Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2017
Abstract
Intellectual virtues are character traits that facilitate the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and related epistemic goods. This chapter takes up the question of which traits are intellectual virtues in relation to a particular variety of knowledge; namely, knowledge of God. It is argued that moral humility (as distinct from intellectual humility) is an intellectual virtue in this context. This account of moral humility and its epistemically salutary effects is sketched against the backdrop of an account of human pride and the obstacles such pride poses to the acquisition of theistic knowledge. Finally, an objection is considered according to which, owing to other features of human psychology, moral humility may in fact be an intellectual vice in this context.
Original Publication Citation
Baehr, J. (2017). Virtue. In W. J. Abraham & F. D. Aquino (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology (pp. 221–235). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662241.013.32
Digital Commons @ LMU & LLS Citation
Baehr, Jason, "Virtue" (2017). Philosophy Faculty Works. 307.
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac/307
Comments
This is an author manuscript of an entry published inThe Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology, edited by William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino, Oxford University Press (2017).
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