Grand Juries Also Need to Probe Their Own Techniques if They Are to Remain Vital, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, May 4, 1997, at A23, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers; Telephone Interview by Amelia Burroughs with Dan Taranto, vice president, California Grand Jury Association, and two-time grand jury member, Humboldt County grand jury (May 28, 2000) [hereinafter Taranto Interview]. The former American Grand Jury Foundation, run by Bruce T. Olson, recommended at
Efforts to improve the overall quality of grand juries culminated in a bill written and sponsored by the California State Association of Counties.\(^{170}\)

Assembly Bill 829 added sections 914(b) and (c) to the California Penal Code.\(^{171}\) Under those provisions, the superior court must ensure that new jurors receive, at minimum, training in "report writing, interviews, and the scope of the grand jury’s responsibility and statutory authority."\(^{172}\) Counties must pay for the mandated training.\(^{173}\)

2. Current training programs

The authors of this Report are unaware of any successful efforts to create consistent statewide standards for grand jury training. Each county approaches training quite differently. Some counties use a network of former grand jurors to provide training for incoming panels.\(^{174}\) Other counties contract with the California Grand Jurors Association (CGJA) to provide training.\(^{175}\) One participant in the two days of discussion at McGeorge Law School reported favorably that the new training requirement "has made the difference of daylight and dark..."\(^{176}\) That county’s grand jurors’ manual briefly discusses inspections and tours of local facilities within the grand jury’s jurisdiction and describes investigation and interview

least eighty hours of training for grand jurors. See id. In San Francisco, jurors asked that training include: (1) a review of the grand jury mandate; (2) an overview of local government (including the clients of county counsel delineated); (3) availability of resources; and (4) logistical and practical matters (for example, who in the superior court may be asked to type forms). See Telephone Interview by Amelia Burroughs with Hilda Bernstein, Foreperson, 1994-95 San Francisco County Civil Grand Jury (May 24, 2000).

170. See A.B. 829 Analysis, supra note 168, at 3. It is important to note that Dan Taranto suspects the training part of A.B. 829 Analysis was added to encourage past and present grand jurors to give support to the bill. It was otherwise resisted by the California Grand Jury Association, the California Judges Association, and the Judicial Council for requiring that jurors meet with the subject of their investigation. See Taranto Interview, supra note 169.


172. Id. § 914(b).

173. See id. § 914(c).

174. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 77.

175. See id. at 78.

176. Id. at 6.
techniques. The manual contains other information, such as a checklist for improving objectivity in grand jury reports and tips for improving findings and preparing for interviews. It also includes copies of statutes especially important to grand juries. Other counties provide grand jurors with similar manuals.

Another participant believes that enacting A.B. 829 has made supervising judges aware of their responsibility to train grand jurors. That awareness may increase what training is available.

Still, there are reasons to believe that training could be improved. One active member of the CGJA expressed concern that most current training is really an orientation, rather than a true training. He also stated that training, often lasting at most one day, is "what I fondly refer to as the parade of bureaucrats." One obvious reason why training may be inadequate is cost. As discussed by one of the participants at the McGeorge Roundtable Discussion, the CGJA stepped into a financial breach and provided training for about $75 per person because counties could not afford the heftier $300 fee charged by private organizations.

The CGJA should be applauded for its efforts to provide affordable training to new grand jurors. However, even members of the association recognize the limits of the kind of training that can be provided for such a nominal fee. At most, such training can give grand jurors an overview of the process and explain practical

178. See id. at 9, 13.
179. For example, the manual contains Title 4 of the California Penal Code, dealing exclusively with grand jury proceedings and some excerpts from the California Evidence Code. See id. at apps. 3B, 3C. The manual also contains copies of the 1974 Political Reform Act and the Ralph M. Brown Act. See id. at apps. 3B, 3C.
180. For example, a review of the San Joaquin grand jury manual provides similar results. See SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY GRAND JURY MANUAL, Parts II, IV (rev. June 2001).
181. Telephone Interview by Amelia Burroughs with Sherry Chesny, training committee chair, California Grand Jury Association, and three-time grand jury member, Placer County grand jury (May 25, 2000).
182. See id.
183. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 80.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 79.
186. See id. at 79-82.
problems they may encounter. It simply cannot provide grand jurors with the hands-on training they need to become proficient in interviewing witnesses and local officials and in writing final reports.

Some counties, especially smaller ones, provide their grand juries such limited budgets that they can only send few, if any, of their grand jurors to such programs.\textsuperscript{187} Thus, grand jurors report cases where new grand jurors pay their own way to such training events.\textsuperscript{188}

3. Sound education and training for grand jurors

Educators understand that the best way to learn skills is through simulation or other hands-on experience. Law schools almost universally have created clinical legal education programs for that reason.\textsuperscript{189} Most schools also provide a variety of simulation classes where students become active learners. Inspection of a typical law school catalogue shows offerings in courses like client counseling, negotiation, moot court, trial advocacy, settlement and the like. Such programs are labor intensive and, as a result, carry a heavy price tag.\textsuperscript{190} Their widespread adoption demonstrates their significant educational benefits.

In preparation of this Report, its primary author interviewed Glenn Fait, the director of McGeorge’s Institute for Administrative Justice (IAJ).\textsuperscript{191} For years, IAJ has run highly successful training

\textsuperscript{187} See id. at 82.

\textsuperscript{188} See id. at 78.


\textsuperscript{191} See Interview by Michael Vitiello with Glenn Fait, director, Institute for Administrative Justice, McGeorge Law School, in Sacramento, California (Summer 2000) [hereinafter Fait Interview].
programs for federal and state agencies. For example, IAJ runs training programs for the Special Education Hearing Office, which McGeorge runs under contract with the California Department of Education and the Social Security Administration.

The key to IAJ's teaching methodology is the use of mock hearings and writing exercises. For example, in training disability hearing officers, IAJ uses actual case files, "cleansed" for confidentiality. Trainees attend lectures on different aspects of their work. However, the special feature of their training involves simulation. Participants are given a hearing packet, containing a file for the hearing officer and role-play sheets for those who play other parts in the hearing. IAJ personnel tape record the mock hearings and take notes on the trainees' performance. IAJ personnel provide feedback by playing back portions of the tapes for the full group of trainees, allowing discussion of both substantive and technical issues in conducting the hearings.

In addition to receiving training on conducting hearings, participants also receive instruction on writing decisions for the cases they hear. During a training session, disability-hearing officers, for example, write three decisions. One is based on a case file and mini-record; a second on a videotaped hearing; and a third on a full hearing that the trainee conducts. IAJ personnel provide feedback on the trainees' written work as well.

In a discussion with Director Fait, he agreed with the authors of this Report that similar training would be helpful for newly chosen grand jurors. Critics contend that grand jurors do not know how to conduct interviews to obtain relevant information or draft meaningful

192. Memorandum from Jeanne Benvenuti, associate director, Institute for Administrative Justice, to Michael Vitiello (Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with author, Michael Vitiello) [hereinafter Benvenuti Memo]. See memo and accompanying training literature in Appendix A.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See Fait Interview, supra note 191.
Grand jurors sometimes concur that they feel inept when they first begin their term, and that they spend six months trying to learn basic techniques for conducting a meaningful interview or examining a witness. These kinds of skills are routinely taught in programs similar to those at the IAJ.

Unlike current training available for grand jurors, a well-funded program would train grand jurors to conduct interviews, examine witnesses, and write their reports through extensive simulation. Modeled on the successful formula of the IAJ, a program could adapt existing investigations conducted by grand juries, build mock case files by "cleansing" them to maintain privacy, have participants in training conduct mock interviews and write sections of grand jury reports, followed by detailed feedback from professional trainers.

Such a program would be expensive to run. Providing training for every grand juror statewide would cost over a million dollars a year. That is based on the following calculation: with about 19 grand jurors in each of 58 counties, about 1100 people serve as grand jurors each year. IAJ training costs $1500-2000 for a two-week training session. On the assumption that a one-week training session would be adequate, and would cost approximately $1000 per participant, the total cost would be about $1.1 million. That sum would not include any additional costs, like housing grand jurors if training sessions required travel away from home.

Many counties cannot afford to support such a program, and much is at stake. This section of the Report has argued that the civil oversight function of the grand jury is important and, if

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204. See id.
205. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 78-82.
206. See Benvenuti Memo, supra note 192.
207. See Fait Interview, supra note 191.
208. Budget information was requested from representative counties throughout the state. Based upon the information provided, the average budget for three representative counties is as follows: for counties with populations under 10,000 people—approximately $5000; for counties with populations between 10,001 and 100,000 people—approximately $30,000; and for counties with populations over 100,001—approximately $400,000. Thus, most counties cannot afford to spend several thousand dollars each year to train a new grand jury.
exercised wisely, provides significant public benefits at a remarkably low cost to the public.\textsuperscript{209} It has also recognized some of the inadequacies in the system, specifically relating to the limited time that grand jurors serve, the learning curve that prevents grand jurors from maximizing the time that they do serve, and the lack of technical expertise in conducting interviews and drafting reports. In other words, a central finding of this Report is that while California should retain civil grand juries, it has the opportunity to improve the system.

Rather than proposing that the legislature pick up the tab for training grand jurors statewide, this Report urges that the state pay for a pilot program. Specifically, it would fund a training program along the lines of the one described above. The training organization accepting the funding would also be responsible for creating and conducting a test to measure the success of the pilot program.

For example, the program might involve training for grand jurors in several selected counties. The program might also identify similar counties (in size, education, and income levels of its residents) for which training would not be provided. At the end of the year, the organization would set up objective testing procedures to determine whether the grand juries provided with training performed more effectively than did those without training. After completion of the pilot program, the legislature should revisit whether grand jurors have benefited by training, and whether expansion of the training program is justified by those added benefits.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{209} For example, Fresno County allocates approximately five cents per capita to the grand jury. \textit{See Fresno County, Fresno County Budget: Fiscal Year 1999-2000} (2000). Humboldt County, which allocates the most money per capita to the grand jury, only allocates thirty-one cents per capita. \textit{See Humboldt County, Humboldt County Budget: Fiscal Year 1999-2000} (2000).

\textsuperscript{210} Some critics of the grand jury system have proposed an alternative, the creation of an agency along the lines of the Little Hoover Commission, which would investigate local government. \textit{See Roundtable, supra} note 12, at 5-8. By comparison even to fully funded training for all grand jurors, such an agency would cost far more than the proposal in this Report. It would also lack one of the primary advantages of the grand jury system. The grand jury system is unique in its involvement of ordinary citizens who may come forward without being nominated or otherwise selected by those already involved in the political process. They provide fresh blood and because they
III. CRIMINAL GRAND JURY

A. Introduction

As noted above, Governor Gray Davis vetoed A.B. 527, a bill authored by Assemblyman Scott Baugh. In his October 9, 1999, veto message, Davis stated that in light of the long, "unchanged" operation of the grand jury, "any major departures from existing practice warrants thorough and thoughtful consideration and debate within the legal community and among legal scholars." This study was conducted in response to the governor’s veto message.

This section of the report concerns A.B. 527. It first discusses the events that gave rise to A.B. 527. It then discusses the changes that A.B. 527 would have made in current grand jury practice. It canvasses possible constitutional arguments relevant to representation before the grand jury. Concluding that the Constitution does not compel a right to counsel, it then reviews arguments in favor of adopting such a bill despite the absence of constitutional requirements that such a bill be adopted. This section then examines the law in other states. Thereafter, it addresses the arguments made by opponents of creating a grand jury target’s right to have counsel during the target’s appearance before the grand jury. Finally, this Report makes a recommendation with regard to A.B. 527.

are not beholden to anyone in the system, as would be members of an agency, they may be freer from political influence.


212. At a panel discussion held at McGeorge School of Law, a representative of the California District Attorney’s Association argued that since there is no requirement that witnesses be accompanied by attorneys when testifying before the grand jury, the bill should not be adopted. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 22-23. This argument falls short, however, because there are many statutorily granted rights which expand upon the minimum required by the Constitution. For example, in California, Section 939.71 of the Penal Code requires prosecutors to present any exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, which is not constitutionally mandated. Hence, the question should be whether any proposed changes to the grand jury system are based on sound policy.
B. People v. Scott Baugh

As widely reported in the media, A.B. 527 was a product of a political dispute between Orange County District Attorney Michael Capizzi and Assemblyman Scott Baugh. In 1996, Capizzi notified Baugh that he was a target of the grand jury, and invited him to appear before it. On advice of counsel, Baugh declined the invitation. The grand jury indicted him for “four felony and [eighteen] misdemeanor counts of falsifying campaign records during a special election in 1995.”

An Orange County superior court judge dismissed most of those initial charges because the prosecutor failed to introduce potentially exculpatory evidence. Thereafter, Capizzi re-filed charges against Baugh. A judge eventually removed the Orange County District Attorney’s Office from the case, leaving the case in the hands of the attorney general. Attorney General Bill Lockyer forwarded the matter to the Fair Political Practices Commission. In July of 1999, “Scott Baugh agreed [] to pay a civil fine of $47,900 for nine violations of the state Political Reform Act . . . .”

Undoubtedly, Baugh’s personal experience with the grand jury has led to his interest in reform. In 1997, Baugh introduced a bill, eventually enacted as California Penal Code section 939.71, requiring prosecutors to inform grand jurors of any exculpatory evidence of which they are aware at the time of the grand jury

213. See Granberry, supra note 6.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
218. Id.
220. Orange County District Attorney Michael Capizzi has been quoted as saying that Baugh’s motive for proposing this grand jury reform bill “is obvious without comment from me — and that’s my comment.” Granberry, supra note 6. Although Baugh’s experiences before the grand jury may have sparked his interest in reform, it may not be fair to characterize the bill as being personally motivated, and having no value to the citizens of California. It is hardly uncommon for legislators to champion issues with which they have had personal experience. State Senator John Burton is quoted as saying that “[i]t takes somebody who’s been bitten by a mad dog to understand the nature of rabies . . . .” Id. Therefore, because of Baugh’s unique experience, he may be the right person to champion this cause. See id.
proceedings.\textsuperscript{221} A.B. 527 goes further and would require, most importantly, that a target of a grand jury investigation be given a right to have counsel present when the target is called to testify.\textsuperscript{222}

California currently does not recognize such a right. Consistent with historical practice, a majority of states, and the federal system, California allows only witnesses, prosecutors, court reporters, and, when necessary, translators, to appear before grand jurors.\textsuperscript{223} A.B. 527 would have changed the law.

