Abstract
Presidential regime changes often lead to notable shifts in federal policy and raise important questions about how the executive branch manages high-volume adjudication systems within the broader administrative state. While managing an enormous caseload, federal mass-adjudication systems make determinations concerning individuals’ disputes with the government across various subject areas that disproportionately affect disadvantaged populations. The outcomes of these adjudication systems have profound impacts on the lives of vulnerable individuals compelled to appear before these administrative tribunals. The scale and life-altering consequences of these adjudications highlight the need for a deeper examination of the procedural protections afforded by agencies to some of society’s most vulnerable members. The current operation of the administrative state enables presidents to quickly and easily direct agency action to align with political agendas. Where the subject matter is often highly politicized, such as immigration enforcement, presidential regime changes tend to particularly impact mass-adjudication systems. While changes to procedural protections in agency adjudication rarely capture national headlines, they are deeply consequential—shaping the outcomes of millions of cases and profoundly affecting the lives of those navigating these systems. The significant impact of shifting political winds across presidential administrations on these protections deserves closer scrutiny.
This Article fills an important gap in the literature by excavating distinct characteristics and challenges of presidential regime change on procedural safeguards provided in mass-adjudication systems. By situating the immigration court system within the wider context of agency adjudications, particularly other agency mass adjudication systems, this Article provides a more nuanced understanding of the impact of presidential regime change on agency choices concerning procedural protections for those who must appear before agency adjudicators. It uses the evolution of the right to representation in the immigration court system as a vehicle to examine the distinct challenges and dynamics of presidential administration on protections afforded regulated individuals that differentiate these high-volume administrative courts from other agency adjudication models. This Article argues that presidential administration of agency mass-adjudication systems that are particularly susceptible to politicization raises significant concerns that political prerogatives may conflict with administrative agencies’ abilities to administer their charges in a fair, efficient, and accurate manner.
Recommended Citation
Beth K. Zilberman,
Presidential Power and Administrating Injustice in Removal Proceedings,
58 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 659
().
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol58/iss3/2
