Document Type


Publication Date

Summer 2011


The article discusses the conditions to which an action with two effects or double-effect, one good and the other evil, can be considered ethically permissible. It cites hypothetical cases describing the conditions which include that the action itself, its object is not intrinsically evil; the evil effect is not a means to the good effect; the evil effect is not intended as an end and there is a morally serious reason justifying allowing the evil effect.

Publisher Statement

Permission has been granted by The National Catholic Bioethics Center to supply this article for educational and research purposes. More information can be found about The National Catholic Bioethics Center at

Recommended Citation

Christopher Kaczor, “Philosophy and Theology” Notes on Double Effect Reasoning, National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.2 (Summer 2011): 381-386.

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Philosophy Commons