A.B. 527 contained a number of key provisions. Most importantly, it provided that, if a witness was "the subject of a grand jury investigation... [t]he witness may have an attorney present during the grand jury examination."\textsuperscript{224} In addition, expanding on section 939.71 of the California Penal Code,\textsuperscript{225} A.B. 527 would have allowed the target of the grand jury to submit exculpatory evidence in writing for consideration by the grand jury.\textsuperscript{226}

The bill also included a number of exceptions to the rights created in section one of the bill. For example, amended section 939.2(b)(2)(C) provided that a witness who became a subject of the investigation only after that witness testified would not have a right to complain that he or she lacked a right to counsel during his or her appearance before the grand jury.\textsuperscript{227} Subsection 939.2(b)(2)(D) created a requirement that the prosecutor obtain a waiver of the notice of status as a target and right to counsel from the supervising judge in cases where notice created "undue risk or danger to other

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{See} Hill-Holtzman, \textit{supra} note 8.

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{See} A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (proposing to add § 939.22(a) to the California Penal Code).


\textsuperscript{224} A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (proposing to amend CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 939, 939.2, and to add § 939.22 to the Code). The right to have counsel present while testifying before the grand jury shall not apply if "[a] corporation is the subject of the investigation and the witness is an employee or officer of the corporation and the witness is not the subject of the grand jury investigation." \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{225} Section 939.71 requires the prosecutor to inform the grand jury of any exculpatory evidence of which he or she is aware. Once the prosecutor has informed the grand jury of the existence of such evidence, the grand jury has the option of hearing or not hearing the evidence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.71(a) (West Supp. 2001).

\textsuperscript{226} A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (proposing to add § 939.22(c) to the California Penal Code).

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{See} \textit{id.} (proposing to amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2(b)(2)(C)).
persons or reasonable possibility of destruction of evidence, or . . . strong suspicion of flight of the witness."228

A.B. 527 limited the role of counsel who chose to appear along with the target witness. Specifically, counsel would not have been allowed to object to questions asked of the witness "or otherwise speak to the grand jury . . . ."229 Instead, counsel's role was limited to advising "the witness during the course of the examination."230 Among other limitations, counsel or counsel's law firm would have been allowed to represent only one person appearing before that grand jury.231 Counsel violating any of the limitations in the bill would have been subject to sanctions.232

Subsection 939.22(e) stated "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to grant a witness a constitutional right to counsel under the United States or California Constitutions nor grant any right to discovery for the subpoenaed witness."233 The intent of the first part of subsection (e) was, apparently, to prevent a court from concluding that the grand jury is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding—a stage at which the state might have to provide court appointed counsel consistent with the Sixth Amendment. As discussed below, such a provision would be unavailing on a court trying to decide whether such a right exists as a matter of constitutional law.

228. Id. (proposing to amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2(b)(2)(D)).
229. Id. (proposing to add § 939.22(a)(1) to the California Penal Code).
230. Id. Presumably, the witness would have to indicate a need for advice, in light of the fact that counsel could not otherwise interrupt the questioning.
231. As stated by Assemblyman Scott Baugh, the author of A.B. 527, the goal of the bill is to "correct" the problem of the grand jury being "the only arena in the criminal justice system where a person subjected to questioning does not have the right to have their attorney present at their side during interrogation." A.B. 527 Assembly Bill — Bill Analysis for Senate Committee on Public Safety, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), at 4 [hereinafter Bill Analysis]. The means of correcting this problem is "allowing targets of a grand jury investigation to have their attorney present while testifying." Id. An additional limitation on counsel is that he or she may not disclose what was heard there. A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (proposing to add § 939.22(a)(2) to the California Penal Code).
233. Id. (proposing to add § 939.22(e) to the California Penal Code).
C. Constitutional Law

During the panel discussion held at McGeorge in June of 2000, a representative appearing for the California District Attorney’s Association argued strenuously that A.B. 527 goes well beyond constitutional requirements. That is obviously the case. Were the Supreme Court to decide that the Sixth Amendment or other constitutional guarantees require a grand jury to allow counsel to assist the witness, this Report would be rendered moot. Instead, the question is whether A.B. 527 reflects sound policy. This section reviews the Supreme Court’s constitutional case law relevant to the questions at issue. It concludes that the Constitution does not require proceedings afforded by A.B. 527. It also concludes that, were California to adopt protections like those found in A.B. 527, neither due process nor equal protection would require extending those requirements to indigent grand jury targets. That being said, a later section argues why, if California does adopt protections for grand jury targets, those protections should be afforded to all, without regard to the ability to pay.

1. Right to Miranda-style warnings

A witness before a grand jury retains the right to be free from self-incrimination. However, nothing compels a prosecutor to warn a witness, not the target of the investigation, of the right to remain silent. By contrast, whether the prosecutor or grand jury must inform a target of that right remains an open question.

In United States v. Mandujano, the Court rejected a claim that the defendant had a right to have his perjury conviction overturned because he was not given full Miranda warnings when he testified before the grand jury. While holding that the defendant could not defend against a perjury charge on that basis, it left open whether a

235. See infra Part III.C.3.
236. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.10(c) (3d ed. 2000) (discussing some difference of opinion on whether the grand jury may subpoena targets to appear before the grand jury or if a target has a right to refuse to appear).
238. See id. at 579.
target before the grand jury has a right to Miranda or similar warnings.239

In dicta, four justices argued that Miranda was inapplicable because questioning before a grand jury did not amount to the kind of custodial interrogation involved in Miranda.240 Hence, on that view, a target would not be entitled to a warning that he or she has a right to be free from self-incrimination.241 Elsewhere, a majority of the Court, also in dicta, has endorsed that view.242

Lower courts have split over whether the prosecutor must warn the target of the privilege against self-incrimination.243 The issue may not have been definitively resolved because federal prosecutors

239. See id. at 584.
240. See id. at 580-81.
241. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result, but disagreed with the reasoning. The concurrence, written by Brennan, emphasized that there is a "'coextensive[ness]' in certain circumstances of the right to counsel and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Id. at 603 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). Thus, he felt that there was clearly a Fifth Amendment right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. Together with that right may have been a right to the advice of counsel, to prevent the inadvertent or coerced waiver of that right. Because of the complex nature of asserting privilege and the ease with which it may be waived, Brennan asserted, "some guidance by counsel is required." Id. at 604.
242. While the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its Miranda holding, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), other post-Miranda decisions have narrowed its scope, underscoring the requirement of custodial interrogation. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding Miranda inapplicable to the roadside interrogation of a motorist stopped for a traffic violation, even when the officer intended to arrest the suspect); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that Miranda did not apply because the suspect was not in custody when ordered to be in his probation officer's office); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (finding that Miranda does not apply if the suspect was "invited" to the station and came there of his own will because suspect is not in "custody"); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that interrogation in the suspect's home is noncustodial and Miranda does not apply).
243. More recent rulings indicate a trend towards constitutionally requiring that Miranda warnings be given to grand jury targets. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 236, § 8.10(d). Several state courts have concluded that "the special status of a person viewed by the prosecutor as a target carries with it constitutional obligation[s] to inform that person of his right to refuse to answer on self-incrimination ground[s]." Id. at 452. Other states have not reached the issue because of statutory notification procedures, which include a Miranda-type warning. See id.
already give limited warnings to “known targets” as a matter of Justice Department policy. In addition, some states require similar warnings as a matter of state law. Still other states do not require grand jury indictments to begin criminal proceedings, avoiding the issue entirely, or do not routinely call targets before the grand jury.

Even if the target has a right to a warning, it is a warning of a right to be free from self-incrimination, not a right to counsel. Mandujano implied that an accused had no right to have counsel present in the grand jury room. Further, these cases have not held that an accused has the Miranda right to counsel to advise the accused during his or her testimony before the grand jury. Thus, it

245. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-47f(c) (West 1994); IDAHO CODE § 19-1121 (Michie 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-10a-13(4)(a) (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.120 (West 1990).
246. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“Felonies shall be prosecuted as provided by law, either by indictment or, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, by information.”); see also Roundtable, supra note 12, at 41-42 (stating that targets are infrequently called to testify before the grand jury).
247. Although the disposition of Mandujano turned on the issue of the applicability of a Miranda warning, the Court did consider the issue of right to counsel for witnesses before the grand jury. As stated by Justice Scalia in a later opinion, the Court has “twice suggested, though not held, that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach when an individual is summoned to appear before a grand jury, even if he is the subject of the investigation.” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992). This “suggestion” was made by a plurality of the Court, as two justices dissented from the proposition while two others, in separate concurring opinions, thought that the issue should not have been explored, as the case turned on another issue. See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 604 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring). The plurality opinion specifically says that the fact that counsel could not be present inside the grand jury room is “plainly a correct recital of the law.” Id. at 581. The plurality also said that because criminal proceedings had not been instituted against the defendant, “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not come into play.” Id. Brennan, in his concurrence, disagreed on the issue of whether criminal proceedings had been initiated and thus, on whether there was a constitutional right to counsel. See id. at 604 (Brennan, J., concurring).
248. While the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Miranda, the Court has also limited Miranda by narrowly defining both interrogation and custody, and by requiring a nexus between the custody and the interrogation. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-32; see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (discussing the nexus between custody and interrogation). But cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (declining to overrule Miranda on the issue of interrogation); Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 492-93 (declining to exclude confession on custodial grounds); Mathis
would appear that the *Miranda* line of cases—creating rules to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination, including a subsidiary right to counsel to assist in

v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (giving a broad reading to the term "custody").

A *Miranda* right to counsel is distinct from a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In the *Miranda* setting, counsel's role is to help the defendant protect his or her Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. See *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966). That right exists when the state seeks to interrogate the defendant in a custodial setting. See id. By contrast, a Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises only after the state has commenced formal proceedings. However, once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered, the state must provide counsel in a variety of settings, including any situation in which the state seeks to elicit information from the defendant, and at a variety of postindictment or postarraignment settings. See *Brewer v. Williams*, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); *Coleman v. Alabama*, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); *Gilbert v. California*, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967); *United States v. Wade*, 388 U.S. 218, 223-25 (1967); *Massiah v. United States*, 377 U.S. 201, 204-06 (1964).

Even federal law leaves uncertain whether the federal public defender is required to represent targets. In the federal grand jury model, counsel for the witness under investigation is excluded from the grand jury room. Federal rules allow only "[a]ttorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device... [to] be present while the jury is in session." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) 1. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994), a court need not provide representation for financially eligible grand jury witnesses. The statute requires that "[r]epresentation shall be provided for any financially eligible person who... is entitled to appointment of counsel under the [S]ixth [A]mendment to the Constitution." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(H) (1994). However, "the fact that a person is the subject of... [a grand jury] investigation is not enough to trigger his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." United States v. Soto, 574 F. Supp. 986, 990 (D. Conn. 1983) (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982)). As the court found no such entitlement, section 3006A is not triggered when a witness must appear before a federal grand jury. However, most federal jurisdictions do allow consultation between the witness and his or her attorney outside the grand jury room. See F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY ROTHBLATT, DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES 50-51 (2d ed. 1984). While court appointment of counsel of financially eligible witnesses is not required, some districts make routine appointments once an eligible witness receives a target letter. In other districts, witnesses generally interview with the Public Defender's Office to determine whether counsel should be appointed. The major factor in such a determination is whether the witness is in fact a target or whether the scope of the investigation will make the witness a target. See Telephone Interview by Amelia Burroughs with Jeff Staniels, deputy public defender, Federal Public Defender's Office (June 13, 2000) [hereinafter Staniels Interview].
protecting that right—does not create a right to counsel in the grand jury setting.

2. Right to counsel in the grand jury room

In Mandujano, the Court implied that even a target of the grand jury does not have a right to have counsel present in the grand jury room. Insofar as the Court would rely on historical practice in interpreting grand jury practice, the Court is unlikely to find such a right to have counsel present.

Current practice in the federal system demonstrates a strange tension. A target has a right to consult with counsel necessary to protect the target's privilege to be free from self-incrimination. However, the target does not have the right to have counsel present in the grand jury proceedings during questioning of the target. To assure that the target does not waive his or her Fifth Amendment right, counsel for a grand jury target who agrees to testify must wait in the hallway outside the grand jury room. Periodically, the target leaves the grand jury room to consult with counsel.

In 1982, the American Bar Association (ABA) published the Grand Jury Policy and Model Act. After identifying some of the problems with the grand jury, it noted that during the several years

249. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 564.
250. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 49 (finding that because the grand jury has historically been "functionally independent" from the judicial branch, "certain constitutional protections afforded defendants in criminal proceedings have no application before" the grand jury); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974) (stating that a grand jury investigation is an ex parte investigation which should not be "saddled" with procedures that would frustrate that purpose); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 449 (1960) (stating that procedural rights claimed by petitioners did not apply to "grand jury hearings because of the disruptive influence their injection would have" and because the grand jury's role is to investigate, not to try).
251. See BAILEY & ROTHBLATT, supra note 248, at 50.
252. See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 581.
253. In one federal case, "a witness was excused 1,203 times to consult with his attorney outside the grand jury room." Mary Emma Hixson, Bringing Down the Curtain on the Absurd Drama of Entrances and Exits—Witness Representation in the Grand Jury Room, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 328 (1978).
that the subject of grand jury reform was before the ABA, numerous states adopted various reform measures. By the time of its 1982 report, fifteen states allowed counsel in the grand jury room. Indeed, the first principle in its report was "[t]he hotly-contested question of allowing counsel in the grand jury room ... [that] was approved by the House [of Delegates] by a two-to-one margin—196 to 83—despite substantial opposition voiced by the U.S. Department of Justice."

