Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2009

Abstract

Recent continental philosophy often seeks to retrieve Neoplatonic transcendence, or the Good, while ignoring the place of intellect in classical and medieval Neoplatonism. Instead, it attempts to articulate an encounter with radical transcendence in the immediacy of temporality, individuality, and affectivity. On the assumption that there is no intellectual intuition (Kant), intellectual consciousness is reduced to ratiocination and is taken to be “poor in intuition” (Marion). In this context, the present paper expounds Plotinus’ phenomenology of intellectual experience to show how intellect, for Plotinus, is rather the richest mode of intuition, coinciding with the intelligible content of reality. This content, however, cannot be ultimate, but is the manifestation and apprehension of the transcendent Good as the condition of intelligibility. The Good, therefore, can be encountered only through the ascent to intellectual apprehension, and the vision of the Good is a transcendent moment within the intellectual apprehension of being, not a repudiation of or alternative to it.

Original Publication Citation

Perl, E. D. (2009). The Good of the Intellect. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 83, 25–39. https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc2009834