What Am I to You? The Deck-a-Rep Debate and the Nature of Fictional Truth
Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2019
Abstract
This chapter examines claims asserted or implied in Ridley Scott’s declaration to assess the extent to which they are credible. It uses Scott’s provocative comment about Blade Runner 2049 as the point of departure for deepening the often-superficial Deck-a-Rep debate, for thinking more broadly about the nature of truth within works of fiction, and for assessing our ability to know whatever fictional truths there may be. Scott appears to be relying upon what we might dub the principle of Trans-Fictional Identity—namely, the claim that the identity of any fictional character is necessarily transitive across works of fiction in which “they” are named. The truth of this principle is not self-evident. At the end of Blade Runner 2049, when Deckard asks K, “Who am I to you?” he might be asking “What am I to you?”—to us. In Dick’s novel, Deckard is presented as human. Blade Runner provides clues that he might be a replicant, but never makes that explicit.
Original Publication Citation
Shanahan, T. (2019). What Am I to You? The Deck-a-Rep Debate and the Nature of Fictional Truth. In T. Shanahan & P. Smart (Eds.), Blade Runner 2049 (pp. 228-247). Routledge.
Digital Commons @ LMU & LLS Citation
Shanahan, Timothy, "What Am I to You? The Deck-a-Rep Debate and the Nature of Fictional Truth" (2019). Philosophy Faculty Works. 288.
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac/288
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