The laws applicable in other states are reviewed below. Here, it is worth noting that although there is no constitutional right to have counsel present in the grand jury room, a number of states have extended that right as a matter of sound procedural reform to prevent perceived grand jury abuse.

3. Right to court-appointed counsel

A.B. 527 included a provision, section 939.22(d), providing that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to grant a witness a constitutional right to counsel under the United States or California Constitutions." While that provision is simply not binding on a court's interpretation of the Constitution, an indigent target almost certainly has no right to court-appointed counsel under the Supreme Court's current case law and would not have such a right even if A.B. 527 became law.

a. Critical stages and court-appointed counsel

In 1963, the Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright, held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires a state to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony. In

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255. See id.
256. See id. at 2.
257. Id. at 1.
258. See id. at 1-2.
260. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the right to judicial review of legislation and that the Supreme Court is the final authority on the meaning of the Constitution).
261. If California does extend the right to counsel to targets before the grand jury, it should also provide appointed counsel to indigent defendants. See infra Part III.G.
263. See id. at 344-45; see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37
subsequent cases, the Court had to determine when that right began. The right to court-appointed counsel applies only if the proceeding is a "critical stage" in the criminal prosecution.264

During the two-day session at McGeorge, one of the participants raised the question of whether a grand jury proceeding might become a critical stage if counsel were allowed in the grand jury room, thereby requiring court-appointed counsel.265 That does not appear to be the case.

The argument that the proceeding would be a critical stage finds support in part of the Court's test to determine if counsel must be appointed. For example, the Court has required appointment of counsel at a preliminary hearing,266 at some pretrial identification procedures,267 and, depending on state procedure, at the first appearance before a magistrate or at the arraignment.268 The Court required counsel in these settings because the defendant's "substantial rights may be affected" in the proceeding under consideration.269 Quite obviously, a target's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be affected if he or she lacks counsel to advise the target when to refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions.

However, that ignores the second part of the Court's test for determining whether a particular stage is a critical one. Counsel must be appointed only if the proceeding is part of a criminal prosecution.270 For example, the Court has made it clear that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not triggered when police detain a suspect, even if the prosecutor intends to bring formal

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265. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 40-41.
266. See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 7-10.
267. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 239-42.
268. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961). In Hamilton, the Court found the arraignment to be a critical stage, necessitating appointed counsel because under Alabama law, defenses not raised at the arraignment were waived for trial. See id. Because of this possible prejudice at trial to those defendants unable to afford attorneys at the arraignment, the Court found this to be a critical stage. See id.
270. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 236, § 11.2(b).
charges against the defendant.\textsuperscript{271} In \textit{Brewer v. Williams}, the Court stated:

The right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him—"whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."\textsuperscript{272} That is, until a suspect is indicted, the investigation has not demonstrated the state's commitment to proceed against the defendant and remains an investigation, not a criminal proceeding.\textsuperscript{273}

\textit{b. other possible sources of a right to counsel}

In some instances, when a state creates a right for those able to pay for it, the Supreme Court has found a requirement to extend that right to indigent defendants, thereby compelling the state to pay for it.\textsuperscript{274} This section reviews whether passage of a bill like A.B. 527 would result in an obligation to provide similar assistance to indigent targets.

Apart from the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, found that equal protection (possibly in conjunction with due process) requires appointment of counsel or the provision of other resources to indigents. Indeed, prior to \textit{Gideon}, the Supreme Court found that due process may require appointment of counsel.\textsuperscript{275} The Court held that a state must appoint counsel for the subject of a

\textsuperscript{271} See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984). By contrast, only if the suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation is the suspect entitled to counsel as required by \textit{Miranda}. But here, the right to counsel is part of the protective or prophylactic rights developed in \textit{Miranda} to protect the suspect's Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. \textit{See Dickerson}, 530 U.S. at 440.

\textsuperscript{272} 430 U.S. at 398 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).

\textsuperscript{273} At least one state court has rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to the grand jury. \textit{See Sheriff v. Bright}, 835 P.2d 782, 783 (Nev. 1992). The Nevada Supreme Court, analyzing a statute similar to A.B. 527, found the language regarding counsel inside the grand jury room to be permissive, which would not require the state to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. \textit{See id}. In other words, the right to have counsel was not constitutionally derived.

\textsuperscript{274} See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).

\textsuperscript{275} \textit{See Powell}, 287 U.S. at 68-70.
probation or parole hearing depending on the circumstances of the case. That is, the Court refused to draw a bright line for when counsel must be appointed. Instead, counsel must be appointed when it is necessary to assure that a hearing is effective.

In Douglas v. California, the Court recognized that a state does not have to create an appeal of right, but held nonetheless that once a state does create an appeal of right, equal protection requires that the state afford indigent appellants court-appointed counsel.

In Evitts v. Lucey, the appellant’s retained counsel failed to comply with state appellate rules of procedure, resulting in dismissal of his appeal. The Supreme Court held that due process includes a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal even if the state may dispense with the right to appeal entirely. Once it creates an appeal of right as “an integral part of the... system for... adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,”... the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.

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278. See id. at 356-68. In Douglas, the Court reaffirmed an earlier decision holding that once a state has decided to give a right to appeal to criminal defendants, that appeal must be administered in such a way that there is equal access to this right. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18-19. The Court stated that if a state “has a general policy of allowing criminal appeals, it cannot make lack of means an effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity.” Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, the state has a constitutional obligation to provide counsel for indigents in appeals, even though there is no constitutional obligation to provide the appeal at all. See also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894), for the proposition that the state does not have to create a right to review.
280. See id. at 389-91. This case did not turn on equal protection grounds as the defendant was represented by counsel. The Douglas line of cases involved indigent defendants entitled to treatment similar to those able to pay.
281. See id. at 393-97.
282. Id. (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18); see also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499-500 (1963) (“invalidating state procedure providing for free transcript only for a defendant who could satisfy the trial judge that his appeal was not frivolous”); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (“invalidating procedure whereby meaningful appeal was possible only if [the] public defender requested a transcript”); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 253-58 (1959) (“invalidating state requirement that indigent defendants pay fee before
Were California to recognize the right of a person able to afford counsel to have his or her attorney in the grand jury room, an indigent target might argue that the *Douglas-Evitts* line of cases requires court-appointed counsel. That conclusion is probably wrong.

Subsequent cases have limited *Douglas*. Even in *Douglas*, the Court insisted that it was not requiring "[a]bsolute equality." It also insisted that, without counsel, the appeal of right would amount to a "meaningless ritual." Thereafter, the Court made clear that absolute equality was not required when it held that the state was under no obligation to appoint counsel for indigents seeking discretionary review. The Court found that neither due process nor equal protection was offended. Due process would be violated "only if indigents are singled out... and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty." Equal protection was not violated even though counsel's assistance may be helpful in the "somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review." That was so because the state has no duty "to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process."

Read together, *Evitts*, *Douglas*, and *Ross* suggest that due process and equal protection require appointment of counsel only when a lack of counsel renders the appeal—or presumably other procedures except those that are part of the criminal proceedings where Sixth Amendment rights exist—meaningless rituals. They also suggest that extending a right to have counsel present in the

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283. 372 U.S. at 357.
284. *Id.* at 358.
286. *See id.*
287. *Id.* at 611.
288. *Id.* at 616.
289. *Id.*
grand jury room does not create an obligation to appoint counsel for indigent targets. That is so because an appearance before the grand jury is unlike a hearing or an appeal where the indigent cannot "go it alone." For years, witnesses before the grand jury have "gone it alone," without aid of counsel. At this late date, one cannot argue that the unrepresented witness is so outmatched to implicate notions of fundamental fairness. Further, unlike the appeal and trial, a grand jury determination is not an integral part of the system to determine guilt or innocence. It is merely a determination of probable cause that the defendant committed a crime. Guilt or innocence will be determined at trial with the full panoply of rights, including the right to counsel.

As developed below, however, even if the Constitution does not require appointment of counsel, sound policy dictates that the state make counsel available if it does so for those who can afford counsel.

D. The Arguments in Support of A.B. 527

According to Assemblyman Scott Baugh:
The grand jury is the only arena in the criminal justice system where a person subjected to questioning does not have the right to have their attorney present during interrogation. A.B. 527 seeks to correct this situation by allowing targets of a grand jury investigation to have their attorney present while testifying.

Despite the suggestion that Baugh is attempting to change the law based only on his bad experience with the system, A.B. 527 is neither novel nor radical. Baugh's experience may explain his
interest in the subject matter, but concern over grand jury excess and lack of independence from prosecutors is long standing.

Over twenty years ago, the ABA began its study of the grand jury that led to its Model Act. The ABA was interested in restoring the grand jury's "protective" function. The ABA addressed several problems with the grand jury. The grand jury lacks sufficient procedural safeguards. A unique body in our judicial system, it possesses "awesome powers." Specifically, it works in secret and has "virtually unlimited subpoena powers," as "[i]t can question witnesses without their lawyer present." Further, it works without judicial supervision. It can punish contempt by having a recalcitrant witness jailed without trial. Despite early faith in the grand jury as a shield, it is now

a fundamental change in how grand juries conduct inquiries. Supporters of the bill would argue that the proposed change is hardly "fundamental."

299. Criticisms of the grand jury go back further. See, e.g., Wayne L. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REV. 101, 101 (1931) (noting the criticism that the grand jury was a "rubber stamp for the district attorney").

300. ABA REPORT, supra note 254, at 1. Some scholars suggest the inception of the grand jury was for the purpose of protecting the citizens of England from an oppressive monarchical government. See Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 703 (1971). Other scholars propose that the grand jury was essentially the king's tool for indicting his enemies. See id.; see also Kadish, supra note 15, at 5-9 (noting that King Henry II established a system of twelve informers to inform him of those suspected of committing crimes); Schiappa, supra note 1, at 326 (discussing King Henry II's creation of the Assize of Clarendon, which essentially "acted as an administrative agency to execute the King's laws and political ends"). Undoubtedly, at various times in our history, it has served as a shield against governmental overreaching.

301. See ABA REPORT, supra note 254, at 1.

302. Id.

303. Id.

304. See id.

305. See id. Holding a recalcitrant witness in civil contempt is used to coerce such a witness to comply with a subpoena.

The witness is sentenced to imprisonment or to a fine (which may increase daily), but he may purge himself by complying with the subpoena... [if he] refuses to purge himself [he] will remain under sentence until the grand jury completes its term and is discharged. Moreover, if the information that the contemnor possesses is still needed, he may be subpoenaed by a successor grand jury and again held in contempt if he continues to refuse to supply that information.

LAFAYE ET AL., supra note 236, § 8.3(a) n.1. In its report, the ABA attempted
viewed as a “tool” of the prosecution. The ABA report noted increasing concern among business leaders and the Bar about the sweeping powers of the grand jury.\textsuperscript{306}

After several years of studying the grand jury, the ABA recommended several reforms quite similar to those found in A.B. 527 and earlier California legislation. Those recommendations are summarized below.\textsuperscript{307} The ABA's first principle, adopted by a two-to-one margin, is broader than A.B. 527. It provides, in relevant part, that “a witness before the grand jury shall have the right to be accompanied by counsel in his or her appearance before the grand jury.”\textsuperscript{308} That is, it applies to any witness, not merely to a target. Like A.B. 527, Principle One allowed counsel only to advise the target, and to play no other role in the process.\textsuperscript{309}

In its Commentary, the ABA observed that the limited role of counsel prevents the grand jury from becoming a “mini-trial.”\textsuperscript{310} However, providing counsel addresses concerns about the unfairness of disallowing a person access to counsel. The common practice of allowing the witness to interrupt the proceedings to consult outside the grand jury room is “awkward and prejudicial”: “[i]t to lessen the blow to recalcitrant witnesses by recommending a “cap” on the length of time such witnesses may be confined. See ABA REPORT, supra note 254, at 5.

306. In recent years, the grand jury has been used increasingly by prosecutors as an investigatory “tool.” See ABA REPORT, supra note 254, at 1. In the past, charges of unfair use of the grand jury were made by “radical groups and the criminal defense community,” but now business leaders are making such charges. Id. Corporations such as General Motors and Braniff Airways, both the subjects of federal grand jury investigations, “have criticized the uses to which the grand jury is put.” Id. In addition, there have been “a series of congressional hearings over the past several Congresses” which have “exposed numerous abuses” and suggested numerous “potential reforms.” Id.

307. In its report, the ABA recommended that witnesses before the grand jury “have the right to be accompanied by counsel” and that such counsel be “allowed to be present in the grand jury room.” Id. at 4. The ABA includes the recommendation that the role of counsel be limited to advising the witness and that counsel “not be permitted to address the grand jurors.” Id. The ABA also recommends that targets of grand jury investigations be notified that they are “possible indictees.” Id. The ABA provides for court-imposed sanctions against attorneys who fail to adhere to the procedural rules of the grand jury. See id. at 5.

308. Id. at 4.

309. See id. at 6.

310. Id.
unnecessarily prolongs the grand jury proceedings and places the witness in an unfavorable light before the grand jurors. The American Law Institute (ALI) has called the grand jury system a "degrading and irrational" procedure.

Even before the ABA recommended extending the right to have counsel present in the grand jury room, the ALI made a similar recommendation. Among other arguments favoring the right to have counsel present in the grand jury room, it expressed concern that without counsel, a witness risked waiving the privilege against self-incrimination for refusing to answer, and being held in contempt. It is difficult to imagine that prosecutors need to place citizens in such an untenable dilemma.

E. Grand Jury Reform in Other States

By 1982, according to the ABA, fifteen states allowed counsel to be present in the grand jury room when the attorney's client was testifying. There are now at least twenty states that recognize the right to have counsel present. This section compares A.B. 527 to those statutes, concluding that A.B. 527 would have made a modest change in the law and would have brought California within a significant minority of states that have recognized the right of a person to have counsel present during that witness's testimony.

Statutes in the states that have reformed their grand jury practice vary considerably. However, some common features allow comparison.

