Date of Completion
4-29-2026
Degree Type
Honors Thesis
Discipline
Political Science (POLS)
First Advisor
Chris Jackson
Abstract
This project examines how enforcement irregularities in Mexican food safety regulation affect small exporters’ ability to access U.S. markets. On paper, agricultural trade is regulated by laws on food quality, certification, and logistics. In practice, it is how those rules are enforced. In Mexico, big firms and producer associations tend to gain steady support and easier certification, while smaller producers face delays, rejections, or inconsistent oversight that make it much harder to compete. This study uses a comparative case study approach to analyze how similar industries produce different outcomes in market access. By tracing key events such as disease outbreaks, border rejections, or changes in certification, and combining this with trade data and interviews, this paper shows how unequal enforcement keeps smaller exporters at a disadvantage. My contribution to the international relations debate is showing how informal enforcement practices in Mexico’s meat industry, beyond formal law, directly shape who gains access to U.S. markets. The findings contribute to a bigger debate: are food safety rules really about protecting consumers, or are they sometimes used as a tool of protectionism that worsens global inequalities? This study advances theoretical debates on whether trade rules promote fairness or worsen inequality, while also offering policy insight into how enforcement reforms in Mexico could expand U.S. market access for small exporters.
Recommended Citation
Prieto, Sabina and Jackson, Chris, "Hidden Barriers: Enforcement Asymmetry and the Political Economy of U.S.–Mexico Food Trade and the Cattle Industry" (2026). Honors Thesis. 628.
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/honors-thesis/628
Included in
Business and Corporate Communications Commons, Economic Policy Commons, International Business Commons, International Relations Commons

