Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2019
Abstract
Contemporary virtue epistemology examines the cognitive life with an eye to the epistemic excellences or "intellectual virtues" of knowing subjects (Battaly 2008). It was inspired by virtue ethics, which emphasizes moral virtues and their centrality to acting and living well. This chapter begins with an observation about an apparent structural asymmetry between virtue epistemology and virtue ethics. It considers whether, initial appearances notwithstanding, there is in fact a virtue ethical counterpart of reliabilist virtue epistemology. This leads to a somewhat narrower consideration, namely whether there is a counterpart of reliable cognitive faculties within our moral psychology. The chapter clarifies and motivates further reflection on the relationship between virtue epistemology, virtue ethics, and the virtues proper to each approach; and, underscores the centrality of intellectual virtue to a certain dimension of moral excellence.
Recommended Citation
Baehr, J. (2019). Virtue Epistemology, Virtue Ethics, and the Structure of Virtue. In H. Battaly (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology (1st ed., pp. 95–104). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315712550-9
Comments
This is an author manuscript of a chapter featured in Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, ed. Heather Battaly.
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