311. Id.
312. Id. The ABA Report also discusses the added problems with the current system of consulting with attorneys outside the grand jury room. In one case, a federal prosecutor was free to bring up at trial the fact that the defendant had left the grand jury room to consult with counsel as relevant to perjury charges. See United States v. Kopel, 552 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1977). Another court allowed a limit to be placed on the number of times that a witness could leave the grand jury room to consult with counsel. See In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972). If counsel were allowed inside the grand jury room, these situations would disappear.
313. See ABA REPORT, supra note 254, at 6.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 2.
316. The states are listed in Appendix A.
1. Target or any witness

Unlike A.B. 527, sixteen of the states that have reformed their grand jury practice allow counsel to be present when any witness testifies. The four states that limit representation to "targets" define that term differently. However, a survey of reported case law in those jurisdictions found no case law in which the issue was litigated, suggesting that drawing a line between targets and witnesses who are not targets has not caused significant problems.

Rather than calling for radical reform, A.B. 527 proposed a modest change in the law, limited to targets called before the grand jury. Further, rather than creating problems for prosecutors who realize after a witness testifies that the witness may be indicted, A.B. 527 protects prosecutors from second-guessing themselves in such cases.

317. See id.; see also ABA REPORT, supra note 254, at 2.

318. The definitions of those entitled to be accompanied by counsel range from simply "target," IND. CODE ANN. § 35-34-2-5.5 (Michie 1998) and LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 433(2) (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); to "[t]he person under investigation," ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-412 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000); to "[a] person whose indictment the district attorney intends to seek or the grand jury on its own motion intends to return," NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 172.239(1) (Michie 2001).

319. The annotated statutes regarding grand juries for each state and a lengthy search of each state's case law on the subject produced no results to indicate that those states that allow counsel inside the grand jury room have had any problems.

A couple of states which do allow for counsel to be present inside the grand jury room impose a special limitation: counsel is only allowed inside the grand jury room if immunity has not been granted. See IDAHO CODE § 19-1121 (Michie 1997); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.52(1) (McKinney 1993 & West Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.120 (West 1990). The logic behind these provisions may be that if a witness has been granted immunity, then the need to have counsel present to preserve rights and privileges is lessened. In those instances in which immunity has been granted, and counsel is not allowed inside the grand jury room, the procedures revert to the old system where witnesses must consult with their attorneys outside the grand jury room.


321. See id. (proposing to amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2 by adding subsection (b)(2)(C)), to read that the section allowing for the presence of counsel shall not apply if "[t]he prosecutor determines during the grand jury hearing that a previous witness has become the subject of the grand jury investigation"). However, there may still be room for second-guessing whether the witness was entitled to representation in terms of when the
2. Counsel's role in the grand jury room

Critics of grand jury reform are legitimately concerned about grand jury investigations becoming mini-trials. The essential investigatory function of the grand jury would then become impaired, as would grand jury secrecy. As a result, A.B. 527, like the overwhelming majority of states that have reformed grand jury practices, would have severely limited the role of counsel when counsel is before the grand jury.

Only one of the twenty states that allow counsel to be present does not limit counsel's role. The remaining nineteen states vary in terminology. For example, some statutes state simply that counsel "shall not participate" in the proceedings. Others state "counsel may not communicate with anyone other than his client." Still others are more specific in that counsel "shall not make objections, arguments, or address the grand jury." The most explicit statute states that counsel shall not "[s]peak in such a manner as to be heard by [other] members of the grand jury." That is, most of the statutes limit the role of counsel consistent with the underlying justification for counsel's presence: advising the client in order to protect the client's rights. As with the line between target and

prosecutor knew that the witness was a target or possible target. To eliminate this problem, it may be desirable to include that the determination of whether a witness was a target entitled to counsel be made using an objective standard, such as what the "reasonable prosecutor" would have thought.

322. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 23.
323. See id.
325. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/112-4.1 (West 1992); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.52(2) (McKinney 1993 & West Supp. 2001) ("The attorney ... may not ... take any part in the proceeding.").
327. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4)(d) (Bradford 1986 & Supp. 1996); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.17(2) (West 2001) ("The attorney ... shall not be permitted to address the grand jurors, raise objections, [or] make arguments.").
328. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 172.239(2) (Michie 2001).
329. One unique state provision allows the attorney to participate in the proceedings—making objections or arguments and questioning witnesses—only with the permission of the foreman of the grand jury and the prosecutor. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-34-2-5.5(b)(2) (Michie 1998). Another state allows counsel to make objections on his or her client's behalf, but does not allow counsel to question any witness. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3009(2) (1995). Additionally, there are two states that are silent on the issue of what sort of role
witness, the role of counsel before the grand jury has produced no reported cases. Thus, this also suggests that the statutes have not been difficult to administer.\textsuperscript{330}

A.B. 527 was explicit in the limited role that counsel played in the grand jury room. Counsel could neither object nor speak to the grand jury.\textsuperscript{331} Counsel’s role was limited to advising the client.\textsuperscript{332}

3. Sanctions

Unlike A.B. 527, most statutes fail to address sanctions if counsel violates the limited role defined in the statute. Those states that address the problem include provisions for removal of counsel who fail to comply with their statutory role.\textsuperscript{333} Some provide for an \textit{in camera} hearing before the presiding judge to determine whether removal is proper.\textsuperscript{334}

A.B. 527 provides that “[t]he prosecuting attorney may make a motion to the presiding judge for sanctions against counsel who is representing a witness pursuant to subdivision (a) for any violation of this section and refer the violation to the State Bar of California.”\textsuperscript{335}

Although not elaborated in the analysis of the bill, section 939.22(d)

the attorney for the witness is to take once inside the grand jury room. \textit{See} OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 340 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000); \textit{UTAH CODE ANN.} § 77-10a-13 (1999).

330. A significant amount of satellite litigation about the role of counsel would be one factor weighing against reform. That is so because extensive litigation would burden the process and frustrate legitimate law enforcement goals of timely indictments of criminal defendants and the public interest in efficient administration of justice. By contrast, the fact that there is an absence of significant cases where counsel has overstepped his or her bounds in the grand jury room suggests that fears of disruption of the grand jury process are unfounded. Again, a search of the annotated statutes for each state and the case law failed to turn up any such cases.


332. \textit{See} id.


apparently would have allowed a number of sanctions, including a finding of contempt or financial sanctions.  

4. Multiple representation

Concern has been expressed that allowing counsel before the grand jury poses a special problem in cases involving multiple attorneys representing the same target. Multiple representation may make the grand jury’s job of uncovering evidence more difficult because the target, in effect, will have an “ear” in the grand jury room when other witnesses are examined. A related argument is that the attorney is able to listen to examination of multiple witnesses, and thus, will learn what the grand jury is investigating more fully.  

To prevent obstruction of justice, some of the statutes provide that counsel may not represent multiple witnesses in the same investigation. Similarly, A.B. 527 made explicit the prohibition against multiple representation.  

336. Only a few jurisdictions explicitly require the attorney appearing with the witness to take an oath of secrecy. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-204(4)(d) (Bradford 1986 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-34-2-5.5(b)(1) (Michie 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1411(2) (Michie 1995). A.B. 527 does not address the secrecy issue.  

337. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 35-36.  

338. Id.  

339. See id. at 29.  


341. Most states are very vague on the issue of multiple representation and do not say much more than that no law firm shall represent more than one witness in the same proceeding. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.17(2) (West 2001). There is very little guidance as to how the provisions are to be applied. Wisconsin has a very specific statute, which provides that the prosecuting attorney, attorney for a witness, or any grand juror may file a motion with the presiding judge to have an attorney removed because of a conflict of interest due to representation of multiple witnesses. After such a motion is made, a hearing will be held with “the burden upon the moving party to establish the conflict.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.45(1) (West 1998). No such provision is included in A.B. 527, which leaves the determination of when counsel for a witness should be dismissed difficult to administer. A blanket rule against multiple representation may be unconstitutional. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel, and the defendant’s choice of counsel should not be unnecessarily obstructed. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 350
Rather than creating a fundamental change in grand jury procedure, A.B. 527 was a measured response to a serious problem. The proposed legislation was more cautious and drew brighter lines favoring prosecutors than similar legislation in other states. The perceived harm that gave rise to A.B. 527 was the fear that an uninformed target would inadvertently waive essential rights without advice of counsel, or refuse to testify entirely because of fear of appearing without guidance in the grand jury room. A.B. 527 would have granted a target a right to have counsel present, but carefully circumscribed counsel’s role in the grand jury room.

F. Criticism of A.B. 527 and Responses to That Criticism

A representative of the California District Attorneys Association attended the June 1-2, 2000 information gathering sessions at McGeorge School of Law. In addition, various organizations, including the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, stated their objections to A.B. 527 as it went through the legislature. Some additional objections were quoted in news stories about the proposed legislation. The criticisms are several, but none seem sufficient to reject the limited reform proposed in A.B. 527.

1. Mini-trials

A number of organizations have objected that the addition of counsel will turn the grand jury proceeding into a mini-trial. For example, the Grand Jurors Association of Orange County stated in its opposition to A.B. 527, “the proceedings of the Grand Jury would be virtually destroyed by allowing frequent interruptions with no judge

(7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1969). But a defendant does not have the right to choose a particular attorney. See United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 1977). In 1978, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a state statute prohibiting all multiple representation in grand jury proceedings. See People ex rel. Losavio v. J. L., 580 P.2d 23, 28 (Colo. 1978); see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1979) (holding that there must be a case-by-case evaluation of the competing interests of the court, of the defendant, and of justice when determining whether to deny a defendant counsel of choice). In Wheat, the defendant indicated that he was willing to waive his right to “conflict-free” counsel, but the court still exercised its discretion to require the defendant to seek other counsel. Id.

342. See Hill-Holtzman, supra note 8, at B5.
343. See Bill Analysis, supra note 231, at 4.
present to control such discussions/interruptions.\textsuperscript{344} The Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office voiced similar concern about restricting improper conduct by defense attorneys.\textsuperscript{345} A deputy director of the California District Attorneys Association was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as saying, “[w]e do not think it’s appropriate to turn grand jury [proceedings] into trials.”\textsuperscript{346}

In its report, the ABA addressed the concern about converting grand jury proceedings into mini-trials: the limited role that counsel may play “will preclude the grand jury’s becoming a ‘mini-trial.’”\textsuperscript{347} Under A.B. 527, similar to Principle One in the ABA report, counsel’s role was limited to giving advice to the client.\textsuperscript{348} Objections or otherwise addressing the grand jury were explicitly disallowed.\textsuperscript{349}

A.B. 527 and other similar legislation recognized that counsel might violate the limited role permitted under the statute.\textsuperscript{350} However, A.B. 527 also provided for sanctions, presumably including sanctions such as being held in contempt of court or fined for violating the rules.\textsuperscript{351} In addition, the absence of reported cases in jurisdictions that have adopted similar measures suggests that the threat of attorney misconduct is overstated.\textsuperscript{352}

Opponents of grand jury reform may be concerned that counsel will advise the target not to answer questions and that the prosecutor will be forced to seek a court order to compel an answer. The same problem exists today. Counsel may be outside the grand jury room and the client may interrupt the questioning to seek counsel’s advice.\textsuperscript{353} Thus, under current practice, a prosecutor who wants to challenge counsel’s advice to a target or other witness still must seek

\textsuperscript{344} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{345} \textit{See id.}
\textsuperscript{346} Hill-Holtzman, \textit{supra} note 8, at B5.
\textsuperscript{347} ABA REPORT, \textit{supra} note 254, at 6.
\textsuperscript{348} \textit{See Bill Analysis, supra} note 231, at 3.
\textsuperscript{349} \textit{See id.}
\textsuperscript{350} \textit{See A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999)} (proposing to add § 939.22(d) to the California Penal Code).
\textsuperscript{351} \textit{See id.}
\textsuperscript{352} A search of the annotated statutes for each state allowing counsel inside the grand jury room and the case law for those states did not result in a finding of any reported cases where an attorney inside the grand jury room had caused a disruption requiring significant litigation.
\textsuperscript{353} \textit{See Hixson, supra} note 253, at 334.
a court order compelling the witness to testify.\footnote{354}{See \textit{CAL. PENAL CODE} § 1324 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001).} Presence of counsel in the grand jury room will almost certainly lead to more objections.\footnote{355}{That is not a foregone conclusion. Part of the problem with the current system is that counsel may not be able to adequately advise the client because counsel has not heard an entire line of questioning and cannot make a fully informed decision whether to advise the client not to testify. \textit{See ABA REPORT}, \textit{supra} note 254, at 6. Presence in the grand jury room may lead to fewer uninformed objections.} Whatever additional inefficiency occurs is justified in light of the purpose of having counsel present in the grand jury room: counsel is there to prevent unwarranted waiver of important constitutional rights. Where the grand jury or prosecution has attempted to ask improper questions, the absence of counsel may lead the target to waive those rights. The state can make no serious claim that a procedure increasing the possibility of inadvertent waiver of constitutional rights is preferable to one that forces prosecutors, on occasion, to request a judge to make a determination whether a target’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment is proper. Thus, a bill such as A.B. 527 does not convert grand jury proceedings into mini-trials.

Further, even the marginal increase in the number of cases in which a target asserts a privilege that may be unfounded seems like a small cost to assure the protection of a target’s constitutional rights.\footnote{356}{This is further supported by the infrequency with which prosecutors apparently call targets. \textit{See Roundtable}, \textit{supra} note 12, at 40. In at least one news report, a representative of the California District Attorneys Association expressed concern that “having defense attorneys present could have a devastating impact on victims of child abuse or gang violence who, in the presence of defense attorneys, might feel squeamish about telling what happened.” \textit{Granberry}, \textit{supra} note 6, at B6. This seems to be a more emphatic version of the mini-trial argument. But the argument overlooks the fact that victims of child abuse or gang violence who testify before the grand jury would not have done so in the presence of defense counsel had A.B. 527 been enacted. That is so because counsel’s presence was limited to when the target was testifying.}

2. Obstruction of truth telling

Related to the criticism discussed above is the claim that defense counsel will frustrate the grand jury’s search for the truth. As stated in opposition to A.B. 527, the only benefit of allowing counsel in the
grand jury room is "to provide additional methods of avoiding telling the truth."

