Pluralism, Antirealism, and the Units of Selection
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-1997
Abstract
In an important article, Kim Sterelny and Philip Kitcher (1988) challenge the common assumption that for any biological phenomenon requiring a selectionist explanation, it is possible to identify a uniquely correct account of the relevant selection process. They argue that selection events can be modeled in any of a number of different, equally correct ways. They call their view 'Pluralism,' and explicitly connect it with various antirealist positions in the philosophy of science. I critically evaluate Sterelny and Kitcher's Pluralism along with its attendant antirealist theses. In particular, I argue that there are serious problems with their pluralistic antirealism regarding units of selection. By correctly diagnosing these problems a more adequate position can be constructed. I defend such a position, which I designate Inclusive Hierarchical Monism, and show how it captures the important virtues of Sterelny and Kitcher's approach while avoiding its problems.
Digital Commons @ LMU & LLS Citation
Shanahan, Timothy. "Pluralism, Antirealism, and the Units of Selection," Acta Biotheoretica, Volume 45, Number 2, June 1997, pp. 117-126. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1000377821347
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