Date of Completion

12-13-2024

Degree Type

Honors Thesis

Discipline

Philosophy (PHIL)

First Advisor

Dr. Catherine Peters

Abstract

Rapid progress in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), in which AI technologies can now perform human tasks, e.g. hold advanced conversations, cook, clean, and navigate harsh terrain, blurs the line between humans and robots. The emergence of advanced AI technologies suggests that AI programs may develop consciousness in the near future, prompting important questions: if AIs attain abilities to perform the same tasks and exercise capacities traditionally limited to humans, do they deserve similar moral status? If so, what treatment would we owe to them? Through examination of competing accounts of personhood and moral status, this paper seeks to address changing conceptions of personhood and to consider possible implications for future AI technologies. By utilizing an Aristotelian and Thomistic framework, referred to as a “Substance View” of moral status, this paper will evaluate key differences between human beings and intelligent, robotic artifacts, and demonstrate how AI is essentially precluded from achieving personhood and moral status. Additionally, this paper will illuminate how discussions regarding the future moral status of AI may contribute to a fuller understanding of current, complex marginal cases (such as human embryos, humans with severe cognitive disabilities, or those in persistent vegetative states).

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