Counsel may provide benefits in addition to helping the target avoid telling the truth. Poorly framed questions may lead to confusing answers, unfairly distorting the truth. With that aside, the idea that counsel's role is merely an obstruction of justice is worthy of serious consideration.

Presumably, the obstruction of justice comes about whenever a person invokes a privilege properly or improperly. If the invocation is improper, the recourse is to seek a court order to compel an answer—that is true under the current system as well. As discussed above, had A.B. 527 been enacted, it may have led to some marginal increase in cases where prosecutors would have to seek such court orders. That conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow. Counsel may urge targets to refuse to answer more frequently than they may do so without aid of counsel. However, having counsel present may lead to more proper and fewer improper refusals to testify than under the current system. Under the current system, counsel can consult with a target before and during the target's appearance before the grand jury. Presumably, the target tries to implement counsel's advice but may improperly invoke privilege because the target lacks legal knowledge. In at least some cases, counsel's presence should eliminate some improper invocations of privilege.

What then of cases in which a target properly invokes a privilege. May such an invocation be construed as an obstruction of justice? In some nontechnical sense, yes. Every privilege has a cost: it often deprives a fact-finder from hearing the most probative evidence. When a psychiatrist or a priest may not testify about the confession of a patient or penitent who has committed a felony, the fact-finder is deprived of highly relevant evidence. Privileges exist, however, because of important countervailing policies. Hence, in some sense, proper invocation of a privilege not to testify

358. For an example of abuse of the right to leave the grand jury room and consult with counsel, see supra note 253 and accompanying text.
360. See id.
obstructs the job of the fact-finder to discover the truth. However, opponents of grand jury reform should not complain about a target invoking his or her rights: if the opponents of reform have an argument, it is with policy makers—either legislators or, in the case of the Fifth Amendment, with the drafters of the Bill of Rights.

Further, if more targets properly invoke their privileges because counsel is allowed in the grand jury room, it is hard to understand the criticism. The suggestion is that the targets that do not currently invoke their privileges fail to do so out of ignorance—A.B. 527 does not create new privileges, but simply assures that the target properly invokes any privileges available. Opponents to reform cannot seriously argue that a system that relies on uninformed targets waiving their rights is preferable to one in which the targets make informed decisions whether to testify.\textsuperscript{361}

3. Secrecy

Concern has been raised that counsel’s presence impairs grand jury secrecy. That results, or so goes the argument, in a number of different ways. Each needs to be addressed.

\textit{a. piecing together the evidence}

Under current practice, secrecy does not extend to grand jury witnesses.\textsuperscript{362} Hence, a witness may discuss his or her own testimony with an attorney. Discussing the case with one’s client reveals a great deal about the subject of the investigation.\textsuperscript{363} Despite that,

\textsuperscript{361} It is also unclear how many cases we are discussing, given that some prosecutors do not routinely call targets to testify. \textit{See} Roundtable, \textit{supra} note 12, at 40.

\textsuperscript{362} Under California law, witnesses testifying before a grand jury are given an oath of secrecy. \textit{See} 66 Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 85, 88 (1983). However, that secrecy is not absolute, as witnesses are allowed to “consult with an attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.” \textit{Id.} at 86. Thus, witnesses’ attorneys are able to hear from their clients about what happened inside the grand jury room for the purposes of giving legal advice. Allowing counsel inside the grand jury room may not expand the information coming out to the grand jury room that counsel would have heard anyway.

\textsuperscript{363} That may explain why some prosecutors are hesitant to call targets. David Harris of the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s Office, stated that targets are not often called before the grand jury. \textit{See} Roundtable, \textit{supra} note 12, at 40-41. Similar concerns may militate in favor of calling a target late in an investigation.
opponents of A.B. 527 and similar grand jury reform have argued that counsel’s presence will impair grand jury secrecy. During the discussions held at McGeorge School of Law, some participants urged that counsel would have a better understanding of the grand jury’s investigation than would an unaccompanied client.\textsuperscript{364} In other words, despite the reality that under current practice, counsel may learn a good deal about the direction of an investigation by talking to the witness, counsel’s presence in the grand jury increases that risk.\textsuperscript{365}

The increased risk of counsel learning about the direction of an investigation seems marginal at best. One must believe that the target is unable to recall useful information at all to suggest that current practice would differ significantly from the situation that would result if counsel were present during examination of the target.

This is especially true in light of statements made by Bill Larsen, the representative of the California District Attorneys Association during information gathering conducted at McGeorge. He acknowledged that at least some prosecutors seldom call grand jury targets.\textsuperscript{366} In light of that, and in light of current practice, which allows a target or other witness to communicate freely about his or her testimony, opponents’ arguments about serious impairment of grand jury secrecy seem grossly overstated at best.

Further, opponents ignore the provision in A.B. 527 that allows a prosecutor to petition the supervising judge to bypass rights created by section 939.2(b)(1) (presumably including the right to have counsel present, a right provided in section 939.2(b)(1)(B)).\textsuperscript{367} Specifically, a prosecutor may obtain a waiver of rights created in subsection (b)(1) “upon proof that there are reasonable grounds to

\textsuperscript{364} See id. at 28.

\textsuperscript{365} A claim was made during the June 1st Roundtable Discussions at McGeorge that multiple representation of witnesses testifying in the same proceeding will increase such a risk of counsel learning too much about the direction of the grand jury investigation. See id. at 35-38. However, A.B. 527 would not have allowed multiple representation, and given that counsel is required to maintain secrecy, some limitations are posed on counsel’s ability to share information. See A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).

\textsuperscript{366} See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 39.

\textsuperscript{367} A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (proposing to amend \textsc{Cal. Penal Code} § 939.2 by adding subsection (b)(1)).
believe the notice would create an undue risk or danger to other persons or a reasonable possibility of destruction of evidence, or there is a strong suspicion of flight of the witness." Thus, in cases in which counsel’s presence would create a serious risk of harm, A.B. 527 seems to allow the prosecutor to request an order circumventing the right to have counsel present.

**b. viewing the evidence**

During the discussions held at McGeorge, some participants suggested that another way in which grand jury secrecy may be violated is if counsel is allowed in the grand jury room. One prosecutor offered the situation in which the prosecutor uses an exhibit of various gang members’ photographs. According to the prosecutor, a gang member may not be able to understand the legal significance of the various photos whereas counsel may be able to do so.

As in the previous discussion, under current practice, the witness is free to describe to counsel whatever exhibits he or she viewed in the grand jury room. While a lay witness may not understand the legal significance of lines of questioning or perhaps of a photo array, it seems implausible that an attorney would better understand the facts under investigation than would the target, who presumably engaged in the criminal conduct. A target would almost certainly be better able to identify the people depicted than would counsel.

And as discussed above, the situation described seems infrequent at best. Where a real risk exists that counsel’s presence or other rights in section 939.2(b)(1) would create specific harm, a prosecutor may petition the court to waive those rights.

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368. *Id.* (proposing to amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2 by adding subsection (b)(2)(D)).


370. *See id.*


372. Presumably, the photo array may reveal organizational structure within a gang, leading to charges of aiding and abetting, commission of a crime, or conspiracy to commit a crime.
4. Statutory ambiguity: Who is a target?

The Los Angeles District Attorney's Office raised as a concern "the difficulty in some cases of determining who is the target and what would be required to comply with the new target notification requirements."\(^3\)

Section 939.2(b)(2)(C) addressed the concern that a prosecutor may not realize until after a witness has testified that the witness should be indicted. It provided that the rights created in the statute—most importantly, the rights to submit exculpatory evidence in writing and to have counsel present during the target's testimony—"shall not apply if... (C) [t]he prosecutor determines during the grand jury hearing that a previous witness has become the subject of the grand jury investigation."\(^3\)

For example, the grand jury may call a person whom it believes has evidence of a target's criminal activity.\(^3\) After that person has testified, the grand jury will get additional evidence sufficient to indict the witness.\(^3\) The statute creates an exception for the right to counsel.\(^3\)

Perhaps the harder question is what a prosecutor should do when the grand jury or prosecutor realizes, in the midst of that witness's testimony, that the witness may be subject to indictment. If that is the Los Angeles County district attorney's concern, the solution should not be opposition to the bill, but a suggested amendment that would clarify the provision. The legislation could have been amended to clarify either that the prosecutor should stop the inquiry and warn the witness, allowing the witness time to secure counsel, or that the prosecutor did not have to provide warnings and a right to counsel.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Bill Analysis, supra note 231, at 4.
\(^3\) A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (proposing to amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2 by adding subsection (b)(2)(C)).
\(^3\) See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 236, § 8.11(a).
\(^3\) See id. at § 8.10(c).
\(^3\) Arguably, even as written, the bill would have allowed the prosecutor to argue the latter position. That is so because subsection (b)(2)(A) states that the right to counsel (and other rights created in the bill) does not apply if "[t]he prosecutor is not able to notify the witness with reasonable diligence." Id. (proposing to amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2 by adding subsection (b)(2)(A)). One plausible application of that language to the example offered
In addition, as a general matter, the line between a target and a mere witness is not a particularly difficult one to draw. Prosecutors cannot claim that they do not know what they expect to hear from a witness when they call the witness, unless they are engaging in a fishing expedition, which is surely an abuse of prosecutorial power. That is, prosecutors must know whom they are targeting when they bring a case before a grand jury. If they are wrong and stumble on a target, A.B. 527 would have protected the prosecution.\(^\text{379}\) That the line between target and witness is not difficult to draw is supported by the absence of litigation on that issue in other jurisdictions that have drawn that line.\(^\text{380}\)

5. Scheduling delays

During the discussions at McGeorge, some prosecutors raised concerns that allowing counsel to appear in the grand jury room would create unmanageable scheduling delays.\(^\text{381}\) In effect, they contend that the additional burden would make the smooth operation of the grand jury unreasonably difficult.\(^\text{382}\) That would be the case especially in cases involving multiple targets.

Even under current practice, a witness has the right to consult with counsel during that witness’s testimony. As one prosecutor commented, prosecutors already accommodate counsel’s schedules when they call represented witnesses.\(^\text{383}\) According to that prosecutor, current practice does not unduly impair the functioning

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\(^{379}\) See A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (proposing to amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2 by adding subsection (b)(2)(C)).

\(^{380}\) A search of the annotated statutes and case law for every state allowing counsel inside the grand jury room revealed no significant cases on the subject. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 32-33.

\(^{381}\) See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 32-33.

\(^{382}\) See id.

\(^{383}\) See id.
of the grand jury.\textsuperscript{384} In addition, one prosecutor who raised scheduling concerns also acknowledged that he infrequently calls targets before the grand jury.\textsuperscript{385} In light of both of those comments, it is hard to understand why A.B. 527 would create an intolerable scheduling problem.

Further, if A.B. 527 were extended to indigent defendants, as this Report recommends below,\textsuperscript{386} then the Public Defender’s Office would routinely deal with similar problems by assigning an attorney to represent clients at a particular stage of the proceeding.\textsuperscript{387} Thus, a client may have a different attorney at the preliminary hearing, suppression motion hearing stage, and at trial. Such a scheme decreases scheduling difficulties.\textsuperscript{388}

\textbf{G. Recommendations}

As in the first section of this Report, we conclude that grand juries are worth retaining, but that their performance can be

\textsuperscript{384} \textit{See id.}
\textsuperscript{385} \textit{See id. at 40.}
\textsuperscript{386} \textit{See infra Part III.G.}
\textsuperscript{387} \textit{See Staniels Interview, supra note 248.}
\textsuperscript{388} In addition, even when a client has retained counsel, private counsel cannot frustrate the administration of justice by claiming unfounded scheduling conflicts. As the Supreme Court has held, the right to counsel of one’s choice can be circumscribed when justified by sufficiently overriding interests of the judicial system. \textit{See} Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988) (holding that the trial court had discretion to evaluate on a case-by-case basis the interests at stake in granting or denying a defendant’s choice of counsel).

The defendant’s right to counsel of his choosing is not absolute and must be weighed against the interests of justice. \textit{See} LAFAVE ET AL., \textit{supra} note 236, § 11.4(c). The court is only required to accommodate defendant’s choice of counsel when not doing so would result in a constitutional violation. \textit{See id.} The Supreme Court has held that there is no set formula for determining when denying a continuance to substitute defendant’s choice of counsel is unconstitutional. \textit{See} Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 591 (1964). Rather, “[t]he answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” \textit{Id.} at 589.

The Supreme Court held that in some instances the state’s interest in orderly administration of justice may be sufficiently great to deny a defendant the choice of counsel entirely because of scheduling and other difficulties. \textit{See id.} Presumably, a court may order that another member of retained counsel’s firm appear before the grand jury if counsel’s schedule presents too great a difficulty.
improved with minor reforms. A.B. 527 represented such a reform. 389

Despite the claim that A.B. 527 would have amounted to a “fundamental change” 390 in grand jury procedure, that is simply not the case. The bill represented a measured response to a serious problem. A.B. 527 would not have expanded a target’s right to refuse to testify, or to consult with an attorney to assure that the target does not inadvertently waive a right or privilege. 391 It would have made a minor change by allowing counsel’s presence in the grand jury room during the target’s testimony, rather than forcing counsel to wait in the hallway outside. 392 It would have created reasonable exceptions to the target’s right to counsel. 393 It would have prevented counsel’s disruption by carefully circumscribing counsel’s role. 394 Meanwhile, A.B. 527 would have helped a target make important decisions about giving testimony more fully informed than is the case under current practice.

