Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2018
Abstract
This chapter addresses the proper end or aim of intellectual virtues. After distinguishing between two fundamentally different conceptions of intellectual virtue, the author considers the plausibility, with respect to each conception, of the “binary thesis,” according to which the proper aim of intellectual virtues is true belief and the avoidance of cognitive error. The author goes on to argue that if one understands intellectual virtues (as many virtue epistemologists do) as admirable traits of personal character—for example, as traits like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual humility—then sophia or theoretical wisdom presents itself as a plausible way of understanding their aim.
Recommended Citation
Baehr, J. (2018). Intellectual Virtues and Truth, Understanding, and Wisdom. In N. E. Snow (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtue (pp. 800–819). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199385195.013.3
Comments
This is an author manuscript. Please cite final version in the Oxford Handbook of Virtue, ed. Nancy Snow (2018).
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