Document Type
Article - pre-print
Publication Date
2010
Abstract
Against the background of a great deal of structural symmetry between intellectual and moral virtue and vice, it is a surprising fact that what is arguably the central or paradigm moral vice—that is, moral malevolence or malevolence proper—has no obvious or well-known counterpart among the intellectual vices. The notion of “epistemic malevolence” makes no appearance on any standard list of intellectual vices; nor is it central to our ordinary ways of thinking about intellectual vice. In this essay, I argue that there is such a thing as epistemic malevolence and offer an account of its basic character and structure. Doing so requires a good deal of attention to malevolence simpliciter. In the final section of the essay, I offer an explanation of our relative unfamiliarity with this trait.
Original Publication Citation
Baehr, Jason. “Epistemic Malevolence.” Metaphilosophy 41 (2010): 189-213. Print.
Digital Commons @ LMU & LLS Citation
Baehr, Jason, "Epistemic Malevolence" (2010). Philosophy Faculty Works. 37.
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac/37
Comments
The final version is located here.