The California Supreme Court has called the grand jury a prosecutor’s “Eden” because it is “the total captive of the prosecutor.” 395 That is consistent with the frequent criticism that grand juries serve as a rubber stamp of the prosecutor who presents evidence to the grand jury. Statistical evidence suggests that grand juries seldom exercise independent judgment. 396

The challenge is how to find a way to maintain grand jury secrecy, and to allow it to conduct its investigations in conjunction with the prosecution while increasing its ability to exercise independent judgment. 397 We gain little by having the grand jury

390. Granberry, supra note 6, at B1.
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. See id.
396. For example, during the fiscal year ending in September of 1984, federal grand juries returned 17,419 indictments and only 68 “no true bills.” See 1984 U.S. ATT’YS OFFICE STATISTICAL REP. 2. This works out to a nonindicting rate of .4%.
397. Elsewhere in this Report, see supra Part II.F.3., the authors recommend
serve merely as a rubber stamp for the prosecutor. In most cases, the prosecutor can begin criminal proceedings by filing an information, avoiding the need to use the grand jury. In those cases, the accused has a right to a preliminary hearing where an independent magistrate must determine that the evidence is sufficient to justify further proceedings. Use of the grand jury allows the prosecutor to avoid a preliminary hearing. Unless the grand jury exercises independent judgment, a person may be held without any neutral fact-finder assessing the strength of the prosecution’s case.

Assuring that the grand jury exercises independent judgment may call for reforms even greater than those proposed in A.B. 527. Major reform would also risk impairing the functioning of the grand jury.

A bill like A.B. 527, especially in conjunction with earlier legislation giving the grand jury the opportunity to hear exculpatory evidence, may improve the grand jury process. We have no way to measure how many targets refuse to testify because they lack the right to have counsel present. At least in those limited number of cases where a target would testify with counsel present, but not otherwise, the grand jury may hear a more complete version of the facts and be willing to reject the prosecutor’s argument that an indictment is proper.

As discussed above, presence of counsel should also limit situations in which a prosecutor may overreach by asking improper questions that may result in the waiver of various privileges that a target might otherwise invoke. Preventing overreaching by the prosecutor is a worthwhile goal.

greater training for grand jurors, and greater outreach, see infra Part IV.D., not only to assure broader representation, but also to involve more competent individuals in the process. Both of those suggestions may increase the independence of the grand jury.

399. See id.
400. See id.
401. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.71 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001), a bill introduced by Assemblyman Scott Baugh, which requires that the prosecutor, when presenting a case before the grand jury, inform the grand jury of the “nature and existence” of any exculpatory evidence of which he or she is “aware.” This change in the law is a positive step in increasing the grand jury’s independence by putting exculpatory evidence before them.
We recommend, therefore, that the legislature adopt A.B. 527. However, we also recommend one significant change to A.B. 527. Subsection 939.22(e) specifically attempted to limit the right of counsel to targets who could afford counsel. We think such a limitation is unwarranted. Instead, we recommend that if the legislature creates a right to counsel in the grand jury room, it should also be extended to indigent targets.

This Report has argued that the Constitution does not compel appointment of counsel. The right to counsel created by A.B. 527 would have been entirely a statutorily created right. This Report has also argued that creation of a right to counsel for those who could afford it would not create an equal protection or due process right to have the state appoint counsel for indigent targets. However, that is not responsive to whether the state should provide the right.

This Report has argued that sound policy justifies the creation of a limited right to counsel before the grand jury. Counsel has a role in assuring that a target is not cajoled, tricked, or coerced into giving up constitutional rights or other privileges. Counsel has a role in assuring that a target makes proper invocation of such rights and privileges. Counsel may also encourage some targets to testify. This offers the grand jury a fuller understanding of the facts than might otherwise have been available. The end result increases the grand jury’s ability to exercise independent judgment on whether to indict. If these benefits justify creation of the right to counsel, it is hard to see how we can deny the right to counsel to indigent targets. That is so because wealth should not determine whether a target receives a fair hearing before the grand jury.

Furthermore, insofar as the creation of the right to counsel furthers independence of the grand jury and serves to assure that only proper objections are raised, the right to counsel serves the public’s interest, and not merely the interest of the target. The public’s interest does not vary depending on whether the target can afford counsel.


403. "In either case the evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent. For there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money he has.’" Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
These two recommendations are reflected in a bill that this Report proposes. The proposed bill incorporates most of the provisions of A.B. 527, except for its attempt to limit the right to counsel to those who can afford it. At the same time, it adds a provision to make clear that the state will provide counsel for indigent targets who want counsel and who choose to testify.

IV. DIVERSITY ON GRAND JURIES

A. Introduction

California grand juries do not reflect the diverse nature of its population. While we could find no definitive study of the composition of California grand juries, significant anecdotal evidence suggests that grand juries lack diversity. In addition, to some degree, the lack of diversity results from demographics and the method for selection of grand jurors.

With or without a legal challenge to the composition of California's grand juries, the legislature should support efforts to increase diversity on our grand juries. Some commentators have urged that given the difficulty that some counties experience in finding competent grand jurors, efforts to assure diversity may detract from efforts to improve the quality of grand juries. As argued below, that position is not sound as a matter of policy or as a matter of constitutional law.

This section discusses the lack of diversity on our grand juries and policies supporting full involvement by minority communities. Next, it considers statutory and constitutional requirements that militate in favor of greater diversity than now exists. It then discusses how the California legislature might assist county efforts to improve diverse membership on grand juries. Finally, it discusses

404. See infra app. B; see also J. Clark Kelso & Michael Vitiello, Tentative Recommendation Reform of California Grand Jury Statutes, at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/government_law_and_policy/publications/ccglp_pubs_grand_jury_tentative_recommendations.pdf (Apr. 18, 2001) [hereinafter Tentative Recommendation]. The Tentative Recommendation contains a draft legislation to recodify California's grand jury statutes in a newly enacted Title 8.5 of the Government Code. In it, the authors have corrected certain errors in the existing statutes, clarified archaic or dated references, and revised the statutes to be gender neutral.
whether outreach programs to increase minority participation on grand juries would violate Proposition 209.

B. The Lack of Diversity

Our research has not located any systematic information concerning composition of grand juries. At times, litigants have produced studies of the composition of grand juries in particular communities.\textsuperscript{405} Elsewhere, news reports chronicle the lack of diversity on grand juries.\textsuperscript{406} Despite the lack of systematic reporting on the ethnic composition of grand juries, the evidence is substantial that California grand juries do not represent its diverse population.

In litigation currently filed in Los Angeles County, a defendant has moved to dismiss the criminal indictment against him on the grounds of discrimination.\textsuperscript{407} Specifically, he has alleged:

[He] has shown a violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by an impartial jury in violation of the defendant’s right to due process of law, due to the absence of a fair cross-section of the community based on the systematic exclusion of a distinctive group in the community.\textsuperscript{408}

In addition, he has alleged that the county has intentionally discriminated “in violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of the law.”\textsuperscript{409}


\textsuperscript{407} See Supplemental Decl. of John R. Weeks, Mares, No. BA-109979, at 2.

\textsuperscript{408} Id. at 3.

\textsuperscript{409} Id.
In support of his motion to dismiss, the defendant has alleged facts supporting his claim:

With respect to the data for 1998, the Hispanic jury-eligible population was 22.67%. The percent of Hispanics in the grand jury pool was only 8.1%, indicating an absolute disparity of 15.2%. With respect to 1997, the Hispanic jury-eligible population was 22.7%, while the percentage of Hispanics on the grand jury was 11.6%, indicating an absolute disparity of 11.1%.410

Those allegations were based on a study performed by Dr. John R. Weeks, a professor of geography and the director of the International Population Center at San Diego State University.411 Apart from whether the study demonstrates grounds for relief in People v. Mares, his study demonstrates underrepresentation of racial minorities on Los Angeles County’s grand jury.412

Press reports suggest a similar lack of diversity in other counties as well. For example, an Orange County superior court judge in charge of that county’s grand jury reportedly found it “unconscionable” that Orange County, with a sizable Hispanic and Asian population, had no minorities on a recently impaneled grand jury.413 As reported in the Los Angeles Times, all nineteen panelists on the 1999-2000 grand jury in Orange County, “as well as the 11 alternates, are white. Three-quarters are older than 60. Compare that with Orange County’s general population, which is 30% Latino, 13.2% Asian and has a median age of 33.”414 Similar reports are common.

Apart from the outcome of the Los Angeles County litigation, lack of minority representation on California’s grand juries is a cause of concern, one worthy of attention by the legislature. That is so even when at least some counties experience difficulty in filling the ranks of grand juries with any citizens.

410. Id. at 2.
411. See id. at 4.
412. Id.
413. See James, supra note 406, at B1.
414. Id. Note that the 2000-2001 Orange County grand jury has made significant improvements. See Richard Marosi, Incoming Grand Jury Meets Diversity Goal, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2000, at B1 (reporting that the incoming grand jury is 40% nonwhite, which reflects Orange County’s 30% Latino and 13% Asian population).
During the discussion conducted by McGeorge's Institute for Legislative Practice, some participants raised concerns about achieving diversity. One participant summed up some of the concerns when she stated, "[w]hat I think is more important [than diversity about] being a grand juror is someone who is very interested, and who is willing to dedicate the time and the effort it takes to do a good job, and that has nothing to do with diversity."\textsuperscript{415} Participants seemed concerned primarily with increasing the pool of competent and willing individuals.\textsuperscript{416}

However, increasing the pool of competent grand jurors is not inconsistent with increasing the available pool of underrepresented groups. As discussed below, increased representation may be constitutionally required and, even if not, it is sound policy.

In the earlier discussion about the watchdog role of the grand jury, this Report emphasized the historical justification for the grand jury. Concerned citizens use common sense to examine local governmental entities to determine whether local government is free from corruption. Despite its inadequacies, the system is worth saving because of its considerable potential for social good.

No group should be excluded from participation in such an institution. The grand jury benefits from full participation of members of the community who may bring different points of view of areas studied by the grand jury.\textsuperscript{417} Members of racial and ethnic communities benefit by sharing a full stake in self-governance.

Boalt Hall Professor Ian F. Haney Lopez reached a similar conclusion in his article published in the Yale Law Journal.\textsuperscript{418} He

\textsuperscript{415} Roundtable, supra note 12, at 47-48.
\textsuperscript{416} See id. at 49-51.
\textsuperscript{417} See The Regional Review, Developments in Orange, Riverside, San Bernadino and Ventura Counties: Grand Jury Criticizes Police Discipline, Training, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2000, at B4. One remedy for the lack of minority members may be the use of county ethnic groups to publicize the need for grand jurors. See Minorities: Grand Jury Needs You, supra note 406, at B26. In some instances, a member of a minority community may bring a perspective quite distinct from members of the majority community. For example, an African-American may be interested in having the grand jury investigate whether local police engage in racial profiling when they make traffic stops, or whether public officials respond similarly to complaints from minority and majority communities.
argued that even if “proportional presence of minorities on California’s grand juries would [not] significantly impact the way they function,” ideological and symbolic reasons support proportional diversity on grand juries. Ideologically, discrimination “undermines” the representative nature of democracy and “popular self-governance.” Symbolically, participation sends an important social message: “[e]xclusion from organs of self-government communicates an inferior social position, while participation bespeaks full civic membership.”

C. Constitutional and Statutory Concerns

Whether any particular county violates the constitution in its selection of grand jury members is beyond the scope of this Report and is a question properly reserved for the courts. However, this section discusses the constitutional and statutory requirements of assuring diversity on our grand juries. Not only is diversity sound policy, it is also legally required.

1. Criminal grand juries

For many years, criminal defendants have made challenges to the grand jury selection process. While some questions await definitive resolution by the United States Supreme Court, both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution apply to the selection of state grand juries.

a. equal protection

The Supreme Court has made it explicit that a state violates a defendant’s right to equal protection when “the procedure employed result[s] in substantial underrepresentation of [defendant’s] race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs.” The Court has long recognized that states may not intentionally discriminate by

419. Id. at 1747.
420. Id. at 1745.
421. Id. at 1747. Professor Lopez provides anecdotal evidence to support this proposition, quoting a Hispanic grand juror, Lydia Lopez: “[S]ince I am on the grand jury the people from my area feel they have a voice, they feel terrific about my position.” Id. (quoting Edward A. Villalobos, Comment, Grand Jury Discrimination and the Mexican American, 5 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 87, 121 n.201 (1972)).
excluding minorities from juries. The Court’s more recent case law has lessened a defendant’s burden, making a showing of discrimination easier than in the past.

Shortly after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that a state violated equal protection by excluding African Americans from service on juries. In 1935, the Court held that a defendant might make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing the existence of a substantial number of African Americans in the relevant community and their virtual exclusion from jury service. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the state to show a lack of discriminatory intent.

Castaneda is representative of the Court’s current approach to equal protection in the selection of grand juries. There, the Court recognized that a defendant establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination when a defendant’s group is a


424. See, e.g., Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494-95 (holding that discriminatory intent may be established by the use of statistics and a showing that the process of juror selection itself is susceptible to abuse or is not racially neutral). For arguments and statistics as to why certain common selection procedures are not racially neutral, see Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 238, 238-39 (1994).

425. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that a black defendant was denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment when he was tried before a jury from which all members of his race were excluded); see also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880) (extending the same principle to what appeared to be fair jury selection systems that resulted in the exclusion of blacks from the jury). Under the Strauder-Neal equal protection approach, only a member of the same class of excluded jurors could make the constitutional challenge. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991), however, the Court held that a defendant in a criminal case has standing to raise equal protection challenges for excluded jurors of another race. See also Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 400 (1998) (extending the standing doctrine to grand juror selection).


“recognizable, distinct class,” when the defendant demonstrates that underrepresentation has existed over a “significant period of time,” and where underrepresentation is substantial, meaning that it is unlikely that the disparity is “due solely to chance or accident.” Further, if the state uses a selection procedure that is “susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral,” that fact “supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing.”

In Castaneda, the Court upheld a lower court’s determination of discrimination based on a showing that during an eleven-year period, only 39% of those serving on the grand jury were Mexican American, despite a general population of 79.1% Mexican Americans. The Court found that Texas’s use of the “key-man” system, while facially constitutional, supported the finding of discrimination because it was “highly subjective.”

A criminal defendant has ample incentive to challenge the composition of the grand jury that indicted him or her because once...

428. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494. An equal protection claim can be brought despite a defendant’s race. See Campbell, 523 U.S. at 400 (holding that a “white defendant, has standing to raise an equal protection challenge to discrimination against black persons in the selection of his grand jury”). Thus, a defendant may bring the equal protection claim of another. While the Supreme Court has not yet determined that a state grand jury is bound by the fair cross-section requirement, scholars predict it will likely be applied. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 236, at 753-55.

430. Id. at 494 n.13.
431. Id. at 494.
432. Id. at 495.

433. The “key-man” system is a statutory scheme for selecting grand jurors. The Texas system of the mid-1970s was under the Court’s scrutiny in Castaneda. This particular “key-man” system had the state district court judge appoint three to five jury commissioners who, in turn, had the responsibility of selecting citizens from counties in order to create a prospective juror pool for the grand jury. The district court judge then interviewed the prospective grand jurors and the court impaneled a grand jury. See id. at 484-85. The “key-man” system, however, may conflict with a constitutional cross-section requirement. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 236, at 753-55.

434. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 497. Where discriminatory intent is shown without an inference from statistics, the percentage of underrepresentation need not be so obvious. For example, the Supreme Court found discriminatory intent and a violation of equal protection despite only a 4.7% underrepresentation. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 268 n.2 (1986).
discrimination is found, reversal is mandatory. In *Vasquez v. Hillery*, the defendant did not allege that he received an unfair trial. Nonetheless, a divided Court held that:

> [E]ven if a grand jury's determination of probable cause is confirmed in hindsight by a conviction on the indicted offense, that confirmation in no way suggests that the discrimination did not impermissibly infect the framing of the indictment and, consequently, the nature or very existence of the proceedings to come.

The early cases all involved a defendant of the same race as the people who were excluded from service as grand or petit jurors. Later cases have made clear that the right is not just the right of the defendant. Instead, a person denied equal protection is a citizen denied participation on the jury. As a result, for example, a white defendant has successfully challenged the exclusion of African Americans from his jury.

### b. fair cross-section

The Supreme Court first discussed the requirement that juries represent a fair cross-section of the community in a case involving a federal petit jury. The application of a cross-section requirement is not surprising because the Sixth Amendment operates as a limit upon petit juries. Whether a similar cross-section requirement applies to grand juries is not entirely clear because the right to a

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435. See, e.g., *Vasquez*, 474 U.S. at 264.
437. See *id.* at 260.
438. *Id.* at 263.
439. See, e.g., *Carter*, 396 U.S. at 329.
440. See *id*.
441. See *Campbell*, 523 U.S. at 400.
443. The U.S. Constitution states:

> In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
grand jury is found in the Fifth Amendment, which does not include the Sixth Amendment language creating a fair cross-section requirement.\textsuperscript{444}

The Supreme Court has left open the issue of whether due process requires that a grand jury represent a fair cross-section of the community. In 1972, a plurality of the Court asserted that such a right existed.\textsuperscript{445} A later opinion suggested that a majority of the Court then agreed that discrimination might violate "representational due process values."\textsuperscript{446} Subsequently, the Court indicated that the precise question is still open leaving lower federal courts divided on whether "representational due process values" are equivalent to the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement.\textsuperscript{447}

In California, the issue is largely moot because of Section 904.6(e) of the Penal Code.\textsuperscript{448} This section requires that, at the least, criminal grand juries be selected from a source or sources that are "reasonably representative of a cross-section of the population . . . [and] eligible for jury service in the county."\textsuperscript{449}

\textsuperscript{444} "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.


\textsuperscript{447} LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 236, at 755 (quoting Hobby, 468 U.S. at 346).

\textsuperscript{448} The California Penal Code provides:

It is the intent of the Legislature that all persons qualified for jury service shall have an equal opportunity to be considered for service as criminal grand jurors in the county in which they reside, and that they have an obligation to serve, when summoned for that purpose. All persons selected for the additional criminal grand jury shall be selected at random from a source or sources reasonably representative of a cross-section of the population which is eligible for jury service in the county.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).


The purpose of this bill is to provide grand juries that are legally competent to return indictments. Because of the method used in selecting grand juries which investigate the operations of county and city governments, criminal indictments issued by them have been successfully challenged by defendants in court. This bill will correct this deficiency by ensuring that grand juries used in criminal cases are
On the assumption that the fair cross-section requirement applies to California grand juries, the Supreme Court's interpretation of that provision becomes relevant. As early as 1942, the Supreme Court held that "the proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the community,' and not the organ of any special group or class." As a result, even the desire for competent jurors does not justify jury officials making selections "which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community." 

Until 1968, when the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applied to the states, the Court did not impose the requirement of a fair cross-section on state juries. More recently, the Court has held that states must meet the fair cross-section requirement.

As summarized in Duren v. Missouri, a defendant makes out a prima facie case for a violation of the fair cross-section requirement if the defendant shows "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process."

impartial and representative of the community.

Id. at 1-2.

[G]rand juries are to be as representative as reasonably possible of the racial, gender and ethnic diversity of the jurisdiction in which they sit. To this end the bill mandates that the 19 member grand jury be selected from 60 to 120 persons drawn at random from the list of those qualified to serve as superior court trial jurors.

Id. at 2.

451. Id.
453. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
455. Id. at 364. There is, however, some ambiguity about what constitutes a "distinctive group." "[S]ome groups may be so small as to not come within Taylor and . . . some groups may be insufficiently 'distinct' to fall within the cross section requirement." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 236, at 1034. Furthermore, the second element of the fair cross-section requirement is shown by use of jury demographics and census statistics. Most courts use the
The primary difference between an equal protection and a fair cross-section challenge is that the litigant who makes a fair cross-section challenge does not have to prove discriminatory intent. Instead, he or she must prove systematic exclusion, which requires more than a showing that on a particular occasion a distinct group was excused. The Duren Court found systematic exclusion satisfied in a case in which women were underrepresented in the weekly venires for almost a year.

**c. assuring fair selection of grand juries**

In 1991, California established statutory requirements on the composition of the criminal grand jury pool in light of the concern about constitutional requirements of equal protection and fair cross-section. Historically, many counties impaneled grand juries by nomination. Superior court judges nominated individuals for service; the nominees were then randomly selected. The process led to grand juries that were dominated by judges' acquaintances and by older professionals.

Under this system, for example, Los Angeles superior court judges nominated 255 potential grand juries between 1959 and 1968; approximately 83% of those were described as social acquaintances of the nominating judge. Given the racial and ethnic composition

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absolute disparity test, which takes the percentage of the group in the total population minus the percentage of that same group on the master jury wheel or venires that appear for jury service. See United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1989). However, some courts employ the "comparative disparity" test, especially where a group's population in the whole community is small. See United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995). The comparative disparity test divides the absolute disparity by the percentage of the group in the community at large. See Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 548.

456. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 (requiring intent to discriminate). Intent can be shown with statistics or a system susceptible to manipulation. See id. at 495-97.
457. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
458. Id. at 366.
460. See Lopez, supra note 418, at 1731-32.
461. See id. at 1731 n.48.
462. See id. at 1732.
463. See id. at 1735-36. For example, one judge who submitted a total of ten nominees named eight of them from his tennis club alone. See id. at 1733.
of the judiciary during that period, no one should be surprised that only 47 out of 1690 grand jurors were Mexican American. At issue in the litigation in *Mares* is whether that kind of gross disparity continues today, despite increased numbers of Latinos and Latinas on the bench.

Since changes in California law allow counties to impanel separate criminal grand juries to indict, many counties have used the same procedures that they use for selection of petit juries. Neutral methods of selection, probably immune from constitutional challenge, include selection of jurors from motor vehicle and voter registration lists. It is unclear whether the change resulted in significantly greater diversity.

Litigation in cases like *Mares* will determine whether California is constitutionally compelled to improve diverse membership on its grand juries. The result will turn on whether sufficient disparity exists between minority populations and representation on the grand jury to create a prima facie case of discrimination and, if so, whether the county has a sufficient explanation for the disparity that rebuts the inference of discrimination. Even if the county prevails, greater effort should be made in those counties where disparity exists. Below, this Report discusses some specific proposals to increase minority representation.

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464. See id. at 1742-43.
468. While there do not appear to be any cases upholding this proposition, the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 encourages the use of voter registration lists. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1989). Some scholars assert, however, that the use of voter registration lists alone will not result in a representative cross-section. Scholars cite differing registration rates by economic and racial groups. See Fukurai & Butler, *supra* note 424, at 244-47.
469. See *infra* Part IV.D. This Report also discusses some legal issues that might arise with greater efforts to increase minority representation. Some jurisdictions have adopted procedures to ensure that the number of minorities in the jury selection pool mirrors the number of minorities in the general population. One scholar has suggested that such procedures may be vulnerable
2. Civil grand jury

Most of the litigation dealing with equal protection involves cases with criminal defendants. This raises the question as to whether a grand jury that serves only the civil watchdog function must meet the same standards as a criminal grand jury. That is, does a significant lack of minority representation on a civil grand jury create a prima facie case for a violation of equal protection?

The answer is almost certainly "yes," that it does create a prima facie case. Litigation developing equal protection has arisen in the criminal context because a criminal defendant has an incentive to litigate the claim. As discussed above, even when a defendant has been convicted, prevailing on a claim that the grand jury selection process violated equal protection voids the conviction without harmless error analysis.

Early case law focused on the race of the defendant. That is, the case law suggested that an African American could challenge only the exclusion of African Americans on the theory that it was the defendant's equal protection right that was being vindicated. Today, that view of case law is simply incorrect.

to equal protection challenges. Race-conscious methods of selection will be subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to a race-conscious method of awarding municipal construction contracts); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 236, at 1032-34. Whether such efforts are unconstitutional is far from clear. Croson held that Richmond's set-aside for minority contractors violated equal protection. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 511. But it did so in a case in which the city council made no finding of past discrimination by the governmental entity that now sought to remedy past discrimination. See id. at 505. If local communities adopt measures to increase diversity on their grand juries, they may avoid the equal protection problem if they adopt the measures to remedy past discrimination in that community. In addition, they may also avoid the equal protection problem if their efforts to increase diversity do not amount to rigid set-aside programs. For example, outreach efforts to underrepresented communities do not pose the same problem as Richmond's set-aside program. Even in Croson, the Court recognized that had the political entity demonstrated systematic exclusion of minorities, it could have taken remedial measures. See id. at 509.

470. The constitutional cases that address the issue of grand jury composition have only dealt with grand juries that return criminal indictments. The unique question for California counties that divide grand jury functions into separate civil and criminal grand juries is whether the same constitutional standards apply to a grand jury that serves only a civil function. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
For example, in *Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County*, the Court made clear that citizens excluded from jury service based on race were denied equal protection. There, the Court stated:

> [P]eople excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion.... Whether jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty, the State may no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to others on racial grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in the offering and withholding of the elective franchise.

In most cases where jurors' equal protection rights have been at stake, litigants have raised those rights. In those cases, the Supreme Court has found that third-party standing—allowing a person whose right has not been violated to raise rights of third parties not before the court—is appropriate. In 1998, the Court made it explicit that third-party standing applies in challenges to the composition of grand juries, as well as to petit juries.

Litigants have an obvious incentive to raise the equal protection rights of excluded prospective jurors. It is less clear who may have an incentive to challenge the composition of the civil grand jury. A member of the minority community may merely put his or her own name forward and ask to participate. If he or she is selected, his or her selection reduces the chances that a plaintiff would emerge to challenge the lack of diversity on a civil grand jury. However, the lack of obvious plaintiffs to challenge the system does not negate the reality that the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis applies with equal force to the civil grand jury system as it does to the

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472. See id. at 329.
473. Id. at 329-30.
474. See *Powers*, 499 U.S. at 415 (holding that a criminal defendant has standing to raise equal protection rights of jurors); see also *Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.*, 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that a civil litigant may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race, as race-based exclusion violates equal protection of the challenged jurors); *Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that prosecutors in a criminal case may not challenge potential jurors based solely on their race, as to do so is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
475. See *Powers*, 499 U.S. at 410-11.
476. See *Campbell*, 523 U.S. at 400.
criminal grand jury. As indicated above, discrimination is not proven simply by the absence of members of a racial or ethnic minority from a particular grand jury or even the venire from which the panel is selected. In addition, the party who raises the equal protection claim must demonstrate more than historic underrepresentation; the party must prove intentional discrimination.

Apart from whether a party can successfully demonstrate a denial of equal protection, as indicated above, participation by significant numbers of minorities is a desirable goal that should be supported. The next section discusses some ideas on how greater representation may be achieved.

D. Increasing Diversity

Many counties suffer not only from the underrepresentation of minorities on their grand juries, but also from the lack of interest among members of the community at large. Counties can increase the competence of their grand juries generally if they have a larger pool from which to choose their grand jurors. Counties should engage in strategies that will increase the size of the pool of potential grand juries to satisfy both the goal of increasing diversity and that of increasing the quality of the work done by the grand jury. What follows is a summary of various suggestions that have been made by grand juries themselves and others close to the grand jury process.

In its 1998-99 Final Report, the San Diego County grand jury recommended increasing the “public interest in and awareness of the county grand jury, its history, sphere of authority, composition, general activity, and how it benefits county taxpayers.” It suggested that grand jury members “speak to service clubs, community area councils, special interest groups, religious groups, high school civics classes, [and] college courses on local government” about the activities of the grand jury and outline how one becomes a grand juror. The Final Report also suggested that a

477. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 492.
478. See id. at 494.
480. Id.
new "brochure" be produced each year, with a summary of the grand jury report along with an overview of the grand jury itself. 481

The Humboldt County grand jury also implemented a similar program. It distributed 30,000 copies of its report, which allowed the report to go countywide. 482 Previously, the grand jury gave copies of the final report to the media, which would then pick and choose which stories to publish. 483 Wide distribution of the reports makes the community "more enlightened" and creates a larger pool of "people that would like to serve on the Grand Jury now that they are aware of something that they can do as a part of their civic contribution to the community." 484 Thus, greater awareness of the functions of the grand jury leads to a greater number and variety of people who want to participate by serving on the grand jury.

