A dubious defense of ‘after‐birth abortion’: A reply to Räsänen
Scholars have offered various critiques of Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article, ‘After‐birth abortion: Why should the baby live?’ My book The Ethics of Abortion: Women's Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice presents four such critiques. First, Giubilini and Minerva argue from the deeply controversial to the even more controversial. Second, they presuppose a false view of personal identity called body‐self dualism. Third, their view cannot secure human equality. And fourth, their account of harm cannot account for harm found in some cases of murder. In the article, ‘Pro‐life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’, J. Räsänen examines and finds wanting these four critiques. This essay responds to Räsänen's defense of infanticide and argues that his responses to the four objections fail.
Kaczor, Christopher. “A Dubious Defense of ‘after-Birth Abortion’: A Reply to Räsänen.” Bioethics 32, no. 2 (2018): 132–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12413.