Article - post-print
Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis, indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters. We also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election. In accordance with these electoral incentives, governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years. These results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes.
This is an author-manuscript of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Development Economics following peer review. The version of record: “Do Voters Demand Responsive Governments? Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief” is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.05.005.
Cole, Shawn, Andrew Healy, and Eric Werker. 2012. “Do Voters Demand Responsive Governments? Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief,” Journal of Development Economics 97(2): 167-181.