The presiding judge in charge of the grand jury for Orange County recognized that the ethnic make-up of the grand jury in his county was a problem. 485 In an effort to increase minority representation on the grand jury, "the judge sent letters and fliers to dozens of minority leaders, asking for assistance in recruiting minorities to serve on the grand jury." 486 In addition, the court plans to "place ads in Spanish and Vietnamese language newspapers, and judges will speak at city council meetings, business group functions and other community forums." 487

A number of suggestions were proposed at the meeting held at McGeorge. 488 Members of the Marin County grand jury spoke about their activities to various civic groups and schools. 489 One participant observed that most people have no knowledge about the civil functions of the grand jury and proposed that high schools be required to educate students about the grand jury. 490

481. See id.
482. See Roundtable, supra note 12, at 46.
483. See id.
484. Id.
485. See James, supra note 406, at B1.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. See generally Roundtable, supra note 12, at 44-52 (discussing methods for increasing diversity among grand juries).
489. See id. at 45.
490. See id. at 48. For example, California might include education about the grand jury as part of its civics requirement. See id.
We are unaware whether subsequent grand juries have followed the advice of San Diego County’s 1998-99 report and put in place greater outreach programs. Common sense suggests that outreach efforts like those suggested in the San Diego County report and broad distribution of a final report, as done in Humboldt County, will produce greater interest among members of the community in serving on the grand jury. Those involved in the grand jury, including superior court judges who supervise grand juries and those involved in the California Grand Jurors Association, should encourage sitting and former grand jurors to spread the word about grand jury service. While such efforts may produce significant results, they are dependent on the energy of grand jurors who often feel overwhelmed by their current duties. Additional efforts need to supplement efforts of individual grand jurors.

Orange County’s outreach program has been successful in increasing minority representation on its grand juries. It provides a model for other counties to follow. Mailing fliers and placing ads do not require the same amount of individual effort by already overworked grand juries. The problem is that not all counties have sufficient resources for meaningful outreach, which is an area where the state has a role in improving the grand jury process. Counties should have the option to apply to the state for funds necessary to solicit public participation in the grand jury. Those funds should be allocated to target not only minority communities to increase diversity—an important goal if the grand jury is to fulfill its promise—but also to the community at large to increase the pool of available grand jurors.

E. Outreach and Proposition 209

This Report has urged that counties engage in aggressive outreach programs, in part, to increase minority representation on their grand juries. This section addresses whether an outreach program targeted towards a minority community may violate Proposition 209.

Adopted in 1996, Proposition 209 or the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI) added section 31 to Article I of the California

491. See Marosi, supra note 414, at B1.
Constitution. It provides that: "[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting."

Initially, the CCRI limits governmental action, which obviously includes operation of the state's court system. While it reaffirms existing prohibitions on certain types of discrimination, it prohibits preferences in three specific areas. Grand juries are arguably an adjunct of the state court system or are themselves a public agency. Thus, for purposes of this discussion, the first serious question is whether service on a grand jury amounts to "public employment," bringing the selection of its members within the CCRI. There is a strong argument that grand jurors, who receive fees but no compensation, are not public employees, and that targeted outreach programs to increase diversity on grand juries would therefore not be prohibited by the CCRI.

However, if service on a grand jury constitutes public employment, then a second question arises: whether outreach efforts targeted to minority communities are a form of "preferential treatment" within the meaning of the CCRI. Proponents of the CCRI agree that CCRI probably makes recruitment efforts targeted at minorities unconstitutional. Ward Connerly, one author of the CCRI, has advocated broad outreach efforts that reach all ethnicities in the community's population, thereby presumably avoiding preferential treatment. Eugene Volokh, another author of the CCRI, has stated that "[l]earning about the existence of an opening is an important

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493. Id.
494. See id. This is not spelled out within the language of the CCRI, but presumably "state" includes state agencies and instrumentalities.
495. One scholar has pointed out that it is "important to remember that this ban is limited to a particular area—government action in public employment, education, and contracting." Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1997).
496. See Telephone Interview by Amelia Burroughs with Royce Van Tassell, director of research, American Civil Rights Institute (Oct. 9, 2000); see also John Welsh, UCBoosts Minority Admissions, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Apr. 4, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers (discussing aggressive recruiting for UC schools by guaranteeing admission to the top four percent of graduates in each high school regardless of race).
part of applying for that opening; if a person is discriminatorily
denied this information, his chances of getting the spot are
discriminatorily diminished."\footnote{497} Volokh concluded by stating,
"recruitment campaigns intentionally targeted at a particular group
are probably prohibited."\footnote{498}

Recently, the California Supreme Court agreed. In \textit{Hi-Voltage
Wire Works, Inc. v. San Jose},\footnote{499} the City of San Jose argued
"Proposition 209... would permit targeted efforts to draw
underrepresented groups into the applicant pool for public jobs,
contracts and education."\footnote{500} San Jose's outreach efforts were
focused on women and minority contractors.\footnote{501} The City argued that
targeted outreach programs are not prohibited by Article I, Section
31 of California's Constitution.\footnote{502} California Attorney General Bill
Lockyer argued in favor of San Jose's outreach efforts, and argued
that, "'inclusive' outreach should be distinguished from 'exclusive'
programs that harm the majority."\footnote{503} The Pacific Legal Foundation
argued that focused outreach to minorities and women "give[]
women and minorities 'a competitive advantage' by narrowing the
field of eligible white male bidders, and it coerces contractors to hire with an eye toward meeting quotas."\(^{504}\)

The California Supreme Court agreed with the Pacific Legal Foundation, holding that San Jose's outreach program violates the CCRI.\(^{505}\) In striking down San Jose's program, the court noted that "outreach may assume many forms, not all of which would be unlawful."\(^{506}\) In particular, the court continued, "[p]lainly, the voters intended to preserve outreach efforts to disseminate information about public employment, education, and contracting not predicated on an impermissible classification."\(^ {507}\)

On the assumption that the CCRI applies to court attempts to recruit grand jurors—an assumption that has not been tested—the holding in *Hi-Voltage Wire Works* creates a challenge for courts and jury commissioners who may need to increase minority representation on juries. This is so because the United States Constitution prohibits discrimination in the jury selection process and the Supreme Court has held that underrepresentation is relevant to whether discrimination has taken place. For example, in *Castaneda*, the Supreme Court held that discriminatory intent may be established by the use of statistics along with other evidence.\(^ {508}\)

Faced with statistical underrepresentation, a jury commissioner may feel compelled to increase minority participation through outreach programs. A reading of the CCRI, which prohibits such programs, places the local official in a difficult position.

At a minimum, even if the CCRI applies, counties would be advised to engage in "neutral" outreach programs.\(^ {509}\) As discussed above, such programs have a benefit in addition to increasing minority participation in the grand jury system. Community-wide outreach programs should increase the size and quality of the pool, allowing greater diversity and competence. Under the court's interpretation in *Hi-Voltage Wire Works*, outreach clearly can include media advertisements serving distinct ethnic and racial

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504. Id.
505. See *Hi-Voltage Wire Works*, 24 Cal. 4th at 565, 12 P.3d at 1085, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. See *Castaneda*, 430 U.S. at 502.
communities, as long as such ads are part of a community-wide advertising program.

V. CONCLUSION

This study was motivated by Governor Davis's veto message of A.B. 527. At the time, he asserted that "the grand jury . . . has served us well for 150 years." As a result, he was unwilling to endorse legislative reform without further study.

The authors' study supports Governor Davis's view that the grand jury has served California well. By serving on grand juries, ordinary citizens may study local governmental entities and recommend reform to root out corruption or inefficiency. While the less affluent communities may not provide grand juries with adequate resources, the cost to the public is minimal, especially when compared to the potential social benefits derived from a well-informed, energetic grand jury. Not surprisingly, no one who participated in our study recommended abandoning the civil oversight function.

While the authors agree that the grand jury is a worthwhile entity, they do believe that the grand jury can be improved. Time constraints and the lack of adequate training detract from grand jurors' ability to achieve their full potential. Even grand jurors agree with their critics that their reports could be better. Grand jurors admit that they often do not fully understand how to do their job until well into their term of service. Current training programs are not sufficient to address those concerns. Given the benefits provided by effective grand juries, this study recommends that the state support a pilot program designed to give grand jurors the skills necessary to interview witnesses and write effective final reports.

Likely to be more controversial is the authors' recommendation that the California legislature pass legislation that would give the target of a grand jury's criminal investigation the limited right to have counsel present when the target testifies before the grand jury. Objections posed by various individuals and organizations were unconvincing. The authors recommend passage of a bill similar to A.B. 527, but extending the right of counsel to indigents as well. While no constitutional right compels the allowance of counsel in the

grand jury room, counsel’s presence is helpful by ensuring that a
target answers questions without risking the waiver of important
testimonial privileges. The state cannot claim a need to a target’s
evidence that results from the witness’s confusion about availability
of a privilege. As developed above, the right created is a narrowly
circumscribed right to have counsel present in the grand jury room
for the limited purpose of advising the target whether to invoke a
privilege to refuse to testify. The bill would not create any new right
to refuse to testify. Given current practice whereby a target may
leave the grand jury room to consult with counsel, the proposed
change would not create the disruption claimed by opponents of the
proposed legislation. In addition, numerous other states have already
reformed grand jury practice consistent with the ABA proposal. The
authors found no evidence that those states that have reformed these
grand jury practices face administrative or other problems
implementing reform.

Finally, ample anecdotal evidence suggests that grand juries do
not reflect California’s diverse population. This study did not
examine whether underrepresentation results from intentional
discrimination, or whether any particular litigant would be able to
claim a violation of a right to equal protection or to a fair cross-
section. However, underrepresentation certainly raises those
concerns. Apart from possible constitutional violations, sound policy
supports inclusion of all ethnic and racial groups in the grand jury
process. As a result, this Report supports outreach efforts to
encourage greater participation by underrepresented groups. The
authors raise the issue of whether outreach aimed at particular groups
may violate the California Civil Rights Initiative. However, they
express doubts that would apply to service on the grand jury. While
they explore possible arguments that it would apply, the authors
further express concern that local officials attempting to meet federal
constitutional obligations of equal protection, and possibly, the right
to a fair cross-section, are placed in an untenable position if the
CCRI would make those efforts unlawful.

In the end, the authors believe that California will be best served
by well-trained grand juries that reflect our diverse population.
## APPENDIX A

### CRIMINAL GRAND JURIES

**States That Allow Counsel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Target Witness Only</th>
<th>Counsel's Role Limited to Advising the Witness</th>
<th>Counsel May Be Removed</th>
<th>Counsel Appointed for Indigent Witnesses</th>
<th>Counsel Must Take Oath of Secrecy</th>
<th>No Multiple Representation in Same Investigation</th>
<th>Other Provisions</th>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Counsel may object, but may not ask questions</td>
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<td>State</td>
<td>Target Witness Only</td>
<td>Counsel's Role Limited to Advising the Witness</td>
<td>Counsel May Be Removed</td>
<td>Counsel Appointed for Indigent Witnesses</td>
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<td>Other Provisions</td>
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<td>If witness becomes target, record not usable</td>
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### CALIFORNIA GRAND JURY REFORM

#### Table: Target Witness Only

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<th>State</th>
<th>Target Witness Only</th>
<th>Counsel's Role Limited to Advising the Witness</th>
<th>Counsel May Be Removed</th>
<th>Counsel Appointed for Indigent Witnesses</th>
<th>Counsel Must Take Oath of Secrecy</th>
<th>No Multiple Representation in Same Investigation</th>
<th>Other Provisions</th>
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APPENDIX B

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CALIFORNIA'S GRAND JURY STATUTES

TITLE 8.5. GRAND JURY
CHAPTER 5. ADDITIONAL POWERS AND DUTIES
OF CRIMINAL GRAND JURY
ARTICLE 3. CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

§ 77953. RIGHT TO COUNSEL

(a) Any witness before a grand jury who is or becomes the subject of a grand jury investigation that may result in an indictment, or in an accusation pursuant to Section 3060 of the Government Code, may have counsel present on his or her behalf while he or she is testifying. Counsel present before the grand jury pursuant to this subdivision shall comply with all of the following:

(1) Counsel shall not object to any questions asked of the witness or otherwise speak to the grand jury, but may advise the witness during the course of the examination.

(2) Counsel shall not disclose anything heard in the grand jury room.

(3) Counsel, or any law firm representing a witness pursuant to this subdivision, shall not represent more than one witness in the same proceeding.

(b) Subdivision (a) shall not apply if a corporation is the subject of the investigation, the witness is an employee or officer of the corporation, and the witness is not the subject of the grand jury investigation.

(c) Any witness who is the subject of a grand jury investigation has the right to disclose, in writing, exculpatory evidence, including the names and addresses of other witnesses who possess exculpatory information, to the prosecutor.

(d) The prosecuting attorney may make a motion to the presiding judge for sanctions against counsel who is representing a witness pursuant to subdivision (a) for
any violation of this section and refer the violation to the State Bar of California.

(e) A witness who is entitled to have counsel present pursuant to subdivision (a), and who appears without counsel, shall be informed by the prosecutor that it is his or her right to have counsel present and asked if he or she desires the assistance of counsel. If he or she does so desire, but is unable to employ counsel, the court shall assign counsel in the same manner as trial counsel is assigned pursuant to Sections 987 through 987.9 of the Penal Code.

(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to grant a witness a constitutional right to counsel under the United States or California Constitutions, or grant any right to discovery for the subpoenaed witness.

Comment: Derivation: A.B. 527, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). Section 77953 guarantees certain rights, including the right to have counsel present in the grand jury room to a witness who is also a target of a grand jury investigation. Counsel is limited by subdivision (a) to advising his or her client, and may not speak to the grand jury or make objections.

Subdivision (e) requires the prosecutor to notify an unrepresented witness of his or her right to have the assistance of counsel and that, if the witness is unable to afford counsel, counsel will be appointed by the court.