The Togetherness of Thought and Being: A Phenomenological Reading of Plotinus’ Doctrine ‘That the Intelligibles Are Not outside the Intellect
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2006
Abstract
Plotinus’ doctrine that intelligible reality is in and thus one with intellect bears close affinities to certain features of Husserlian phenomenology. For Husserl, consciousness is the immediate apprehension of being, and being is immediately given to consciousness. Within this unity, we find a “seeing” and a “seen,” an intentional grasp and that which is grasped. Thus there is neither mere identity nor extrinsic duality, but an irreducible polarity or to- getherness of consciousness and being. For Plotinus, intellect, as the thinking of being, possesses being, and being is in intellect, as that of which it is the thinking. Therefore, intellect and being are one. Otherwise, what intellect
Digital Commons @ LMU & LLS Citation
Perl, Eric, "The Togetherness of Thought and Being: A Phenomenological Reading of Plotinus’ Doctrine ‘That the Intelligibles Are Not outside the Intellect" (2006). Philosophy Faculty Works. 257.
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac/257
